From: "Günther Noack" <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
To: Alejandro Colomar <alx+linux-man@kernel.org>
Cc: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>,
linux-man@vger.kernel.org,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>,
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 4/8] man/man7/unix.7: SCM_SECURITY: Generalize to other LSMs, not just SELinux
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 15:17:46 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261120.790f70cab7b5@gnoack.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <avz6f7OyIVCKusQ3@devuan>
On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 02:13:40AM +0100, Alejandro Colomar wrote:
> Hi Günther,
>
> > Date: 2026-11-03 21:22:06+0100
> > From: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
> >
> > Reword the description of SCM_SECURITY to not be specific to SELinux.
> >
> > The security context is populated in scm_passec() in linux.git
> > net/core/scm.c, through the security_secid_to_secctx() LSM hook, which
> > is currently implemented by SELinux, Smack and AppArmor.
> >
> > As clarified in [1], the returned security context is in the general
> > case a byte buffer, not a null-terminated string. The only LSM that
> > returns a buffer with trailing null byte is SELinux, but even that is
> > not guaranteed in case that the message is truncated.
> >
> > Link: [1] <https://lore.kernel.org/all/auZcwYWv0NeiIR8d@google.com/>
> > Fixes: ffad6a017f91 (2018-07-28; "unix.7: Document SCM_SECURITY ancillary data")
> > Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
> > Cc: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
> > Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>
> > Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
> > Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
> > Assisted-by: LLM
> > Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
> > ---
> >
> > Notes:
> > This feature is also available in other LSMs. Unfortunately, they
> > implemented it inconsistently and that complicates the description of
> > how string boundaries are handled. Linux does indeed neither
> > guarantee that this terminates with a NUL byte, nor that NAME_MAX is
> > large enough to hold it.
> >
> > After confirmation from Kuniyuki Iwashima, this documents it as
> > returning a byte buffer.
> >
> > I prefer this variant over the previous longer one, also because it
> > refers to the individual LSMs for the exact format. A reader of the
> > security context will require LSM-specific documentation anyway to
> > interpret the security context.
> >
> > This patch is still LLM-assisted, but at this point, since everything
> > is rewritten now, the only LLM-assisted part is the discovery that
> > this part of the documentation could be improved.
>
> You may use 'Reported-by: LLM' for distinguishing such cases.
Thanks, done.
(Minor remark, btw; I have carried the Assisted-by: LLM convention
over from the Linux kernel, but they have phased that practice out now
and removed that convention from the guidelines.)
> > man/man7/unix.7 | 19 +++++++++++--------
> > 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/man/man7/unix.7 b/man/man7/unix.7
> > index 61f06a74359b..c0e2bdbacdd8 100644
> > --- a/man/man7/unix.7
> > +++ b/man/man7/unix.7
> > @@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ .SS Socket options
> > is an integer boolean flag.
> > .TP
> > .B SO_PASSSEC
> > -Enables receiving of the SELinux security label of the peer socket
> > +Enables receiving of the security label of the peer socket
> > in an ancillary message of type
> > .B SCM_SECURITY
> > (see below).
> > @@ -538,13 +538,16 @@ .SS Ancillary messages
> > option must be enabled on the socket.
> > .TP
> > .B SCM_SECURITY
> > -Receive the SELinux security context (the security label)
> > -of the peer socket.
> > -The received ancillary data is a null-terminated string containing
> > -the security context.
> > -The receiver should allocate at least
> > -.B NAME_MAX
> > -bytes in the data portion of the ancillary message for this data.
> > +Receive the security context (the security label)
> > +of the peer socket,
> > +as provided by the active Linux Security Module (LSM).
> > +The received ancillary data is a byte buffer.
> > +.IP
> > +The exact format of the security context buffer
> > +is defined by the active major LSM.
> > +For example,
> > +SELinux returns a SELinux label as a string
> > +(including a terminating null byte).
>
> Considering that the interface doesn't promise to respect the null byte
> written by SELinux, I think I'd entirely remove this example, and
> instead focus on disclaiming that regardless of the format, the buffer
> is truncated in a way that destroys the format.
>
> I'm not an expert of this feature (actually, never used it at all), so
> maybe some silly question:
>
> How is a user supposed to know how much space to provide to prevent this
> problematic truncation? Is there a buffer size that will guarantee no
> truncation? If so, we should instruct programmers to use it. And if
> there's no possible size that fits all, we should probably warn about
> it.
The required space for the buffers is again dependent on LSM; in some
LSMs, the buffer can (theoretically) be unbounded, but it's possible
that you can calculate a maximum size if you understand how these LSMs
are configured...
I removed the example and will point out that truncation may happen in
a buffer-unaware format, if the caller-nprovided buffer is not large
enough.
Thanks for the review!
–Günther
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-20 14:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-03 20:22 [PATCH v2 0/8] unix.7: Socket Options and SCM_* fixes Günther Noack
2026-11-03 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 1/8] man/man7/unix.7: ERRORS: ETOOMANYREFS: Fix the conditions Günther Noack
2026-11-06 13:00 ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-11-03 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 2/8] man/man7/unix.7: Multiple same-typed SCM_* messages may be sent in one message Günther Noack
2026-11-16 0:52 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-11-18 0:59 ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-11-03 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 3/8] man/man7/unix.7: Autobind: Clarify when it happens, and mention SO_PASSPIDFD Günther Noack
2026-11-16 0:53 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-11-18 1:06 ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-11-03 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 4/8] man/man7/unix.7: SCM_SECURITY: Generalize to other LSMs, not just SELinux Günther Noack
2026-11-16 0:55 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-11-16 7:35 ` Günther Noack
2026-11-18 1:15 ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-11-18 1:13 ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-11-20 14:17 ` Günther Noack [this message]
2026-11-20 14:41 ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-11-20 14:42 ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-11-03 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 5/8] man/man7/unix.7: SO_PASSSEC: wfix Günther Noack
2026-11-03 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 6/8] man/man7/unix.7: Document SO_PASSPIDFD, SO_PEERPIDFD, and SCM_PIDFD Günther Noack
2026-11-16 1:03 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-11-18 16:24 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-20 15:59 ` Günther Noack
2026-11-03 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 7/8] man/man7/unix.7: Document SO_PASSRIGHTS Günther Noack
2026-11-16 1:02 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-11-03 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 8/8] man/man7/unix.7: Remove mentions of "namespace" in the general sense Günther Noack
2026-11-16 0:59 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-11-19 23:37 ` [PATCH v2 0/8] unix.7: Socket Options and SCM_* fixes Alejandro Colomar
2026-11-20 16:02 ` Günther Noack
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