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From: Alejandro Colomar <alx+linux-man@kernel.org>
To: "Günther Noack" <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Cc: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>,
	linux-man@vger.kernel.org,
	 Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>,
	 Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
	Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 4/8] man/man7/unix.7: SCM_SECURITY: Generalize to other LSMs, not just SELinux
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 15:41:10 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <awBavx8g4q9pCZpZ@devuan> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261120.790f70cab7b5@gnoack.org>

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Hi Günther,

> Date: 2026-11-20 15:17:46+0100
> From: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
>
> On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 02:13:40AM +0100, Alejandro Colomar wrote:
> > Hi Günther,
> > 
> > > Date: 2026-11-03 21:22:06+0100
> > > From: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
> > >
> > > Reword the description of SCM_SECURITY to not be specific to SELinux.
> > > 
> > > The security context is populated in scm_passec() in linux.git
> > > net/core/scm.c, through the security_secid_to_secctx() LSM hook, which
> > > is currently implemented by SELinux, Smack and AppArmor.
> > > 
> > > As clarified in [1], the returned security context is in the general
> > > case a byte buffer, not a null-terminated string.  The only LSM that
> > > returns a buffer with trailing null byte is SELinux, but even that is
> > > not guaranteed in case that the message is truncated.
> > > 
> > > Link: [1] <https://lore.kernel.org/all/auZcwYWv0NeiIR8d@google.com/>
> > > Fixes: ffad6a017f91 (2018-07-28; "unix.7: Document SCM_SECURITY ancillary data")
> > > Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
> > > Cc: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
> > > Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>
> > > Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
> > > Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
> > > Assisted-by: LLM
> > > Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
> > > ---
> > > 
> > > Notes:
> > >     This feature is also available in other LSMs.  Unfortunately, they
> > >     implemented it inconsistently and that complicates the description of
> > >     how string boundaries are handled.  Linux does indeed neither
> > >     guarantee that this terminates with a NUL byte, nor that NAME_MAX is
> > >     large enough to hold it.
> > >     
> > >     After confirmation from Kuniyuki Iwashima, this documents it as
> > >     returning a byte buffer.
> > >     
> > >     I prefer this variant over the previous longer one, also because it
> > >     refers to the individual LSMs for the exact format.  A reader of the
> > >     security context will require LSM-specific documentation anyway to
> > >     interpret the security context.
> > >     
> > >     This patch is still LLM-assisted, but at this point, since everything
> > >     is rewritten now, the only LLM-assisted part is the discovery that
> > >     this part of the documentation could be improved.
> > 
> > You may use 'Reported-by: LLM' for distinguishing such cases.
> 
> Thanks, done.
> 
> (Minor remark, btw; I have carried the Assisted-by: LLM convention
> over from the Linux kernel, but they have phased that practice out now
> and removed that convention from the guidelines.)

Yup; I'm aware.  We should still disclose it here.  I personally would
prefer distinguishing Suggested-by from Co-authored-by, FWIW, but at the
same time I refuse to say that an LLM has authored anything (rather, it
has stolen it from someone else), so Assisted-by might be more
appropriate.

Perhaps, I'd distinguish Reported-by, Suggested-by, and then use
Assisted-by for what a human would get Co-authored-by.


Have a lovely day!
Alex

> 
> 
> > >  man/man7/unix.7 | 19 +++++++++++--------
> > >  1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> > > 
> > > diff --git a/man/man7/unix.7 b/man/man7/unix.7
> > > index 61f06a74359b..c0e2bdbacdd8 100644
> > > --- a/man/man7/unix.7
> > > +++ b/man/man7/unix.7
> > > @@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ .SS Socket options
> > >  is an integer boolean flag.
> > >  .TP
> > >  .B SO_PASSSEC
> > > -Enables receiving of the SELinux security label of the peer socket
> > > +Enables receiving of the security label of the peer socket
> > >  in an ancillary message of type
> > >  .B SCM_SECURITY
> > >  (see below).
> > > @@ -538,13 +538,16 @@ .SS Ancillary messages
> > >  option must be enabled on the socket.
> > >  .TP
> > >  .B SCM_SECURITY
> > > -Receive the SELinux security context (the security label)
> > > -of the peer socket.
> > > -The received ancillary data is a null-terminated string containing
> > > -the security context.
> > > -The receiver should allocate at least
> > > -.B NAME_MAX
> > > -bytes in the data portion of the ancillary message for this data.
> > > +Receive the security context (the security label)
> > > +of the peer socket,
> > > +as provided by the active Linux Security Module (LSM).
> > > +The received ancillary data is a byte buffer.
> > > +.IP
> > > +The exact format of the security context buffer
> > > +is defined by the active major LSM.
> > > +For example,
> > > +SELinux returns a SELinux label as a string
> > > +(including a terminating null byte).
> > 
> > Considering that the interface doesn't promise to respect the null byte
> > written by SELinux, I think I'd entirely remove this example, and
> > instead focus on disclaiming that regardless of the format, the buffer
> > is truncated in a way that destroys the format.
> > 
> > I'm not an expert of this feature (actually, never used it at all), so
> > maybe some silly question:
> > 
> > How is a user supposed to know how much space to provide to prevent this
> > problematic truncation?  Is there a buffer size that will guarantee no
> > truncation?  If so, we should instruct programmers to use it.  And if
> > there's no possible size that fits all, we should probably warn about
> > it.
> 
> The required space for the buffers is again dependent on LSM; in some
> LSMs, the buffer can (theoretically) be unbounded, but it's possible
> that you can calculate a maximum size if you understand how these LSMs
> are configured...
> 
> I removed the example and will point out that truncation may happen in
> a buffer-unaware format, if the caller-nprovided buffer is not large
> enough.
> 
> Thanks for the review!
> –Günther
> 

-- 
<https://www.alejandro-colomar.es>

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  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-20 14:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-03 20:22 [PATCH v2 0/8] unix.7: Socket Options and SCM_* fixes Günther Noack
2026-11-03 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 1/8] man/man7/unix.7: ERRORS: ETOOMANYREFS: Fix the conditions Günther Noack
2026-11-06 13:00   ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-11-03 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 2/8] man/man7/unix.7: Multiple same-typed SCM_* messages may be sent in one message Günther Noack
2026-11-16  0:52   ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-11-18  0:59     ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-11-03 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 3/8] man/man7/unix.7: Autobind: Clarify when it happens, and mention SO_PASSPIDFD Günther Noack
2026-11-16  0:53   ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-11-18  1:06     ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-11-03 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 4/8] man/man7/unix.7: SCM_SECURITY: Generalize to other LSMs, not just SELinux Günther Noack
2026-11-16  0:55   ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-11-16  7:35     ` Günther Noack
2026-11-18  1:15       ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-11-18  1:13   ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-11-20 14:17     ` Günther Noack
2026-11-20 14:41       ` Alejandro Colomar [this message]
2026-11-20 14:42         ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-11-03 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 5/8] man/man7/unix.7: SO_PASSSEC: wfix Günther Noack
2026-11-03 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 6/8] man/man7/unix.7: Document SO_PASSPIDFD, SO_PEERPIDFD, and SCM_PIDFD Günther Noack
2026-11-16  1:03   ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-11-18 16:24   ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-20 15:59     ` Günther Noack
2026-11-03 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 7/8] man/man7/unix.7: Document SO_PASSRIGHTS Günther Noack
2026-11-16  1:02   ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-11-03 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 8/8] man/man7/unix.7: Remove mentions of "namespace" in the general sense Günther Noack
2026-11-16  0:59   ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-11-19 23:37 ` [PATCH v2 0/8] unix.7: Socket Options and SCM_* fixes Alejandro Colomar
2026-11-20 16:02   ` Günther Noack

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