[PATCH 6.6 00/91] 6.6.156-rc1 review

[PATCH 6.6 00/91] 6.6.156-rc1 review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.156 release.
There are 91 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.

Responses should be made by Wed, 02 Sep 2026 13:32:19 +0000.
Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.6.156-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.6.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
    Linux 6.6.156-rc1

Miguel Peñaranda <mig.penaranda07@gmail.com>
    usb: usbfs: fix use-after-free of usb_device in usbdev_release()

Shuangpeng Bai <shuangpeng.kernel@gmail.com>
    USB: c67x00: fix use-after-free in c67x00_add_iso_urb()

Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
    USB: serial: spcp8x5: drop broken carrier detect support

Jiale Yao <yaojiale02@163.com>
    USB: serial: option: fix slab OOB read in interrupt URB callback

Will Porter <mrwillporter@gmail.com>
    ALSA: usb-audio: Complete cleanup after system-resume errors

Marouane El Moufid <eun0us@espilon.net>
    ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in snd_usbmidi_novation_output()

Griffin Kroah-Hartman <griffin@kroah.com>
    usb: core: Strengthen error handling in hub_hub_status()

Griffin Kroah-Hartman <griffin@kroah.com>
    usb: core: Add lock to usb_wakeup_notification()

Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
    KVM: s390: vsie: zero stale crypto bits

Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>
    crypto: qce - Remove unsafe/deprecated algorithms

Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
    crypto: mxs-dcp - fix source scatterlist length access

Md Sadre Alam <md.alam@oss.qualcomm.com>
    crypto: qce - fix CCM AAD buffer underallocation

Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
    crypto: atmel-tdes - use scatterlist length before DMA mapping

Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
    mm/swap: reject swapon() on filesystem-level encrypted files

Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
    ipv6: seg6: clear IPv4 control block on IPIP decapsulation

Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
    net: bridge: mcast: fix use-after-free of a master VLAN's multicast context

Zihan Xi <zihanx@nebusec.ai>
    xfrm: fix xfrm_state_construct() auth-trunc leak

Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada <manizada@pm.me>
    xfrm: ah6: validate routing header segments_left

Zhiling Zou <roxy520tt@gmail.com>
    xfrm: drop ESP-in-TCP packets with no ingress device

Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
    xfrm: espintcp: fix UAF during close

Pratik Vishwakarma <Pratik.Vishwakarma@amd.com>
    x86/CPU/AMD: Carve out a Zen5 models range

Perry Yuan <perry.yuan@amd.com>
    x86/CPU/AMD: Add models 0x60-0x6f to the Zen5 range

Wenkuan Wang <Wenkuan.Wang@amd.com>
    x86/CPU/AMD: Add models 0x10-0x1f to the Zen5 range

Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
    x86/CPU/AMD: Add more models to X86_FEATURE_ZEN5

Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
    x86/CPU/AMD: Add X86_FEATURE_ZEN5

Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
    tls: device: fix out-of-bounds write in tls_append_frag()

Shuangpeng Bai <shuangpeng.kernel@gmail.com>
    usb: gadget: f_tcm: keep port count until LUN teardown completes

Aleksandr Nogikh <nogikh@google.com>
    usb: usbtest: disable dynamic ID support

Baokun Li <libaokun@linux.alibaba.com>
    fuse: fix invalidate lock leak on open O_TRUNC DAX failure

Baokun Li <libaokun@linux.alibaba.com>
    fuse: fix invalidate lock leak on setattr writeback failure

Lucas De Marchi <ldemarchi@nvidia.com>
    xhci: dbgtty: Fix unregister on tty_alloc_driver() failure

Lucas De Marchi <ldemarchi@nvidia.com>
    xhci: dbgtty: Fix unregister on tty_register_driver() failure

Semih Baskan <strst.gs@gmail.com>
    usb: xhci: Handle USB3 port events when there is one roothub

Haoxiang Li <lihaoxiang@isrc.iscas.ac.cn>
    accessibility: speakup: unregister tty ldisc on later init failures

Griffin Kroah-Hartman <griffin@kroah.com>
    fpga: dfl: fme: add error handling

Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
    xfs: remove file_path tracepoint data

Chengfeng Ye <nicoyip.dev@gmail.com>
    Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix accept list UAF during suspend

Zijun Hu <zijun.hu@oss.qualcomm.com>
    Bluetooth: hci_sync: Use bt_dev_err() to log error message in hci_update_event_filter_sync()

Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>
    HID: pidff: fix OOB write when hid->inputs is empty

Tomasz Pakuła <tomasz.pakula.oficjalny@gmail.com>
    HID: pidff: clang-format pass

Tomasz Pakuła <tomasz.pakula.oficjalny@gmail.com>
    HID: pidff: Support device error response from PID_BLOCK_LOAD

Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>
    HID: uclogic: fix use-after-free of inrange_timer on remove

Raman Varabets <kernel-linux-20260610-80b7ab08@raman.v1.sg>
    HID: ft260: fix stack-use-after-return write in I2C read race

Michael Zaidman <michael.zaidman@gmail.com>
    HID: ft260: validate i2c input report length

Jiangshan Yi <yijiangshan@kylinos.cn>
    HID: nintendo: stop device IO before hid_hw_stop on probe failure

Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>
    nvmet-tcp: bound SGL data length before allocating command buffers

Weiwen Hu <huweiwen@linux.alibaba.com>
    nvme: rename CDR/MORE/DNR to NVME_STATUS_*

Weiwen Hu <huweiwen@linux.alibaba.com>
    nvme: fix status magic numbers

Weiwen Hu <huweiwen@linux.alibaba.com>
    nvme: rename nvme_sc_to_pr_err to nvme_status_to_pr_err

Jose Villaseñor Montfort <pepemontfort@gmail.com>
    HID: magicmouse: prevent unbounded recursion in magicmouse_raw_event()

Christopher Kodama <ckhordiasma@gmail.com>
    HID: magicmouse: re-enable multitouch after reset-resume

Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
    nfc: nci: add data_len bound checks to activation parameter extractors

Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
    nilfs2: reject invalid block index in GC ioctl

Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
    nilfs2: correct return value kernel-doc descriptions for ioctl functions

Guanghui Yang <3497809730@qq.com>
    ext4: propagate errors from fast commit range replay

Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
    ext4: make some fast commit functions reuse extents path

Kemeng Shi <shikemeng@huaweicloud.com>
    ext4: make state in ext4_mb_mark_bb to be bool

DaeMyung Kang <charsyam@gmail.com>
    ksmbd: harden file lifetime during session teardown

Jia Jie Ho <jiajie.ho@starfivetech.com>
    crypto: starfive - Do not free stack buffer

Aboorva Devarajan <aboorvad@linux.ibm.com>
    powerpc/hv-gpci: fix preempt count leak in sysfs show paths

Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
    net/sched: initialize noop_qdisc owner

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    net/sched: Fix mirred deadlock on device recursion

Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
    selinux: switch two allocations to use kzalloc_objs()

Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
    smc: Use __sk_dst_get() and dst_dev_rcu() in smc_vlan_by_tcpsk().

Cristian Ciocaltea <cristian.ciocaltea@collabora.com>
    ASoC: nau8821: Cancel pending work before suspend

Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
    Revert "PM: sleep: Use complete() in device_pm_sleep_init()"

Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
    riscv: Fix register corruption from uninitialized cregs on error

Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
    bpf: Fix use-after-free in offloaded map/prog info fill

Cristian Ciocaltea <cristian.ciocaltea@collabora.com>
    ASoC: nau8821: Cancel delayed work on component remove

Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
    smc: Use __sk_dst_get() and dst_dev_rcu() in smc_clc_prfx_match().

Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
    smc: Use __sk_dst_get() and dst_dev_rcu() in in smc_clc_prfx_set().

Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
    KVM: arm64: Prevent access to vCPU events before init

Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
    smc: Fix use-after-free in __pnet_find_base_ndev().

Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
    can: j1939: make j1939_sk_bind() fail if device is no longer registered

Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
    can: j1939: add missing calls in NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification handler

Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
    can: j1939: implement NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification handler

Vladimir Riabchun <ferr.lambarginio@gmail.com>
    mISDN: hfcpci: Fix warning when deleting uninitialized timer

Wentao Liang <vulab@iscas.ac.cn>
    media: platform: exynos4-is: Add hardware sync wait to fimc_is_hw_change_mode()

Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
    exfat: fix double free in delayed_free

Dylan Wolff <wolffd@comp.nus.edu.sg>
    jfs: Fix null-ptr-deref in jfs_ioc_trim

Nick Child <nnac123@linux.ibm.com>
    ibmvnic: Use kernel helpers for hex dumps

Vasiliy Kovalev <kovalev@altlinux.org>
    jfs: add check read-only before txBeginAnon() call

Vasiliy Kovalev <kovalev@altlinux.org>
    jfs: add check read-only before truncation in jfs_truncate_nolock()

Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
    bpf: Remove tst_run from lwt_seg6local_prog_ops.

Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
    perf: Reject exited events as group leaders

Tao Lyu <tao.lyu@epfl.ch>
    bpf: Ensure reg is PTR_TO_STACK in process_iter_arg

Ralf Lici <ralf@mandelbit.com>
    Revert "usb: phy: fsl-usb: Fix use-after-free in delayed work during device removal"

Vishnu Razdan <vrazdan@openai.com>
    io_uring/io-wq: fix worker accounting when canceling creation callbacks

Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
    ext4: don't enable DAX on new encrypted files

Jinu Kim <kimjw04271234@gmail.com>
    KVM: x86/mmu: Check write tracking in all address spaces

Peiyang He <peiyang_he@smail.nju.edu.cn>
    RDMA/rxe: Fix OOB in free_rd_atomic_resources()


-------------

Diffstat:

 Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst              |   4 +
 Makefile                                           |   4 +-
 arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c                               |   6 +
 arch/powerpc/perf/hv-gpci.c                        |  24 +-
 arch/riscv/kernel/compat_signal.c                  |   2 +
 arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c                         |   4 +-
 arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c                               |   1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h                 |   4 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c                          |  28 ++-
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c                      |  32 ++-
 drivers/accessibility/speakup/main.c               |   1 +
 drivers/base/power/main.c                          |   6 +-
 drivers/crypto/atmel-tdes.c                        |   5 +-
 drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c                           |   2 +-
 drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c                          |  58 +----
 drivers/crypto/qce/common.c                        |  55 +----
 drivers/crypto/qce/common.h                        |  16 +-
 drivers/crypto/qce/regs-v5.h                       |   4 -
 drivers/crypto/qce/sha.c                           |  30 +--
 drivers/crypto/qce/sha.h                           |   1 -
 drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c                      |  97 +-------
 drivers/crypto/starfive/jh7110-rsa.c               |   1 -
 drivers/fpga/dfl-fme-perf.c                        |   2 +
 drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c                            |  41 +++-
 drivers/hid/hid-magicmouse.c                       |  44 +++-
 drivers/hid/hid-nintendo.c                         |  13 +-
 drivers/hid/hid-uclogic-core.c                     |  12 +-
 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c                     |  21 +-
 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c                 |   3 +-
 drivers/isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcpci.c               |  12 +-
 .../platform/samsung/exynos4-is/fimc-is-regs.c     |   1 +
 drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c                 |  30 ++-
 drivers/nvme/host/constants.c                      |   2 +-
 drivers/nvme/host/core.c                           |  32 +--
 drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c                        |   8 +-
 drivers/nvme/host/fault_inject.c                   |   2 +-
 drivers/nvme/host/fc.c                             |   8 +-
 drivers/nvme/host/multipath.c                      |   2 +-
 drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h                           |   4 +-
 drivers/nvme/host/pr.c                             |  10 +-
 drivers/nvme/target/admin-cmd.c                    |  24 +-
 drivers/nvme/target/core.c                         |  46 ++--
 drivers/nvme/target/discovery.c                    |  14 +-
 drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c             |  16 +-
 drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd.c                  |  36 +--
 drivers/nvme/target/io-cmd-bdev.c                  |  12 +-
 drivers/nvme/target/passthru.c                     |  10 +-
 drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c                         |  10 +-
 drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c                          |  17 +-
 drivers/nvme/target/zns.c                          |  30 +--
 drivers/target/target_core_fabric_configfs.c       |   8 +
 drivers/usb/c67x00/c67x00-sched.c                  |   4 +-
 drivers/usb/core/devio.c                           |   2 +-
 drivers/usb/core/hub.c                             |   7 +-
 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c                |   2 +-
 drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c                     |  15 +-
 drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c                       |   2 +-
 drivers/usb/misc/usbtest.c                         |   1 +
 drivers/usb/phy/phy-fsl-usb.c                      |   1 -
 drivers/usb/serial/option.c                        |  20 +-
 drivers/usb/serial/spcp8x5.c                       |  13 --
 fs/exfat/nls.c                                     |   1 +
 fs/ext4/crypto.c                                   |  40 ++--
 fs/ext4/ext4.h                                     |   2 +-
 fs/ext4/extents.c                                  |  55 ++---
 fs/ext4/fast_commit.c                              |  35 ++-
 fs/ext4/ialloc.c                                   |   4 +
 fs/ext4/mballoc.c                                  |   4 +-
 fs/fuse/dir.c                                      |   9 +-
 fs/fuse/file.c                                     |   4 +-
 fs/jfs/inode.c                                     |   2 +-
 fs/jfs/jfs_discard.c                               |   3 +-
 fs/jfs/jfs_extent.c                                |  10 +
 fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c                                  | 251 ++++++++++-----------
 fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c                            |   6 +-
 fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c                          | 179 +++++++++++++--
 fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.h                          |   4 +-
 fs/xfs/scrub/trace.h                               |  12 +-
 include/linux/nvme.h                               |  16 +-
 include/net/sch_generic.h                          |   1 +
 include/target/target_core_fabric.h                |   2 +
 io_uring/io-wq.c                                   |   9 +-
 kernel/bpf/offload.c                               |  10 +-
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c                              |   5 +
 kernel/events/core.c                               |  10 +
 mm/swapfile.c                                      |   7 +
 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c                           |  48 +++-
 net/bridge/br_multicast.c                          |   4 +-
 net/can/j1939/j1939-priv.h                         |   1 +
 net/can/j1939/main.c                               |   5 +
 net/can/j1939/socket.c                             |  55 +++++
 net/core/dev.c                                     |   6 +
 net/core/filter.c                                  |   1 -
 net/ipv6/ah6.c                                     |  29 ++-
 net/ipv6/seg6_local.c                              |   7 +
 net/nfc/nci/ntf.c                                  |  26 ++-
 net/sched/sch_generic.c                            |   2 +
 net/smc/smc_clc.c                                  |  67 +++---
 net/smc/smc_core.c                                 |  27 +--
 net/smc/smc_pnet.c                                 |  43 ++--
 net/tls/tls_device.c                               |   3 +-
 net/xfrm/espintcp.c                                |   9 +-
 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c                               |   2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/conditional.c                  |  12 +-
 sound/soc/codecs/nau8821.c                         |  13 ++
 sound/usb/card.c                                   |  14 +-
 sound/usb/midi.c                                   |   2 +
 107 files changed, 1133 insertions(+), 846 deletions(-)

[PATCH 6.6 01/91] RDMA/rxe: Fix OOB in free_rd_atomic_resources()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Peiyang He <peiyang_he@smail.nju.edu.cn>

commit de329533792a373186d79dca1ca120f8fa0afd05 upstream.

free_rd_atomic_resources() iterates using qp->attr.max_dest_rd_atomic.
Updating max_dest_rd_atomic before freeing the old array can make the
free path walk past the old allocation and trigger a slab out-of-bounds
write catched by KASAN:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in free_rd_atomic_resource drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:180 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in free_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:171 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in free_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:163 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rxe_qp_from_attr+0x1e88/0x2150 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:712
Write of size 4 at addr ffff88802b8dddb8 by task syz.3.451/11063

CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 11063 Comm: syz.3.451 Not tainted 7.1.0 #2 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x10e/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
 print_report+0xf7/0x600 mm/kasan/report.c:482
 kasan_report+0xe4/0x120 mm/kasan/report.c:595
 free_rd_atomic_resource drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:180 [inline]
 free_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:171 [inline]
 free_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:163 [inline]
 rxe_qp_from_attr+0x1e88/0x2150 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:712
 rxe_modify_qp+0x1e2/0x530 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_verbs.c:623
 ib_security_modify_qp+0x223/0xfa0 drivers/infiniband/core/security.c:625
 _ib_modify_qp+0x333/0xec0 drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c:1915
 modify_qp+0x13ca/0x1940 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1932
 ib_uverbs_modify_qp+0xcb/0x120 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1958
 ib_uverbs_write+0xb86/0x1030 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c:680
 vfs_write+0x2aa/0x1070 fs/read_write.c:686
 ksys_write+0x1f8/0x250 fs/read_write.c:740
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x116/0x800 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fefc75a70cd
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fefc8495018 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fefc7835fa0 RCX: 00007fefc75a70cd
RDX: 0000000000000078 RSI: 0000200000000240 RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: 00007fefc764f10f R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fefc7836038 R14: 00007fefc7835fa0 R15: 00007ffcf0586aa0
 </TASK>

Allocated by task 11063:
 kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:57
 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:78
 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:398 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:415
 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:263 [inline]
 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5296 [inline]
 __kmalloc_noprof+0x32a/0x850 mm/slub.c:5308
 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:954 [inline]
 kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1188 [inline]
 alloc_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:155 [inline]
 rxe_qp_from_attr+0x3f8/0x2150 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:714
 rxe_modify_qp+0x1e2/0x530 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_verbs.c:623
 ib_security_modify_qp+0x223/0xfa0 drivers/infiniband/core/security.c:625
 _ib_modify_qp+0x333/0xec0 drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c:1915
 modify_qp+0x13ca/0x1940 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1932
 ib_uverbs_modify_qp+0xcb/0x120 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1958
 ib_uverbs_write+0xb86/0x1030 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c:680
 vfs_write+0x2aa/0x1070 fs/read_write.c:686
 ksys_write+0x1f8/0x250 fs/read_write.c:740
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x116/0x800 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88802b8ddd80
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
 allocated 56-byte region [ffff88802b8ddd80, ffff88802b8dddb8)

The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x2b8dd
flags: 0xfff00000000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 00fff00000000000 ffff888015c418c0 dead000000000100 dead000000000122
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000800200020 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xd2c40(GFP_NOFS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC), pid 4651, tgid 4651 ((udev-worker)), ts 123427165316, free_ts 123425874255
 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline]
 post_alloc_hook+0xfc/0x120 mm/page_alloc.c:1853
 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1861 [inline]
 get_page_from_freelist+0x75b/0x3220 mm/page_alloc.c:3941
 __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x27e/0x2b00 mm/page_alloc.c:5221
 alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:3278 [inline]
 allocate_slab mm/slub.c:3467 [inline]
 new_slab+0xa6/0x670 mm/slub.c:3525
 refill_objects+0x278/0x420 mm/slub.c:7272
 refill_sheaf mm/slub.c:2816 [inline]
 __pcs_replace_empty_main+0x2ed/0x640 mm/slub.c:4652
 alloc_from_pcs mm/slub.c:4750 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4884 [inline]
 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5295 [inline]
 __kmalloc_noprof+0x68d/0x850 mm/slub.c:5308
 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:954 [inline]
 kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1188 [inline]
 tomoyo_encode2+0x100/0x3e0 security/tomoyo/realpath.c:45
 tomoyo_encode+0x29/0x50 security/tomoyo/realpath.c:80
 tomoyo_realpath_from_path+0x18c/0x690 security/tomoyo/realpath.c:283
 tomoyo_get_realpath security/tomoyo/file.c:151 [inline]
 tomoyo_check_open_permission+0x2ab/0x3c0 security/tomoyo/file.c:776
 tomoyo_file_open+0x6b/0x90 security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c:334
 security_file_open+0x7a/0x1b0 security/security.c:2739
 do_dentry_open+0x57e/0x1690 fs/open.c:924
 vfs_open+0x82/0x3f0 fs/open.c:1079
 do_open fs/namei.c:4699 [inline]
 path_openat+0x218a/0x3190 fs/namei.c:4858
page last free pid 1 tgid 1 stack trace:
 reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline]
 __free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1397 [inline]
 __free_frozen_pages+0x763/0xfc0 mm/page_alloc.c:2938
 selinux_genfs_get_sid security/selinux/hooks.c:1364 [inline]
 inode_doinit_with_dentry+0x903/0x1320 security/selinux/hooks.c:1563
 selinux_d_instantiate+0x26/0x30 security/selinux/hooks.c:6658
 security_d_instantiate+0x123/0x190 security/security.c:3704
 d_splice_alias_ops+0x92/0x850 fs/dcache.c:3141
 kernfs_iop_lookup+0x23f/0x2d0 fs/kernfs/dir.c:1289
 lookup_open.isra.0+0x659/0x1080 fs/namei.c:4484
 open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:4611 [inline]
 path_openat+0x17dd/0x3190 fs/namei.c:4855
 do_file_open+0x20c/0x430 fs/namei.c:4887
 do_sys_openat2+0x101/0x1d0 fs/open.c:1364
 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1370 [inline]
 __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1386 [inline]
 __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1381 [inline]
 __x64_sys_openat+0x141/0x200 fs/open.c:1381
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x116/0x800 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff88802b8ddc80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff88802b8ddd00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff88802b8ddd80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
                                        ^
 ffff88802b8dde00: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff88802b8dde80: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc

Fix the OOB by moving the assignment after free_rd_atomic_resources()
so the old array is freed using the old bound. This matches the original
ordering in commit 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver").

Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/365C68B4923F8214+30195a67-0b90-4b92-ab96-2ce41517793c@smail.nju.edu.cn/
Fixes: b6bbee0d2438 ("IB/rxe: Properly honor max IRD value for rd/atomic.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Peiyang He <peiyang_he@smail.nju.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
(cherry picked from commit de329533792a373186d79dca1ca120f8fa0afd05)
[This commit is based on the upstream commit 6f7014237405 ("RDMA/rxe: Fix responder UAF on IB_QP_MAX_DEST_RD_ATOMIC modify_qp")]
Signed-off-by: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c
index 8426c261c263a..1d6c8eb1f97d9 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c
@@ -664,10 +664,9 @@ int rxe_qp_from_attr(struct rxe_qp *qp, struct ib_qp_attr *attr, int mask,
 		int max_dest_rd_atomic = attr->max_dest_rd_atomic ?
 			roundup_pow_of_two(attr->max_dest_rd_atomic) : 0;
 
-		qp->attr.max_dest_rd_atomic = max_dest_rd_atomic;
-
 		free_rd_atomic_resources(qp);
 
+		qp->attr.max_dest_rd_atomic = max_dest_rd_atomic;
 		err = alloc_rd_atomic_resources(qp, max_dest_rd_atomic);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 02/91] KVM: x86/mmu: Check write tracking in all address spaces

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jinu Kim <kimjw04271234@gmail.com>

commit 0f38453cdb2e17566ccb7c0f3dabd5bd21caca26 upstream.

kvm_gfn_is_write_tracked() checks only the supplied memslot, but page
tracking is per-address-space and shadow pages are shared across all
address spaces.  With SMM, a GFN can therefore be write-tracked in one
address space and appear untracked through the other.

Check the supplied slot first, then the slot for the other address space.
This ensures all callers honor write tracking regardless of the active
address space.  In particular, it prevents mmu_try_to_unsync_pages() from
marking an upper-level shadow page unsync and eventually triggering the
BUG in pte_list_remove().

Fixes: 699023e23965 ("KVM: x86: add SMM to the MMU role, support SMRAM address space")
Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5
Signed-off-by: Jinu Kim <kimjw04271234@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20260721103512.2136240-2-kimjw04271234@gmail.com>
[invert direction of the conditional. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[ artem: adapt to 6.6, which has neither KVM_MAX_NR_ADDRESS_SPACES nor
  kvm_arch_nr_memslot_as_ids(); use KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM instead. That
  macro is CONFIG_KVM_SMM-conditional in 6.6, so the guard on
  KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM > 1 around the peer-slot lookup is retained ]
Signed-off-by: Artem Dinaburg <artem@trailofbits.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c
index c87da11f3a049..2615074a4bffe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c
@@ -117,13 +117,23 @@ void __kvm_write_track_remove_gfn(struct kvm *kvm,
 	kvm_mmu_gfn_allow_lpage(slot, gfn);
 }
 
-/*
- * check if the corresponding access on the specified guest page is tracked.
- */
+static bool __kvm_gfn_is_write_tracked(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+				       gfn_t gfn)
+{
+	int index;
+
+	if (!slot)
+		return false;
+
+	index = gfn_to_index(gfn, slot->base_gfn, PG_LEVEL_4K);
+	return !!READ_ONCE(slot->arch.gfn_write_track[index]);
+}
+
+/* check if write access is tracked on the specified guest page.  */
 bool kvm_gfn_is_write_tracked(struct kvm *kvm,
 			      const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn)
 {
-	int index;
+	const struct kvm_memory_slot *other_slot;
 
 	if (!slot)
 		return false;
@@ -131,8 +141,18 @@ bool kvm_gfn_is_write_tracked(struct kvm *kvm,
 	if (!kvm_page_track_write_tracking_enabled(kvm))
 		return false;
 
-	index = gfn_to_index(gfn, slot->base_gfn, PG_LEVEL_4K);
-	return !!READ_ONCE(slot->arch.gfn_write_track[index]);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM > 2);
+
+	if (__kvm_gfn_is_write_tracked(slot, gfn))
+		return true;
+
+	if (KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM > 1) {
+		other_slot = __gfn_to_memslot(__kvm_memslots(kvm, slot->as_id ^ 1), gfn);
+		if (__kvm_gfn_is_write_tracked(other_slot, gfn))
+			return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_EXTERNAL_WRITE_TRACKING
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 03/91] ext4: dont enable DAX on new encrypted files

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>

commit da32af420d6d466e247c43ac0b829edeac7ae0ad upstream.

Currently, when a new encrypted regular file is created, the call to
ext4_set_inode_flags(inode, init=true) in __ext4_new_inode() is made
before EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT is set.  As a result, it can set S_DAX if the
filesystem is mounted with "-o dax=always".

EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT then actually gets set a bit later in
__ext4_new_inode(), when it calls fscrypt_set_context() which calls
ext4_set_context().  ext4_set_context() sets EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT and
calls ext4_set_inode_flags(inode, init=false) to set S_ENCRYPTED too.

This was intended to clear S_DAX as well.  However, this was broken by
commit 043546e46dc7 ("fs/ext4: Only change S_DAX on inode load").  This
causes data written to the file to bypass encryption, also causing
xfstests failures such as generic/548 (when "-o dax=always" is used).

Fix this by simplifying the flow by making __ext4_new_inode() set
EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT earlier.  This makes it take effect in
ext4_set_inode_flags(inode, init=true), making S_DAX never be set.

Similarly, make EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA never be set in the first
place on new encrypted inodes.  Then it doesn't need to be cleared.

As a result of these simplifications, ext4_set_context() no longer needs
to change inode flags or state when 'handle != NULL'.  Remove that too.

Reported-by: Disha Goel <disgoel@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260723085648.1500357-1-ojaswin@linux.ibm.com
Fixes: 043546e46dc7 ("fs/ext4: Only change S_DAX on inode load")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Disha Goel <disgoel@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260730175212.36923-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/ext4/crypto.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 fs/ext4/ialloc.c |  4 ++++
 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/ext4/crypto.c b/fs/ext4/crypto.c
index 8292494a9b6c8..8497f6125a8eb 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/crypto.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/crypto.c
@@ -150,7 +150,13 @@ static int ext4_set_context(struct inode *inode, const void *ctx, size_t len,
 	if (inode->i_ino == EXT4_ROOT_INO)
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(IS_DAX(inode) && i_size_read(inode)))
+	/*
+	 * For new encrypted inodes, S_DAX is never set in the first place.
+	 *
+	 * For existing inodes, this is called only on empty directories.  ext4
+	 * never sets S_DAX on directories.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(IS_DAX(inode)))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_DAX))
@@ -169,6 +175,14 @@ static int ext4_set_context(struct inode *inode, const void *ctx, size_t len,
 	 */
 
 	if (handle) {
+		/*
+		 * __ext4_new_inode() should have already set the encrypt flag
+		 * on the inode and avoided enabling inline data.
+		 */
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA)))
+			return -EINVAL;
 		/*
 		 * Since the inode is new it is ok to pass the
 		 * XATTR_CREATE flag. This is necessary to match the
@@ -176,21 +190,10 @@ static int ext4_set_context(struct inode *inode, const void *ctx, size_t len,
 		 * function with the credits allocated for the new
 		 * inode.
 		 */
-		res = ext4_xattr_set_handle(handle, inode,
-					    EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_ENCRYPTION,
-					    EXT4_XATTR_NAME_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT,
-					    ctx, len, XATTR_CREATE);
-		if (!res) {
-			ext4_set_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT);
-			ext4_clear_inode_state(inode,
-					EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA);
-			/*
-			 * Update inode->i_flags - S_ENCRYPTED will be enabled,
-			 * S_DAX may be disabled
-			 */
-			ext4_set_inode_flags(inode, false);
-		}
-		return res;
+		return ext4_xattr_set_handle(handle, inode,
+					     EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_ENCRYPTION,
+					     EXT4_XATTR_NAME_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT,
+					     ctx, len, XATTR_CREATE);
 	}
 
 	res = dquot_initialize(inode);
@@ -211,10 +214,7 @@ static int ext4_set_context(struct inode *inode, const void *ctx, size_t len,
 				    ctx, len, 0);
 	if (!res) {
 		ext4_set_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT);
-		/*
-		 * Update inode->i_flags - S_ENCRYPTED will be enabled,
-		 * S_DAX may be disabled
-		 */
+		/* Update inode->i_flags to set S_ENCRYPTED. */
 		ext4_set_inode_flags(inode, false);
 		res = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
 		if (res)
diff --git a/fs/ext4/ialloc.c b/fs/ext4/ialloc.c
index 8daebea58027a..aa5afd7a17b99 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/ialloc.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/ialloc.c
@@ -996,6 +996,8 @@ struct inode *__ext4_new_inode(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 		err = fscrypt_prepare_new_inode(dir, inode, &encrypt);
 		if (err)
 			goto out;
+		if (encrypt)
+			i_flags |= EXT4_ENCRYPT_FL;
 	}
 
 	err = dquot_initialize(inode);
@@ -1310,6 +1312,8 @@ struct inode *__ext4_new_inode(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 	ei->i_extra_isize = sbi->s_want_extra_isize;
 	ei->i_inline_off = 0;
 	if (ext4_has_feature_inline_data(sb) &&
+	    /* Encrypted inodes cannot have inline data */
+	    !(ei->i_flags & EXT4_ENCRYPT_FL) &&
 	    (!(ei->i_flags & EXT4_DAX_FL) || S_ISDIR(mode)))
 		ext4_set_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA);
 	ret = inode;
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 04/91] io_uring/io-wq: fix worker accounting when canceling creation callbacks

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vishnu Razdan <vrazdan@openai.com>

commit 297b5ccea4acacaa47c150f043bce695202afbf1 upstream.

create_worker_cb() reserves an io-wq worker slot only after its
task-work callback runs. If the callback is canceled before then,
io_worker_cancel_cb() still decrements acct->nr_workers. When an
existing worker retires with its creation callback pending, that
worker has already decremented the same account's worker count.

The resulting undercount permits worker creation beyond the account's
configured limit. On an AST2600 OpenBMC system, an unchanged sensor
daemon reached 4,291 threads with the original kernel. With an
equivalent downstream fix, 25 passive samples under its normal
workload showed 6-9 threads.

Decrement nr_workers only when the canceled callback is not
create_worker_cb(). Continuation callbacks still release their reserved
slot, and both callback types retain the existing running-count,
reference-count, and create-state cleanup.

[ Backport: retain the existing wq->lock protecting worker accounting. ]

Fixes: 1d5f5ea7cb7d ("io-wq: remove worker to owner tw dependency")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6-sol
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@suse.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260811-vrazdan-io-wq-b4-submit-v1-1-719ced16c921@openai.com
Signed-off-by: Vishnu Razdan <vrazdan@openai.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 io_uring/io-wq.c | 9 ++++++---
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/io_uring/io-wq.c b/io_uring/io-wq.c
index 37725c5031b4c..a20be1a43aafc 100644
--- a/io_uring/io-wq.c
+++ b/io_uring/io-wq.c
@@ -193,9 +193,12 @@ static void io_worker_cancel_cb(struct io_worker *worker)
 	struct io_wq *wq = worker->wq;
 
 	atomic_dec(&acct->nr_running);
-	raw_spin_lock(&wq->lock);
-	acct->nr_workers--;
-	raw_spin_unlock(&wq->lock);
+	/* create_worker_cb() has not reserved a worker slot yet. */
+	if (worker->create_work.func != create_worker_cb) {
+		raw_spin_lock(&wq->lock);
+		acct->nr_workers--;
+		raw_spin_unlock(&wq->lock);
+	}
 	io_worker_ref_put(wq);
 	clear_bit_unlock(0, &worker->create_state);
 	io_worker_release(worker);
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 05/91] Revert "usb: phy: fsl-usb: Fix use-after-free in delayed work during device removal"

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ralf Lici <ralf@mandelbit.com>

This reverts commit 319f7a85b3c4e34ac2fe083eb146fe129a556317.

The reverted commit uses disable_delayed_work_sync, which was introduced
by commit 86898fa6b8cd ("workqueue: Implement disable/enable for
(delayed) work items") in v6.10. The function is therefore unavailable
in 6.6.y, causing configurations that enable CONFIG_FSL_USB2_OTG to fail
to build.

The upstream commit is unaffected; only its incompatible stable backport
is being reverted.

Fixes: 319f7a85b3c4 ("usb: phy: fsl-usb: Fix use-after-free in delayed work during device removal")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/stable/20260827154302.706689-1-ralf@mandelbit.com/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Lici <ralf@mandelbit.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/usb/phy/phy-fsl-usb.c | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/usb/phy/phy-fsl-usb.c b/drivers/usb/phy/phy-fsl-usb.c
index 552899fa985ed..79617bb0a70e8 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/phy/phy-fsl-usb.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/phy/phy-fsl-usb.c
@@ -987,7 +987,6 @@ static void fsl_otg_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
 {
 	struct fsl_usb2_platform_data *pdata = dev_get_platdata(&pdev->dev);
 
-	disable_delayed_work_sync(&fsl_otg_dev->otg_event);
 	usb_remove_phy(&fsl_otg_dev->phy);
 	free_irq(fsl_otg_dev->irq, fsl_otg_dev);
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 06/91] bpf: Ensure reg is PTR_TO_STACK in process_iter_arg

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tao Lyu <tao.lyu@epfl.ch>

commit 12659d28615d606b36e382f4de2dd05550d202af upstream.

Currently, KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ITER handling missed checking the reg->type and
ensuring it is PTR_TO_STACK. Instead of enforcing this in the caller of
process_iter_arg, move the check into it instead so that all callers
will gain the check by default. This is similar to process_dynptr_func.

An existing selftest in verifier_bits_iter.c fails due to this change,
but it's because it was passing a NULL pointer into iter_next helper and
getting an error further down the checks, but probably meant to pass an
uninitialized iterator on the stack (as is done in the subsequent test
below it). We will gain coverage for non-PTR_TO_STACK arguments in later
patches hence just change the declaration to zero-ed stack object.

Fixes: 06accc8779c1 ("bpf: add support for open-coded iterator loops")
Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tao Lyu <tao.lyu@epfl.ch>
[ Kartikeya: move check into process_iter_arg, rewrite commit log ]
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241203000238.3602922-2-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

[ Xu Yunxiang: Resolve the verifier.c context conflict by retaining the
  6.6.y BTF lookup and its regno diagnostic convention. Omit the
  verifier_bits_iter.c change because that selftest does not exist in
  6.6.y. ]
Assisted-by: Pi:GLM-5.3
[ sashal: print regno - 1 to match upstream and 6.6's own 0-based arg#
  messages in check_kfunc_args(); supersedes the regno convention noted
  above ]

Signed-off-by: Xu Yunxiang <xyx2021@mail.ustc.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index ad679bc42427c..0a67f285f4b08 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -7827,6 +7827,11 @@ static int process_iter_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int insn_id
 	int spi, err, i, nr_slots;
 	u32 btf_id;
 
+	if (reg->type != PTR_TO_STACK) {
+		verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to an iterator on stack\n", regno - 1);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	/* btf_check_iter_kfuncs() ensures we don't need to validate anything here */
 	arg = &btf_params(meta->func_proto)[0];
 	t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(meta->btf, arg->type, NULL);	/* PTR */
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 07/91] perf: Reject exited events as group leaders

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>

[ Upstream commit fa091f46c3833fb22384f10eade2b4e1e1d0b278 ]

perf_event_remove_on_exec() sets remove-on-exec events to the EXIT state
and detaches their group relationships.  The event's file descriptor can
remain open, however, and perf_event_open() currently accepts that event
as a group leader because its early validation rejects only REVOKED and
DEAD events.

A new sibling can consequently be linked to the detached leader.  When
the leader is closed, perf_group_detach() observes that its
PERF_ATTACH_GROUP bit is already clear and skips the new sibling.  The
sibling then retains a group_leader pointer to the freed event.

Reject group leaders in the EXIT state.  Perform the check while holding
the shared context mutex so that an exec in the target task cannot detach
the leader between validation and group attachment.

[peterz: make the earlier test fully consistent]
Fixes: 037a3c43edfb ("perf/core: Detach event groups during remove_on_exec")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6-sol
Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260806205655.75722-1-kylebot@openai.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/events/core.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 3f86104eb4c5a..95743e6c5b0cb 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -12692,6 +12692,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 		if (err)
 			goto err_fd;
 		group_leader = group.file->private_data;
+		if (group_leader->state <= PERF_EVENT_STATE_EXIT) {
+			err = -ENODEV;
+			goto err_group_fd;
+		}
 		if (flags & PERF_FLAG_FD_OUTPUT)
 			output_event = group_leader;
 		if (flags & PERF_FLAG_FD_NO_GROUP)
@@ -12819,6 +12823,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 		if (group_leader->ctx != ctx)
 			goto err_locked;
 
+		/* Recheck under ctx::mutex to serialize against remove-on-exec. */
+		if (group_leader->state <= PERF_EVENT_STATE_EXIT) {
+			err = -ENODEV;
+			goto err_locked;
+		}
+
 		/*
 		 * Only a group leader can be exclusive or pinned
 		 */
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 08/91] bpf: Remove tst_run from lwt_seg6local_prog_ops.

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>

[ Upstream commit c13fda93aca118b8e5cd202e339046728ee7dddb ]

The syzbot reported that the lwt_seg6 related BPF ops can be invoked
via bpf_test_run() without without entering input_action_end_bpf()
first.

Martin KaFai Lau said that self test for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_SEG6LOCAL
probably didn't work since it was introduced in commit 04d4b274e2a
("ipv6: sr: Add seg6local action End.BPF"). The reason is that the
per-CPU variable seg6_bpf_srh_states::srh is never assigned in the self
test case but each BPF function expects it.

Remove test_run for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_SEG6LOCAL.

Suggested-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>
Reported-by: syzbot+608a2acde8c5a101d07d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: d1542d4ae4df ("seg6: Use nested-BH locking for seg6_bpf_srh_states.")
Fixes: 004d4b274e2a ("ipv6: sr: Add seg6local action End.BPF")
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240710141631.FbmHcQaX@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/core/filter.c | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
index 62d21a961e5ec..23e9deba098c9 100644
--- a/net/core/filter.c
+++ b/net/core/filter.c
@@ -11117,7 +11117,6 @@ const struct bpf_verifier_ops lwt_seg6local_verifier_ops = {
 };
 
 const struct bpf_prog_ops lwt_seg6local_prog_ops = {
-	.test_run		= bpf_prog_test_run_skb,
 };
 
 const struct bpf_verifier_ops cg_sock_verifier_ops = {
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 09/91] jfs: add check read-only before truncation in jfs_truncate_nolock()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vasiliy Kovalev <kovalev@altlinux.org>

[ Upstream commit b5799dd77054c1ec49b0088b006c9908e256843b ]

Added a check for "read-only" mode in the `jfs_truncate_nolock`
function to avoid errors related to writing to a read-only
filesystem.

Call stack:

block_write_begin() {
  jfs_write_failed() {
    jfs_truncate() {
      jfs_truncate_nolock() {
        txEnd() {
          ...
          log = JFS_SBI(tblk->sb)->log;
          // (log == NULL)

If the `isReadOnly(ip)` condition is triggered in
`jfs_truncate_nolock`, the function execution will stop, and no
further data modification will occur. Instead, the `xtTruncate`
function will be called with the "COMMIT_WMAP" flag, preventing
modifications in "read-only" mode.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot+4e89b5368baba8324e07@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4e89b5368baba8324e07
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kovalev <kovalev@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/jfs/inode.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/jfs/inode.c b/fs/jfs/inode.c
index 1e6c1d1a15a6a..953b6cb6e89ed 100644
--- a/fs/jfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/jfs/inode.c
@@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ void jfs_truncate_nolock(struct inode *ip, loff_t length)
 
 	ASSERT(length >= 0);
 
-	if (test_cflag(COMMIT_Nolink, ip)) {
+	if (test_cflag(COMMIT_Nolink, ip) || isReadOnly(ip)) {
 		xtTruncate(0, ip, length, COMMIT_WMAP);
 		return;
 	}
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 10/91] jfs: add check read-only before txBeginAnon() call

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vasiliy Kovalev <kovalev@altlinux.org>

[ Upstream commit 0176e69743ecc02961f2ae1ea42439cd2bf9ed58 ]

Added a read-only check before calling `txBeginAnon` in `extAlloc`
and `extRecord`. This prevents modification attempts on a read-only
mounted filesystem, avoiding potential errors or crashes.

Call trace:
 txBeginAnon+0xac/0x154
 extAlloc+0xe8/0xdec fs/jfs/jfs_extent.c:78
 jfs_get_block+0x340/0xb98 fs/jfs/inode.c:248
 __block_write_begin_int+0x580/0x166c fs/buffer.c:2128
 __block_write_begin fs/buffer.c:2177 [inline]
 block_write_begin+0x98/0x11c fs/buffer.c:2236
 jfs_write_begin+0x44/0x88 fs/jfs/inode.c:299

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot+4e89b5368baba8324e07@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4e89b5368baba8324e07
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kovalev <kovalev@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/jfs/jfs_extent.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/jfs/jfs_extent.c b/fs/jfs/jfs_extent.c
index 63d21822d309b..46529bcc8297e 100644
--- a/fs/jfs/jfs_extent.c
+++ b/fs/jfs/jfs_extent.c
@@ -74,6 +74,11 @@ extAlloc(struct inode *ip, s64 xlen, s64 pno, xad_t * xp, bool abnr)
 	int rc;
 	int xflag;
 
+	if (isReadOnly(ip)) {
+		jfs_error(ip->i_sb, "read-only filesystem\n");
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
 	/* This blocks if we are low on resources */
 	txBeginAnon(ip->i_sb);
 
@@ -253,6 +258,11 @@ int extRecord(struct inode *ip, xad_t * xp)
 {
 	int rc;
 
+	if (isReadOnly(ip)) {
+		jfs_error(ip->i_sb, "read-only filesystem\n");
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
 	txBeginAnon(ip->i_sb);
 
 	mutex_lock(&JFS_IP(ip)->commit_mutex);
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 11/91] ibmvnic: Use kernel helpers for hex dumps

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Nick Child <nnac123@linux.ibm.com>

[ Upstream commit d93a6caab5d7d9b5ce034d75b1e1e993338e3852 ]

Previously, when the driver was printing hex dumps, the buffer was cast
to an 8 byte long and printed using string formatters. If the buffer
size was not a multiple of 8 then a read buffer overflow was possible.

Therefore, create a new ibmvnic function that loops over a buffer and
calls hex_dump_to_buffer instead.

This patch address KASAN reports like the one below:
  ibmvnic 30000003 env3: Login Buffer:
  ibmvnic 30000003 env3: 01000000af000000
  <...>
  ibmvnic 30000003 env3: 2e6d62692e736261
  ibmvnic 30000003 env3: 65050003006d6f63
  ==================================================================
  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ibmvnic_login+0xacc/0xffc [ibmvnic]
  Read of size 8 at addr c0000001331a9aa8 by task ip/17681
  <...>
  Allocated by task 17681:
  <...>
  ibmvnic_login+0x2f0/0xffc [ibmvnic]
  ibmvnic_open+0x148/0x308 [ibmvnic]
  __dev_open+0x1ac/0x304
  <...>
  The buggy address is located 168 bytes inside of
                allocated 175-byte region [c0000001331a9a00, c0000001331a9aaf)
  <...>
  =================================================================
  ibmvnic 30000003 env3: 000000000033766e

Fixes: 032c5e82847a ("Driver for IBM System i/p VNIC protocol")
Signed-off-by: Nick Child <nnac123@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Marquardt <davemarq@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250320212951.11142-1-nnac123@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c
index 05f410999a5a1..c54d28a40c588 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c
@@ -4863,6 +4863,18 @@ static void vnic_add_client_data(struct ibmvnic_adapter *adapter,
 	strscpy(vlcd->name, adapter->netdev->name, len);
 }
 
+static void ibmvnic_print_hex_dump(struct net_device *dev, void *buf,
+				   size_t len)
+{
+	unsigned char hex_str[16 * 3];
+
+	for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i += 16) {
+		hex_dump_to_buffer((unsigned char *)buf + i, len - i, 16, 8,
+				   hex_str, sizeof(hex_str), false);
+		netdev_dbg(dev, "%s\n", hex_str);
+	}
+}
+
 static int send_login(struct ibmvnic_adapter *adapter)
 {
 	struct ibmvnic_login_rsp_buffer *login_rsp_buffer;
@@ -4973,10 +4985,8 @@ static int send_login(struct ibmvnic_adapter *adapter)
 	vnic_add_client_data(adapter, vlcd);
 
 	netdev_dbg(adapter->netdev, "Login Buffer:\n");
-	for (i = 0; i < (adapter->login_buf_sz - 1) / 8 + 1; i++) {
-		netdev_dbg(adapter->netdev, "%016lx\n",
-			   ((unsigned long *)(adapter->login_buf))[i]);
-	}
+	ibmvnic_print_hex_dump(adapter->netdev, adapter->login_buf,
+			       adapter->login_buf_sz);
 
 	memset(&crq, 0, sizeof(crq));
 	crq.login.first = IBMVNIC_CRQ_CMD;
@@ -5352,15 +5362,13 @@ static void handle_query_ip_offload_rsp(struct ibmvnic_adapter *adapter)
 {
 	struct device *dev = &adapter->vdev->dev;
 	struct ibmvnic_query_ip_offload_buffer *buf = &adapter->ip_offload_buf;
-	int i;
 
 	dma_unmap_single(dev, adapter->ip_offload_tok,
 			 sizeof(adapter->ip_offload_buf), DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
 
 	netdev_dbg(adapter->netdev, "Query IP Offload Buffer:\n");
-	for (i = 0; i < (sizeof(adapter->ip_offload_buf) - 1) / 8 + 1; i++)
-		netdev_dbg(adapter->netdev, "%016lx\n",
-			   ((unsigned long *)(buf))[i]);
+	ibmvnic_print_hex_dump(adapter->netdev, buf,
+			       sizeof(adapter->ip_offload_buf));
 
 	netdev_dbg(adapter->netdev, "ipv4_chksum = %d\n", buf->ipv4_chksum);
 	netdev_dbg(adapter->netdev, "ipv6_chksum = %d\n", buf->ipv6_chksum);
@@ -5591,10 +5599,8 @@ static int handle_login_rsp(union ibmvnic_crq *login_rsp_crq,
 	netdev->mtu = adapter->req_mtu - ETH_HLEN;
 
 	netdev_dbg(adapter->netdev, "Login Response Buffer:\n");
-	for (i = 0; i < (adapter->login_rsp_buf_sz - 1) / 8 + 1; i++) {
-		netdev_dbg(adapter->netdev, "%016lx\n",
-			   ((unsigned long *)(adapter->login_rsp_buf))[i]);
-	}
+	ibmvnic_print_hex_dump(netdev, adapter->login_rsp_buf,
+			       adapter->login_rsp_buf_sz);
 
 	/* Sanity checks */
 	if (login->num_txcomp_subcrqs != login_rsp->num_txsubm_subcrqs ||
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 12/91] jfs: Fix null-ptr-deref in jfs_ioc_trim

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dylan Wolff <wolffd@comp.nus.edu.sg>

[ Upstream commit a4685408ff6c3e2af366ad9a7274f45ff3f394ee ]

[ Syzkaller Report ]

Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xdffffc0000000087: 0000 [#1
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000438-0x000000000000043f]
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 10614 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted
6.13.0-rc6-gfbfd64d25c7a-dirty #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Sched_ext: serialise (enabled+all), task: runnable_at=-30ms
RIP: 0010:jfs_ioc_trim+0x34b/0x8f0
Code: e7 e8 59 a4 87 fe 4d 8b 24 24 4d 8d bc 24 38 04 00 00 48 8d 93
90 82 fe ff 4c 89 ff 31 f6
RSP: 0018:ffffc900055f7cd0 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000087 RBX: 00005866a9e67ff8 RCX: 000000000000000a
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffff88807c180003 R09: 1ffff1100f830000
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100f830001 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000438
FS:  00007fe520225640(0000) GS:ffff8880b7e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00005593c91b2c88 CR3: 000000014927c000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die_body+0x61/0xb0
? die_addr+0xb1/0xe0
? exc_general_protection+0x333/0x510
? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
? jfs_ioc_trim+0x34b/0x8f0
jfs_ioctl+0x3c8/0x4f0
? __pfx_jfs_ioctl+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_jfs_ioctl+0x10/0x10
__se_sys_ioctl+0x269/0x350
? __pfx___se_sys_ioctl+0x10/0x10
? do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x210
do_syscall_64+0xee/0x210
? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1e0/0x330
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fe51f4903ad
Code: c3 e8 a7 2b 00 00 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48
89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d
RSP: 002b:00007fe5202250c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fe51f5cbf80 RCX: 00007fe51f4903ad
RDX: 0000000020000680 RSI: 00000000c0185879 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe520225640
R13: 000000000000000e R14: 00007fe51f44fca0 R15: 00007fe52021d000
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:jfs_ioc_trim+0x34b/0x8f0
Code: e7 e8 59 a4 87 fe 4d 8b 24 24 4d 8d bc 24 38 04 00 00 48 8d 93
90 82 fe ff 4c 89 ff 31 f6
RSP: 0018:ffffc900055f7cd0 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000087 RBX: 00005866a9e67ff8 RCX: 000000000000000a
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffff88807c180003 R09: 1ffff1100f830000
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100f830001 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000438
FS:  00007fe520225640(0000) GS:ffff8880b7e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00005593c91b2c88 CR3: 000000014927c000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

[ Analysis ]

We believe that we have found a concurrency bug in the `fs/jfs` module
that results in a null pointer dereference. There is a closely related
issue which has been fixed:

https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=d6c1b3599b2feb5c7291f5ac3a36e5fa7cedb234

... but, unfortunately, the accepted patch appears to still be
susceptible to a null pointer dereference under some interleavings.

To trigger the bug, we think that `JFS_SBI(ipbmap->i_sb)->bmap` is set
to NULL in `dbFreeBits` and then dereferenced in `jfs_ioc_trim`. This
bug manifests quite rarely under normal circumstances, but is
triggereable from a syz-program.

Reported-and-tested-by: Dylan J. Wolff<wolffd@comp.nus.edu.sg>
Reported-and-tested-by: Jiacheng Xu <stitch@zju.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Dylan J. Wolff<wolffd@comp.nus.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Xu <stitch@zju.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/jfs/jfs_discard.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/jfs/jfs_discard.c b/fs/jfs/jfs_discard.c
index 5f4b305030ad5..4b660296caf39 100644
--- a/fs/jfs/jfs_discard.c
+++ b/fs/jfs/jfs_discard.c
@@ -86,7 +86,8 @@ int jfs_ioc_trim(struct inode *ip, struct fstrim_range *range)
 	down_read(&sb->s_umount);
 	bmp = JFS_SBI(ip->i_sb)->bmap;
 
-	if (minlen > bmp->db_agsize ||
+	if (bmp == NULL ||
+	    minlen > bmp->db_agsize ||
 	    start >= bmp->db_mapsize ||
 	    range->len < sb->s_blocksize) {
 		up_read(&sb->s_umount);
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 13/91] exfat: fix double free in delayed_free

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 1f3d9724e16d62c7d42c67d6613b8512f2887c22 ]

The double free could happen in the following path.

exfat_create_upcase_table()
        exfat_create_upcase_table() : return error
        exfat_free_upcase_table() : free ->vol_utbl
        exfat_load_default_upcase_table : return error
     exfat_kill_sb()
           delayed_free()
                  exfat_free_upcase_table() <--------- double free
This patch set ->vol_util as NULL after freeing it.

Reported-by: Jianzhou Zhao <xnxc22xnxc22@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/exfat/nls.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/fs/exfat/nls.c b/fs/exfat/nls.c
index 705710f93e2dd..0e05c6b5a2864 100644
--- a/fs/exfat/nls.c
+++ b/fs/exfat/nls.c
@@ -804,4 +804,5 @@ int exfat_create_upcase_table(struct super_block *sb)
 void exfat_free_upcase_table(struct exfat_sb_info *sbi)
 {
 	kvfree(sbi->vol_utbl);
+	sbi->vol_utbl = NULL;
 }
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 14/91] media: platform: exynos4-is: Add hardware sync wait to fimc_is_hw_change_mode()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wentao Liang <vulab@iscas.ac.cn>

[ Upstream commit bd9f6ce7d512fa21249415c16af801a4ed5d97b6 ]

In fimc_is_hw_change_mode(), the function changes camera modes without
waiting for hardware completion, risking corrupted data or system hangs
if subsequent operations proceed before the hardware is ready.

Add fimc_is_hw_wait_intmsr0_intmsd0() after mode configuration, ensuring
hardware state synchronization and stable interrupt handling.

Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang <vulab@iscas.ac.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/media/platform/samsung/exynos4-is/fimc-is-regs.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/samsung/exynos4-is/fimc-is-regs.c b/drivers/media/platform/samsung/exynos4-is/fimc-is-regs.c
index 366e6393817d2..5f9c44e825a5f 100644
--- a/drivers/media/platform/samsung/exynos4-is/fimc-is-regs.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/samsung/exynos4-is/fimc-is-regs.c
@@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ int fimc_is_hw_change_mode(struct fimc_is *is)
 	if (WARN_ON(is->config_index >= ARRAY_SIZE(cmd)))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	fimc_is_hw_wait_intmsr0_intmsd0(is);
 	mcuctl_write(cmd[is->config_index], is, MCUCTL_REG_ISSR(0));
 	mcuctl_write(is->sensor_index, is, MCUCTL_REG_ISSR(1));
 	mcuctl_write(is->setfile.sub_index, is, MCUCTL_REG_ISSR(2));
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 15/91] mISDN: hfcpci: Fix warning when deleting uninitialized timer

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vladimir Riabchun <ferr.lambarginio@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 97766512a9951b9fd6fc97f1b93211642bb0b220 ]

With CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_TIMERS unloading hfcpci module leads
to the following splat:

[  250.215892] ODEBUG: assert_init not available (active state 0) object: ffffffffc01a3dc0 object type: timer_list hint: 0x0
[  250.217520] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 233 at lib/debugobjects.c:612 debug_print_object+0x1b6/0x2c0
[  250.218775] Modules linked in: hfcpci(-) mISDN_core
[  250.219537] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 233 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 6.17.0-rc2-g6f713187ac98 #2 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[  250.220940] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[  250.222377] RIP: 0010:debug_print_object+0x1b6/0x2c0
[  250.223131] Code: fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 75 4f 41 56 48 8b 14 dd a0 4e 01 9f 48 89 ee 48 c7 c7 20 46 01 9f e8 cb 84d
[  250.225805] RSP: 0018:ffff888015ea7c08 EFLAGS: 00010286
[  250.226608] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: ffffffff9be93a95
[  250.227708] RDX: 1ffff1100d945138 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88806ca289c0
[  250.228993] RBP: ffffffff9f014a00 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1002bd4f39
[  250.230043] R10: ffff888015ea79cf R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001
[  250.231185] R13: ffffffff9eea0520 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888015ea7cc8
[  250.232454] FS:  00007f3208f01540(0000) GS:ffff8880caf5a000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  250.233851] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  250.234856] CR2: 00007f32090a7421 CR3: 0000000004d63000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[  250.236117] Call Trace:
[  250.236599]  <TASK>
[  250.236967]  ? trace_irq_enable.constprop.0+0xd4/0x130
[  250.237920]  debug_object_assert_init+0x1f6/0x310
[  250.238762]  ? __pfx_debug_object_assert_init+0x10/0x10
[  250.239658]  ? __lock_acquire+0xdea/0x1c70
[  250.240369]  __try_to_del_timer_sync+0x69/0x140
[  250.241172]  ? __pfx___try_to_del_timer_sync+0x10/0x10
[  250.242058]  ? __timer_delete_sync+0xc6/0x120
[  250.242842]  ? lock_acquire+0x30/0x80
[  250.243474]  ? __timer_delete_sync+0xc6/0x120
[  250.244262]  __timer_delete_sync+0x98/0x120
[  250.245015]  HFC_cleanup+0x10/0x20 [hfcpci]
[  250.245704]  __do_sys_delete_module+0x348/0x510
[  250.246461]  ? __pfx___do_sys_delete_module+0x10/0x10
[  250.247338]  do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x360
[  250.247924]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Fix this by initializing hfc_tl timer with DEFINE_TIMER macro.
Also, use mod_timer instead of manual timeout update.

Fixes: 87c5fa1bb426 ("mISDN: Add different different timer settings for hfc-pci")
Fixes: 175302f6b79e ("mISDN: hfcpci: Fix use-after-free bug in hfcpci_softirq")
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <ferr.lambarginio@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/aKiy2D_LiWpQ5kXq@vova-pc
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcpci.c | 12 +++++-------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcpci.c b/drivers/isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcpci.c
index fe391de1aba32..bdf2fa5ee11be 100644
--- a/drivers/isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcpci.c
+++ b/drivers/isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcpci.c
@@ -39,12 +39,13 @@
 
 #include "hfc_pci.h"
 
+static void hfcpci_softirq(struct timer_list *unused);
 static const char *hfcpci_revision = "2.0";
 
 static int HFC_cnt;
 static uint debug;
 static uint poll, tics;
-static struct timer_list hfc_tl;
+static DEFINE_TIMER(hfc_tl, hfcpci_softirq);
 static unsigned long hfc_jiffies;
 
 MODULE_AUTHOR("Karsten Keil");
@@ -2304,8 +2305,7 @@ hfcpci_softirq(struct timer_list *unused)
 		hfc_jiffies = jiffies + 1;
 	else
 		hfc_jiffies += tics;
-	hfc_tl.expires = hfc_jiffies;
-	add_timer(&hfc_tl);
+	mod_timer(&hfc_tl, hfc_jiffies);
 }
 
 static int __init
@@ -2331,10 +2331,8 @@ HFC_init(void)
 	if (poll != HFCPCI_BTRANS_THRESHOLD) {
 		printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Using alternative poll value of %d\n",
 		       __func__, poll);
-		timer_setup(&hfc_tl, hfcpci_softirq, 0);
-		hfc_tl.expires = jiffies + tics;
-		hfc_jiffies = hfc_tl.expires;
-		add_timer(&hfc_tl);
+		hfc_jiffies = jiffies + tics;
+		mod_timer(&hfc_tl, hfc_jiffies);
 	} else
 		tics = 0; /* indicate the use of controller's timer */
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 16/91] can: j1939: implement NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification handler

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>

[ Upstream commit 7fcbe5b2c6a4b5407bf2241fdb71e0a390f6ab9a ]

syzbot is reporting

  unregister_netdevice: waiting for vcan0 to become free. Usage count = 2

problem, for j1939 protocol did not have NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification
handler for undoing changes made by j1939_sk_bind().

Commit 25fe97cb7620 ("can: j1939: move j1939_priv_put() into sk_destruct
callback") expects that a call to j1939_priv_put() can be unconditionally
delayed until j1939_sk_sock_destruct() is called. But we need to call
j1939_priv_put() against an extra ref held by j1939_sk_bind() call
(as a part of undoing changes made by j1939_sk_bind()) as soon as
NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification fires (i.e. before j1939_sk_sock_destruct()
is called via j1939_sk_release()). Otherwise, the extra ref on "struct
j1939_priv" held by j1939_sk_bind() call prevents "struct net_device" from
dropping the usage count to 1; making it impossible for
unregister_netdevice() to continue.

Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+881d65229ca4f9ae8c84@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=881d65229ca4f9ae8c84
Tested-by: syzbot <syzbot+881d65229ca4f9ae8c84@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol")
Fixes: 25fe97cb7620 ("can: j1939: move j1939_priv_put() into sk_destruct callback")
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Tested-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/ac9db9a4-6c30-416e-8b94-96e6559d55b2@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
[mkl: remove space in front of label]
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/can/j1939/j1939-priv.h |  1 +
 net/can/j1939/main.c       |  3 +++
 net/can/j1939/socket.c     | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 53 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/can/j1939/j1939-priv.h b/net/can/j1939/j1939-priv.h
index 1d3d5d0551e0f..cf26352d1d8ce 100644
--- a/net/can/j1939/j1939-priv.h
+++ b/net/can/j1939/j1939-priv.h
@@ -214,6 +214,7 @@ void j1939_priv_get(struct j1939_priv *priv);
 
 /* notify/alert all j1939 sockets bound to ifindex */
 void j1939_sk_netdev_event_netdown(struct j1939_priv *priv);
+void j1939_sk_netdev_event_unregister(struct j1939_priv *priv);
 int j1939_cancel_active_session(struct j1939_priv *priv, struct sock *sk);
 void j1939_tp_init(struct j1939_priv *priv);
 
diff --git a/net/can/j1939/main.c b/net/can/j1939/main.c
index b45f834ff2cf6..6bbe75d2211d5 100644
--- a/net/can/j1939/main.c
+++ b/net/can/j1939/main.c
@@ -377,6 +377,9 @@ static int j1939_netdev_notify(struct notifier_block *nb,
 		j1939_sk_netdev_event_netdown(priv);
 		j1939_ecu_unmap_all(priv);
 		break;
+	case NETDEV_UNREGISTER:
+		j1939_sk_netdev_event_unregister(priv);
+		break;
 	}
 
 	j1939_priv_put(priv);
diff --git a/net/can/j1939/socket.c b/net/can/j1939/socket.c
index 4a76f7434e1e7..eeff9b84fba81 100644
--- a/net/can/j1939/socket.c
+++ b/net/can/j1939/socket.c
@@ -1300,6 +1300,55 @@ void j1939_sk_netdev_event_netdown(struct j1939_priv *priv)
 	read_unlock_bh(&priv->j1939_socks_lock);
 }
 
+void j1939_sk_netdev_event_unregister(struct j1939_priv *priv)
+{
+	struct sock *sk;
+	struct j1939_sock *jsk;
+	bool wait_rcu = false;
+
+rescan: /* The caller is holding a ref on this "priv" via j1939_priv_get_by_ndev(). */
+	read_lock_bh(&priv->j1939_socks_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(jsk, &priv->j1939_socks, list) {
+		/* Skip if j1939_jsk_add() is not called on this socket. */
+		if (!(jsk->state & J1939_SOCK_BOUND))
+			continue;
+		sk = &jsk->sk;
+		sock_hold(sk);
+		read_unlock_bh(&priv->j1939_socks_lock);
+		/* Check if j1939_jsk_del() is not yet called on this socket after holding
+		 * socket's lock, for both j1939_sk_bind() and j1939_sk_release() call
+		 * j1939_jsk_del() with socket's lock held.
+		 */
+		lock_sock(sk);
+		if (jsk->state & J1939_SOCK_BOUND) {
+			/* Neither j1939_sk_bind() nor j1939_sk_release() called j1939_jsk_del().
+			 * Make this socket no longer bound, by pretending as if j1939_sk_bind()
+			 * dropped old references but did not get new references.
+			 */
+			j1939_jsk_del(priv, jsk);
+			j1939_local_ecu_put(priv, jsk->addr.src_name, jsk->addr.sa);
+			j1939_netdev_stop(priv);
+			/* Call j1939_priv_put() now and prevent j1939_sk_sock_destruct() from
+			 * calling the corresponding j1939_priv_put().
+			 *
+			 * j1939_sk_sock_destruct() is supposed to call j1939_priv_put() after
+			 * an RCU grace period. But since the caller is holding a ref on this
+			 * "priv", we can defer synchronize_rcu() until immediately before
+			 * the caller calls j1939_priv_put().
+			 */
+			j1939_priv_put(priv);
+			jsk->priv = NULL;
+			wait_rcu = true;
+		}
+		release_sock(sk);
+		sock_put(sk);
+		goto rescan;
+	}
+	read_unlock_bh(&priv->j1939_socks_lock);
+	if (wait_rcu)
+		synchronize_rcu();
+}
+
 static int j1939_sk_no_ioctlcmd(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd,
 				unsigned long arg)
 {
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 17/91] can: j1939: add missing calls in NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification handler

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>

[ Upstream commit 93a27b5891b8194a8c083c9a80d2141d4bf47ba8 ]

Currently NETDEV_UNREGISTER event handler is not calling
j1939_cancel_active_session() and j1939_sk_queue_drop_all().
This will result in these calls being skipped when j1939_sk_release() is
called. And I guess that the reason syzbot is still reporting

  unregister_netdevice: waiting for vcan0 to become free. Usage count = 2

is caused by lack of these calls.

Calling j1939_cancel_active_session(priv, sk) from j1939_sk_release() can
be covered by calling j1939_cancel_active_session(priv, NULL) from
j1939_netdev_notify().

Calling j1939_sk_queue_drop_all() from j1939_sk_release() can be covered
by calling j1939_sk_netdev_event_netdown() from j1939_netdev_notify().

Therefore, we can reuse j1939_cancel_active_session(priv, NULL) and
j1939_sk_netdev_event_netdown(priv) for NETDEV_UNREGISTER event handler.

Fixes: 7fcbe5b2c6a4 ("can: j1939: implement NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification handler")
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Tested-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/3ad3c7f8-5a74-4b07-a193-cb0725823558@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/can/j1939/main.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/can/j1939/main.c b/net/can/j1939/main.c
index 6bbe75d2211d5..21186932f8f61 100644
--- a/net/can/j1939/main.c
+++ b/net/can/j1939/main.c
@@ -378,6 +378,8 @@ static int j1939_netdev_notify(struct notifier_block *nb,
 		j1939_ecu_unmap_all(priv);
 		break;
 	case NETDEV_UNREGISTER:
+		j1939_cancel_active_session(priv, NULL);
+		j1939_sk_netdev_event_netdown(priv);
 		j1939_sk_netdev_event_unregister(priv);
 		break;
 	}
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 18/91] can: j1939: make j1939_sk_bind() fail if device is no longer registered

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>

[ Upstream commit 46cea215dc9444ec32a76b1b6a9cb809e17b64d5 ]

There is a theoretical race window in j1939_sk_netdev_event_unregister()
where two j1939_sk_bind() calls jump in between read_unlock_bh() and
lock_sock().

The assumption jsk->priv == priv can fail if the first j1939_sk_bind()
call once made jsk->priv == NULL due to failed j1939_local_ecu_get() call
and the second j1939_sk_bind() call again made jsk->priv != NULL due to
successful j1939_local_ecu_get() call.

Since the socket lock is held by both j1939_sk_netdev_event_unregister()
and j1939_sk_bind(), checking ndev->reg_state with the socket lock held can
reliably make the second j1939_sk_bind() call fail (and close this race
window).

Fixes: 7fcbe5b2c6a4 ("can: j1939: implement NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification handler")
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/5732921e-247e-4957-a364-da74bd7031d7@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/can/j1939/socket.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/can/j1939/socket.c b/net/can/j1939/socket.c
index eeff9b84fba81..4841aae2fcaad 100644
--- a/net/can/j1939/socket.c
+++ b/net/can/j1939/socket.c
@@ -481,6 +481,12 @@ static int j1939_sk_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int len)
 			goto out_release_sock;
 		}
 
+		if (ndev->reg_state != NETREG_REGISTERED) {
+			dev_put(ndev);
+			ret = -ENODEV;
+			goto out_release_sock;
+		}
+
 		can_ml = can_get_ml_priv(ndev);
 		if (!can_ml) {
 			dev_put(ndev);
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 19/91] smc: Fix use-after-free in __pnet_find_base_ndev().

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 3d3466878afd8d43ec0ca2facfbc7f03e40d0f79 ]

syzbot reported use-after-free of net_device in __pnet_find_base_ndev(),
which was called during connect(). [0]

smc_pnet_find_ism_resource() fetches sk_dst_get(sk)->dev and passes
down to pnet_find_base_ndev(), where RTNL is held.  Then, UAF happened
at __pnet_find_base_ndev() when the dev is first used.

This means dev had already been freed before acquiring RTNL in
pnet_find_base_ndev().

While dev is going away, dst->dev could be swapped with blackhole_netdev,
and the dev's refcnt by dst will be released.

We must hold dev's refcnt before calling smc_pnet_find_ism_resource().

Also, smc_pnet_find_roce_resource() has the same problem.

Let's use __sk_dst_get() and dst_dev_rcu() in the two functions.

[0]:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __pnet_find_base_ndev+0x1b1/0x1c0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:926
Read of size 1 at addr ffff888036bac33a by task syz.0.3632/18609

CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 18609 Comm: syz.0.3632 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/18/2025
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
 print_report+0xca/0x240 mm/kasan/report.c:482
 kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595
 __pnet_find_base_ndev+0x1b1/0x1c0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:926
 pnet_find_base_ndev net/smc/smc_pnet.c:946 [inline]
 smc_pnet_find_ism_by_pnetid net/smc/smc_pnet.c:1103 [inline]
 smc_pnet_find_ism_resource+0xef/0x390 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:1154
 smc_find_ism_device net/smc/af_smc.c:1030 [inline]
 smc_find_proposal_devices net/smc/af_smc.c:1115 [inline]
 __smc_connect+0x372/0x1890 net/smc/af_smc.c:1545
 smc_connect+0x877/0xd90 net/smc/af_smc.c:1715
 __sys_connect_file net/socket.c:2086 [inline]
 __sys_connect+0x313/0x440 net/socket.c:2105
 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:2111 [inline]
 __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:2108 [inline]
 __x64_sys_connect+0x7a/0x90 net/socket.c:2108
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f47cbf8eba9
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f47ccdb1038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f47cc1d5fa0 RCX: 00007f47cbf8eba9
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000200000000280 RDI: 000000000000000b
RBP: 00007f47cc011e19 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007f47cc1d6038 R14: 00007f47cc1d5fa0 R15: 00007ffc512f8aa8
 </TASK>

The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888036bacd00 pfn:0x36bac
flags: 0xfff00000000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
raw: 00fff00000000000 ffffea0001243d08 ffff8880b863fdc0 0000000000000000
raw: ffff888036bacd00 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as freed
page last allocated via order 2, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x446dc0(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT|__GFP_ZERO|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL|__GFP_COMP), pid 16741, tgid 16741 (syz-executor), ts 343313197788, free_ts 380670750466
 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline]
 post_alloc_hook+0x240/0x2a0 mm/page_alloc.c:1851
 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1859 [inline]
 get_page_from_freelist+0x21e4/0x22c0 mm/page_alloc.c:3858
 __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x181/0x370 mm/page_alloc.c:5148
 alloc_pages_mpol+0x232/0x4a0 mm/mempolicy.c:2416
 ___kmalloc_large_node+0x5f/0x1b0 mm/slub.c:4317
 __kmalloc_large_node_noprof+0x18/0x90 mm/slub.c:4348
 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4364 [inline]
 __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x6d/0x5f0 mm/slub.c:5067
 alloc_netdev_mqs+0xa3/0x11b0 net/core/dev.c:11812
 tun_set_iff+0x532/0xef0 drivers/net/tun.c:2775
 __tun_chr_ioctl+0x788/0x1df0 drivers/net/tun.c:3085
 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
 __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:598 [inline]
 __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:584
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
page last free pid 18610 tgid 18608 stack trace:
 reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline]
 free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1395 [inline]
 __free_frozen_pages+0xbc4/0xd30 mm/page_alloc.c:2895
 free_large_kmalloc+0x13a/0x1f0 mm/slub.c:4820
 device_release+0x99/0x1c0 drivers/base/core.c:-1
 kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:689 [inline]
 kobject_release lib/kobject.c:720 [inline]
 kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline]
 kobject_put+0x22b/0x480 lib/kobject.c:737
 netdev_run_todo+0xd2e/0xea0 net/core/dev.c:11513
 rtnl_unlock net/core/rtnetlink.c:157 [inline]
 rtnl_net_unlock include/linux/rtnetlink.h:135 [inline]
 rtnl_dellink+0x537/0x710 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3563
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x7cc/0xb70 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6946
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x208/0x470 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2552
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1320 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x82f/0x9e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1346
 netlink_sendmsg+0x805/0xb30 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1896
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg+0x219/0x270 net/socket.c:729
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x505/0x830 net/socket.c:2614
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x21f/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2668
 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2700 [inline]
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2705 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2703 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x19b/0x260 net/socket.c:2703
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff888036bac200: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
 ffff888036bac280: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
>ffff888036bac300: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
                                        ^
 ffff888036bac380: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
 ffff888036bac400: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff

Fixes: 0afff91c6f5e ("net/smc: add pnetid support")
Fixes: 1619f770589a ("net/smc: add pnetid support for SMC-D and ISM")
Reported-by: syzbot+ea28e9d85be2f327b6c6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/68c237c7.050a0220.3c6139.0036.GAE@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250916214758.650211-2-kuniyu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/smc/smc_pnet.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/smc/smc_pnet.c b/net/smc/smc_pnet.c
index d44d7f427fc94..0081d1c6ce466 100644
--- a/net/smc/smc_pnet.c
+++ b/net/smc/smc_pnet.c
@@ -1131,37 +1131,38 @@ static void smc_pnet_find_ism_by_pnetid(struct net_device *ndev,
  */
 void smc_pnet_find_roce_resource(struct sock *sk, struct smc_init_info *ini)
 {
-	struct dst_entry *dst = sk_dst_get(sk);
-
-	if (!dst)
-		goto out;
-	if (!dst->dev)
-		goto out_rel;
+	struct net_device *dev;
+	struct dst_entry *dst;
 
-	smc_pnet_find_roce_by_pnetid(dst->dev, ini);
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);
+	dev = dst ? dst_dev_rcu(dst) : NULL;
+	dev_hold(dev);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 
-out_rel:
-	dst_release(dst);
-out:
-	return;
+	if (dev) {
+		smc_pnet_find_roce_by_pnetid(dev, ini);
+		dev_put(dev);
+	}
 }
 
 void smc_pnet_find_ism_resource(struct sock *sk, struct smc_init_info *ini)
 {
-	struct dst_entry *dst = sk_dst_get(sk);
+	struct net_device *dev;
+	struct dst_entry *dst;
 
 	ini->ism_dev[0] = NULL;
-	if (!dst)
-		goto out;
-	if (!dst->dev)
-		goto out_rel;
 
-	smc_pnet_find_ism_by_pnetid(dst->dev, ini);
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);
+	dev = dst ? dst_dev_rcu(dst) : NULL;
+	dev_hold(dev);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 
-out_rel:
-	dst_release(dst);
-out:
-	return;
+	if (dev) {
+		smc_pnet_find_ism_by_pnetid(dev, ini);
+		dev_put(dev);
+	}
 }
 
 /* Lookup and apply a pnet table entry to the given ib device.
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 20/91] KVM: arm64: Prevent access to vCPU events before init

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>

[ Upstream commit 0aa1b76fe1429629215a7c79820e4b96233ac4a3 ]

Another day, another syzkaller bug. KVM erroneously allows userspace to
pend vCPU events for a vCPU that hasn't been initialized yet, leading to
KVM interpreting a bunch of uninitialized garbage for routing /
injecting the exception.

In one case the injection code and the hyp disagree on whether the vCPU
has a 32bit EL1 and put the vCPU into an illegal mode for AArch64,
tripping the BUG() in exception_target_el() during the next injection:

  kernel BUG at arch/arm64/kvm/inject_fault.c:40!
  Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1]  SMP
  CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 318 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.17.0-rc4-00104-g10fd0285305d #6 PREEMPT
  Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
  pstate: 21402009 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
  pc : exception_target_el+0x88/0x8c
  lr : pend_serror_exception+0x18/0x13c
  sp : ffff800082f03a10
  x29: ffff800082f03a10 x28: ffff0000cb132280 x27: 0000000000000000
  x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff0000c2a99c20 x24: 0000000000000000
  x23: 0000000000008000 x22: 0000000000000002 x21: 0000000000000004
  x20: 0000000000008000 x19: ffff0000c2a99c20 x18: 0000000000000000
  x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 00000000200000c0
  x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
  x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000000
  x8 : ffff800082f03af8 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
  x5 : ffff800080f621f0 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
  x2 : 000000000040009b x1 : 0000000000000003 x0 : ffff0000c2a99c20
  Call trace:
   exception_target_el+0x88/0x8c (P)
   kvm_inject_serror_esr+0x40/0x3b4
   __kvm_arm_vcpu_set_events+0xf0/0x100
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x180/0x9d4
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x60c/0x9f4
   __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xac/0x104
   invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110
   el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0
   do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
   el0_svc+0x34/0xf0
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe4
   el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
  Code: f946bc01 b4fffe61 9101e020 17fffff2 (d4210000)

Reject the ioctls outright as no sane VMM would call these before
KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT anyway. Even if it did the exception would've been
thrown away by the eventual reset of the vCPU's state.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.17
Fixes: b7b27facc7b5 ("arm/arm64: KVM: Add KVM_GET/SET_VCPU_EVENTS")
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
index d581aedf00190..37a6545238187 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
@@ -1497,6 +1497,9 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
 	case KVM_GET_VCPU_EVENTS: {
 		struct kvm_vcpu_events events;
 
+		if (!kvm_vcpu_initialized(vcpu))
+			return -ENOEXEC;
+
 		if (kvm_arm_vcpu_get_events(vcpu, &events))
 			return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -1508,6 +1511,9 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
 	case KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS: {
 		struct kvm_vcpu_events events;
 
+		if (!kvm_vcpu_initialized(vcpu))
+			return -ENOEXEC;
+
 		if (copy_from_user(&events, argp, sizeof(events)))
 			return -EFAULT;
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 21/91] smc: Use __sk_dst_get() and dst_dev_rcu() in in smc_clc_prfx_set().

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 935d783e5de9b64587f3adb25641dd8385e64ddb ]

smc_clc_prfx_set() is called during connect() and not under RCU
nor RTNL.

Using sk_dst_get(sk)->dev could trigger UAF.

Let's use __sk_dst_get() and dev_dst_rcu() under rcu_read_lock()
after kernel_getsockname().

Note that the returned value of smc_clc_prfx_set() is not used
in the caller.

While at it, we change the 1st arg of smc_clc_prfx_set[46]_rcu()
not to touch dst there.

Fixes: a046d57da19f ("smc: CLC handshake (incl. preparation steps)")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250916214758.650211-3-kuniyu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/smc/smc_clc.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/smc/smc_clc.c b/net/smc/smc_clc.c
index 1bf6cd010f04a..1859682dfb1cd 100644
--- a/net/smc/smc_clc.c
+++ b/net/smc/smc_clc.c
@@ -508,10 +508,10 @@ static bool smc_clc_msg_hdr_valid(struct smc_clc_msg_hdr *clcm, bool check_trl)
 }
 
 /* find ipv4 addr on device and get the prefix len, fill CLC proposal msg */
-static int smc_clc_prfx_set4_rcu(struct dst_entry *dst, __be32 ipv4,
+static int smc_clc_prfx_set4_rcu(struct net_device *dev, __be32 ipv4,
 				 struct smc_clc_msg_proposal_prefix *prop)
 {
-	struct in_device *in_dev = __in_dev_get_rcu(dst->dev);
+	struct in_device *in_dev = __in_dev_get_rcu(dev);
 	const struct in_ifaddr *ifa;
 
 	if (!in_dev)
@@ -529,12 +529,12 @@ static int smc_clc_prfx_set4_rcu(struct dst_entry *dst, __be32 ipv4,
 }
 
 /* fill CLC proposal msg with ipv6 prefixes from device */
-static int smc_clc_prfx_set6_rcu(struct dst_entry *dst,
+static int smc_clc_prfx_set6_rcu(struct net_device *dev,
 				 struct smc_clc_msg_proposal_prefix *prop,
 				 struct smc_clc_ipv6_prefix *ipv6_prfx)
 {
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
-	struct inet6_dev *in6_dev = __in6_dev_get(dst->dev);
+	struct inet6_dev *in6_dev = __in6_dev_get(dev);
 	struct inet6_ifaddr *ifa;
 	int cnt = 0;
 
@@ -563,41 +563,44 @@ static int smc_clc_prfx_set(struct socket *clcsock,
 			    struct smc_clc_msg_proposal_prefix *prop,
 			    struct smc_clc_ipv6_prefix *ipv6_prfx)
 {
-	struct dst_entry *dst = sk_dst_get(clcsock->sk);
 	struct sockaddr_storage addrs;
 	struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
 	struct sockaddr_in *addr;
+	struct net_device *dev;
+	struct dst_entry *dst;
 	int rc = -ENOENT;
 
-	if (!dst) {
-		rc = -ENOTCONN;
-		goto out;
-	}
-	if (!dst->dev) {
-		rc = -ENODEV;
-		goto out_rel;
-	}
 	/* get address to which the internal TCP socket is bound */
 	if (kernel_getsockname(clcsock, (struct sockaddr *)&addrs) < 0)
-		goto out_rel;
+		goto out;
+
 	/* analyze IP specific data of net_device belonging to TCP socket */
 	addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&addrs;
+
 	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	dst = __sk_dst_get(clcsock->sk);
+	dev = dst ? dst_dev_rcu(dst) : NULL;
+	if (!dev) {
+		rc = -ENODEV;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
 	if (addrs.ss_family == PF_INET) {
 		/* IPv4 */
 		addr = (struct sockaddr_in *)&addrs;
-		rc = smc_clc_prfx_set4_rcu(dst, addr->sin_addr.s_addr, prop);
+		rc = smc_clc_prfx_set4_rcu(dev, addr->sin_addr.s_addr, prop);
 	} else if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&addr6->sin6_addr)) {
 		/* mapped IPv4 address - peer is IPv4 only */
-		rc = smc_clc_prfx_set4_rcu(dst, addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3],
+		rc = smc_clc_prfx_set4_rcu(dev, addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3],
 					   prop);
 	} else {
 		/* IPv6 */
-		rc = smc_clc_prfx_set6_rcu(dst, prop, ipv6_prfx);
+		rc = smc_clc_prfx_set6_rcu(dev, prop, ipv6_prfx);
 	}
+
+out_unlock:
 	rcu_read_unlock();
-out_rel:
-	dst_release(dst);
 out:
 	return rc;
 }
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 22/91] smc: Use __sk_dst_get() and dst_dev_rcu() in smc_clc_prfx_match().

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 235f81045c008169cc4e1955b4a64e118eebe61b ]

smc_clc_prfx_match() is called from smc_listen_work() and
not under RCU nor RTNL.

Using sk_dst_get(sk)->dev could trigger UAF.

Let's use __sk_dst_get() and dst_dev_rcu().

Note that the returned value of smc_clc_prfx_match() is not
used in the caller.

Fixes: a046d57da19f ("smc: CLC handshake (incl. preparation steps)")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250916214758.650211-4-kuniyu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/smc/smc_clc.c | 26 +++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/smc/smc_clc.c b/net/smc/smc_clc.c
index 1859682dfb1cd..571533c72661f 100644
--- a/net/smc/smc_clc.c
+++ b/net/smc/smc_clc.c
@@ -656,26 +656,26 @@ static int smc_clc_prfx_match6_rcu(struct net_device *dev,
 int smc_clc_prfx_match(struct socket *clcsock,
 		       struct smc_clc_msg_proposal_prefix *prop)
 {
-	struct dst_entry *dst = sk_dst_get(clcsock->sk);
+	struct net_device *dev;
+	struct dst_entry *dst;
 	int rc;
 
-	if (!dst) {
-		rc = -ENOTCONN;
-		goto out;
-	}
-	if (!dst->dev) {
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	dst = __sk_dst_get(clcsock->sk);
+	dev = dst ? dst_dev_rcu(dst) : NULL;
+	if (!dev) {
 		rc = -ENODEV;
-		goto out_rel;
+		goto out;
 	}
-	rcu_read_lock();
+
 	if (!prop->ipv6_prefixes_cnt)
-		rc = smc_clc_prfx_match4_rcu(dst->dev, prop);
+		rc = smc_clc_prfx_match4_rcu(dev, prop);
 	else
-		rc = smc_clc_prfx_match6_rcu(dst->dev, prop);
-	rcu_read_unlock();
-out_rel:
-	dst_release(dst);
+		rc = smc_clc_prfx_match6_rcu(dev, prop);
 out:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
 	return rc;
 }
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 23/91] ASoC: nau8821: Cancel delayed work on component remove

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Cristian Ciocaltea <cristian.ciocaltea@collabora.com>

[ Upstream commit dbd3fd05cddfdeec1e49b0a66269881c09eebd17 ]

Attempting to unload the driver while a jack detection work is pending
would likely crash the kernel when it is eventually scheduled for
execution:

[ 1984.896308] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffc10c2a20
[...]
[ 1984.896388] Hardware name: Valve Jupiter/Jupiter, BIOS F7A0131 01/30/2024
[ 1984.896396] Workqueue: events nau8821_jdet_work [snd_soc_nau8821]
[ 1984.896414] RIP: 0010:__mutex_lock+0x9f/0x11d0
[...]
[ 1984.896504] Call Trace:
[ 1984.896511]  <TASK>
[ 1984.896524]  ? snd_soc_dapm_disable_pin+0x26/0x60 [snd_soc_core]
[ 1984.896572]  ? snd_soc_dapm_disable_pin+0x26/0x60 [snd_soc_core]
[ 1984.896596]  snd_soc_dapm_disable_pin+0x26/0x60 [snd_soc_core]
[ 1984.896622]  nau8821_jdet_work+0xeb/0x1e0 [snd_soc_nau8821]
[ 1984.896636]  process_one_work+0x211/0x590
[ 1984.896649]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ 1984.896670]  worker_thread+0x1cd/0x3a0

Cancel unscheduled jdet_work or wait for its execution to finish before
the component driver gets removed.

Fixes: aab1ad11d69f ("ASoC: nau8821: new driver")
Fixes: ee70bacef1c6 ("ASoC: nau8821: Avoid unnecessary blocking in IRQ handler")
Signed-off-by: Cristian Ciocaltea <cristian.ciocaltea@collabora.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251231-nau8821-cleanup-v1-2-6b0b76cbbb64@collabora.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 sound/soc/codecs/nau8821.c | 9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/nau8821.c b/sound/soc/codecs/nau8821.c
index 3cf531258911b..0bfb4601fe333 100644
--- a/sound/soc/codecs/nau8821.c
+++ b/sound/soc/codecs/nau8821.c
@@ -1275,6 +1275,14 @@ static int nau8821_component_probe(struct snd_soc_component *component)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static void nau8821_component_remove(struct snd_soc_component *component)
+{
+	struct nau8821 *nau8821 = snd_soc_component_get_drvdata(component);
+
+	if (nau8821->jdet_active)
+		cancel_delayed_work_sync(&nau8821->jdet_work);
+};
+
 /**
  * nau8821_calc_fll_param - Calculate FLL parameters.
  * @fll_in: external clock provided to codec.
@@ -1633,6 +1641,7 @@ static int __maybe_unused nau8821_resume(struct snd_soc_component *component)
 
 static const struct snd_soc_component_driver nau8821_component_driver = {
 	.probe			= nau8821_component_probe,
+	.remove			= nau8821_component_remove,
 	.set_sysclk		= nau8821_set_sysclk,
 	.set_pll		= nau8821_set_fll,
 	.set_bias_level		= nau8821_set_bias_level,
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 24/91] bpf: Fix use-after-free in offloaded map/prog info fill

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>

[ Upstream commit a0c584fc18056709c8e047a82a6045d6c209f4ce ]

When querying info for an offloaded BPF map or program,
bpf_map_offload_info_fill_ns() and bpf_prog_offload_info_fill_ns()
obtain the network namespace with get_net(dev_net(offmap->netdev)).
However, the associated netdev's netns may be racing with teardown
during netns destruction. If the netns refcount has already reached 0,
get_net() performs a refcount_t increment on 0, triggering:

  refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.

Although rtnl_lock and bpf_devs_lock ensure the netdev pointer remains
valid, they cannot prevent the netns refcount from reaching zero.

Fix this by using maybe_get_net() instead of get_net(). maybe_get_net()
uses refcount_inc_not_zero() and returns NULL if the refcount is already
zero, which causes ns_get_path_cb() to fail and the caller to return
-ENOENT -- the correct behavior when the netns is being destroyed.

Fixes: 675fc275a3a2d ("bpf: offload: report device information for offloaded programs")
Fixes: 52775b33bb507 ("bpf: offload: report device information about offloaded maps")
Reported-by: Yinhao Hu <dddddd@hust.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Kaiyan Mei <M202472210@hust.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Dongliang Mu <dzm91@hust.edu.cn>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/f0aa3678-79c9-47ae-9e8c-02a3d1df160a@hust.edu.cn/
Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260409023733.168050-1-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/offload.c | 10 ++++------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/offload.c b/kernel/bpf/offload.c
index 87d6693d8233f..60c82c328d42a 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/offload.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/offload.c
@@ -437,9 +437,8 @@ static struct ns_common *bpf_prog_offload_info_fill_ns(void *private_data)
 
 	if (aux->offload) {
 		args->info->ifindex = aux->offload->netdev->ifindex;
-		net = dev_net(aux->offload->netdev);
-		get_net(net);
-		ns = &net->ns;
+		net = maybe_get_net(dev_net(aux->offload->netdev));
+		ns = net ? &net->ns : NULL;
 	} else {
 		args->info->ifindex = 0;
 		ns = NULL;
@@ -645,9 +644,8 @@ static struct ns_common *bpf_map_offload_info_fill_ns(void *private_data)
 
 	if (args->offmap->netdev) {
 		args->info->ifindex = args->offmap->netdev->ifindex;
-		net = dev_net(args->offmap->netdev);
-		get_net(net);
-		ns = &net->ns;
+		net = maybe_get_net(dev_net(args->offmap->netdev));
+		ns = net ? &net->ns : NULL;
 	} else {
 		args->info->ifindex = 0;
 		ns = NULL;
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 25/91] riscv: Fix register corruption from uninitialized cregs on error

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>

[ Upstream commit 6ebcbb53fc9bc30843054ed99fd60b8e542628f4 ]

compat_riscv_gpr_set() calls cregs_to_regs() unconditionally, even when
user_regset_copyin() fails. Since cregs is an uninitialized stack
variable, a copyin failure causes uninitialized stack data to be written
into the target task's pt_regs, corrupting its register state and
potentially leaking kernel stack contents.

compat_restore_sigcontext() has the same issue: it calls cregs_to_regs()
even when __copy_from_user() fails, leading to the same corruption of
the signal-returning task's register state on error.

Only call cregs_to_regs() when the user copy succeeds.

Fixes: 4608c159594f ("riscv: compat: ptrace: Add compat_arch_ptrace implement")
Fixes: 7383ee05314b ("riscv: compat: signal: Add rt_frame implementation")
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Assisted-by: Cursor:claude-4.6-opus-high-thinking
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260501062320.2339562-1-mikey@neuling.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/riscv/kernel/compat_signal.c | 2 ++
 arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c        | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/compat_signal.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/compat_signal.c
index 6ec4e34255a9a..cf3eb33a11e46 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/compat_signal.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/compat_signal.c
@@ -107,6 +107,8 @@ static long compat_restore_sigcontext(struct pt_regs *regs,
 
 	/* sc_regs is structured the same as the start of pt_regs */
 	err = __copy_from_user(&cregs, &sc->sc_regs, sizeof(sc->sc_regs));
+	if (unlikely(err))
+		return err;
 
 	cregs_to_regs(&cregs, regs);
 
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c
index 2afe460de16a6..be412db2ba1f3 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -327,8 +327,8 @@ static int compat_riscv_gpr_set(struct task_struct *target,
 	struct compat_user_regs_struct cregs;
 
 	ret = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, &cregs, 0, -1);
-
-	cregs_to_regs(&cregs, task_pt_regs(target));
+	if (!ret)
+		cregs_to_regs(&cregs, task_pt_regs(target));
 
 	return ret;
 }
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 26/91] Revert "PM: sleep: Use complete() in device_pm_sleep_init()"

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

This reverts commit 59096e2aa0f66008fab21a3ebf8e097bc026c060.

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/base/power/main.c | 6 +-----
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/base/power/main.c b/drivers/base/power/main.c
index dc3d30860ef32..ef5157fc8dcc5 100644
--- a/drivers/base/power/main.c
+++ b/drivers/base/power/main.c
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ void device_pm_sleep_init(struct device *dev)
 	dev->power.is_noirq_suspended = false;
 	dev->power.is_late_suspended = false;
 	init_completion(&dev->power.completion);
-	complete(&dev->power.completion);
+	complete_all(&dev->power.completion);
 	dev->power.wakeup = NULL;
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->power.entry);
 }
@@ -238,10 +238,6 @@ static void dpm_wait(struct device *dev, bool async)
 	if (!dev)
 		return;
 
-	/* Devices with no PM support don't use the completion. */
-	if (dev->power.no_pm)
-		return;
-
 	if (async || (pm_async_enabled && dev->power.async_suspend))
 		wait_for_completion(&dev->power.completion);
 }
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 27/91] ASoC: nau8821: Cancel pending work before suspend

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Cristian Ciocaltea <cristian.ciocaltea@collabora.com>

[ Upstream commit 7786b10688ac0ebeaff655923cbb2c7d34a98995 ]

A jack detection work that is unscheduled or in progress while executing
the suspend handler could trigger a race condition.

Ensure state consistency by cancelling any pending work or wait for its
execution to complete before processing the suspend.  Since driver
(re)enables both insert and eject interrupts on resume, there is no risk
to miss the related jack events.  Therefore, flush_delayed_work() is not
required here.

Fixes: aab1ad11d69f ("ASoC: nau8821: new driver")
Fixes: ee70bacef1c6 ("ASoC: nau8821: Avoid unnecessary blocking in IRQ handler")
Signed-off-by: Cristian Ciocaltea <cristian.ciocaltea@collabora.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251231-nau8821-cleanup-v1-3-6b0b76cbbb64@collabora.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 sound/soc/codecs/nau8821.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/nau8821.c b/sound/soc/codecs/nau8821.c
index 0bfb4601fe333..f20a0e1ba5320 100644
--- a/sound/soc/codecs/nau8821.c
+++ b/sound/soc/codecs/nau8821.c
@@ -1617,6 +1617,10 @@ static int __maybe_unused nau8821_suspend(struct snd_soc_component *component)
 
 	if (nau8821->irq)
 		disable_irq(nau8821->irq);
+
+	if (nau8821->jdet_active)
+		cancel_delayed_work_sync(&nau8821->jdet_work);
+
 	snd_soc_component_force_bias_level(component, SND_SOC_BIAS_OFF);
 	/* Power down codec power; don't support button wakeup */
 	snd_soc_component_disable_pin(component, "MICBIAS");
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 28/91] smc: Use __sk_dst_get() and dst_dev_rcu() in smc_vlan_by_tcpsk().

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 0b0e4d51c6554e5ecc3f8cc73c2eaf12da21249a ]

smc_vlan_by_tcpsk() fetches sk_dst_get(sk)->dev before RTNL and
passes it to netdev_walk_all_lower_dev(), which is illegal.

Also, smc_vlan_by_tcpsk_walk() does not require RTNL at all.

Let's use __sk_dst_get(), dst_dev_rcu(), and
netdev_walk_all_lower_dev_rcu().

Note that the returned value of smc_vlan_by_tcpsk() is not used
in the caller.

Fixes: 0cfdd8f92cac ("smc: connection and link group creation")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250916214758.650211-5-kuniyu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/smc/smc_core.c | 27 ++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/smc/smc_core.c b/net/smc/smc_core.c
index 1e27617a5f88c..d325dbd012254 100644
--- a/net/smc/smc_core.c
+++ b/net/smc/smc_core.c
@@ -1827,35 +1827,32 @@ static int smc_vlan_by_tcpsk_walk(struct net_device *lower_dev,
 /* Determine vlan of internal TCP socket. */
 int smc_vlan_by_tcpsk(struct socket *clcsock, struct smc_init_info *ini)
 {
-	struct dst_entry *dst = sk_dst_get(clcsock->sk);
 	struct netdev_nested_priv priv;
 	struct net_device *ndev;
+	struct dst_entry *dst;
 	int rc = 0;
 
 	ini->vlan_id = 0;
-	if (!dst) {
-		rc = -ENOTCONN;
-		goto out;
-	}
-	if (!dst->dev) {
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	dst = __sk_dst_get(clcsock->sk);
+	ndev = dst ? dst_dev_rcu(dst) : NULL;
+	if (!ndev) {
 		rc = -ENODEV;
-		goto out_rel;
+		goto out;
 	}
 
-	ndev = dst->dev;
 	if (is_vlan_dev(ndev)) {
 		ini->vlan_id = vlan_dev_vlan_id(ndev);
-		goto out_rel;
+		goto out;
 	}
 
 	priv.data = (void *)&ini->vlan_id;
-	rtnl_lock();
-	netdev_walk_all_lower_dev(ndev, smc_vlan_by_tcpsk_walk, &priv);
-	rtnl_unlock();
-
-out_rel:
-	dst_release(dst);
+	netdev_walk_all_lower_dev_rcu(ndev, smc_vlan_by_tcpsk_walk, &priv);
 out:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
 	return rc;
 }
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 29/91] selinux: switch two allocations to use kzalloc_objs()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit cf6a513f1937581eb012a217b29817e025a1a0ef ]

These were the only two allocations in the policy loading logic
that were not already using kzalloc_objs() for the policy
data structures. Fix these to be consistent with the rest and
to protect against ill-formed policy.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 security/selinux/ss/conditional.c | 12 ++++++------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
index 81ff676f209a8..4cd908913b379 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -166,9 +166,9 @@ void cond_policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
 int cond_init_bool_indexes(struct policydb *p)
 {
 	kfree(p->bool_val_to_struct);
-	p->bool_val_to_struct = kmalloc_array(p->p_bools.nprim,
-					      sizeof(*p->bool_val_to_struct),
-					      GFP_KERNEL);
+	p->bool_val_to_struct = kcalloc(p->p_bools.nprim,
+					sizeof(*p->bool_val_to_struct),
+					GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!p->bool_val_to_struct)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	return 0;
@@ -714,9 +714,9 @@ static int duplicate_policydb_bools(struct policydb *newdb,
 	struct cond_bool_datum **cond_bool_array;
 	int rc;
 
-	cond_bool_array = kmalloc_array(orig->p_bools.nprim,
-					sizeof(*orig->bool_val_to_struct),
-					GFP_KERNEL);
+	cond_bool_array = kcalloc(orig->p_bools.nprim,
+				  sizeof(*orig->bool_val_to_struct),
+				  GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!cond_bool_array)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 30/91] net/sched: Fix mirred deadlock on device recursion

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 0f022d32c3eca477fbf79a205243a6123ed0fe11 ]

When the mirred action is used on a classful egress qdisc and a packet is
mirrored or redirected to self we hit a qdisc lock deadlock.
See trace below.

[..... other info removed for brevity....]
[   82.890906]
[   82.890906] ============================================
[   82.890906] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[   82.890906] 6.8.0-05205-g77fadd89fe2d-dirty #213 Tainted: G        W
[   82.890906] --------------------------------------------
[   82.890906] ping/418 is trying to acquire lock:
[   82.890906] ffff888006994110 (&sch->q.lock){+.-.}-{3:3}, at:
__dev_queue_xmit+0x1778/0x3550
[   82.890906]
[   82.890906] but task is already holding lock:
[   82.890906] ffff888006994110 (&sch->q.lock){+.-.}-{3:3}, at:
__dev_queue_xmit+0x1778/0x3550
[   82.890906]
[   82.890906] other info that might help us debug this:
[   82.890906]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[   82.890906]
[   82.890906]        CPU0
[   82.890906]        ----
[   82.890906]   lock(&sch->q.lock);
[   82.890906]   lock(&sch->q.lock);
[   82.890906]
[   82.890906]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[   82.890906]
[..... other info removed for brevity....]

Example setup (eth0->eth0) to recreate
tc qdisc add dev eth0 root handle 1: htb default 30
tc filter add dev eth0 handle 1: protocol ip prio 2 matchall \
     action mirred egress redirect dev eth0

Another example(eth0->eth1->eth0) to recreate
tc qdisc add dev eth0 root handle 1: htb default 30
tc filter add dev eth0 handle 1: protocol ip prio 2 matchall \
     action mirred egress redirect dev eth1

tc qdisc add dev eth1 root handle 1: htb default 30
tc filter add dev eth1 handle 1: protocol ip prio 2 matchall \
     action mirred egress redirect dev eth0

We fix this by adding an owner field (CPU id) to struct Qdisc set after
root qdisc is entered. When the softirq enters it a second time, if the
qdisc owner is the same CPU, the packet is dropped to break the loop.

Reported-by: Mingshuai Ren <renmingshuai@huawei.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240314111713.5979-1-renmingshuai@huawei.com/
Fixes: 3bcb846ca4cf ("net: get rid of spin_trylock() in net_tx_action()")
Fixes: e578d9c02587 ("net: sched: use counter to break reclassify loops")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Victor Nogueira <victor@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
Tested-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240415210728.36949-1-victor@mojatatu.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 include/net/sch_generic.h | 1 +
 net/core/dev.c            | 6 ++++++
 net/sched/sch_generic.c   | 1 +
 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/net/sch_generic.h b/include/net/sch_generic.h
index 4a157ab9a724f..0ec685beb2fc5 100644
--- a/include/net/sch_generic.h
+++ b/include/net/sch_generic.h
@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ struct Qdisc {
 	struct qdisc_skb_head	q;
 	struct gnet_stats_basic_sync bstats;
 	struct gnet_stats_queue	qstats;
+	int                     owner;
 	unsigned long		state;
 	unsigned long		state2; /* must be written under qdisc spinlock */
 	struct Qdisc            *next_sched;
diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c
index 8b0a0d449afdf..f2c7bb0fc7f9c 100644
--- a/net/core/dev.c
+++ b/net/core/dev.c
@@ -3901,6 +3901,10 @@ static inline int __dev_xmit_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *q,
 		return rc;
 	}
 
+	if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(q->owner) == smp_processor_id())) {
+		kfree_skb_reason(skb, SKB_DROP_REASON_TC_RECLASSIFY_LOOP);
+		return NET_XMIT_DROP;
+	}
 	/*
 	 * Heuristic to force contended enqueues to serialize on a
 	 * separate lock before trying to get qdisc main lock.
@@ -3940,7 +3944,9 @@ static inline int __dev_xmit_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *q,
 		qdisc_run_end(q);
 		rc = NET_XMIT_SUCCESS;
 	} else {
+		WRITE_ONCE(q->owner, smp_processor_id());
 		rc = dev_qdisc_enqueue(skb, q, &to_free, txq);
+		WRITE_ONCE(q->owner, -1);
 		if (qdisc_run_begin(q)) {
 			if (unlikely(contended)) {
 				spin_unlock(&q->busylock);
diff --git a/net/sched/sch_generic.c b/net/sched/sch_generic.c
index 714e51f8d46e9..1bb8862698030 100644
--- a/net/sched/sch_generic.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_generic.c
@@ -986,6 +986,7 @@ struct Qdisc *qdisc_alloc(struct netdev_queue *dev_queue,
 	sch->enqueue = ops->enqueue;
 	sch->dequeue = ops->dequeue;
 	sch->dev_queue = dev_queue;
+	sch->owner = -1;
 	netdev_hold(dev, &sch->dev_tracker, GFP_KERNEL);
 	refcount_set(&sch->refcnt, 1);
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 31/91] net/sched: initialize noop_qdisc owner

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>

[ Upstream commit 44180feaccf266d9b0b28cc4ceaac019817deb5c ]

When the noop_qdisc owner isn't initialized, then it will be 0,
so packets will erroneously be regarded as having been subject
to recursion as long as only CPU 0 queues them. For non-SMP,
that's all packets, of course. This causes a change in what's
reported to userspace, normally noop_qdisc would drop packets
silently, but with this change the syscall returns -ENOBUFS if
RECVERR is also set on the socket.

Fix this by initializing the owner field to -1, just like it
would be for dynamically allocated qdiscs by qdisc_alloc().

Fixes: 0f022d32c3ec ("net/sched: Fix mirred deadlock on device recursion")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240607175340.786bfb938803.I493bf8422e36be4454c08880a8d3703cea8e421a@changeid
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/sched/sch_generic.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/net/sched/sch_generic.c b/net/sched/sch_generic.c
index 1bb8862698030..65561ecae516b 100644
--- a/net/sched/sch_generic.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_generic.c
@@ -684,6 +684,7 @@ struct Qdisc noop_qdisc = {
 		.qlen = 0,
 		.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(noop_qdisc.skb_bad_txq.lock),
 	},
+	.owner = -1,
 };
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(noop_qdisc);
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 32/91] powerpc/hv-gpci: fix preempt count leak in sysfs show paths

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Aboorva Devarajan <aboorvad@linux.ibm.com>

[ Upstream commit dbc30a57bd8e026995e9fa8e8c31cffd18542c01 ]

Four sysfs show() callbacks in hv-gpci take get_cpu_var(hv_gpci_reqb)
(which calls preempt_disable()) but only call the matching put_cpu_var()
on the error path under the 'out:' label. Every successful read leaks
one preempt_disable():

  processor_bus_topology_show()
  processor_config_show()
  affinity_domain_via_virtual_processor_show()
  affinity_domain_via_domain_show()

(affinity_domain_via_partition_show() was already correct.)

On a CONFIG_PREEMPT=y kernel, repeated reads raise preempt_count and
eventually return to userspace with preemption still disabled. The
next user-mode page fault then hits faulthandler_disabled() == 1,
gets forced to SIGSEGV, and the resulting coredump trips
'BUG: scheduling while atomic' in call_usermodehelper_exec ->
wait_for_completion_state -> schedule:

  BUG: scheduling while atomic: <task>/<pid>/0x00000004
  ...
  __schedule_bug+0x6c/0x90
  __schedule+0x58c/0x13a0
  schedule+0x48/0x1a0
  schedule_timeout+0x104/0x170
  wait_for_completion_state+0x16c/0x330
  call_usermodehelper_exec+0x254/0x2d0
  vfs_coredump+0x1050/0x2590
  get_signal+0xb9c/0xc80
  do_notify_resume+0xf8/0x470

Add an out_success label that calls put_cpu_var() before returning
the byte count, mirroring affinity_domain_via_partition_show().

Fixes: 71f1c39647d8 ("powerpc/hv_gpci: Add sysfs file inside hv_gpci device to show processor bus topology information")
Fixes: 1a160c2a13c6 ("powerpc/hv_gpci: Add sysfs file inside hv_gpci device to show processor config information")
Fixes: 71a7ccb478fc ("powerpc/hv_gpci: Add sysfs file inside hv_gpci device to show affinity domain via virtual processor information")
Fixes: a69a57cac1ec ("powerpc/hv_gpci: Add sysfs file inside hv_gpci device to show affinity domain via domain information")
Signed-off-by: Aboorva Devarajan <aboorvad@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) <ritesh.list@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260508041256.3447113-1-aboorvad@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/powerpc/perf/hv-gpci.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/perf/hv-gpci.c b/arch/powerpc/perf/hv-gpci.c
index 241551d1282f8..0ec0bd3110652 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/perf/hv-gpci.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/perf/hv-gpci.c
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static ssize_t processor_bus_topology_show(struct device *dev, struct device_att
 			0, 0, buf, &n, arg);
 
 	if (!ret)
-		return n;
+		goto out_success;
 
 	if (ret != H_PARAMETER)
 		goto out;
@@ -244,12 +244,14 @@ static ssize_t processor_bus_topology_show(struct device *dev, struct device_att
 				starting_index, 0, buf, &n, arg);
 
 		if (!ret)
-			return n;
+			goto out_success;
 
 		if (ret != H_PARAMETER)
 			goto out;
 	}
 
+out_success:
+	put_cpu_var(hv_gpci_reqb);
 	return n;
 
 out:
@@ -278,7 +280,7 @@ static ssize_t processor_config_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute
 			0, 0, buf, &n, arg);
 
 	if (!ret)
-		return n;
+		goto out_success;
 
 	if (ret != H_PARAMETER)
 		goto out;
@@ -312,12 +314,14 @@ static ssize_t processor_config_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute
 				starting_index, 0, buf, &n, arg);
 
 		if (!ret)
-			return n;
+			goto out_success;
 
 		if (ret != H_PARAMETER)
 			goto out;
 	}
 
+out_success:
+	put_cpu_var(hv_gpci_reqb);
 	return n;
 
 out:
@@ -346,7 +350,7 @@ static ssize_t affinity_domain_via_virtual_processor_show(struct device *dev,
 			0, 0, buf, &n, arg);
 
 	if (!ret)
-		return n;
+		goto out_success;
 
 	if (ret != H_PARAMETER)
 		goto out;
@@ -382,12 +386,14 @@ static ssize_t affinity_domain_via_virtual_processor_show(struct device *dev,
 				starting_index, secondary_index, buf, &n, arg);
 
 		if (!ret)
-			return n;
+			goto out_success;
 
 		if (ret != H_PARAMETER)
 			goto out;
 	}
 
+out_success:
+	put_cpu_var(hv_gpci_reqb);
 	return n;
 
 out:
@@ -416,7 +422,7 @@ static ssize_t affinity_domain_via_domain_show(struct device *dev, struct device
 			0, 0, buf, &n, arg);
 
 	if (!ret)
-		return n;
+		goto out_success;
 
 	if (ret != H_PARAMETER)
 		goto out;
@@ -448,12 +454,14 @@ static ssize_t affinity_domain_via_domain_show(struct device *dev, struct device
 					starting_index, 0, buf, &n, arg);
 
 		if (!ret)
-			return n;
+			goto out_success;
 
 		if (ret != H_PARAMETER)
 			goto out;
 	}
 
+out_success:
+	put_cpu_var(hv_gpci_reqb);
 	return n;
 
 out:
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 33/91] crypto: starfive - Do not free stack buffer

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jia Jie Ho <jiajie.ho@starfivetech.com>

[ Upstream commit d7f01649f4eaf1878472d3d3f480ae1e50d98f6c ]

RSA text data uses variable length buffer allocated in software stack.
Calling kfree on it causes undefined behaviour in subsequent operations.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #6.7+
Signed-off-by: Jia Jie Ho <jiajie.ho@starfivetech.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/crypto/starfive/jh7110-rsa.c | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/starfive/jh7110-rsa.c b/drivers/crypto/starfive/jh7110-rsa.c
index 1db9a3d02848b..3116828d60a07 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/starfive/jh7110-rsa.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/starfive/jh7110-rsa.c
@@ -303,7 +303,6 @@ static int starfive_rsa_enc_core(struct starfive_cryp_ctx *ctx, int enc)
 
 err_rsa_crypt:
 	writel(STARFIVE_RSA_RESET, cryp->base + STARFIVE_PKA_CACR_OFFSET);
-	kfree(rctx->rsa_data);
 	return ret;
 }
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 34/91] ksmbd: harden file lifetime during session teardown

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: DaeMyung Kang <charsyam@gmail.com>

commit a42896bebfcc287ed1e61d820a888e33b1eb80ce upstream.

__close_file_table_ids() is the per-session teardown that closes every
fp belonging to a session (or to one tree connect on that session) by
walking the session's volatile-id idr.  The current loop has three
related problems on busy or racing workloads:

  * Sleeping under ft->lock.  The session-teardown skip callback,
    session_fd_check(), already sleeps in ksmbd_vfs_copy_durable_owner()
    -> kstrdup(GFP_KERNEL) and down_write(&fp->f_ci->m_lock) (a
    rw_semaphore).  Running the callback inside write_lock(&ft->lock)
    trips CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP / CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING on a
    durable-fd workload.

  * Refcount accounting blind to f_state.  The unconditional
    atomic_dec_and_test(&fp->refcount) does not distinguish
    FP_INITED (idr-owned reference still intact) from FP_CLOSED (an
    earlier ksmbd_close_fd() already consumed the idr-owned reference
    while leaving fp in the idr because a holder kept refcount
    non-zero).  When the latter races with teardown the same path
    over-decrements into a holder reference and ksmbd_fd_put() later
    UAFs that holder.

  * FP_NEW window.  Between __open_id() publishing fp into the
    session idr and ksmbd_update_fstate(..., FP_INITED) committing the
    transition at the end of smb2_open(), an fp is in FP_NEW and an
    intervening teardown that takes a transient reference and
    unpublishes the volatile id leaves the original idr-owned
    reference orphaned -- the opener is unaware that fp has been
    unpublished, returns success to the client, and the fp leaks at
    refcount = 1.

Refactor __close_file_table_ids() to take a transient reference on fp
and unpublish fp from the session idr *under ft->lock* before calling
skip() outside the lock.  A transient ref protects lifetime but not
concurrent field mutation, so the idr_remove() is what keeps
__ksmbd_lookup_fd() through this session's idr from granting a new
ksmbd_fp_get() reference to an fp whose fp->conn / fp->tcon /
fp->volatile_id / op->conn / lock_list links are about to be rewritten
by session_fd_check().  Durable reconnect is unaffected because it
reaches fp through the global durable table (ksmbd_lookup_durable_fd
-> global_ft).

Decide n_to_drop together with any FP_INITED -> FP_CLOSED transition
under ft->lock so teardown and ksmbd_close_fd() never both consume the
idr-owned reference.  See ksmbd_mark_fp_closed() for the per-state
accounting.  For the FP_NEW path to be safe, the opener has to learn
that fp was unpublished: ksmbd_update_fstate() now returns -ENOENT
when an FP_NEW -> FP_INITED transition finds f_state already advanced
or the volatile id cleared (both committed by teardown under
ft->lock); smb2_open() propagates that as STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_INVALID
and drops the original reference via ksmbd_fd_put().

The list removal cannot be left for a deferred final putter because
fp->volatile_id has already been cleared and __ksmbd_remove_fd() will
intentionally skip both idr_remove() and list_del_init().  Move the
m_fp_list unlink in __ksmbd_remove_fd() above the volatile-id check so
that an FP_NEW fp that happened to be added to m_fp_list (smb2_open()
adds fp->node before ksmbd_update_fstate() runs) is still cleaned up
on the deferred putter path; list_del_init() on an empty node is a
no-op and remains safe for fps that were never added.

Add a defensive guard in session_fd_check() that refuses non-FP_INITED
fps so that even if a teardown reaches an FP_NEW fp it falls into the
close branch (where the n_to_drop = 1 accounting keeps the opener's
reference alive) instead of the durable-preserve branch (which mutates
fp->conn / fp->tcon).

Validation on a debug kernel additionally built with CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST
and CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_WORK used a same-session two-tcon workload
(open/write storm on one tcon, 50 tree disconnects on the other) and
reported no list-corruption, work_struct ODEBUG, sleep-in-atomic,
lockdep or kmemleak reports.  Reverting only the
__close_file_table_ids() hunk while keeping a forced-is_reconnectable()
harness produced the expected sleep-in-atomic at vfs_cache.c:1095,
confirming the ft->lock-out-of-sleepable-skip discipline.

KASAN-enabled direct SMB2 coverage with durable handles enabled
exercised ksmbd_close_tree_conn_fds(), ksmbd_close_session_fds(),
the FP_NEW failure path, tree_conn_fd_check(), and a non-zero
session_fd_check() durable-preserve return.  This produced no KASAN,
DEBUG_LIST, ODEBUG, or WARNING reports.

Fixes: f44158485826 ("cifsd: add file operations")
Signed-off-by: DaeMyung Kang <charsyam@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c   |    6 +
 fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c |  179 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.h |    4 -
 3 files changed, 164 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
@@ -3751,8 +3751,10 @@ err_out1:
 
 err_out2:
 	if (!rc) {
-		ksmbd_update_fstate(&work->sess->file_table, fp, FP_INITED);
-		rc = ksmbd_iov_pin_rsp(work, (void *)rsp, iov_len);
+		rc = ksmbd_update_fstate(&work->sess->file_table, fp,
+					 FP_INITED);
+		if (!rc)
+			rc = ksmbd_iov_pin_rsp(work, (void *)rsp, iov_len);
 	}
 	if (rc) {
 		if (rc == -EINVAL)
--- a/fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c
@@ -358,13 +358,13 @@ static void ksmbd_remove_durable_fd(stru
 
 static void __ksmbd_remove_fd(struct ksmbd_file_table *ft, struct ksmbd_file *fp)
 {
-	if (!has_file_id(fp->volatile_id))
-		return;
-
 	down_write(&fp->f_ci->m_lock);
 	list_del_init(&fp->node);
 	up_write(&fp->f_ci->m_lock);
 
+	if (!has_file_id(fp->volatile_id))
+		return;
+
 	write_lock(&ft->lock);
 	idr_remove(ft->idr, fp->volatile_id);
 	write_unlock(&ft->lock);
@@ -748,15 +748,58 @@ err_out:
 	return ERR_PTR(ret);
 }
 
-void ksmbd_update_fstate(struct ksmbd_file_table *ft, struct ksmbd_file *fp,
-			 unsigned int state)
+/**
+ * ksmbd_update_fstate() - update an fp state under the file-table lock
+ * @ft: file table that publishes @fp's volatile id
+ * @fp: file pointer to update
+ * @state: new state
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success.  The FP_NEW -> FP_INITED transition is special:
+ * -ENOENT if teardown already unpublished @fp by advancing the state or
+ * clearing the volatile id.  Other state updates preserve the historical
+ * fire-and-forget behavior.
+ */
+int ksmbd_update_fstate(struct ksmbd_file_table *ft, struct ksmbd_file *fp,
+			unsigned int state)
 {
+	int ret;
+
 	if (!fp)
-		return;
+		return -ENOENT;
 
 	write_lock(&ft->lock);
-	fp->f_state = state;
+	if (state == FP_INITED &&
+	    (fp->f_state != FP_NEW || !has_file_id(fp->volatile_id))) {
+		ret = -ENOENT;
+	} else {
+		fp->f_state = state;
+		ret = 0;
+	}
 	write_unlock(&ft->lock);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ksmbd_mark_fp_closed() - mark fp closed under ft->lock and return how many
+ * refs the teardown path owns.
+ *
+ * FP_INITED has a normal idr-owned reference, so teardown owns both that
+ * reference and the transient lookup reference.  FP_NEW is still owned by the
+ * in-flight opener/reopener, which will drop the original reference after
+ * ksmbd_update_fstate(..., FP_INITED) observes the cleared volatile id.
+ * FP_CLOSED on entry means an earlier ksmbd_close_fd() already consumed the
+ * idr-owned ref.
+ */
+static int ksmbd_mark_fp_closed(struct ksmbd_file *fp)
+{
+	if (fp->f_state == FP_INITED) {
+		set_close_state_blocked_works(fp);
+		fp->f_state = FP_CLOSED;
+		return 2;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
 }
 
 static int
@@ -764,7 +807,8 @@ __close_file_table_ids(struct ksmbd_sess
 		       struct ksmbd_tree_connect *tcon,
 		       bool (*skip)(struct ksmbd_tree_connect *tcon,
 				    struct ksmbd_file *fp,
-				    struct ksmbd_user *user))
+				    struct ksmbd_user *user),
+		       bool skip_preserves_fp)
 {
 	struct ksmbd_file_table *ft = &sess->file_table;
 	struct ksmbd_file *fp;
@@ -772,32 +816,120 @@ __close_file_table_ids(struct ksmbd_sess
 	int num = 0;
 
 	while (1) {
+		int n_to_drop;
+
 		write_lock(&ft->lock);
 		fp = idr_get_next(ft->idr, &id);
 		if (!fp) {
 			write_unlock(&ft->lock);
 			break;
 		}
-
-		if (skip(tcon, fp, sess->user) ||
-		    !atomic_dec_and_test(&fp->refcount)) {
+		if (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&fp->refcount)) {
 			id++;
 			write_unlock(&ft->lock);
 			continue;
 		}
 
-		set_close_state_blocked_works(fp);
-		idr_remove(ft->idr, fp->volatile_id);
-		fp->volatile_id = KSMBD_NO_FID;
-		write_unlock(&ft->lock);
+		if (skip_preserves_fp) {
+			/*
+			 * Session teardown: skip() is session_fd_check(),
+			 * which may sleep and mutates fp->conn / fp->tcon /
+			 * fp->volatile_id when it chooses to preserve fp
+			 * for durable reconnect.  Unpublish fp from the
+			 * session idr here, under ft->lock, so that
+			 * __ksmbd_lookup_fd() through this session cannot
+			 * grant a new ksmbd_fp_get() reference to an fp
+			 * whose fields are about to be rewritten outside
+			 * the lock.  Durable reconnect still reaches fp via
+			 * global_ft.
+			 */
+			idr_remove(ft->idr, id);
+			fp->volatile_id = KSMBD_NO_FID;
+			write_unlock(&ft->lock);
 
+			if (skip(tcon, fp, sess->user)) {
+				/*
+				 * session_fd_check() has converted fp to
+				 * durable-preserve state and cleared its
+				 * per-conn fields.  fp is already unpublished
+				 * above; the original idr-owned ref keeps it
+				 * alive for the durable scavenger.  Drop only
+				 * the transient ref.  atomic_dec() is safe --
+				 * atomic_inc_not_zero() succeeded on a
+				 * positive value and we added one more, so
+				 * refcount cannot be zero here.
+				 */
+				atomic_dec(&fp->refcount);
+				id++;
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			/*
+			 * Keep the close-state decision under the same lock
+			 * observed by ksmbd_update_fstate(), which is how an
+			 * in-flight FP_NEW opener learns that teardown has
+			 * cleared its volatile id.
+			 */
+			write_lock(&ft->lock);
+			n_to_drop = ksmbd_mark_fp_closed(fp);
+			write_unlock(&ft->lock);
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * Tree teardown: skip() is tree_conn_fd_check(), a
+			 * cheap pointer compare that doesn't sleep and has
+			 * no side effects, so keep the skip decision plus
+			 * the unpublish-and-mark-closed sequence atomic
+			 * under ft->lock.  fps belonging to other tree
+			 * connects (skip() == true) stay fully published in
+			 * the session idr with no lock window.
+			 */
+			if (skip(tcon, fp, sess->user)) {
+				atomic_dec(&fp->refcount);
+				write_unlock(&ft->lock);
+				id++;
+				continue;
+			}
+			idr_remove(ft->idr, id);
+			fp->volatile_id = KSMBD_NO_FID;
+			n_to_drop = ksmbd_mark_fp_closed(fp);
+			write_unlock(&ft->lock);
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * fp->volatile_id is already cleared to prevent stale idr
+		 * removal from a deferred final close.  Remove fp from
+		 * m_fp_list here because __ksmbd_remove_fd() will skip the
+		 * list unlink when volatile_id is KSMBD_NO_FID.
+		 */
 		down_write(&fp->f_ci->m_lock);
 		list_del_init(&fp->node);
 		up_write(&fp->f_ci->m_lock);
 
-		__ksmbd_close_fd(ft, fp);
-
-		num++;
+		/*
+		 * Drop the references this iteration owns:
+		 *
+		 *   n_to_drop == 2: we observed FP_INITED and committed
+		 *     the FP_CLOSED transition ourselves, so we own the
+		 *     transient (+1) and the still-intact idr-owned ref.
+		 *
+		 *   n_to_drop == 1: either a prior ksmbd_close_fd()
+		 *     already consumed the idr-owned ref, or fp was still
+		 *     FP_NEW and the in-flight opener/reopener must keep
+		 *     the original reference until ksmbd_update_fstate()
+		 *     observes the cleared volatile id.
+		 *
+		 * If we end up as the final putter, finalize fp and
+		 * account the open_files_count decrement via the caller's
+		 * atomic_sub(num, ...).  Otherwise the remaining user's
+		 * ksmbd_fd_put() reaches __put_fd_final(), which does its
+		 * own atomic_dec(&open_files_count), so we must not count
+		 * this fp here -- doing so would double-decrement the
+		 * connection-wide counter.
+		 */
+		if (atomic_sub_and_test(n_to_drop, &fp->refcount)) {
+			__ksmbd_close_fd(NULL, fp);
+			num++;
+		}
 		id++;
 	}
 
@@ -1077,6 +1209,9 @@ static bool session_fd_check(struct ksmb
 	if (!is_reconnectable(fp))
 		return false;
 
+	if (fp->f_state != FP_INITED)
+		return false;
+
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!fp->conn))
 		return false;
 
@@ -1128,7 +1263,8 @@ void ksmbd_close_tree_conn_fds(struct ks
 {
 	int num = __close_file_table_ids(work->sess,
 					 work->tcon,
-					 tree_conn_fd_check);
+					 tree_conn_fd_check,
+					 false);
 
 	atomic_sub(num, &work->conn->stats.open_files_count);
 }
@@ -1137,7 +1273,8 @@ void ksmbd_close_session_fds(struct ksmb
 {
 	int num = __close_file_table_ids(work->sess,
 					 work->tcon,
-					 session_fd_check);
+					 session_fd_check,
+					 true);
 
 	atomic_sub(num, &work->conn->stats.open_files_count);
 }
@@ -1277,7 +1414,7 @@ void ksmbd_destroy_file_table(struct ksm
 	if (!ft->idr)
 		return;
 
-	__close_file_table_ids(sess, NULL, session_fd_check);
+	__close_file_table_ids(sess, NULL, session_fd_check, true);
 	idr_destroy(ft->idr);
 	kfree(ft->idr);
 	ft->idr = NULL;
--- a/fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.h
+++ b/fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.h
@@ -172,8 +172,8 @@ int ksmbd_close_inode_fds(struct ksmbd_w
 int ksmbd_init_global_file_table(void);
 void ksmbd_free_global_file_table(void);
 void ksmbd_set_fd_limit(unsigned long limit);
-void ksmbd_update_fstate(struct ksmbd_file_table *ft, struct ksmbd_file *fp,
-			 unsigned int state);
+int ksmbd_update_fstate(struct ksmbd_file_table *ft, struct ksmbd_file *fp,
+			unsigned int state);
 bool ksmbd_vfs_compare_durable_owner(struct ksmbd_file *fp,
 		struct ksmbd_user *user);
 

[PATCH 6.6 35/91] ext4: make state in ext4_mb_mark_bb to be bool

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kemeng Shi <shikemeng@huaweicloud.com>

[ Upstream commit d2f7cf40ea89b486fb7a25f5ab9a5d3ce26fb4bb ]

As state could only be either 0 or 1, just make it bool.

Signed-off-by: Kemeng Shi <shikemeng@huaweicloud.com>
Reviewed-by: "Ritesh Harjani (IBM)" <ritesh.list@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230928160407.142069-2-shikemeng@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Stable-dep-of: d8b8dd3530bf ("ext4: propagate errors from fast commit range replay")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/ext4/ext4.h        |    2 +-
 fs/ext4/extents.c     |    4 ++--
 fs/ext4/fast_commit.c |    8 ++++----
 fs/ext4/mballoc.c     |    4 ++--
 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h
+++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h
@@ -2940,7 +2940,7 @@ extern int ext4_group_add_blocks(handle_
 extern int ext4_trim_fs(struct super_block *, struct fstrim_range *);
 extern void ext4_process_freed_data(struct super_block *sb, tid_t commit_tid);
 extern void ext4_mb_mark_bb(struct super_block *sb, ext4_fsblk_t block,
-		       int len, int state);
+			    int len, bool state);
 static inline bool ext4_mb_cr_expensive(enum criteria cr)
 {
 	return cr >= CR_GOAL_LEN_SLOW;
--- a/fs/ext4/extents.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/extents.c
@@ -6207,13 +6207,13 @@ int ext4_ext_clear_bb(struct inode *inod
 				for (j = 0; j < path->p_depth; j++) {
 
 					ext4_mb_mark_bb(inode->i_sb,
-							path[j].p_block, 1, 0);
+							path[j].p_block, 1, false);
 					ext4_fc_record_regions(inode->i_sb, inode->i_ino,
 							0, path[j].p_block, 1, 1);
 				}
 				ext4_free_ext_path(path);
 			}
-			ext4_mb_mark_bb(inode->i_sb, map.m_pblk, map.m_len, 0);
+			ext4_mb_mark_bb(inode->i_sb, map.m_pblk, map.m_len, false);
 			ext4_fc_record_regions(inode->i_sb, inode->i_ino,
 					map.m_lblk, map.m_pblk, map.m_len, 1);
 		}
--- a/fs/ext4/fast_commit.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/fast_commit.c
@@ -1838,7 +1838,7 @@ static int ext4_fc_replay_add_range(stru
 			 * at the end of the FC replay using our array of
 			 * modified inodes.
 			 */
-			ext4_mb_mark_bb(inode->i_sb, map.m_pblk, map.m_len, 0);
+			ext4_mb_mark_bb(inode->i_sb, map.m_pblk, map.m_len, false);
 			goto next;
 		}
 
@@ -1907,7 +1907,7 @@ ext4_fc_replay_del_range(struct super_bl
 		if (ret > 0) {
 			remaining -= ret;
 			cur += ret;
-			ext4_mb_mark_bb(inode->i_sb, map.m_pblk, map.m_len, 0);
+			ext4_mb_mark_bb(inode->i_sb, map.m_pblk, map.m_len, false);
 		} else {
 			remaining -= map.m_len;
 			cur += map.m_len;
@@ -1966,12 +1966,12 @@ static void ext4_fc_set_bitmaps_and_coun
 				if (!IS_ERR(path)) {
 					for (j = 0; j < path->p_depth; j++)
 						ext4_mb_mark_bb(inode->i_sb,
-							path[j].p_block, 1, 1);
+							path[j].p_block, 1, true);
 					ext4_free_ext_path(path);
 				}
 				cur += ret;
 				ext4_mb_mark_bb(inode->i_sb, map.m_pblk,
-							map.m_len, 1);
+							map.m_len, true);
 			} else {
 				cur = cur + (map.m_len ? map.m_len : 1);
 			}
--- a/fs/ext4/mballoc.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/mballoc.c
@@ -4121,7 +4121,7 @@ out_err:
  * blocks in bitmaps and update counters.
  */
 void ext4_mb_mark_bb(struct super_block *sb, ext4_fsblk_t block,
-			int len, int state)
+		     int len, bool state)
 {
 	struct buffer_head *bitmap_bh = NULL;
 	struct ext4_group_desc *gdp;
@@ -6158,7 +6158,7 @@ ext4_mb_new_blocks_simple(struct ext4_al
 	}
 
 	block = ext4_group_first_block_no(sb, group) + EXT4_C2B(sbi, i);
-	ext4_mb_mark_bb(sb, block, 1, 1);
+	ext4_mb_mark_bb(sb, block, 1, true);
 	ar->len = 1;
 
 	*errp = 0;

[PATCH 6.6 36/91] ext4: make some fast commit functions reuse extents path

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit 2352e3e461926b59f01c1e39fbb0494891cff997 ]

The ext4_find_extent() can update the extent path so that it does not have
to allocate and free the path repeatedly, thus reducing the consumption of
memory allocation and freeing in the following functions:

    ext4_ext_clear_bb
    ext4_ext_replay_set_iblocks
    ext4_fc_replay_add_range
    ext4_fc_set_bitmaps_and_counters

No functional changes. Note that ext4_find_extent() does not support error
pointers, so in this case set path to NULL first.

Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240822023545.1994557-25-libaokun@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Stable-dep-of: d8b8dd3530bf ("ext4: propagate errors from fast commit range replay")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/ext4/extents.c     |   51 +++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------------
 fs/ext4/fast_commit.c |   11 ++++++----
 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/ext4/extents.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/extents.c
@@ -6092,12 +6092,9 @@ int ext4_ext_replay_set_iblocks(struct i
 	if (IS_ERR(path))
 		return PTR_ERR(path);
 	ex = path[path->p_depth].p_ext;
-	if (!ex) {
-		ext4_free_ext_path(path);
+	if (!ex)
 		goto out;
-	}
 	end = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block) + ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
-	ext4_free_ext_path(path);
 
 	/* Count the number of data blocks */
 	cur = 0;
@@ -6123,32 +6120,28 @@ int ext4_ext_replay_set_iblocks(struct i
 	ret = skip_hole(inode, &cur);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto out;
-	path = ext4_find_extent(inode, cur, NULL, 0);
+	path = ext4_find_extent(inode, cur, path, 0);
 	if (IS_ERR(path))
 		goto out;
 	numblks += path->p_depth;
-	ext4_free_ext_path(path);
 	while (cur < end) {
-		path = ext4_find_extent(inode, cur, NULL, 0);
+		path = ext4_find_extent(inode, cur, path, 0);
 		if (IS_ERR(path))
 			break;
 		ex = path[path->p_depth].p_ext;
-		if (!ex) {
-			ext4_free_ext_path(path);
-			return 0;
-		}
+		if (!ex)
+			goto cleanup;
+
 		cur = max(cur + 1, le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block) +
 					ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex));
 		ret = skip_hole(inode, &cur);
-		if (ret < 0) {
-			ext4_free_ext_path(path);
+		if (ret < 0)
 			break;
-		}
-		path2 = ext4_find_extent(inode, cur, NULL, 0);
-		if (IS_ERR(path2)) {
-			ext4_free_ext_path(path);
+
+		path2 = ext4_find_extent(inode, cur, path2, 0);
+		if (IS_ERR(path2))
 			break;
-		}
+
 		for (i = 0; i <= max(path->p_depth, path2->p_depth); i++) {
 			cmp1 = cmp2 = 0;
 			if (i <= path->p_depth)
@@ -6160,13 +6153,14 @@ int ext4_ext_replay_set_iblocks(struct i
 			if (cmp1 != cmp2 && cmp2 != 0)
 				numblks++;
 		}
-		ext4_free_ext_path(path);
-		ext4_free_ext_path(path2);
 	}
 
 out:
 	inode->i_blocks = numblks << (inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits - 9);
 	ext4_mark_inode_dirty(NULL, inode);
+cleanup:
+	ext4_free_ext_path(path);
+	ext4_free_ext_path(path2);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -6187,12 +6181,9 @@ int ext4_ext_clear_bb(struct inode *inod
 	if (IS_ERR(path))
 		return PTR_ERR(path);
 	ex = path[path->p_depth].p_ext;
-	if (!ex) {
-		ext4_free_ext_path(path);
-		return 0;
-	}
+	if (!ex)
+		goto out;
 	end = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block) + ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
-	ext4_free_ext_path(path);
 
 	cur = 0;
 	while (cur < end) {
@@ -6202,16 +6193,16 @@ int ext4_ext_clear_bb(struct inode *inod
 		if (ret < 0)
 			break;
 		if (ret > 0) {
-			path = ext4_find_extent(inode, map.m_lblk, NULL, 0);
-			if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(path)) {
+			path = ext4_find_extent(inode, map.m_lblk, path, 0);
+			if (!IS_ERR(path)) {
 				for (j = 0; j < path->p_depth; j++) {
-
 					ext4_mb_mark_bb(inode->i_sb,
 							path[j].p_block, 1, false);
 					ext4_fc_record_regions(inode->i_sb, inode->i_ino,
 							0, path[j].p_block, 1, 1);
 				}
-				ext4_free_ext_path(path);
+			} else {
+				path = NULL;
 			}
 			ext4_mb_mark_bb(inode->i_sb, map.m_pblk, map.m_len, false);
 			ext4_fc_record_regions(inode->i_sb, inode->i_ino,
@@ -6220,5 +6211,7 @@ int ext4_ext_clear_bb(struct inode *inod
 		cur = cur + map.m_len;
 	}
 
+out:
+	ext4_free_ext_path(path);
 	return 0;
 }
--- a/fs/ext4/fast_commit.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/fast_commit.c
@@ -1798,7 +1798,7 @@ static int ext4_fc_replay_add_range(stru
 
 		if (ret == 0) {
 			/* Range is not mapped */
-			path = ext4_find_extent(inode, cur, NULL, 0);
+			path = ext4_find_extent(inode, cur, path, 0);
 			if (IS_ERR(path))
 				goto out;
 			memset(&newex, 0, sizeof(newex));
@@ -1814,7 +1814,6 @@ static int ext4_fc_replay_add_range(stru
 			up_write((&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem));
 			if (IS_ERR(path))
 				goto out;
-			ext4_free_ext_path(path);
 			goto next;
 		}
 
@@ -1862,6 +1861,7 @@ next:
 	ext4_ext_replay_shrink_inode(inode, i_size_read(inode) >>
 					sb->s_blocksize_bits);
 out:
+	ext4_free_ext_path(path);
 	iput(inode);
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -1962,12 +1962,13 @@ static void ext4_fc_set_bitmaps_and_coun
 				break;
 
 			if (ret > 0) {
-				path = ext4_find_extent(inode, map.m_lblk, NULL, 0);
+				path = ext4_find_extent(inode, map.m_lblk, path, 0);
 				if (!IS_ERR(path)) {
 					for (j = 0; j < path->p_depth; j++)
 						ext4_mb_mark_bb(inode->i_sb,
 							path[j].p_block, 1, true);
-					ext4_free_ext_path(path);
+				} else {
+					path = NULL;
 				}
 				cur += ret;
 				ext4_mb_mark_bb(inode->i_sb, map.m_pblk,
@@ -1978,6 +1979,8 @@ static void ext4_fc_set_bitmaps_and_coun
 		}
 		iput(inode);
 	}
+
+	ext4_free_ext_path(path);
 }
 
 /*

[PATCH 6.6 37/91] ext4: propagate errors from fast commit range replay

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Guanghui Yang <3497809730@qq.com>

[ Upstream commit d8b8dd3530bf41e14b118702cdaf9de64bb96885 ]

ext4_fc_replay() stops replaying fast commit tags only when a tag
handler returns a negative error. However, ext4_fc_replay_add_range()
and ext4_fc_replay_del_range() currently return 0 from their common
exit paths even after internal failures.

This hides errors from ext4_fc_record_modified_inode(),
ext4_map_blocks(), ext4_find_extent(), ext4_ext_insert_extent(),
ext4_ext_replay_update_ex(), and ext4_ext_remove_space(). As a result,
a failed ADD_RANGE or DEL_RANGE replay can be treated as successful and
the replay code may continue with subsequent fast commit tags.

This is particularly problematic for DEL_RANGE because it may already
have marked blocks as free before ext4_ext_remove_space() fails. If the
error is swallowed, replay may continue from a partially applied range
operation.

Return the saved error from the common exit paths and make the
ERR_PTR() cases in ADD_RANGE store PTR_ERR() before jumping to out.

Fixes: 8016e29f4362 ("ext4: fast commit recovery path")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Guanghui Yang <3497809730@qq.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/tencent_E3622146846A84C75C31C7D32AC4D5AD0605@qq.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/ext4/fast_commit.c |   16 ++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/ext4/fast_commit.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/fast_commit.c
@@ -1799,8 +1799,11 @@ static int ext4_fc_replay_add_range(stru
 		if (ret == 0) {
 			/* Range is not mapped */
 			path = ext4_find_extent(inode, cur, path, 0);
-			if (IS_ERR(path))
+			if (IS_ERR(path)) {
+				ret = PTR_ERR(path);
+				path = NULL;
 				goto out;
+			}
 			memset(&newex, 0, sizeof(newex));
 			newex.ee_block = cpu_to_le32(cur);
 			ext4_ext_store_pblock(
@@ -1812,8 +1815,11 @@ static int ext4_fc_replay_add_range(stru
 			path = ext4_ext_insert_extent(NULL, inode,
 						      path, &newex, 0);
 			up_write((&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem));
-			if (IS_ERR(path))
+			if (IS_ERR(path)) {
+				ret = PTR_ERR(path);
+				path = NULL;
 				goto out;
+			}
 			goto next;
 		}
 
@@ -1860,10 +1866,11 @@ next:
 	}
 	ext4_ext_replay_shrink_inode(inode, i_size_read(inode) >>
 					sb->s_blocksize_bits);
+	ret = 0;
 out:
 	ext4_free_ext_path(path);
 	iput(inode);
-	return 0;
+	return ret;
 }
 
 /* Replay DEL_RANGE tag */
@@ -1924,9 +1931,10 @@ ext4_fc_replay_del_range(struct super_bl
 	ext4_ext_replay_shrink_inode(inode,
 		i_size_read(inode) >> sb->s_blocksize_bits);
 	ext4_mark_inode_dirty(NULL, inode);
+	ret = 0;
 out:
 	iput(inode);
-	return 0;
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static void ext4_fc_set_bitmaps_and_counters(struct super_block *sb)

[PATCH 6.6 38/91] nilfs2: correct return value kernel-doc descriptions for ioctl functions

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 17c46a45cdb94c500f4e93b176cdd61931b03020 ]

Patch series "nilfs2: fix kernel-doc comments for function return values",
v2.

This series fixes the inadequacies in the return value descriptions in
nilfs2's kernel-doc comments (mainly incorrect formatting), as well as the
lack of return value descriptions themselves, and fixes most of the
remaining warnings that are output when the kernel-doc script is run with
the "-Wall" option.

This patch (of 7):

In the kernel-doc comments for functions, there are many cases where the
format of the return value description is inaccurate, such as "Return
Value: ...", which causes many warnings to be output when the kernel-doc
script is executed with the "-Wall" option.

This fixes such incorrectly formatted return value descriptions for ioctl
functions.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250110010530.21872-1-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250110010530.21872-2-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Cc: "Brian G ." <gissf1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Stable-dep-of: a1735eae5544 ("nilfs2: reject invalid block index in GC ioctl")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c |  231 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------------
 1 file changed, 95 insertions(+), 136 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c
@@ -32,17 +32,14 @@
  * @dofunc: concrete function of get/set metadata info
  *
  * Description: nilfs_ioctl_wrap_copy() gets/sets metadata info by means of
- * calling dofunc() function on the basis of @argv argument.
+ * calling dofunc() function on the basis of @argv argument.  If successful,
+ * the requested metadata information is copied to userspace memory.
  *
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned and requested metadata info
- * is copied into userspace. On error, one of the following
- * negative error codes is returned.
- *
- * %-EINVAL - Invalid arguments from userspace.
- *
- * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient amount of memory available.
- *
- * %-EFAULT - Failure during execution of requested operation.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or one of the following negative error codes on
+ * failure:
+ * * %-EFAULT	- Failure during execution of requested operation.
+ * * %-EINVAL	- Invalid arguments from userspace.
+ * * %-ENOMEM	- Insufficient memory available.
  */
 static int nilfs_ioctl_wrap_copy(struct the_nilfs *nilfs,
 				 struct nilfs_argv *argv, int dir,
@@ -176,13 +173,10 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_getversion(struct
  * given checkpoint between checkpoint and snapshot state. This ioctl
  * is used in chcp and mkcp utilities.
  *
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned and mode of a checkpoint is
- * changed. On error, one of the following negative error codes
- * is returned.
- *
- * %-EPERM - Operation not permitted.
- *
- * %-EFAULT - Failure during checkpoint mode changing.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or one of the following negative error codes on
+ * failure:
+ * %-EFAULT	- Failure during checkpoint mode changing.
+ * %-EPERM	- Operation not permitted.
  */
 static int nilfs_ioctl_change_cpmode(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
 				     unsigned int cmd, void __user *argp)
@@ -230,13 +224,10 @@ out:
  * checkpoint from NILFS2 file system. This ioctl is used in rmcp
  * utility.
  *
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned and a checkpoint is
- * removed. On error, one of the following negative error codes
- * is returned.
- *
- * %-EPERM - Operation not permitted.
- *
- * %-EFAULT - Failure during checkpoint removing.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or one of the following negative error codes on
+ * failure:
+ * %-EFAULT	- Failure during checkpoint removing.
+ * %-EPERM	- Operation not permitted.
  */
 static int
 nilfs_ioctl_delete_checkpoint(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
@@ -282,7 +273,7 @@ out:
  * requested checkpoints. The NILFS_IOCTL_GET_CPINFO ioctl is used in
  * lscp utility and by nilfs_cleanerd daemon.
  *
- * Return value: count of nilfs_cpinfo structures in output buffer.
+ * Return: Count of nilfs_cpinfo structures in output buffer.
  */
 static ssize_t
 nilfs_ioctl_do_get_cpinfo(struct the_nilfs *nilfs, __u64 *posp, int flags,
@@ -306,17 +297,14 @@ nilfs_ioctl_do_get_cpinfo(struct the_nil
  *
  * Description: nilfs_ioctl_get_cpstat() returns information about checkpoints.
  * The NILFS_IOCTL_GET_CPSTAT ioctl is used by lscp, rmcp utilities
- * and by nilfs_cleanerd daemon.
- *
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned, and checkpoints information is
- * copied into userspace pointer @argp. On error, one of the following
- * negative error codes is returned.
- *
- * %-EIO - I/O error.
+ * and by nilfs_cleanerd daemon.  The checkpoint statistics are copied to
+ * the userspace memory pointed to by @argp.
  *
- * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient amount of memory available.
- *
- * %-EFAULT - Failure during getting checkpoints statistics.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or one of the following negative error codes on
+ * failure:
+ * * %-EFAULT	- Failure during getting checkpoints statistics.
+ * * %-EIO	- I/O error.
+ * * %-ENOMEM	- Insufficient memory available.
  */
 static int nilfs_ioctl_get_cpstat(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
 				  unsigned int cmd, void __user *argp)
@@ -349,7 +337,8 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_get_cpstat(struct
  * info about requested segments. The NILFS_IOCTL_GET_SUINFO ioctl is used
  * in lssu, nilfs_resize utilities and by nilfs_cleanerd daemon.
  *
- * Return value: count of nilfs_suinfo structures in output buffer.
+ * Return: Count of nilfs_suinfo structures in output buffer on success,
+ * or a negative error code on failure.
  */
 static ssize_t
 nilfs_ioctl_do_get_suinfo(struct the_nilfs *nilfs, __u64 *posp, int flags,
@@ -373,17 +362,14 @@ nilfs_ioctl_do_get_suinfo(struct the_nil
  *
  * Description: nilfs_ioctl_get_sustat() returns segment usage statistics.
  * The NILFS_IOCTL_GET_SUSTAT ioctl is used in lssu, nilfs_resize utilities
- * and by nilfs_cleanerd daemon.
- *
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned, and segment usage information is
- * copied into userspace pointer @argp. On error, one of the following
- * negative error codes is returned.
- *
- * %-EIO - I/O error.
+ * and by nilfs_cleanerd daemon.  The requested segment usage information is
+ * copied to the userspace memory pointed to by @argp.
  *
- * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient amount of memory available.
- *
- * %-EFAULT - Failure during getting segment usage statistics.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or one of the following negative error codes on
+ * failure:
+ * * %-EFAULT	- Failure during getting segment usage statistics.
+ * * %-EIO	- I/O error.
+ * * %-ENOMEM	- Insufficient memory available.
  */
 static int nilfs_ioctl_get_sustat(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
 				  unsigned int cmd, void __user *argp)
@@ -416,7 +402,8 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_get_sustat(struct
  * on virtual block addresses. The NILFS_IOCTL_GET_VINFO ioctl is used
  * by nilfs_cleanerd daemon.
  *
- * Return value: count of nilfs_vinfo structures in output buffer.
+ * Return: Count of nilfs_vinfo structures in output buffer on success, or
+ * a negative error code on failure.
  */
 static ssize_t
 nilfs_ioctl_do_get_vinfo(struct the_nilfs *nilfs, __u64 *posp, int flags,
@@ -443,7 +430,8 @@ nilfs_ioctl_do_get_vinfo(struct the_nilf
  * about descriptors of disk block numbers. The NILFS_IOCTL_GET_BDESCS ioctl
  * is used by nilfs_cleanerd daemon.
  *
- * Return value: count of nilfs_bdescs structures in output buffer.
+ * Return: Count of nilfs_bdescs structures in output buffer on success, or
+ * a negative error code on failure.
  */
 static ssize_t
 nilfs_ioctl_do_get_bdescs(struct the_nilfs *nilfs, __u64 *posp, int flags,
@@ -480,19 +468,15 @@ nilfs_ioctl_do_get_bdescs(struct the_nil
  *
  * Description: nilfs_ioctl_do_get_bdescs() function returns information
  * about descriptors of disk block numbers. The NILFS_IOCTL_GET_BDESCS ioctl
- * is used by nilfs_cleanerd daemon.
- *
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned, and disk block descriptors are
- * copied into userspace pointer @argp. On error, one of the following
- * negative error codes is returned.
- *
- * %-EINVAL - Invalid arguments from userspace.
- *
- * %-EIO - I/O error.
- *
- * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient amount of memory available.
+ * is used by nilfs_cleanerd daemon.  If successful, disk block descriptors
+ * are copied to userspace pointer @argp.
  *
- * %-EFAULT - Failure during getting disk block descriptors.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or one of the following negative error codes on
+ * failure:
+ * * %-EFAULT	- Failure during getting disk block descriptors.
+ * * %-EINVAL	- Invalid arguments from userspace.
+ * * %-EIO	- I/O error.
+ * * %-ENOMEM	- Insufficient memory available.
  */
 static int nilfs_ioctl_get_bdescs(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
 				  unsigned int cmd, void __user *argp)
@@ -526,16 +510,12 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_get_bdescs(struct
  * Description: nilfs_ioctl_move_inode_block() function registers data/node
  * buffer in the GC pagecache and submit read request.
  *
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned. On error, one of the following
- * negative error codes is returned.
- *
- * %-EIO - I/O error.
- *
- * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient amount of memory available.
- *
- * %-ENOENT - Requested block doesn't exist.
- *
- * %-EEXIST - Blocks conflict is detected.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or one of the following negative error codes on
+ * failure:
+ * * %-EEXIST	- Block conflict detected.
+ * * %-EIO	- I/O error.
+ * * %-ENOENT	- Requested block doesn't exist.
+ * * %-ENOMEM	- Insufficient memory available.
  */
 static int nilfs_ioctl_move_inode_block(struct inode *inode,
 					struct nilfs_vdesc *vdesc,
@@ -590,8 +570,8 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_move_inode_block(
  * blocks that garbage collector specified with the array of nilfs_vdesc
  * structures and stores them into page caches of GC inodes.
  *
- * Return Value: Number of processed nilfs_vdesc structures or
- * error code, otherwise.
+ * Return: Number of processed nilfs_vdesc structures on success, or
+ * a negative error code on failure.
  */
 static int nilfs_ioctl_move_blocks(struct super_block *sb,
 				   struct nilfs_argv *argv, void *buf)
@@ -668,14 +648,11 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_move_blocks(struc
  * in the period from p_start to p_end, excluding p_end itself. The checkpoints
  * which have been already deleted are ignored.
  *
- * Return Value: Number of processed nilfs_period structures or
- * error code, otherwise.
- *
- * %-EIO - I/O error.
- *
- * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient amount of memory available.
- *
- * %-EINVAL - invalid checkpoints.
+ * Return: Number of processed nilfs_period structures on success, or one of
+ * the following negative error codes on failure:
+ * * %-EINVAL	- invalid checkpoints.
+ * * %-EIO	- I/O error.
+ * * %-ENOMEM	- Insufficient memory available.
  */
 static int nilfs_ioctl_delete_checkpoints(struct the_nilfs *nilfs,
 					  struct nilfs_argv *argv, void *buf)
@@ -703,14 +680,11 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_delete_checkpoint
  * Description: nilfs_ioctl_free_vblocknrs() function frees
  * the virtual block numbers specified by @buf and @argv->v_nmembs.
  *
- * Return Value: Number of processed virtual block numbers or
- * error code, otherwise.
- *
- * %-EIO - I/O error.
- *
- * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient amount of memory available.
- *
- * %-ENOENT - The virtual block number have not been allocated.
+ * Return: Number of processed virtual block numbers on success, or one of the
+ * following negative error codes on failure:
+ * * %-EIO	- I/O error.
+ * * %-ENOENT	- Unallocated virtual block number.
+ * * %-ENOMEM	- Insufficient memory available.
  */
 static int nilfs_ioctl_free_vblocknrs(struct the_nilfs *nilfs,
 				      struct nilfs_argv *argv, void *buf)
@@ -732,14 +706,11 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_free_vblocknrs(st
  * Description: nilfs_ioctl_mark_blocks_dirty() function marks
  * metadata file or data blocks as dirty.
  *
- * Return Value: Number of processed block descriptors or
- * error code, otherwise.
- *
- * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient memory available.
- *
- * %-EIO - I/O error
- *
- * %-ENOENT - the specified block does not exist (hole block)
+ * Return: Number of processed block descriptors on success, or one of the
+ * following negative error codes on failure:
+ * * %-EIO	- I/O error.
+ * * %-ENOENT	- Non-existent block (hole block).
+ * * %-ENOMEM	- Insufficient memory available.
  */
 static int nilfs_ioctl_mark_blocks_dirty(struct the_nilfs *nilfs,
 					 struct nilfs_argv *argv, void *buf)
@@ -844,7 +815,7 @@ int nilfs_ioctl_prepare_clean_segments(s
  * from userspace. The NILFS_IOCTL_CLEAN_SEGMENTS ioctl is used by
  * nilfs_cleanerd daemon.
  *
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned or error code, otherwise.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or a negative error code on failure.
  */
 static int nilfs_ioctl_clean_segments(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
 				      unsigned int cmd, void __user *argp)
@@ -970,20 +941,14 @@ out:
  * and metadata are written out to the device when it successfully
  * returned.
  *
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is retured. On errors, one of the following
- * negative error code is returned.
- *
- * %-EROFS - Read only filesystem.
- *
- * %-EIO - I/O error
- *
- * %-ENOSPC - No space left on device (only in a panic state).
- *
- * %-ERESTARTSYS - Interrupted.
- *
- * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient memory available.
- *
- * %-EFAULT - Failure during execution of requested operation.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or one of the following negative error codes on
+ * failure:
+ * * %-EFAULT		- Failure during execution of requested operation.
+ * * %-EIO		- I/O error.
+ * * %-ENOMEM		- Insufficient memory available.
+ * * %-ENOSPC		- No space left on device (only in a panic state).
+ * * %-ERESTARTSYS	- Interrupted.
+ * * %-EROFS		- Read only filesystem.
  */
 static int nilfs_ioctl_sync(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
 			    unsigned int cmd, void __user *argp)
@@ -1017,7 +982,7 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_sync(struct inode
  * @filp: file object
  * @argp: pointer on argument from userspace
  *
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned or error code, otherwise.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or a negative error code on failure.
  */
 static int nilfs_ioctl_resize(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
 			      void __user *argp)
@@ -1053,7 +1018,7 @@ out:
  * checks the arguments from userspace and calls nilfs_sufile_trim_fs, which
  * performs the actual trim operation.
  *
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned or negative error code, otherwise.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or a negative error code on failure.
  */
 static int nilfs_ioctl_trim_fs(struct inode *inode, void __user *argp)
 {
@@ -1095,7 +1060,7 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_trim_fs(struct in
  * of segments in bytes and upper limit of segments in bytes.
  * The NILFS_IOCTL_SET_ALLOC_RANGE is used by nilfs_resize utility.
  *
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned or error code, otherwise.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or a negative error code on failure.
  */
 static int nilfs_ioctl_set_alloc_range(struct inode *inode, void __user *argp)
 {
@@ -1146,17 +1111,15 @@ out:
  * @dofunc: concrete function of getting metadata info
  *
  * Description: nilfs_ioctl_get_info() gets metadata info by means of
- * calling dofunc() function.
- *
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned and requested metadata info
- * is copied into userspace. On error, one of the following
- * negative error codes is returned.
- *
- * %-EINVAL - Invalid arguments from userspace.
- *
- * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient amount of memory available.
+ * calling dofunc() function.  The requested metadata information is copied
+ * to userspace memory @argp.
  *
- * %-EFAULT - Failure during execution of requested operation.
+ * Return: 0 on success, or one of the following negative error codes on
+ * failure:
+ * * %-EFAULT	- Failure during execution of requested operation.
+ * * %-EINVAL	- Invalid arguments from userspace.
+ * * %-EIO	- I/O error.
+ * * %-ENOMEM	- Insufficient memory available.
  */
 static int nilfs_ioctl_get_info(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
 				unsigned int cmd, void __user *argp,
@@ -1196,18 +1159,14 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_get_info(struct i
  * encapsulated in nilfs_argv and updates the segment usage info
  * according to the flags in nilfs_suinfo_update.
  *
- * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned. On error, one of the
- * following negative error codes is returned.
- *
- * %-EPERM - Not enough permissions
- *
- * %-EFAULT - Error copying input data
- *
- * %-EIO - I/O error.
- *
- * %-ENOMEM - Insufficient amount of memory available.
- *
- * %-EINVAL - Invalid values in input (segment number, flags or nblocks)
+ * Return: 0 on success, or one of the following negative error codes on
+ * failure:
+ * * %-EEXIST	- Block conflict detected.
+ * * %-EFAULT	- Error copying input data.
+ * * %-EINVAL	- Invalid values in input (segment number, flags or nblocks).
+ * * %-EIO	- I/O error.
+ * * %-ENOMEM	- Insufficient memory available.
+ * * %-EPERM	- Not enough permissions.
  */
 static int nilfs_ioctl_set_suinfo(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
 				unsigned int cmd, void __user *argp)

[PATCH 6.6 39/91] nilfs2: reject invalid block index in GC ioctl

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit a1735eae55448bc79c2da6593455791e886f6ed8 ]

Syzbot reported list corruption caused by a double list_add_tail() call on
bh->b_assoc_buffers within nilfs_lookup_dirty_data_buffers().

Analysis revealed that the root cause was the insertion of a page/folio
with a page index of ULONG_MAX into the page cache via the GC ioctl.
filemap_get_folios_tag(), called by nilfs_lookup_dirty_data_buffers(),
repeatedly detects a dirty folio with a page index of ULONG_MAX due to
index wrap-around, leading to duplicate processing of dirty buffers.

As a preparatory step, the GC ioctl loads the page/folio of the block to
be moved during GC and inserts it into the page cache based on information
in the nilfs_vdesc structure passed as an argument.  Normally, this does
not cause issues because the user-space GC library configures the
nilfs_vdesc structure properly.  However, since there is no range check on
the parameters determining the page index, a request with artificially
crafted parameters -- such as those generated by Syzbot -- can result in a
page/folio being inserted with a page index of ULONG_MAX, triggering the
above problem.

This resolves the issue by checking the ranges of 'vd_offset' and
'vd_vblocknr' in the nilfs_vdesc structure that determine the page index,
thereby preventing the invalid page/folio insertions.

Reported-by: syzbot+c37bed40868932d790e9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c37bed40868932d790e9
Fixes: 7942b919f732 ("nilfs2: ioctl operations")
Cc: wuyankun <wuyankun@uniontech.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c |   20 ++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c
@@ -513,6 +513,7 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_get_bdescs(struct
  * Return: 0 on success, or one of the following negative error codes on
  * failure:
  * * %-EEXIST	- Block conflict detected.
+ * * %-EINVAL	- Invalid virtual block descriptor.
  * * %-EIO	- I/O error.
  * * %-ENOENT	- Requested block doesn't exist.
  * * %-ENOMEM	- Insufficient memory available.
@@ -522,15 +523,30 @@ static int nilfs_ioctl_move_inode_block(
 					struct list_head *buffers)
 {
 	struct buffer_head *bh;
+	__u64 limit_blkidx = (__u64)inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes >> inode->i_blkbits;
 	int ret;
 
-	if (vdesc->vd_flags == 0)
+	/*
+	 * vblocknr 0 is reserved as an invalid pointer.  Also, limit_blkidx
+	 * ensures that the page index converted from vd_vblocknr never
+	 * overflows the page cache limit and respects the architecture's bmap
+	 * key width.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(vdesc->vd_vblocknr == 0 ||
+			vdesc->vd_vblocknr >= limit_blkidx))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (vdesc->vd_flags == 0) {
+		if (unlikely(vdesc->vd_offset >= limit_blkidx))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
 		ret = nilfs_gccache_submit_read_data(
 			inode, vdesc->vd_offset, vdesc->vd_blocknr,
 			vdesc->vd_vblocknr, &bh);
-	else
+	} else {
 		ret = nilfs_gccache_submit_read_node(
 			inode, vdesc->vd_blocknr, vdesc->vd_vblocknr, &bh);
+	}
 
 	if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
 		if (ret == -ENOENT)

[PATCH 6.6 40/91] nfc: nci: add data_len bound checks to activation parameter extractors

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>

[ Upstream commit 0428fa2c22e2ba0cff766d3b80d461e149102045 ]

nci_extract_activation_params_iso_dep() and
nci_extract_activation_params_nfc_dep() read an inner length byte from
the NCI RF_INTF_ACTIVATED_NTF payload and use it to memcpy() into fixed
kernel buffers, but neither function receives the caller-validated
activation_params_len.  A crafted NCI notification with
activation_params_len=1 and an inner length byte of up to 20 (NFC-A) or
50 (NFC-B) causes memcpy() to read that many bytes past the one valid
byte in the activation params region -- a slab out-of-bounds read of
kernel memory adjacent to the NCI skb.

The sibling nci_extract_rf_params_*() family was given equivalent
protection by commit 571dcbeb8e63 ("net: nfc: nci: Fix parameter
validation for packet data"), but the two activation parameter
extractors were not updated at that time.

Add a data_len parameter to both functions, guard against an empty
region before consuming the inner length byte, decrement the remaining
count after consuming it, and clamp the copy length to what is actually
available.  Update both call sites to pass ntf.activation_params_len,
which is already validated against the skb at ntf.c:801.

Fixes: e8c0dacd9836 ("NFC: Update names and structs to NCI spec 1.0 d18")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612-b4-disp-6d52d8b0-v3-1-e26221f8826d@proton.me
Signed-off-by: David Heidelberg <david@ixit.cz>
[ Replaced `NFC_ATS_MAXSIZE` with the literal `20` since that macro doesn't exist in this tree. ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/nfc/nci/ntf.c |   26 ++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/net/nfc/nci/ntf.c
+++ b/net/nfc/nci/ntf.c
@@ -525,15 +525,19 @@ static int nci_rf_discover_ntf_packet(st
 
 static int nci_extract_activation_params_iso_dep(struct nci_dev *ndev,
 						 struct nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf *ntf,
-						 const __u8 *data)
+						 const __u8 *data, __u8 data_len)
 {
 	struct activation_params_nfca_poll_iso_dep *nfca_poll;
 	struct activation_params_nfcb_poll_iso_dep *nfcb_poll;
 
 	switch (ntf->activation_rf_tech_and_mode) {
 	case NCI_NFC_A_PASSIVE_POLL_MODE:
+		if (data_len < 1)
+			return NCI_STATUS_RF_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
 		nfca_poll = &ntf->activation_params.nfca_poll_iso_dep;
 		nfca_poll->rats_res_len = min_t(__u8, *data++, 20);
+		data_len--;
+		nfca_poll->rats_res_len = min_t(__u8, nfca_poll->rats_res_len, data_len);
 		pr_debug("rats_res_len %d\n", nfca_poll->rats_res_len);
 		if (nfca_poll->rats_res_len > 0) {
 			memcpy(nfca_poll->rats_res,
@@ -542,8 +546,12 @@ static int nci_extract_activation_params
 		break;
 
 	case NCI_NFC_B_PASSIVE_POLL_MODE:
+		if (data_len < 1)
+			return NCI_STATUS_RF_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
 		nfcb_poll = &ntf->activation_params.nfcb_poll_iso_dep;
 		nfcb_poll->attrib_res_len = min_t(__u8, *data++, 50);
+		data_len--;
+		nfcb_poll->attrib_res_len = min_t(__u8, nfcb_poll->attrib_res_len, data_len);
 		pr_debug("attrib_res_len %d\n", nfcb_poll->attrib_res_len);
 		if (nfcb_poll->attrib_res_len > 0) {
 			memcpy(nfcb_poll->attrib_res,
@@ -562,7 +570,7 @@ static int nci_extract_activation_params
 
 static int nci_extract_activation_params_nfc_dep(struct nci_dev *ndev,
 						 struct nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf *ntf,
-						 const __u8 *data)
+						 const __u8 *data, __u8 data_len)
 {
 	struct activation_params_poll_nfc_dep *poll;
 	struct activation_params_listen_nfc_dep *listen;
@@ -570,9 +578,13 @@ static int nci_extract_activation_params
 	switch (ntf->activation_rf_tech_and_mode) {
 	case NCI_NFC_A_PASSIVE_POLL_MODE:
 	case NCI_NFC_F_PASSIVE_POLL_MODE:
+		if (data_len < 1)
+			return NCI_STATUS_RF_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
 		poll = &ntf->activation_params.poll_nfc_dep;
 		poll->atr_res_len = min_t(__u8, *data++,
 					  NFC_ATR_RES_MAXSIZE - 2);
+		data_len--;
+		poll->atr_res_len = min_t(__u8, poll->atr_res_len, data_len);
 		pr_debug("atr_res_len %d\n", poll->atr_res_len);
 		if (poll->atr_res_len > 0)
 			memcpy(poll->atr_res, data, poll->atr_res_len);
@@ -580,9 +592,13 @@ static int nci_extract_activation_params
 
 	case NCI_NFC_A_PASSIVE_LISTEN_MODE:
 	case NCI_NFC_F_PASSIVE_LISTEN_MODE:
+		if (data_len < 1)
+			return NCI_STATUS_RF_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
 		listen = &ntf->activation_params.listen_nfc_dep;
 		listen->atr_req_len = min_t(__u8, *data++,
 					    NFC_ATR_REQ_MAXSIZE - 2);
+		data_len--;
+		listen->atr_req_len = min_t(__u8, listen->atr_req_len, data_len);
 		pr_debug("atr_req_len %d\n", listen->atr_req_len);
 		if (listen->atr_req_len > 0)
 			memcpy(listen->atr_req, data, listen->atr_req_len);
@@ -790,12 +806,14 @@ static int nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf_pac
 		switch (ntf.rf_interface) {
 		case NCI_RF_INTERFACE_ISO_DEP:
 			err = nci_extract_activation_params_iso_dep(ndev,
-								    &ntf, data);
+								    &ntf, data,
+								    ntf.activation_params_len);
 			break;
 
 		case NCI_RF_INTERFACE_NFC_DEP:
 			err = nci_extract_activation_params_nfc_dep(ndev,
-								    &ntf, data);
+								    &ntf, data,
+								    ntf.activation_params_len);
 			break;
 
 		case NCI_RF_INTERFACE_FRAME:

[PATCH 6.6 41/91] HID: magicmouse: re-enable multitouch after reset-resume

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christopher Kodama <ckhordiasma@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 4253fe22b137c4ee68f36b707fdb1b44b191edc4 ]

When the Apple Magic Trackpad 2 (USB) is reset across a power transition
(e.g. resume from hibernation) it drops out of multitouch mode: it keeps
sending report ID 0x02 on its HID_TYPE_USBMOUSE interface, but the packet
shrinks from 21 to 8 bytes and the trackpad2 handler drops it (size < 12).
Clicks still work but pointer motion is lost until the device is re-plugged
or the driver reloaded.

Re-enable multitouch from .reset_resume via the workqueue.  Only
.reset_resume is needed; suspend-to-idle keeps the device powered and
retains multitouch.

Fixes: 87a2f10395c8 ("HID: magicmouse: Apple Magic Trackpad 2 USB-C driver support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude-Code:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Christopher Kodama <ckhordiasma@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
[ kept 6.6's non-const `magicmouse_report_fixup()` signature in context instead of upstream's `static const __u8 *` ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/hid/hid-magicmouse.c |   19 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/hid/hid-magicmouse.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-magicmouse.c
@@ -993,6 +993,22 @@ static void magicmouse_remove(struct hid
 	hid_hw_stop(hdev);
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_PM
+static int magicmouse_reset_resume(struct hid_device *hdev)
+{
+	struct magicmouse_sc *msc = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
+
+	/* The device drops out of multitouch mode on resume; re-send the
+	 * enable report.  Only the HID_TYPE_USBMOUSE interface accepts it, and
+	 * it must be deferred. Sending it inline here is too early.
+	 */
+	if (msc && hdev->type == HID_TYPE_USBMOUSE)
+		schedule_delayed_work(&msc->work, msecs_to_jiffies(500));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
 static __u8 *magicmouse_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
 				     unsigned int *rsize)
 {
@@ -1052,6 +1068,9 @@ static struct hid_driver magicmouse_driv
 	.event = magicmouse_event,
 	.input_mapping = magicmouse_input_mapping,
 	.input_configured = magicmouse_input_configured,
+#ifdef CONFIG_PM
+	.reset_resume = magicmouse_reset_resume,
+#endif
 };
 module_hid_driver(magicmouse_driver);
 

[PATCH 6.6 42/91] HID: magicmouse: prevent unbounded recursion in magicmouse_raw_event()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jose Villaseñor Montfort <pepemontfort@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit db8d634128d2ba88d79c0b601e983ebe14bb0519 ]

magicmouse_raw_event() handles DOUBLE_REPORT_ID (0xf7) packets, which pack
two touch reports into one, by splitting the packet and calling itself on
each half. The only guard against runaway recursion is a "size < 1" check,
which stops zero-sized calls but does not bound the recursion depth.

A malicious HID device that matches this driver can send a report starting
with DOUBLE_REPORT_ID and filled with the sequence [0xf7, 0x00]. Each level
consumes two bytes and recurses on the remainder, so an incoming report of
up to HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE (16 KiB) drives roughly 8000 nested calls. That
easily exhausts the 16 KiB kernel stack, leading to a stack overflow: a
panic with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK, or memory corruption without it.

A double report only ever wraps two normal reports; it is never
legitimately nested. Refuse to re-enter the DOUBLE_REPORT_ID case from a
recursive call so the recursion depth is bounded to two, while all valid
packets keep being parsed exactly as before.

Fixes: a462230e16ac ("HID: magicmouse: enable Magic Trackpad support")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-input/20260706181347.700DB1F00A3F@smtp.kernel.org/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jose Villaseñor Montfort <pepemontfort@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alec Hall <signshop.alec@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Alec Hall <signshop.alec@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/hid/hid-magicmouse.c |   25 ++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/hid/hid-magicmouse.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-magicmouse.c
@@ -377,8 +377,8 @@ static void magicmouse_emit_touch(struct
 	}
 }
 
-static int magicmouse_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev,
-		struct hid_report *report, u8 *data, int size)
+static int __magicmouse_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev,
+		struct hid_report *report, u8 *data, int size, bool nested)
 {
 	struct magicmouse_sc *msc = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
 	struct input_dev *input = msc->input;
@@ -489,6 +489,15 @@ static int magicmouse_raw_event(struct h
 		 * packet.
 		 */
 
+		/*
+		 * A double report only ever wraps two normal reports, so it is
+		 * never nested. Refuse to recurse a second time; otherwise a
+		 * malicious device could chain DOUBLE_REPORT_ID packets to drive
+		 * unbounded recursion and overflow the kernel stack.
+		 */
+		if (nested)
+			return 0;
+
 		/* Ensure that we have at least 2 elements (report type and size) */
 		if (size < 2)
 			return 0;
@@ -500,9 +509,9 @@ static int magicmouse_raw_event(struct h
 			return 0;
 		}
 
-		magicmouse_raw_event(hdev, report, data + 2, data[1]);
-		magicmouse_raw_event(hdev, report, data + 2 + data[1],
-			size - 2 - data[1]);
+		__magicmouse_raw_event(hdev, report, data + 2, data[1], true);
+		__magicmouse_raw_event(hdev, report, data + 2 + data[1],
+			size - 2 - data[1], true);
 		return 0;
 	default:
 		return 0;
@@ -527,6 +536,12 @@ static int magicmouse_raw_event(struct h
 	return 1;
 }
 
+static int magicmouse_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev,
+		struct hid_report *report, u8 *data, int size)
+{
+	return __magicmouse_raw_event(hdev, report, data, size, false);
+}
+
 static int magicmouse_event(struct hid_device *hdev, struct hid_field *field,
 		struct hid_usage *usage, __s32 value)
 {

[PATCH 6.6 43/91] nvme: rename nvme_sc_to_pr_err to nvme_status_to_pr_err

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Weiwen Hu <huweiwen@linux.alibaba.com>

[ Upstream commit 22f19a584d7045e0509f103dbc5c0acfd6415163 ]

This should better match its semantic.  "sc" is used in the NVMe spec to
specifically refer to the last 8 bits in the status field. We should not
reuse "sc" here.

Signed-off-by: Weiwen Hu <huweiwen@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>
Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 4a3f00262a04 ("nvmet-tcp: bound SGL data length before allocating command buffers")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/nvme/host/pr.c |   10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/nvme/host/pr.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/pr.c
@@ -72,12 +72,12 @@ static int nvme_send_ns_pr_command(struc
 	return nvme_submit_sync_cmd(ns->queue, c, data, data_len);
 }
 
-static int nvme_sc_to_pr_err(int nvme_sc)
+static int nvme_status_to_pr_err(int status)
 {
-	if (nvme_is_path_error(nvme_sc))
+	if (nvme_is_path_error(status))
 		return PR_STS_PATH_FAILED;
 
-	switch (nvme_sc & 0x7ff) {
+	switch (status & 0x7ff) {
 	case NVME_SC_SUCCESS:
 		return PR_STS_SUCCESS;
 	case NVME_SC_RESERVATION_CONFLICT:
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static int nvme_pr_command(struct block_
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
-	return nvme_sc_to_pr_err(ret);
+	return nvme_status_to_pr_err(ret);
 }
 
 static int nvme_pr_register(struct block_device *bdev, u64 old,
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ retry:
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
-	return nvme_sc_to_pr_err(ret);
+	return nvme_status_to_pr_err(ret);
 }
 
 static int nvme_pr_read_keys(struct block_device *bdev,

[PATCH 6.6 44/91] nvme: fix status magic numbers

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Weiwen Hu <huweiwen@linux.alibaba.com>

[ Upstream commit d89a5c6705998ddc42b104f8eabd3c4b9e8fde08 ]

Replaced some magic numbers about SC and SCT with enum and macro.

Signed-off-by: Weiwen Hu <huweiwen@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>
Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 4a3f00262a04 ("nvmet-tcp: bound SGL data length before allocating command buffers")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/nvme/host/constants.c |    2 +-
 drivers/nvme/host/core.c      |   14 +++++++-------
 drivers/nvme/host/multipath.c |    2 +-
 drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h      |    4 ++--
 drivers/nvme/host/pr.c        |    2 +-
 include/linux/nvme.h          |   14 ++++++++++++--
 6 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/nvme/host/constants.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/constants.c
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ static const char * const nvme_statuses[
 
 const unsigned char *nvme_get_error_status_str(u16 status)
 {
-	status &= 0x7ff;
+	status &= NVME_SCT_SC_MASK;
 	if (status < ARRAY_SIZE(nvme_statuses) && nvme_statuses[status])
 		return nvme_statuses[status & 0x7ff];
 	return "Unknown";
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/core.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/core.c
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ void nvme_delete_ctrl_sync(struct nvme_c
 
 static blk_status_t nvme_error_status(u16 status)
 {
-	switch (status & 0x7ff) {
+	switch (status & NVME_SCT_SC_MASK) {
 	case NVME_SC_SUCCESS:
 		return BLK_STS_OK;
 	case NVME_SC_CAP_EXCEEDED:
@@ -319,8 +319,8 @@ static void nvme_log_error(struct reques
 		       (unsigned long long)nvme_sect_to_lba(ns, blk_rq_pos(req)),
 		       (unsigned long long)blk_rq_bytes(req) >> ns->lba_shift,
 		       nvme_get_error_status_str(nr->status),
-		       nr->status >> 8 & 7,	/* Status Code Type */
-		       nr->status & 0xff,	/* Status Code */
+		       NVME_SCT(nr->status),		/* Status Code Type */
+		       nr->status & NVME_SC_MASK,	/* Status Code */
 		       nr->status & NVME_SC_MORE ? "MORE " : "",
 		       nr->status & NVME_SC_DNR  ? "DNR "  : "");
 		return;
@@ -331,8 +331,8 @@ static void nvme_log_error(struct reques
 			   nvme_get_admin_opcode_str(nr->cmd->common.opcode),
 			   nr->cmd->common.opcode,
 			   nvme_get_error_status_str(nr->status),
-			   nr->status >> 8 & 7,	/* Status Code Type */
-			   nr->status & 0xff,	/* Status Code */
+			   NVME_SCT(nr->status),	/* Status Code Type */
+			   nr->status & NVME_SC_MASK,	/* Status Code */
 			   nr->status & NVME_SC_MORE ? "MORE " : "",
 			   nr->status & NVME_SC_DNR  ? "DNR "  : "");
 }
@@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ static inline enum nvme_disposition nvme
 	if (likely(nvme_req(req)->status == 0))
 		return COMPLETE;
 
-	if ((nvme_req(req)->status & 0x7ff) == NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+	if ((nvme_req(req)->status & NVME_SCT_SC_MASK) == NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED)
 		return AUTHENTICATE;
 
 	if (blk_noretry_request(req) ||
@@ -1155,7 +1155,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(nvme_passthru_end,
 
 /*
  * Recommended frequency for KATO commands per NVMe 1.4 section 7.12.1:
- * 
+ *
  *   The host should send Keep Alive commands at half of the Keep Alive Timeout
  *   accounting for transport roundtrip times [..].
  */
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/multipath.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/multipath.c
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ void nvme_mpath_start_freeze(struct nvme
 void nvme_failover_req(struct request *req)
 {
 	struct nvme_ns *ns = req->q->queuedata;
-	u16 status = nvme_req(req)->status & 0x7ff;
+	u16 status = nvme_req(req)->status & NVME_SCT_SC_MASK;
 	unsigned long flags;
 	struct bio *bio;
 
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h
@@ -692,7 +692,7 @@ static inline u32 nvme_bytes_to_numd(siz
 
 static inline bool nvme_is_ana_error(u16 status)
 {
-	switch (status & 0x7ff) {
+	switch (status & NVME_SCT_SC_MASK) {
 	case NVME_SC_ANA_TRANSITION:
 	case NVME_SC_ANA_INACCESSIBLE:
 	case NVME_SC_ANA_PERSISTENT_LOSS:
@@ -705,7 +705,7 @@ static inline bool nvme_is_ana_error(u16
 static inline bool nvme_is_path_error(u16 status)
 {
 	/* check for a status code type of 'path related status' */
-	return (status & 0x700) == 0x300;
+	return (status & NVME_SCT_MASK) == NVME_SCT_PATH;
 }
 
 /*
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/pr.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/pr.c
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ static int nvme_status_to_pr_err(int sta
 	if (nvme_is_path_error(status))
 		return PR_STS_PATH_FAILED;
 
-	switch (status & 0x7ff) {
+	switch (status & NVME_SCT_SC_MASK) {
 	case NVME_SC_SUCCESS:
 		return PR_STS_SUCCESS;
 	case NVME_SC_RESERVATION_CONFLICT:
--- a/include/linux/nvme.h
+++ b/include/linux/nvme.h
@@ -1847,6 +1847,7 @@ enum {
 	/*
 	 * Generic Command Status:
 	 */
+	NVME_SCT_GENERIC		= 0x0,
 	NVME_SC_SUCCESS			= 0x0,
 	NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE		= 0x1,
 	NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD		= 0x2,
@@ -1894,6 +1895,7 @@ enum {
 	/*
 	 * Command Specific Status:
 	 */
+	NVME_SCT_COMMAND_SPECIFIC	= 0x100,
 	NVME_SC_CQ_INVALID		= 0x100,
 	NVME_SC_QID_INVALID		= 0x101,
 	NVME_SC_QUEUE_SIZE		= 0x102,
@@ -1967,6 +1969,7 @@ enum {
 	/*
 	 * Media and Data Integrity Errors:
 	 */
+	NVME_SCT_MEDIA_ERROR		= 0x200,
 	NVME_SC_WRITE_FAULT		= 0x280,
 	NVME_SC_READ_ERROR		= 0x281,
 	NVME_SC_GUARD_CHECK		= 0x282,
@@ -1979,6 +1982,7 @@ enum {
 	/*
 	 * Path-related Errors:
 	 */
+	NVME_SCT_PATH			= 0x300,
 	NVME_SC_INTERNAL_PATH_ERROR	= 0x300,
 	NVME_SC_ANA_PERSISTENT_LOSS	= 0x301,
 	NVME_SC_ANA_INACCESSIBLE	= 0x302,
@@ -1987,11 +1991,17 @@ enum {
 	NVME_SC_HOST_PATH_ERROR		= 0x370,
 	NVME_SC_HOST_ABORTED_CMD	= 0x371,
 
-	NVME_SC_CRD			= 0x1800,
+	NVME_SC_MASK			= 0x00ff, /* Status Code */
+	NVME_SCT_MASK			= 0x0700, /* Status Code Type */
+	NVME_SCT_SC_MASK		= NVME_SCT_MASK | NVME_SC_MASK,
+
+	NVME_SC_CRD			= 0x1800, /* Command Retry Delayed */
 	NVME_SC_MORE			= 0x2000,
-	NVME_SC_DNR			= 0x4000,
+	NVME_SC_DNR			= 0x4000, /* Do Not Retry */
 };
 
+#define NVME_SCT(status) ((status) >> 8 & 7)
+
 struct nvme_completion {
 	/*
 	 * Used by Admin and Fabrics commands to return data:

[PATCH 6.6 45/91] nvme: rename CDR/MORE/DNR to NVME_STATUS_*

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Weiwen Hu <huweiwen@linux.alibaba.com>

[ Upstream commit dd0b0a4a2c5d7209457dc172997d1243ad269cfa ]

CDR/MORE/DNR fields are not belonging to SC in the NVMe spec, rename
them to NVME_STATUS_* to avoid confusion.

Signed-off-by: Weiwen Hu <huweiwen@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>
Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 4a3f00262a04 ("nvmet-tcp: bound SGL data length before allocating command buffers")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/nvme/host/core.c               |   18 ++++++------
 drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c            |    8 ++---
 drivers/nvme/host/fault_inject.c       |    2 -
 drivers/nvme/host/fc.c                 |    8 ++---
 drivers/nvme/target/admin-cmd.c        |   24 ++++++++---------
 drivers/nvme/target/core.c             |   46 ++++++++++++++++-----------------
 drivers/nvme/target/discovery.c        |   14 +++++-----
 drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c |   16 +++++------
 drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd.c      |   36 ++++++++++++-------------
 drivers/nvme/target/io-cmd-bdev.c      |   12 ++++----
 drivers/nvme/target/passthru.c         |   10 +++----
 drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c             |   10 +++----
 drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c              |    4 +-
 drivers/nvme/target/zns.c              |   30 ++++++++++-----------
 include/linux/nvme.h                   |    6 ++--
 15 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 122 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/nvme/host/core.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/core.c
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ static void nvme_retry_req(struct reques
 	u16 crd;
 
 	/* The mask and shift result must be <= 3 */
-	crd = (nvme_req(req)->status & NVME_SC_CRD) >> 11;
+	crd = (nvme_req(req)->status & NVME_STATUS_CRD) >> 11;
 	if (crd)
 		delay = nvme_req(req)->ctrl->crdt[crd - 1] * 100;
 
@@ -321,8 +321,8 @@ static void nvme_log_error(struct reques
 		       nvme_get_error_status_str(nr->status),
 		       NVME_SCT(nr->status),		/* Status Code Type */
 		       nr->status & NVME_SC_MASK,	/* Status Code */
-		       nr->status & NVME_SC_MORE ? "MORE " : "",
-		       nr->status & NVME_SC_DNR  ? "DNR "  : "");
+		       nr->status & NVME_STATUS_MORE ? "MORE " : "",
+		       nr->status & NVME_STATUS_DNR  ? "DNR "  : "");
 		return;
 	}
 
@@ -333,8 +333,8 @@ static void nvme_log_error(struct reques
 			   nvme_get_error_status_str(nr->status),
 			   NVME_SCT(nr->status),	/* Status Code Type */
 			   nr->status & NVME_SC_MASK,	/* Status Code */
-			   nr->status & NVME_SC_MORE ? "MORE " : "",
-			   nr->status & NVME_SC_DNR  ? "DNR "  : "");
+			   nr->status & NVME_STATUS_MORE ? "MORE " : "",
+			   nr->status & NVME_STATUS_DNR  ? "DNR "  : "");
 }
 
 enum nvme_disposition {
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ static inline enum nvme_disposition nvme
 		return AUTHENTICATE;
 
 	if (blk_noretry_request(req) ||
-	    (nvme_req(req)->status & NVME_SC_DNR) ||
+	    (nvme_req(req)->status & NVME_STATUS_DNR) ||
 	    nvme_req(req)->retries >= nvme_max_retries)
 		return COMPLETE;
 
@@ -3764,7 +3764,7 @@ static void nvme_ns_remove_by_nsid(struc
 
 static void nvme_validate_ns(struct nvme_ns *ns, struct nvme_ns_info *info)
 {
-	int ret = NVME_SC_INVALID_NS | NVME_SC_DNR;
+	int ret = NVME_SC_INVALID_NS | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 
 	if (!nvme_ns_ids_equal(&ns->head->ids, &info->ids)) {
 		dev_err(ns->ctrl->device,
@@ -3780,7 +3780,7 @@ out:
 	 *
 	 * TODO: we should probably schedule a delayed retry here.
 	 */
-	if (ret > 0 && (ret & NVME_SC_DNR))
+	if (ret > 0 && (ret & NVME_STATUS_DNR))
 		nvme_ns_remove(ns);
 }
 
@@ -3972,7 +3972,7 @@ static void nvme_scan_work(struct work_s
 		 * they report) but don't actually support it.
 		 */
 		ret = nvme_scan_ns_list(ctrl);
-		if (ret > 0 && ret & NVME_SC_DNR)
+		if (ret > 0 && ret & NVME_STATUS_DNR)
 			nvme_scan_ns_sequential(ctrl);
 	}
 	mutex_unlock(&ctrl->scan_lock);
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ int nvmf_reg_read32(struct nvme_ctrl *ct
 	if (unlikely(ret != 0))
 		dev_err(ctrl->device,
 			"Property Get error: %d, offset %#x\n",
-			ret > 0 ? ret & ~NVME_SC_DNR : ret, off);
+			ret > 0 ? ret & ~NVME_STATUS_DNR : ret, off);
 
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ int nvmf_reg_read64(struct nvme_ctrl *ct
 	if (unlikely(ret != 0))
 		dev_err(ctrl->device,
 			"Property Get error: %d, offset %#x\n",
-			ret > 0 ? ret & ~NVME_SC_DNR : ret, off);
+			ret > 0 ? ret & ~NVME_STATUS_DNR : ret, off);
 	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvmf_reg_read64);
@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ int nvmf_reg_write32(struct nvme_ctrl *c
 	if (unlikely(ret))
 		dev_err(ctrl->device,
 			"Property Set error: %d, offset %#x\n",
-			ret > 0 ? ret & ~NVME_SC_DNR : ret, off);
+			ret > 0 ? ret & ~NVME_STATUS_DNR : ret, off);
 	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvmf_reg_write32);
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ static void nvmf_log_connect_error(struc
 		int errval, int offset, struct nvme_command *cmd,
 		struct nvmf_connect_data *data)
 {
-	int err_sctype = errval & ~NVME_SC_DNR;
+	int err_sctype = errval & ~NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 
 	if (errval < 0) {
 		dev_err(ctrl->device,
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/fault_inject.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/fault_inject.c
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ void nvme_should_fail(struct request *re
 		/* inject status code and DNR bit */
 		status = fault_inject->status;
 		if (fault_inject->dont_retry)
-			status |= NVME_SC_DNR;
+			status |= NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		nvme_req(req)->status =	status;
 	}
 }
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/fc.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/fc.c
@@ -3091,7 +3091,7 @@ nvme_fc_create_association(struct nvme_f
 	if (ctrl->ctrl.icdoff) {
 		dev_err(ctrl->ctrl.device, "icdoff %d is not supported!\n",
 				ctrl->ctrl.icdoff);
-		ret = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		ret = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out_disconnect_admin_queue;
 	}
 
@@ -3099,7 +3099,7 @@ nvme_fc_create_association(struct nvme_f
 	if (!nvme_ctrl_sgl_supported(&ctrl->ctrl)) {
 		dev_err(ctrl->ctrl.device,
 			"Mandatory sgls are not supported!\n");
-		ret = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		ret = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out_disconnect_admin_queue;
 	}
 
@@ -3275,7 +3275,7 @@ nvme_fc_reconnect_or_delete(struct nvme_
 		dev_info(ctrl->ctrl.device,
 			"NVME-FC{%d}: reset: Reconnect attempt failed (%d)\n",
 			ctrl->cnum, status);
-		if (status > 0 && (status & NVME_SC_DNR))
+		if (status > 0 && (status & NVME_STATUS_DNR))
 			recon = false;
 	} else if (time_after_eq(jiffies, rport->dev_loss_end))
 		recon = false;
@@ -3292,7 +3292,7 @@ nvme_fc_reconnect_or_delete(struct nvme_
 		queue_delayed_work(nvme_wq, &ctrl->connect_work, recon_delay);
 	} else {
 		if (portptr->port_state == FC_OBJSTATE_ONLINE) {
-			if (status > 0 && (status & NVME_SC_DNR))
+			if (status > 0 && (status & NVME_STATUS_DNR))
 				dev_warn(ctrl->ctrl.device,
 					 "NVME-FC{%d}: reconnect failure\n",
 					 ctrl->cnum);
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/admin-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/admin-cmd.c
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_get_log_page(s
 	pr_debug("unhandled lid %d on qid %d\n",
 	       req->cmd->get_log_page.lid, req->sq->qid);
 	req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_get_log_page_command, lid);
-	nvmet_req_complete(req, NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR);
+	nvmet_req_complete(req, NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR);
 }
 
 static void nvmet_execute_identify_ctrl(struct nvmet_req *req)
@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_identify_ns(st
 
 	if (le32_to_cpu(req->cmd->identify.nsid) == NVME_NSID_ALL) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_identify, nsid);
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_NS | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_NS | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -662,7 +662,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_identify_descl
 
 	if (sg_zero_buffer(req->sg, req->sg_cnt, NVME_IDENTIFY_DATA_SIZE - off,
 			off) != NVME_IDENTIFY_DATA_SIZE - off)
-		status = NVME_SC_INTERNAL | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INTERNAL | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 
 out:
 	nvmet_req_complete(req, status);
@@ -724,7 +724,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_identify(struc
 	pr_debug("unhandled identify cns %d on qid %d\n",
 	       req->cmd->identify.cns, req->sq->qid);
 	req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_identify, cns);
-	nvmet_req_complete(req, NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR);
+	nvmet_req_complete(req, NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -807,7 +807,7 @@ u16 nvmet_set_feat_async_event(struct nv
 
 	if (val32 & ~mask) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, cdw11);
-		return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	WRITE_ONCE(req->sq->ctrl->aen_enabled, val32);
@@ -833,7 +833,7 @@ void nvmet_execute_set_features(struct n
 		ncqr = (cdw11 >> 16) & 0xffff;
 		nsqr = cdw11 & 0xffff;
 		if (ncqr == 0xffff || nsqr == 0xffff) {
-			status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+			status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 			break;
 		}
 		nvmet_set_result(req,
@@ -846,14 +846,14 @@ void nvmet_execute_set_features(struct n
 		status = nvmet_set_feat_async_event(req, NVMET_AEN_CFG_ALL);
 		break;
 	case NVME_FEAT_HOST_ID:
-		status = NVME_SC_CMD_SEQ_ERROR | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_CMD_SEQ_ERROR | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		break;
 	case NVME_FEAT_WRITE_PROTECT:
 		status = nvmet_set_feat_write_protect(req);
 		break;
 	default:
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, cdw10);
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		break;
 	}
 
@@ -939,7 +939,7 @@ void nvmet_execute_get_features(struct n
 		if (!(req->cmd->common.cdw11 & cpu_to_le32(1 << 0))) {
 			req->error_loc =
 				offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, cdw11);
-			status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+			status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 			break;
 		}
 
@@ -952,7 +952,7 @@ void nvmet_execute_get_features(struct n
 	default:
 		req->error_loc =
 			offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, cdw10);
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		break;
 	}
 
@@ -969,7 +969,7 @@ void nvmet_execute_async_event(struct nv
 	mutex_lock(&ctrl->lock);
 	if (ctrl->nr_async_event_cmds >= NVMET_ASYNC_EVENTS) {
 		mutex_unlock(&ctrl->lock);
-		nvmet_req_complete(req, NVME_SC_ASYNC_LIMIT | NVME_SC_DNR);
+		nvmet_req_complete(req, NVME_SC_ASYNC_LIMIT | NVME_STATUS_DNR);
 		return;
 	}
 	ctrl->async_event_cmds[ctrl->nr_async_event_cmds++] = req;
@@ -1006,7 +1006,7 @@ u16 nvmet_parse_admin_cmd(struct nvmet_r
 	if (nvme_is_fabrics(cmd))
 		return nvmet_parse_fabrics_admin_cmd(req);
 	if (unlikely(!nvmet_check_auth_status(req)))
-		return NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	if (nvmet_is_disc_subsys(nvmet_req_subsys(req)))
 		return nvmet_parse_discovery_cmd(req);
 
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/core.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/core.c
@@ -55,18 +55,18 @@ inline u16 errno_to_nvme_status(struct n
 		return NVME_SC_SUCCESS;
 	case -ENOSPC:
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_rw_command, length);
-		return NVME_SC_CAP_EXCEEDED | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_CAP_EXCEEDED | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	case -EREMOTEIO:
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_rw_command, slba);
-		return  NVME_SC_LBA_RANGE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return  NVME_SC_LBA_RANGE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	case -EOPNOTSUPP:
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, opcode);
 		switch (req->cmd->common.opcode) {
 		case nvme_cmd_dsm:
 		case nvme_cmd_write_zeroes:
-			return NVME_SC_ONCS_NOT_SUPPORTED | NVME_SC_DNR;
+			return NVME_SC_ONCS_NOT_SUPPORTED | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		default:
-			return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+			return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		}
 		break;
 	case -ENODATA:
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ inline u16 errno_to_nvme_status(struct n
 		fallthrough;
 	default:
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, opcode);
-		return NVME_SC_INTERNAL | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INTERNAL | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 }
 
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ u16 nvmet_report_invalid_opcode(struct n
 		 req->sq->qid);
 
 	req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, opcode);
-	return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+	return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 }
 
 static struct nvmet_subsys *nvmet_find_get_subsys(struct nvmet_port *port,
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ u16 nvmet_copy_to_sgl(struct nvmet_req *
 {
 	if (sg_pcopy_from_buffer(req->sg, req->sg_cnt, buf, len, off) != len) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, dptr);
-		return NVME_SC_SGL_INVALID_DATA | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_SGL_INVALID_DATA | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ u16 nvmet_copy_from_sgl(struct nvmet_req
 {
 	if (sg_pcopy_to_buffer(req->sg, req->sg_cnt, buf, len, off) != len) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, dptr);
-		return NVME_SC_SGL_INVALID_DATA | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_SGL_INVALID_DATA | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ u16 nvmet_zero_sgl(struct nvmet_req *req
 {
 	if (sg_zero_buffer(req->sg, req->sg_cnt, len, off) != len) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, dptr);
-		return NVME_SC_SGL_INVALID_DATA | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_SGL_INVALID_DATA | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static void nvmet_async_events_failall(s
 	while (ctrl->nr_async_event_cmds) {
 		req = ctrl->async_event_cmds[--ctrl->nr_async_event_cmds];
 		mutex_unlock(&ctrl->lock);
-		nvmet_req_complete(req, NVME_SC_INTERNAL | NVME_SC_DNR);
+		nvmet_req_complete(req, NVME_SC_INTERNAL | NVME_STATUS_DNR);
 		mutex_lock(&ctrl->lock);
 	}
 	mutex_unlock(&ctrl->lock);
@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ u16 nvmet_req_find_ns(struct nvmet_req *
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, nsid);
 		if (nvmet_subsys_nsid_exists(subsys, nsid))
 			return NVME_SC_INTERNAL_PATH_ERROR;
-		return NVME_SC_INVALID_NS | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INVALID_NS | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	percpu_ref_get(&req->ns->ref);
@@ -892,7 +892,7 @@ static u16 nvmet_parse_io_cmd(struct nvm
 		return nvmet_parse_fabrics_io_cmd(req);
 
 	if (unlikely(!nvmet_check_auth_status(req)))
-		return NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 
 	ret = nvmet_check_ctrl_status(req);
 	if (unlikely(ret))
@@ -955,7 +955,7 @@ bool nvmet_req_init(struct nvmet_req *re
 	/* no support for fused commands yet */
 	if (unlikely(flags & (NVME_CMD_FUSE_FIRST | NVME_CMD_FUSE_SECOND))) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, flags);
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto fail;
 	}
 
@@ -966,7 +966,7 @@ bool nvmet_req_init(struct nvmet_req *re
 	 */
 	if (unlikely((flags & NVME_CMD_SGL_ALL) != NVME_CMD_SGL_METABUF)) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, flags);
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto fail;
 	}
 
@@ -984,7 +984,7 @@ bool nvmet_req_init(struct nvmet_req *re
 	trace_nvmet_req_init(req, req->cmd);
 
 	if (unlikely(!percpu_ref_tryget_live(&sq->ref))) {
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto fail;
 	}
 
@@ -1011,7 +1011,7 @@ bool nvmet_check_transfer_len(struct nvm
 {
 	if (unlikely(len != req->transfer_len)) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, dptr);
-		nvmet_req_complete(req, NVME_SC_SGL_INVALID_DATA | NVME_SC_DNR);
+		nvmet_req_complete(req, NVME_SC_SGL_INVALID_DATA | NVME_STATUS_DNR);
 		return false;
 	}
 
@@ -1023,7 +1023,7 @@ bool nvmet_check_data_len_lte(struct nvm
 {
 	if (unlikely(data_len > req->transfer_len)) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, dptr);
-		nvmet_req_complete(req, NVME_SC_SGL_INVALID_DATA | NVME_SC_DNR);
+		nvmet_req_complete(req, NVME_SC_SGL_INVALID_DATA | NVME_STATUS_DNR);
 		return false;
 	}
 
@@ -1291,18 +1291,18 @@ u16 nvmet_check_ctrl_status(struct nvmet
 	if (unlikely(!(req->sq->ctrl->cc & NVME_CC_ENABLE))) {
 		pr_err("got cmd %d while CC.EN == 0 on qid = %d\n",
 		       req->cmd->common.opcode, req->sq->qid);
-		return NVME_SC_CMD_SEQ_ERROR | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_CMD_SEQ_ERROR | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	if (unlikely(!(req->sq->ctrl->csts & NVME_CSTS_RDY))) {
 		pr_err("got cmd %d while CSTS.RDY == 0 on qid = %d\n",
 		       req->cmd->common.opcode, req->sq->qid);
-		return NVME_SC_CMD_SEQ_ERROR | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_CMD_SEQ_ERROR | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	if (unlikely(!nvmet_check_auth_status(req))) {
 		pr_warn("qid %d not authenticated\n", req->sq->qid);
-		return NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -1376,7 +1376,7 @@ u16 nvmet_alloc_ctrl(const char *subsysn
 	int ret;
 	u16 status;
 
-	status = NVME_SC_CONNECT_INVALID_PARAM | NVME_SC_DNR;
+	status = NVME_SC_CONNECT_INVALID_PARAM | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	subsys = nvmet_find_get_subsys(req->port, subsysnqn);
 	if (!subsys) {
 		pr_warn("connect request for invalid subsystem %s!\n",
@@ -1392,7 +1392,7 @@ u16 nvmet_alloc_ctrl(const char *subsysn
 			hostnqn, subsysnqn);
 		req->cqe->result.u32 = IPO_IATTR_CONNECT_DATA(hostnqn);
 		up_read(&nvmet_config_sem);
-		status = NVME_SC_CONNECT_INVALID_HOST | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_CONNECT_INVALID_HOST | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, dptr);
 		goto out_put_subsystem;
 	}
@@ -1445,7 +1445,7 @@ u16 nvmet_alloc_ctrl(const char *subsysn
 			     subsys->cntlid_min, subsys->cntlid_max,
 			     GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (ret < 0) {
-		status = NVME_SC_CONNECT_CTRL_BUSY | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_CONNECT_CTRL_BUSY | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out_free_sqs;
 	}
 	ctrl->cntlid = ret;
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/discovery.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/discovery.c
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_p
 	if (req->cmd->get_log_page.lid != NVME_LOG_DISC) {
 		req->error_loc =
 			offsetof(struct nvme_get_log_page_command, lid);
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_p
 	if (offset & 0x3) {
 		req->error_loc =
 			offsetof(struct nvme_get_log_page_command, lpo);
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_disc_identify(
 
 	if (req->cmd->identify.cns != NVME_ID_CNS_CTRL) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_identify, cns);
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_disc_set_featu
 	default:
 		req->error_loc =
 			offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, cdw10);
-		stat = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		stat = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		break;
 	}
 
@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_disc_get_featu
 	default:
 		req->error_loc =
 			offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, cdw10);
-		stat = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		stat = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		break;
 	}
 
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ u16 nvmet_parse_discovery_cmd(struct nvm
 		       cmd->common.opcode);
 		req->error_loc =
 			offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, opcode);
-		return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	switch (cmd->common.opcode) {
@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ u16 nvmet_parse_discovery_cmd(struct nvm
 	default:
 		pr_debug("unhandled cmd %d\n", cmd->common.opcode);
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, opcode);
-		return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 }
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c
@@ -198,26 +198,26 @@ void nvmet_execute_auth_send(struct nvme
 	u8 dhchap_status;
 
 	if (req->cmd->auth_send.secp != NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_PROTOCOL_IDENTIFIER) {
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		req->error_loc =
 			offsetof(struct nvmf_auth_send_command, secp);
 		goto done;
 	}
 	if (req->cmd->auth_send.spsp0 != 0x01) {
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		req->error_loc =
 			offsetof(struct nvmf_auth_send_command, spsp0);
 		goto done;
 	}
 	if (req->cmd->auth_send.spsp1 != 0x01) {
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		req->error_loc =
 			offsetof(struct nvmf_auth_send_command, spsp1);
 		goto done;
 	}
 	tl = le32_to_cpu(req->cmd->auth_send.tl);
 	if (!tl) {
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		req->error_loc =
 			offsetof(struct nvmf_auth_send_command, tl);
 		goto done;
@@ -446,26 +446,26 @@ void nvmet_execute_auth_receive(struct n
 	u16 status = 0;
 
 	if (req->cmd->auth_receive.secp != NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_PROTOCOL_IDENTIFIER) {
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		req->error_loc =
 			offsetof(struct nvmf_auth_receive_command, secp);
 		goto done;
 	}
 	if (req->cmd->auth_receive.spsp0 != 0x01) {
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		req->error_loc =
 			offsetof(struct nvmf_auth_receive_command, spsp0);
 		goto done;
 	}
 	if (req->cmd->auth_receive.spsp1 != 0x01) {
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		req->error_loc =
 			offsetof(struct nvmf_auth_receive_command, spsp1);
 		goto done;
 	}
 	al = le32_to_cpu(req->cmd->auth_receive.al);
 	if (!al) {
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		req->error_loc =
 			offsetof(struct nvmf_auth_receive_command, al);
 		goto done;
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd.c
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_prop_set(struc
 	if (req->cmd->prop_set.attrib & 1) {
 		req->error_loc =
 			offsetof(struct nvmf_property_set_command, attrib);
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_prop_set(struc
 	default:
 		req->error_loc =
 			offsetof(struct nvmf_property_set_command, offset);
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 out:
 	nvmet_req_complete(req, status);
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_prop_get(struc
 			val = ctrl->cap;
 			break;
 		default:
-			status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+			status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 			break;
 		}
 	} else {
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_prop_get(struc
 			val = ctrl->csts;
 			break;
 		default:
-			status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+			status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 			break;
 		}
 	}
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ u16 nvmet_parse_fabrics_admin_cmd(struct
 		pr_debug("received unknown capsule type 0x%x\n",
 			cmd->fabrics.fctype);
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvmf_common_command, fctype);
-		return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	return 0;
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ u16 nvmet_parse_fabrics_io_cmd(struct nv
 		pr_debug("received unknown capsule type 0x%x\n",
 			cmd->fabrics.fctype);
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvmf_common_command, fctype);
-		return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	return 0;
@@ -147,14 +147,14 @@ static u16 nvmet_install_queue(struct nv
 		pr_warn("queue size zero!\n");
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvmf_connect_command, sqsize);
 		req->cqe->result.u32 = IPO_IATTR_CONNECT_SQE(sqsize);
-		ret = NVME_SC_CONNECT_INVALID_PARAM | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		ret = NVME_SC_CONNECT_INVALID_PARAM | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto err;
 	}
 
 	if (ctrl->sqs[qid] != NULL) {
 		pr_warn("qid %u has already been created\n", qid);
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvmf_connect_command, qid);
-		return NVME_SC_CMD_SEQ_ERROR | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_CMD_SEQ_ERROR | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	if (sqsize > mqes) {
@@ -162,14 +162,14 @@ static u16 nvmet_install_queue(struct nv
 				sqsize, mqes, ctrl->cntlid);
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvmf_connect_command, sqsize);
 		req->cqe->result.u32 = IPO_IATTR_CONNECT_SQE(sqsize);
-		return NVME_SC_CONNECT_INVALID_PARAM | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_CONNECT_INVALID_PARAM | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	old = cmpxchg(&req->sq->ctrl, NULL, ctrl);
 	if (old) {
 		pr_warn("queue already connected!\n");
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvmf_connect_command, opcode);
-		return NVME_SC_CONNECT_CTRL_BUSY | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_CONNECT_CTRL_BUSY | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	/* note: convert queue size from 0's-based value to 1's-based value */
@@ -229,14 +229,14 @@ static void nvmet_execute_admin_connect(
 		pr_warn("invalid connect version (%d).\n",
 			le16_to_cpu(c->recfmt));
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvmf_connect_command, recfmt);
-		status = NVME_SC_CONNECT_FORMAT | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_CONNECT_FORMAT | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
 	if (unlikely(d->cntlid != cpu_to_le16(0xffff))) {
 		pr_warn("connect attempt for invalid controller ID %#x\n",
 			d->cntlid);
-		status = NVME_SC_CONNECT_INVALID_PARAM | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_CONNECT_INVALID_PARAM | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		req->cqe->result.u32 = IPO_IATTR_CONNECT_DATA(cntlid);
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_admin_connect(
 		       dhchap_status);
 		nvmet_ctrl_put(ctrl);
 		if (dhchap_status == NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_FAILED)
-			status = (NVME_SC_CONNECT_INVALID_HOST | NVME_SC_DNR);
+			status = (NVME_SC_CONNECT_INVALID_HOST | NVME_STATUS_DNR);
 		else
 			status = NVME_SC_INTERNAL;
 		goto out;
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_io_connect(str
 	if (c->recfmt != 0) {
 		pr_warn("invalid connect version (%d).\n",
 			le16_to_cpu(c->recfmt));
-		status = NVME_SC_CONNECT_FORMAT | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_CONNECT_FORMAT | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -315,13 +315,13 @@ static void nvmet_execute_io_connect(str
 	ctrl = nvmet_ctrl_find_get(d->subsysnqn, d->hostnqn,
 				   le16_to_cpu(d->cntlid), req);
 	if (!ctrl) {
-		status = NVME_SC_CONNECT_INVALID_PARAM | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_CONNECT_INVALID_PARAM | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
 	if (unlikely(qid > ctrl->subsys->max_qid)) {
 		pr_warn("invalid queue id (%d)\n", qid);
-		status = NVME_SC_CONNECT_INVALID_PARAM | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_CONNECT_INVALID_PARAM | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		req->cqe->result.u32 = IPO_IATTR_CONNECT_SQE(qid);
 		goto out_ctrl_put;
 	}
@@ -351,13 +351,13 @@ u16 nvmet_parse_connect_cmd(struct nvmet
 		pr_debug("invalid command 0x%x on unconnected queue.\n",
 			cmd->fabrics.opcode);
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, opcode);
-		return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 	if (cmd->fabrics.fctype != nvme_fabrics_type_connect) {
 		pr_debug("invalid capsule type 0x%x on unconnected queue.\n",
 			cmd->fabrics.fctype);
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvmf_common_command, fctype);
-		return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	if (cmd->connect.qid == 0)
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/io-cmd-bdev.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/io-cmd-bdev.c
@@ -133,11 +133,11 @@ u16 blk_to_nvme_status(struct nvmet_req
 	 */
 	switch (blk_sts) {
 	case BLK_STS_NOSPC:
-		status = NVME_SC_CAP_EXCEEDED | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_CAP_EXCEEDED | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_rw_command, length);
 		break;
 	case BLK_STS_TARGET:
-		status = NVME_SC_LBA_RANGE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_LBA_RANGE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_rw_command, slba);
 		break;
 	case BLK_STS_NOTSUPP:
@@ -145,10 +145,10 @@ u16 blk_to_nvme_status(struct nvmet_req
 		switch (req->cmd->common.opcode) {
 		case nvme_cmd_dsm:
 		case nvme_cmd_write_zeroes:
-			status = NVME_SC_ONCS_NOT_SUPPORTED | NVME_SC_DNR;
+			status = NVME_SC_ONCS_NOT_SUPPORTED | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 			break;
 		default:
-			status = NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+			status = NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		}
 		break;
 	case BLK_STS_MEDIUM:
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ u16 blk_to_nvme_status(struct nvmet_req
 		break;
 	case BLK_STS_IOERR:
 	default:
-		status = NVME_SC_INTERNAL | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INTERNAL | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, opcode);
 	}
 
@@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ u16 nvmet_bdev_flush(struct nvmet_req *r
 		return 0;
 
 	if (blkdev_issue_flush(req->ns->bdev))
-		return NVME_SC_INTERNAL | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INTERNAL | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	return 0;
 }
 
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/passthru.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/passthru.c
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ static void nvmet_passthru_execute_cmd(s
 		ns = nvme_find_get_ns(ctrl, nsid);
 		if (unlikely(!ns)) {
 			pr_err("failed to get passthru ns nsid:%u\n", nsid);
-			status = NVME_SC_INVALID_NS | NVME_SC_DNR;
+			status = NVME_SC_INVALID_NS | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 			goto out;
 		}
 
@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ u16 nvmet_parse_passthru_io_cmd(struct n
 		 * emulated in the future if regular targets grow support for
 		 * this feature.
 		 */
-		return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	return nvmet_setup_passthru_command(req);
@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ static u16 nvmet_passthru_get_set_featur
 	case NVME_FEAT_RESV_PERSIST:
 		/* No reservations, see nvmet_parse_passthru_io_cmd() */
 	default:
-		return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 }
 
@@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ u16 nvmet_parse_passthru_admin_cmd(struc
 				req->p.use_workqueue = true;
 				return NVME_SC_SUCCESS;
 			}
-			return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+			return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		case NVME_ID_CNS_NS:
 			req->execute = nvmet_passthru_execute_cmd;
 			req->p.use_workqueue = true;
@@ -558,7 +558,7 @@ u16 nvmet_parse_passthru_admin_cmd(struc
 				req->p.use_workqueue = true;
 				return NVME_SC_SUCCESS;
 			}
-			return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+			return NVME_SC_INVALID_OPCODE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		default:
 			return nvmet_setup_passthru_command(req);
 		}
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c
@@ -853,12 +853,12 @@ static u16 nvmet_rdma_map_sgl_inline(str
 	if (!nvme_is_write(rsp->req.cmd)) {
 		rsp->req.error_loc =
 			offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, opcode);
-		return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	if (off + len > rsp->queue->dev->inline_data_size) {
 		pr_err("invalid inline data offset!\n");
-		return NVME_SC_SGL_INVALID_OFFSET | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_SGL_INVALID_OFFSET | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	/* no data command? */
@@ -922,7 +922,7 @@ static u16 nvmet_rdma_map_sgl(struct nvm
 			pr_err("invalid SGL subtype: %#x\n", sgl->type);
 			rsp->req.error_loc =
 				offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, dptr);
-			return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+			return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		}
 	case NVME_KEY_SGL_FMT_DATA_DESC:
 		switch (sgl->type & 0xf) {
@@ -934,12 +934,12 @@ static u16 nvmet_rdma_map_sgl(struct nvm
 			pr_err("invalid SGL subtype: %#x\n", sgl->type);
 			rsp->req.error_loc =
 				offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, dptr);
-			return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+			return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		}
 	default:
 		pr_err("invalid SGL type: %#x\n", sgl->type);
 		rsp->req.error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_common_command, dptr);
-		return NVME_SC_SGL_INVALID_TYPE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_SGL_INVALID_TYPE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 }
 
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c
@@ -420,10 +420,10 @@ static int nvmet_tcp_map_data(struct nvm
 	if (sgl->type == ((NVME_SGL_FMT_DATA_DESC << 4) |
 			  NVME_SGL_FMT_OFFSET)) {
 		if (!nvme_is_write(cmd->req.cmd))
-			return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+			return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 
 		if (len > cmd->req.port->inline_data_size)
-			return NVME_SC_SGL_INVALID_OFFSET | NVME_SC_DNR;
+			return NVME_SC_SGL_INVALID_OFFSET | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		cmd->pdu_len = len;
 	}
 	cmd->req.transfer_len += len;
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/zns.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/zns.c
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ void nvmet_execute_identify_ns_zns(struc
 
 	if (le32_to_cpu(req->cmd->identify.nsid) == NVME_NSID_ALL) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_identify, nsid);
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_NS | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_NS | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ void nvmet_execute_identify_ns_zns(struc
 	}
 
 	if (!bdev_is_zoned(req->ns->bdev)) {
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_identify, nsid);
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -162,17 +162,17 @@ static u16 nvmet_bdev_validate_zone_mgmt
 
 	if (sect >= get_capacity(req->ns->bdev->bd_disk)) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_zone_mgmt_recv_cmd, slba);
-		return NVME_SC_LBA_RANGE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_LBA_RANGE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	if (out_bufsize < sizeof(struct nvme_zone_report)) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_zone_mgmt_recv_cmd, numd);
-		return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	if (req->cmd->zmr.zra != NVME_ZRA_ZONE_REPORT) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_zone_mgmt_recv_cmd, zra);
-		return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	switch (req->cmd->zmr.pr) {
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ static u16 nvmet_bdev_validate_zone_mgmt
 		break;
 	default:
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_zone_mgmt_recv_cmd, pr);
-		return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	switch (req->cmd->zmr.zrasf) {
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ static u16 nvmet_bdev_validate_zone_mgmt
 	default:
 		req->error_loc =
 			offsetof(struct nvme_zone_mgmt_recv_cmd, zrasf);
-		return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	return NVME_SC_SUCCESS;
@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ static u16 blkdev_zone_mgmt_errno_to_nvm
 		return NVME_SC_SUCCESS;
 	case -EINVAL:
 	case -EIO:
-		return NVME_SC_ZONE_INVALID_TRANSITION | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_ZONE_INVALID_TRANSITION | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	default:
 		return NVME_SC_INTERNAL;
 	}
@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ static u16 nvmet_bdev_execute_zmgmt_send
 	default:
 		/* this is needed to quiet compiler warning */
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_zone_mgmt_send_cmd, zsa);
-		return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 	}
 
 	return NVME_SC_SUCCESS;
@@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ static void nvmet_bdev_zmgmt_send_work(s
 
 	if (op == REQ_OP_LAST) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_zone_mgmt_send_cmd, zsa);
-		status = NVME_SC_ZONE_INVALID_TRANSITION | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_ZONE_INVALID_TRANSITION | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -498,13 +498,13 @@ static void nvmet_bdev_zmgmt_send_work(s
 
 	if (sect >= get_capacity(bdev->bd_disk)) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_zone_mgmt_send_cmd, slba);
-		status = NVME_SC_LBA_RANGE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_LBA_RANGE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
 	if (sect & (zone_sectors - 1)) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_zone_mgmt_send_cmd, slba);
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -556,13 +556,13 @@ void nvmet_bdev_execute_zone_append(stru
 
 	if (sect >= get_capacity(req->ns->bdev->bd_disk)) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_rw_command, slba);
-		status = NVME_SC_LBA_RANGE | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_LBA_RANGE | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
 	if (sect & (bdev_zone_sectors(req->ns->bdev) - 1)) {
 		req->error_loc = offsetof(struct nvme_rw_command, slba);
-		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ void nvmet_bdev_execute_zone_append(stru
 	}
 
 	if (total_len != nvmet_rw_data_len(req)) {
-		status = NVME_SC_INTERNAL | NVME_SC_DNR;
+		status = NVME_SC_INTERNAL | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
 		goto out_put_bio;
 	}
 
--- a/include/linux/nvme.h
+++ b/include/linux/nvme.h
@@ -1995,9 +1995,9 @@ enum {
 	NVME_SCT_MASK			= 0x0700, /* Status Code Type */
 	NVME_SCT_SC_MASK		= NVME_SCT_MASK | NVME_SC_MASK,
 
-	NVME_SC_CRD			= 0x1800, /* Command Retry Delayed */
-	NVME_SC_MORE			= 0x2000,
-	NVME_SC_DNR			= 0x4000, /* Do Not Retry */
+	NVME_STATUS_CRD			= 0x1800, /* Command Retry Delayed */
+	NVME_STATUS_MORE		= 0x2000,
+	NVME_STATUS_DNR			= 0x4000, /* Do Not Retry */
 };
 
 #define NVME_SCT(status) ((status) >> 8 & 7)

[PATCH 6.6 46/91] nvmet-tcp: bound SGL data length before allocating command buffers

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>

[ Upstream commit 4a3f00262a044e8e15064b1a6860968bf0500bf4 ]

nvmet_tcp_map_data() reads the host-controlled 32-bit sgl->length
and, for the in-capsule offset descriptor (type 0x01), checks it
against port->inline_data_size before use. Any other SGL descriptor
type -- including the non-inline transport SGL data-block descriptor
(type (NVME_TRANSPORT_SGL_DATA_DESC << 4) | NVME_SGL_FMT_TRANSPORT_A,
the type a real host uses for out-of-capsule writes) skips that check
entirely and falls straight through to:

	cmd->req.sg = sgl_alloc(len, GFP_KERNEL, &cmd->req.sg_cnt);

with len taken directly from the wire, unbounded up to 4 GiB.

nvmet_req_init() only parses the command and never inspects
sgl->length, and nvmet_check_transfer_len() -- the only other place
transfer_len is validated -- runs later, from req->execute(), after
the allocation has already happened. For a write command the target
responds with an R2T and parks the command waiting for the host to
send the data; if the host (or an unauthenticated peer that simply
never follows up) never does, the sgl_alloc() buffer stays resident
for the life of the command. NVMe/TCP has no mandatory authentication
in the default configuration, so any peer able to reach the target
portal and complete a Fabrics connect can drive this with a single
crafted command, repeatable across queues and connections for
amplification. This is unbounded kernel memory allocation
triggered by a remote, effectively unauthenticated peer.

Validate len against the same NVMET_TCP_MAXH2CDATA ceiling this file
already uses to bound per-PDU H2C data, for every SGL descriptor type,
before doing any allocation. This closes the gap for the non-inline
descriptor while leaving the existing, tighter inline_data_size check
in place for the in-capsule case.

Runtime-verified on a v6.19 KASAN stand: with this bound in place, a
crafted write command carrying an oversized non-inline SGL length is
rejected before sgl_alloc() runs, where the same request previously
drove an unbounded ~256 MiB kernel allocation (up to 4 GiB) that
stayed resident pending an R2T the host never satisfies.

Fixes: 872d26a391da ("nvmet-tcp: add NVMe over TCP target driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>
Assisted-by: AuditCode-AI:2026.07
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c |   13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c
@@ -417,6 +417,19 @@ static int nvmet_tcp_map_data(struct nvm
 	if (!len)
 		return 0;
 
+	/*
+	 * inline_data_size only bounds the in-capsule (type 0x01) SGL
+	 * descriptor below. A non-inline transport SGL data-block
+	 * descriptor skips that check entirely and would otherwise reach
+	 * sgl_alloc() with an attacker-controlled len of up to 4 GiB,
+	 * pinning that much kernel memory for a command that may never
+	 * complete. Bound every descriptor type here, before allocating
+	 * anything, using the same ceiling this file already applies to
+	 * per-PDU H2C data.
+	 */
+	if (len > NVMET_TCP_MAXH2CDATA)
+		return NVME_SC_SGL_INVALID_DATA | NVME_STATUS_DNR;
+
 	if (sgl->type == ((NVME_SGL_FMT_DATA_DESC << 4) |
 			  NVME_SGL_FMT_OFFSET)) {
 		if (!nvme_is_write(cmd->req.cmd))

[PATCH 6.6 47/91] HID: nintendo: stop device IO before hid_hw_stop on probe failure

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jiangshan Yi <yijiangshan@kylinos.cn>

[ Upstream commit 1f74d3bff6fe04a64e02ab3661d2e0d554565aa6 ]

nintendo_hid_probe() calls hid_device_io_start() before joycon_init()
and joycon_leds_create().  If either fails, the error path jumps to
err_close which calls hid_hw_close()/hid_hw_stop() without first calling
hid_device_io_stop().

hid_hw_stop() does not stop device IO, so hid_input_report() may still
run and access driver data that is being torn down, resulting in a
use-after-free.

Add an err_io_stop label that calls hid_device_io_stop() before
hid_hw_close(), and point the two post-io_start error paths at it.

Fixes: 2af16c1f846b ("HID: nintendo: add nintendo switch controller driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jiangshan Yi <yijiangshan@kylinos.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
[ dropped the absent `err_ida:`/`ida_free()` context and retargeted all five `goto err_close` paths to the new `err_io_stop` label ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/hid/hid-nintendo.c |   13 +++++++------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/hid/hid-nintendo.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-nintendo.c
@@ -2350,34 +2350,34 @@ static int nintendo_hid_probe(struct hid
 	ret = joycon_init(hdev);
 	if (ret) {
 		hid_err(hdev, "Failed to initialize controller; ret=%d\n", ret);
-		goto err_close;
+		goto err_io_stop;
 	}
 
 	ret = joycon_read_info(ctlr);
 	if (ret) {
 		hid_err(hdev, "Failed to retrieve controller info; ret=%d\n",
 			ret);
-		goto err_close;
+		goto err_io_stop;
 	}
 
 	/* Initialize the leds */
 	ret = joycon_leds_create(ctlr);
 	if (ret) {
 		hid_err(hdev, "Failed to create leds; ret=%d\n", ret);
-		goto err_close;
+		goto err_io_stop;
 	}
 
 	/* Initialize the battery power supply */
 	ret = joycon_power_supply_create(ctlr);
 	if (ret) {
 		hid_err(hdev, "Failed to create power_supply; ret=%d\n", ret);
-		goto err_close;
+		goto err_io_stop;
 	}
 
 	ret = joycon_input_create(ctlr);
 	if (ret) {
 		hid_err(hdev, "Failed to create input device; ret=%d\n", ret);
-		goto err_close;
+		goto err_io_stop;
 	}
 
 	ctlr->ctlr_state = JOYCON_CTLR_STATE_READ;
@@ -2385,7 +2385,8 @@ static int nintendo_hid_probe(struct hid
 	hid_dbg(hdev, "probe - success\n");
 	return 0;
 
-err_close:
+err_io_stop:
+	hid_device_io_stop(hdev);
 	hid_hw_close(hdev);
 err_stop:
 	hid_hw_stop(hdev);

[PATCH 6.6 48/91] HID: ft260: validate i2c input report length

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Zaidman <michael.zaidman@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 80c4bbb2b38513e9c3d84805fa61a0ee16d79c45 ]

Add two checks to ft260_raw_event() to prevent out-of-bounds reads
from malicious or malfunctioning devices:

First, reject reports shorter than the 2-byte header (report ID +
length fields). Without this, even accessing xfer->length on a
1-byte report is an OOB read.

Second, validate xfer->length against the actual data capacity of
the received HID report. Each I2C data report ID (0xD0 through
0xDE) defines a different report size in the HID descriptor, so the
available payload varies per report. A corrupted length field could
cause memcpy to read beyond the report buffer.

Reported-by: Sebastián Josué Alba Vives <sebasjosue84@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Zaidman <michael.zaidman@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Stable-dep-of: bf3e39df3a39 ("HID: ft260: fix stack-use-after-return write in I2C read race")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c |   16 ++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c
@@ -1068,10 +1068,22 @@ static int ft260_raw_event(struct hid_de
 	struct ft260_device *dev = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
 	struct ft260_i2c_input_report *xfer = (void *)data;
 
+	if (size < offsetof(struct ft260_i2c_input_report, data)) {
+		hid_err(hdev, "short report %d\n", size);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
 	if (xfer->report >= FT260_I2C_REPORT_MIN &&
 	    xfer->report <= FT260_I2C_REPORT_MAX) {
-		ft260_dbg("i2c resp: rep %#02x len %d\n", xfer->report,
-			  xfer->length);
+		ft260_dbg("i2c resp: rep %#02x len %d size %d\n",
+			  xfer->report, xfer->length, size);
+
+		if (xfer->length > size -
+		    offsetof(struct ft260_i2c_input_report, data)) {
+			hid_err(hdev, "report %#02x: length %d exceeds HID report size\n",
+				xfer->report, xfer->length);
+			return -1;
+		}
 
 		if ((dev->read_buf == NULL) ||
 		    (xfer->length > dev->read_len - dev->read_idx)) {

[PATCH 6.6 49/91] HID: ft260: fix stack-use-after-return write in I2C read race

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Raman Varabets <kernel-linux-20260610-80b7ab08@raman.v1.sg>

[ Upstream commit bf3e39df3a397fd82967a31d17c4e02c7feab221 ]

ft260_i2c_read() points dev->read_buf at a caller-supplied buffer
(often an on-stack variable), arms a completion and waits up to five
seconds for the device to return the data. The HID input callback
ft260_raw_event() runs in the input/IRQ path, independent of the
dev->lock mutex held by the read path, and copies the device-supplied
payload into dev->read_buf after a plain NULL check.

These two paths share read_buf, read_idx and read_len with no
serialization. If the device delays its response until the read
times out, ft260_i2c_read() resets the controller, clears read_buf
and returns, unwinding the stack frame the buffer lived in. A
response that arrives at that moment lets ft260_raw_event() pass the
NULL check and then memcpy() the device-controlled payload into the
now-freed stack location, a bounded but attacker-influenced
stack-use-after-return write triggerable by malicious or
malfunctioning hardware.

Add a dedicated spinlock that serializes every access to read_buf,
read_idx and read_len. ft260_raw_event() now holds it across the
NULL check, the memcpy and the index update, while the read path
takes it when arming and when clearing the buffer, so the teardown
can no longer slip between the check and the copy.

Fixes: 6a82582d9fa4 ("HID: ft260: add usb hid to i2c host bridge driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Raman Varabets <kernel-linux-20260610-80b7ab08@raman.v1.sg>
Reviewed-by: Michael Zaidman <michael.zaidman@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c |   25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-ft260.c
@@ -240,6 +240,8 @@ struct ft260_device {
 	struct mutex lock;
 	u8 write_buf[FT260_REPORT_MAX_LENGTH];
 	unsigned long need_wakeup_at;
+	/* Protects read_buf, read_idx and read_len against ft260_raw_event() */
+	spinlock_t read_lock;
 	u8 *read_buf;
 	u16 read_idx;
 	u16 read_len;
@@ -501,6 +503,7 @@ static int ft260_i2c_read(struct ft260_d
 	int timeout, ret = 0;
 	struct ft260_i2c_read_request_report rep;
 	struct hid_device *hdev = dev->hdev;
+	unsigned long irqflags;
 	u8 bus_busy = 0;
 
 	if ((flag & FT260_FLAG_START_REPEATED) == FT260_FLAG_START_REPEATED)
@@ -526,9 +529,11 @@ static int ft260_i2c_read(struct ft260_d
 
 		reinit_completion(&dev->wait);
 
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->read_lock, irqflags);
 		dev->read_idx = 0;
 		dev->read_buf = data;
 		dev->read_len = rd_len;
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->read_lock, irqflags);
 
 		ret = ft260_hid_output_report(hdev, (u8 *)&rep, sizeof(rep));
 		if (ret < 0) {
@@ -543,7 +548,9 @@ static int ft260_i2c_read(struct ft260_d
 			goto ft260_i2c_read_exit;
 		}
 
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->read_lock, irqflags);
 		dev->read_buf = NULL;
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->read_lock, irqflags);
 
 		if (flag & FT260_FLAG_STOP)
 			bus_busy = FT260_I2C_STATUS_BUS_BUSY;
@@ -562,7 +569,9 @@ static int ft260_i2c_read(struct ft260_d
 	} while (len > 0);
 
 ft260_i2c_read_exit:
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->read_lock, irqflags);
 	dev->read_buf = NULL;
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->read_lock, irqflags);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -1018,6 +1027,7 @@ static int ft260_probe(struct hid_device
 		 "FT260 usb-i2c bridge");
 
 	mutex_init(&dev->lock);
+	spin_lock_init(&dev->read_lock);
 	init_completion(&dev->wait);
 
 	ret = ft260_xfer_status(dev, FT260_I2C_STATUS_BUS_BUSY);
@@ -1067,6 +1077,7 @@ static int ft260_raw_event(struct hid_de
 {
 	struct ft260_device *dev = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
 	struct ft260_i2c_input_report *xfer = (void *)data;
+	unsigned long irqflags;
 
 	if (size < offsetof(struct ft260_i2c_input_report, data)) {
 		hid_err(hdev, "short report %d\n", size);
@@ -1075,6 +1086,8 @@ static int ft260_raw_event(struct hid_de
 
 	if (xfer->report >= FT260_I2C_REPORT_MIN &&
 	    xfer->report <= FT260_I2C_REPORT_MAX) {
+		bool complete_read;
+
 		ft260_dbg("i2c resp: rep %#02x len %d size %d\n",
 			  xfer->report, xfer->length, size);
 
@@ -1085,8 +1098,15 @@ static int ft260_raw_event(struct hid_de
 			return -1;
 		}
 
+		/*
+		 * Hold read_lock so a timed-out ft260_i2c_read() cannot
+		 * clear read_buf between the NULL check and the memcpy.
+		 */
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->read_lock, irqflags);
+
 		if ((dev->read_buf == NULL) ||
 		    (xfer->length > dev->read_len - dev->read_idx)) {
+			spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->read_lock, irqflags);
 			hid_err(hdev, "unexpected report %#02x, length %d\n",
 				xfer->report, xfer->length);
 			return -1;
@@ -1095,8 +1115,11 @@ static int ft260_raw_event(struct hid_de
 		memcpy(&dev->read_buf[dev->read_idx], &xfer->data,
 		       xfer->length);
 		dev->read_idx += xfer->length;
+		complete_read = dev->read_idx == dev->read_len;
+
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->read_lock, irqflags);
 
-		if (dev->read_idx == dev->read_len)
+		if (complete_read)
 			complete(&dev->wait);
 
 	} else {

[PATCH 6.6 50/91] HID: uclogic: fix use-after-free of inrange_timer on remove

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>

[ Upstream commit 506fd50a9027340f0e9dcc587d10ccb03312dba6 ]

uclogic_remove() cancels the pen in-range timer and then stops the
device:

	timer_delete_sync(&drvdata->inrange_timer);
	hid_hw_stop(hdev);

timer_delete_sync() only guarantees the timer is idle at that instant.
uclogic_raw_event_pen() keeps delivering pen reports until hid_hw_stop()
stops the transport several lines later, and every report with
pen->inrange == UCLOGIC_PARAMS_PEN_INRANGE_NONE re-arms the timer:

	mod_timer(&drvdata->inrange_timer, jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(100));

A report landing between the timer_delete_sync() call and the transport
teardown in hid_hw_stop() re-arms inrange_timer after it was cancelled.
uclogic_remove() then returns and the devm drvdata is freed, while
hid_hw_stop() has already freed the input device drvdata->pen_input
points at, so when the timer fires ~100 ms later
uclogic_inrange_timeout() dereferences freed memory -- a use-after-free
in timer-softirq context.

Swapping the two calls is not a fix: stopping the device first frees
drvdata->pen_input via hidinput_disconnect() while the timer may still
be pending, so a timer already armed before removal fires on the freed
input device in the window before timer_delete_sync() runs.

Use timer_shutdown_sync() before hid_hw_stop() instead. It cancels the
timer, waits for a running callback while pen_input is still valid, and
prevents any further re-arming -- a later mod_timer() from an in-flight
report is silently ignored -- so the timer is provably dead before
hid_hw_stop() frees the inputs. This is the ordering the timer core
documents for this "timer re-armed from another path" teardown case.

Fixes: 01309e29eb95 ("HID: uclogic: Support in-range reporting emulation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>
Assisted-by: AuditCode-AI:2026.07
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
[ changed timer_delete_sync() to del_timer_sync() in the removed line to match the pre-rename API on this branch ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/hid/hid-uclogic-core.c |   12 +++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/hid/hid-uclogic-core.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-uclogic-core.c
@@ -477,7 +477,17 @@ static void uclogic_remove(struct hid_de
 {
 	struct uclogic_drvdata *drvdata = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
 
-	del_timer_sync(&drvdata->inrange_timer);
+	/*
+	 * Shut the in-range timer down before stopping the device.
+	 * uclogic_raw_event_pen() re-arms inrange_timer on every pen report
+	 * and keeps running until hid_hw_stop() stops the transport, so a
+	 * plain timer_delete_sync() here can be undone by a report landing in
+	 * the window before hid_hw_stop().  timer_shutdown_sync() cancels the
+	 * timer and makes any later re-arm a no-op, so it is provably dead
+	 * before hid_hw_stop() frees the input device drvdata->pen_input
+	 * points at.
+	 */
+	timer_shutdown_sync(&drvdata->inrange_timer);
 	hid_hw_stop(hdev);
 	kfree(drvdata->desc_ptr);
 	uclogic_params_cleanup(&drvdata->params);

[PATCH 6.6 51/91] HID: pidff: Support device error response from PID_BLOCK_LOAD

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tomasz Pakuła <tomasz.pakula.oficjalny@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 9d4174dc4a234408d91fd83725e1899766cd1731 ]

If an error happens on the device, the driver will no longer fall
into the trap of reading this status 60 times before it decides that
this reply won't change to success/memory full.

Greatly reduces communication overhead during device error situation.

Signed-off-by: Tomasz Pakuła <tomasz.pakula.oficjalny@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Stable-dep-of: 67bb1074e3d2 ("HID: pidff: fix OOB write when hid->inputs is empty")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c |    8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c
@@ -131,7 +131,8 @@ static const u8 pidff_effect_types[] = {
 
 #define PID_BLOCK_LOAD_SUCCESS	0
 #define PID_BLOCK_LOAD_FULL	1
-static const u8 pidff_block_load_status[] = { 0x8c, 0x8d };
+#define PID_BLOCK_LOAD_ERROR	2
+static const u8 pidff_block_load_status[] = { 0x8c, 0x8d, 0x8e};
 
 #define PID_EFFECT_START	0
 #define PID_EFFECT_STOP		1
@@ -515,6 +516,11 @@ static int pidff_request_effect_upload(s
 				pidff->block_load[PID_RAM_POOL_AVAILABLE].value[0] : -1);
 			return -ENOSPC;
 		}
+		if (pidff->block_load_status->value[0] ==
+		    pidff->status_id[PID_BLOCK_LOAD_ERROR]) {
+			hid_dbg(pidff->hid, "device error during effect creation\n");
+			return -EREMOTEIO;
+		}
 	}
 	hid_err(pidff->hid, "pid_block_load failed 60 times\n");
 	return -EIO;

[PATCH 6.6 52/91] HID: pidff: clang-format pass

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tomasz Pakuła <tomasz.pakula.oficjalny@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit ae42428fb4e3d2eed344f0d6fcfa778bc8b8f80a ]

Signed-off-by: Tomasz Pakuła <tomasz.pakula.oficjalny@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Stable-dep-of: 67bb1074e3d2 ("HID: pidff: fix OOB write when hid->inputs is empty")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c
@@ -1298,8 +1298,8 @@ static int pidff_check_autocenter(struct
 int hid_pidff_init_with_quirks(struct hid_device *hid, __u32 initial_quirks)
 {
 	struct pidff_device *pidff;
-	struct hid_input *hidinput = list_entry(hid->inputs.next,
-						struct hid_input, list);
+	struct hid_input *hidinput =
+		list_entry(hid->inputs.next, struct hid_input, list);
 	struct input_dev *dev = hidinput->input;
 	struct ff_device *ff;
 	int max_effects;

[PATCH 6.6 53/91] HID: pidff: fix OOB write when hid->inputs is empty

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>

[ Upstream commit 67bb1074e3d2d12fa059a9cc707e89398a4e4704 ]

hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() derives its input_dev from

	list_entry(hid->inputs.next, struct hid_input, list)

without first checking that hid->inputs is non-empty.  The list member
of struct hid_input is at offset 0, so on an empty list list_entry()
yields &hid->inputs itself and the following hidinput->input load reads
an unrelated member of struct hid_device.  dev is then a type-confused
pointer, and force-feedback init writes through it: each
set_bit(FF_*, dev->ffbit) stores 8 bytes at dev + 192, past the end of
the object dev actually aliases, and input_ff_create() adds further
writes of a heap pointer and two function pointers.

Until hid-universal-pidff the only caller was hid_pidff_init() from
usbhid, which runs under HID_CLAIMED_INPUT and therefore always has at
least one hid_input.  universal_pidff_probe() starts the device with
HID_CONNECT_DEFAULT & ~HID_CONNECT_FF and then calls
hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() directly whenever the descriptor carries a
PID usage page, bypassing that gate.  A report descriptor whose only
application collection is on HID_UP_PID leaves hid->inputs empty while
hid_connect() still succeeds through the hidraw claim, so probe reaches
the unguarded list_entry().

The write happens in the USB probe path, on the hotplug workqueue, so
plugging in a malicious device is enough to trigger it; no attacker
software and no logged-in user are required.  KASAN reports an 8-byte
out-of-bounds write in hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() reached from
universal_pidff_probe().

Check for an empty list before deriving dev and return -ENODEV, as the
other HID force-feedback drivers already do.  universal_pidff_probe()
propagates the error and unwinds.

Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>

Fixes: f06bf8d94fff ("HID: Add hid-universal-pidff driver and supported device ids")
Reported-by: Federico Kirschbaum <federico.kirschbaum@xbow.com>
Reported-by: Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c |   13 ++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c
@@ -1298,13 +1298,20 @@ static int pidff_check_autocenter(struct
 int hid_pidff_init_with_quirks(struct hid_device *hid, __u32 initial_quirks)
 {
 	struct pidff_device *pidff;
-	struct hid_input *hidinput =
-		list_entry(hid->inputs.next, struct hid_input, list);
-	struct input_dev *dev = hidinput->input;
+	struct hid_input *hidinput;
+	struct input_dev *dev;
 	struct ff_device *ff;
 	int max_effects;
 	int error;
 
+	if (list_empty(&hid->inputs)) {
+		hid_err(hid, "no inputs found\n");
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
+
+	hidinput = list_first_entry(&hid->inputs, struct hid_input, list);
+	dev = hidinput->input;
+
 	hid_dbg(hid, "starting pid init\n");
 
 	if (list_empty(&hid->report_enum[HID_OUTPUT_REPORT].report_list)) {

[PATCH 6.6 54/91] Bluetooth: hci_sync: Use bt_dev_err() to log error message in hci_update_event_filter_sync()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zijun Hu <zijun.hu@oss.qualcomm.com>

[ Upstream commit da0186f19a7433d3d5607b0f61e9a3de17d1f721 ]

Use bt_dev_err() instead of bt_dev_dbg() to log error message in
hci_update_event_filter_sync().

Signed-off-by: Zijun Hu <zijun.hu@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Stable-dep-of: f57b399c4fa1 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix accept list UAF during suspend")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c
@@ -6231,7 +6231,7 @@ static int hci_update_event_filter_sync(
 						 &b->bdaddr,
 						 HCI_CONN_SETUP_AUTO_ON);
 		if (err)
-			bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Failed to set event filter for %pMR",
+			bt_dev_err(hdev, "Failed to set event filter for %pMR",
 				   &b->bdaddr);
 		else
 			scan = SCAN_PAGE;

[PATCH 6.6 55/91] Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix accept list UAF during suspend

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Chengfeng Ye <nicoyip.dev@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit f57b399c4fa1501b2d5451f52d861ece86bcf3db ]

hci_update_event_filter_sync() walks hdev->accept_list while sending a
synchronous HCI command for each remote-wakeup device.  The suspend path
holds hdev->req_lock, but accept-list updates are serialized by hdev->lock.
Consequently, remove_device() can free the current list entry during the
controller wait.

The following interleaving causes the use-after-free:

  hci_update_event_filter_sync()    remove_device()
  fetch accept-list entry
  hci_set_event_filter_sync()
    wait for controller response    hci_dev_lock()
                                    list_del()
                                    kfree()
                                    hci_dev_unlock()
  read the freed list.next

KASAN reported:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hci_suspend_sync+0x835/0x910
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810bec8440 by task kworker/0:1/10
  Workqueue: events vhci_suspend_work
  Call Trace:
   hci_suspend_sync+0x835/0x910
   hci_suspend_dev+0x182/0x450
   process_one_work+0x661/0x1090
   worker_thread+0x45b/0xd10

  Allocated by task 86:
   hci_bdaddr_list_add_with_flags+0x1a8/0x400
   add_device+0x381/0x820
   hci_sock_sendmsg+0x1033/0x1ea0

  Freed by task 91:
   kfree+0x131/0x3c0
   remove_device+0x429/0xb70
   hci_sock_sendmsg+0x1033/0x1ea0

Snapshot the remote-wakeup addresses under hdev->lock.  Release the lock
before sending HCI commands.  Clear the controller event filter before
building the snapshot, and skip allocation and the second list traversal
when there are no matching entries.  This preserves the original filter
and scan-state updates without retaining an accept-list node across a
controller wait.

Fixes: 182ee45da083 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Rework hci_suspend_notifier")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-bluetooth/20260730092331.2069741-1-nicoyip.dev@gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Chengfeng Ye <nicoyip.dev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c |   50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c
@@ -6204,6 +6204,8 @@ static int hci_pause_discovery_sync(stru
 static int hci_update_event_filter_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev)
 {
 	struct bdaddr_list_with_flags *b;
+	bdaddr_t *accept_list;
+	size_t i, num_entries = 0;
 	u8 scan = SCAN_DISABLED;
 	bool scanning = test_bit(HCI_PSCAN, &hdev->flags);
 	int err;
@@ -6220,23 +6222,49 @@ static int hci_update_event_filter_sync(
 	/* Always clear event filter when starting */
 	hci_clear_event_filter_sync(hdev);
 
-	list_for_each_entry(b, &hdev->accept_list, list) {
-		if (!(b->flags & HCI_CONN_FLAG_REMOTE_WAKEUP))
-			continue;
-
-		bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Adding event filters for %pMR", &b->bdaddr);
-
-		err =  hci_set_event_filter_sync(hdev, HCI_FLT_CONN_SETUP,
-						 HCI_CONN_SETUP_ALLOW_BDADDR,
-						 &b->bdaddr,
-						 HCI_CONN_SETUP_AUTO_ON);
+	hci_dev_lock(hdev);
+
+	list_for_each_entry(b, &hdev->accept_list, list)
+		if (b->flags & HCI_CONN_FLAG_REMOTE_WAKEUP)
+			num_entries++;
+
+	if (!num_entries) {
+		hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
+		goto update_scan;
+	}
+
+	accept_list = kmalloc_array(num_entries, sizeof(*accept_list),
+				    GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!accept_list) {
+		hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	i = 0;
+	list_for_each_entry(b, &hdev->accept_list, list)
+		if (b->flags & HCI_CONN_FLAG_REMOTE_WAKEUP)
+			bacpy(&accept_list[i++], &b->bdaddr);
+
+	hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < num_entries; i++) {
+		bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Adding event filters for %pMR",
+			   &accept_list[i]);
+
+		err = hci_set_event_filter_sync(hdev, HCI_FLT_CONN_SETUP,
+						HCI_CONN_SETUP_ALLOW_BDADDR,
+					 &accept_list[i],
+					 HCI_CONN_SETUP_AUTO_ON);
 		if (err)
 			bt_dev_err(hdev, "Failed to set event filter for %pMR",
-				   &b->bdaddr);
+				   &accept_list[i]);
 		else
 			scan = SCAN_PAGE;
 	}
 
+	kfree(accept_list);
+
+update_scan:
 	if (scan && !scanning)
 		hci_write_scan_enable_sync(hdev, scan);
 	else if (!scan && scanning)

[PATCH 6.6 56/91] xfs: remove file_path tracepoint data

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>

commit e31c53a8060e134111ed095783fee0aa0c43b080 upstream.

The xfile/xmbuf shmem file descriptions are no longer as detailed as
they were when online fsck was first merged, because moving to static
strings in commit 60382993a2e180 ("xfs: get rid of the
xchk_xfile_*_descr calls") removed a memory allocation and hence a
source of failure.

However this makes encoding the description in the tracepoints sort of a
waste of memory.  David Laight also points out that file_path doesn't
zero the whole buffer which causes exposure of stale trace bytes, and
Steven Rostedt wonders why we're not using a dynamic array for the file
path.

I don't think this is worth fixing, so let's just rip it out.

Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Cc: david.laight.linux@gmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-xfs/20260323172204.work.979-kees@kernel.org/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.11
Fixes: 19ebc8f84ea12e ("xfs: fix file_path handling in tracepoints")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
[ Karl Mehltretter: Omit the xmbuf_create hunk because that tracepoint
  is not in 6.6.y.  The xfile_create hunk applies unchanged.  This drops
  dynamically generated descriptions because 60382993a2e1 is not in
  6.6.y, but fixes the stale-byte exposure and matches newer stable
  kernels. ]
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Karl Mehltretter <kmehltretter@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/xfs/scrub/trace.h |   12 ++----------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/xfs/scrub/trace.h
+++ b/fs/xfs/scrub/trace.h
@@ -784,20 +784,12 @@ TRACE_EVENT(xfile_create,
 	TP_STRUCT__entry(
 		__field(dev_t, dev)
 		__field(unsigned long, ino)
-		__array(char, pathname, MAXNAMELEN)
 	),
 	TP_fast_assign(
-		char		*path;
-
 		__entry->ino = file_inode(xf->file)->i_ino;
-		path = file_path(xf->file, __entry->pathname, MAXNAMELEN);
-		if (IS_ERR(path))
-			strncpy(__entry->pathname, "(unknown)",
-					sizeof(__entry->pathname));
 	),
-	TP_printk("xfino 0x%lx path '%s'",
-		  __entry->ino,
-		  __entry->pathname)
+	TP_printk("xfino 0x%lx",
+		  __entry->ino)
 );
 
 TRACE_EVENT(xfile_destroy,

[PATCH 6.6 57/91] fpga: dfl: fme: add error handling

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Griffin Kroah-Hartman <griffin@kroah.com>

commit b5ba63e247075087ab8a6a087622c762dc4172e9 upstream.

Add error handling to devm_kasprint in fme_perf_pmu_register().

Assisted-by: gkh_clanker_2000
Fixes: 724142f8c42a ("fpga: dfl: fme: add performance reporting support")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Cc: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com>
Cc: Moritz Fischer <mdf@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Griffin Kroah-Hartman <griffin@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Yilun: Fix stable tag, add Fixes tag ]
Reviewed-by: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2026070620-unwired-clay-f6cc@gregkh
Signed-off-by: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/fpga/dfl-fme-perf.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/fpga/dfl-fme-perf.c
+++ b/drivers/fpga/dfl-fme-perf.c
@@ -925,6 +925,8 @@ static int fme_perf_pmu_register(struct
 				PERF_PMU_CAP_NO_EXCLUDE;
 
 	name = devm_kasprintf(priv->dev, GFP_KERNEL, "dfl_fme%d", pdev->id);
+	if (!name)
+		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	ret = perf_pmu_register(pmu, name, -1);
 	if (ret)

[PATCH 6.6 58/91] accessibility: speakup: unregister tty ldisc on later init failures

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Haoxiang Li <lihaoxiang@isrc.iscas.ac.cn>

commit a76acbaec9b8fd74413646984d2e3626d0543e39 upstream.

The ldisc registration is intentionally non-fatal, since some synth
drivers do not use tty/ldisc.  However, once speakup_init() continues
past the registration point and later fails, the init unwind path should
mirror speakup_exit() and call spk_ttyio_unregister_ldisc().

Add the missing unregister call to the error path after synth_release(),
matching the normal module exit cleanup order.

Signed-off-by: Haoxiang Li <lihaoxiang@isrc.iscas.ac.cn>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org>
Fixes: e23a9b439ce9 ("staging: speakup: safely register and unregister ldisc")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260531230804.254962-16-samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/accessibility/speakup/main.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/drivers/accessibility/speakup/main.c
+++ b/drivers/accessibility/speakup/main.c
@@ -2444,6 +2444,7 @@ error_kbdnotifier:
 	mutex_lock(&spk_mutex);
 	synth_release();
 	mutex_unlock(&spk_mutex);
+	spk_ttyio_unregister_ldisc();
 	speakup_kobj_exit();
 
 error_kobjects:

[PATCH 6.6 59/91] usb: xhci: Handle USB3 port events when there is one roothub

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Semih Baskan <strst.gs@gmail.com>

commit 3e91ec3e7d80a327fb558207613c80415d3bf756 upstream.

handle_port_status() drops every USB3 port event when xhci->shared_hcd is
NULL. The check dates from a time when xhci-plat always created a shared
hcd, so a NULL one could only mean the hcd had been removed.

Since commit 4736ebd7fcaf ("usb: host: xhci-plat: omit shared hcd if
either root hub has no ports") that is no longer true. A controller whose
USB2 root hub has no ports gets a single roothub, the USB3 rhub is served
by the main hcd, and shared_hcd stays NULL for the lifetime of the device.
Every SuperSpeed port event is then thrown away as bogus behind a debug
message, so devices never enumerate even though the port sees the device
and its change bits stay set:

  0x006a1203 Powered Connected Enabled Link:U0 PortSpeed:4
  Change: CSC WRC PRC PLC

Broadcom Northstar is such a controller. USB3 works there up to 5.15 and
stops working from 5.19 onwards.

Ask xhci_get_usb3_hcd() instead. It returns the shared hcd when there is
one, the main hcd when the USB2 root hub has no ports, and NULL once the
shared hcd is gone, which keeps the original meaning of the check.

Tested on an Asus RT-N18U (BCM47081), which has a single roothub. Before
the change nothing enumerates on the USB3 port; after it SuperSpeed
devices enumerate normally over repeated connect and disconnect cycles,
the change bits shown above clear, and USB2 is unaffected on both ports.

Fixes: 4736ebd7fcaf ("usb: host: xhci-plat: omit shared hcd if either root hub has no ports")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Semih Baskan <strst.gs@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260806142113.2436238-17-mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c
@@ -2010,7 +2010,7 @@ static void handle_port_status(struct xh
 	}
 
 	/* We might get interrupts after shared_hcd is removed */
-	if (port->rhub == &xhci->usb3_rhub && xhci->shared_hcd == NULL) {
+	if (port->rhub == &xhci->usb3_rhub && xhci_get_usb3_hcd(xhci) == NULL) {
 		xhci_dbg(xhci, "ignore port event for removed USB3 hcd\n");
 		bogus_port_status = true;
 		goto cleanup;

[PATCH 6.6 60/91] xhci: dbgtty: Fix unregister on tty_register_driver() failure

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lucas De Marchi <ldemarchi@nvidia.com>

commit a916fa66a43e10f63198b6ce978badffc678821a upstream.

If tty_register_driver() fails, it drops the reference, but fails to set
the global dbc_tty_driver to NULL, causing the unregister to be called
again when module exits.

On module unload dbc_tty_exit() only gates its cleanup on the driver
pointer being non-NULL, so it operates on the already-freed driver:

    module_init(xhci_hcd_init)
      xhci_hcd_init()
        xhci_dbc_init()                       [return value ignored]
          dbc_tty_init()
            tty_register_driver() fails
              tty_driver_kref_put()           -> driver freed
              (dbc_tty_driver left dangling)
    ...
    module_exit(xhci_hcd_fini)
      xhci_hcd_fini()
        xhci_dbc_exit()
          dbc_tty_exit()
            if (dbc_tty_driver)               -> true (dangling)
              tty_unregister_driver()         -> use-after-free

Fixes: 4521f1613940 ("xhci: dbctty: split dbc tty driver registration and unregistration functions.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10
Cc: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <ldemarchi@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260806142113.2436238-8-mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c
@@ -619,6 +619,7 @@ int dbc_tty_init(void)
 		pr_err("Can't register dbc tty driver\n");
 		tty_driver_kref_put(dbc_tty_driver);
 		idr_destroy(&dbc_tty_minors);
+		dbc_tty_driver = NULL;
 	}
 
 	return ret;

[PATCH 6.6 61/91] xhci: dbgtty: Fix unregister on tty_alloc_driver() failure

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lucas De Marchi <ldemarchi@nvidia.com>

commit 25b8dfc13495a6c1cf4abacc8ef20196c7f20e5c upstream.

Make sure to set dbc_tty_driver to NULL to match the check in
dbc_tty_exit(). For that, make detached error handling path common to the
other branch in the same function.

Fixes: 4521f1613940 ("xhci: dbctty: split dbc tty driver registration and unregistration functions.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10
Cc: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <ldemarchi@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260806142113.2436238-9-mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c |   16 +++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c
@@ -596,8 +596,8 @@ int dbc_tty_init(void)
 	dbc_tty_driver = tty_alloc_driver(64, TTY_DRIVER_REAL_RAW |
 					  TTY_DRIVER_DYNAMIC_DEV);
 	if (IS_ERR(dbc_tty_driver)) {
-		idr_destroy(&dbc_tty_minors);
-		return PTR_ERR(dbc_tty_driver);
+		ret = PTR_ERR(dbc_tty_driver);
+		goto fail;
 	}
 
 	dbc_tty_driver->driver_name = "dbc_serial";
@@ -617,12 +617,18 @@ int dbc_tty_init(void)
 	ret = tty_register_driver(dbc_tty_driver);
 	if (ret) {
 		pr_err("Can't register dbc tty driver\n");
-		tty_driver_kref_put(dbc_tty_driver);
-		idr_destroy(&dbc_tty_minors);
-		dbc_tty_driver = NULL;
+		goto fail_put;
 	}
 
 	return ret;
+
+fail_put:
+	tty_driver_kref_put(dbc_tty_driver);
+fail:
+	idr_destroy(&dbc_tty_minors);
+	dbc_tty_driver = NULL;
+
+	return ret;
 }
 
 void dbc_tty_exit(void)

[PATCH 6.6 62/91] fuse: fix invalidate lock leak on setattr writeback failure

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Baokun Li <libaokun@linux.alibaba.com>

commit 9afeca0d569c9fc89d758fe7a9339d1e8afb1546 upstream.

fuse_do_setattr() takes filemap_invalidate_lock() for a DAX truncate
(fault_blocked = true) and releases it at the out:/error: labels.  But
when a writeback flush is also needed, a write_inode_now() failure
returns directly and leaks the lock, so any later fault or truncate on
the file stalls on the stale rwsem.

For example, truncate(2) on a setuid file reaches fuse_do_setattr()
with both ATTR_SIZE and ATTR_MODE set:

  truncate(2)
  └─ do_truncate()
     ├─ dentry_needs_remove_privs()         # S_ISUID
     └─ notify_change()                     # KILL_SUID -> ATTR_MODE
        └─ fuse_setattr()                   # no killpriv:
           │                                #   ia_valid |= ATTR_MODE
           └─ fuse_do_setattr()
              ├─ filemap_invalidate_lock()  # IS_DAX && is_truncate
              └─ write_inode_now()          # is_wb && ATTR_MODE
                 └─ if (err)                # e.g. daemon -> -EIO
                    return err              # <- lock leaked

Fix this by adding an unlock label that releases the lock before
returning the error, and use it for the fuse_dax_break_layouts()
failure path as well.

Fixes: 6ae330cad6ef ("virtiofs: serialize truncate/punch_hole and dax fault path")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/fuse/dir.c |    9 ++++-----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/fuse/dir.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c
@@ -1879,10 +1879,8 @@ int fuse_do_setattr(struct dentry *dentr
 		filemap_invalidate_lock(mapping);
 		fault_blocked = true;
 		err = fuse_dax_break_layouts(inode, 0, -1);
-		if (err) {
-			filemap_invalidate_unlock(mapping);
-			return err;
-		}
+		if (err)
+			goto unlock;
 	}
 
 	if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_OPEN) {
@@ -1909,7 +1907,7 @@ int fuse_do_setattr(struct dentry *dentr
 			 ATTR_TIMES_SET)) {
 		err = write_inode_now(inode, true);
 		if (err)
-			return err;
+			goto unlock;
 
 		fuse_set_nowrite(inode);
 		fuse_release_nowrite(inode);
@@ -2017,6 +2015,7 @@ error:
 
 	clear_bit(FUSE_I_SIZE_UNSTABLE, &fi->state);
 
+unlock:
 	if (fault_blocked)
 		filemap_invalidate_unlock(mapping);
 	return err;

[PATCH 6.6 63/91] fuse: fix invalidate lock leak on open O_TRUNC DAX failure

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Baokun Li <libaokun@linux.alibaba.com>

commit a927f1867e61b78f39f9da0bbba3c98c2ca151fe upstream.

fuse_open() takes filemap_invalidate_lock() for a DAX truncate
(dax_truncate = true) and releases it before the out_inode_unlock
label.  But when fuse_dax_break_layouts() fails, the goto
out_inode_unlock skips the unlock and leaks the rwsem, so any later
fault or truncate on the file stalls on the stale lock.

fuse_dax_break_layouts() can fail with -ERESTARTSYS when a signal
interrupts the wait for busy DAX pages to drain:

  open("file", O_RDWR | O_TRUNC)
  └─ fuse_open()
     ├─ filemap_invalidate_lock()        # dax_truncate
     └─ fuse_dax_break_layouts()
        └─ dax_break_layout()
           └─ wait_page_idle()           # TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE
              └─ fuse_wait_dax_page()    # unlock, schedule, re-lock
                 └─ signal → -ERESTARTSYS
     goto out_inode_unlock               # <- lock leaked

Fix this by moving filemap_invalidate_unlock() below the label so
that all error paths release the lock, and rename the label to
out_unlock as it now covers more than just the inode lock.

Fixes: 2fdbb8dd0155 ("fuse: fix deadlock between atomic O_TRUNC and page invalidation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.0+
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/fuse/file.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/fuse/file.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/file.c
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ int fuse_open_common(struct inode *inode
 		filemap_invalidate_lock(inode->i_mapping);
 		err = fuse_dax_break_layouts(inode, 0, -1);
 		if (err)
-			goto out_inode_unlock;
+			goto out_unlock;
 	}
 
 	if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate)
@@ -280,9 +280,9 @@ int fuse_open_common(struct inode *inode
 		else if (!(ff->open_flags & FOPEN_KEEP_CACHE))
 			invalidate_inode_pages2(inode->i_mapping);
 	}
+out_unlock:
 	if (dax_truncate)
 		filemap_invalidate_unlock(inode->i_mapping);
-out_inode_unlock:
 	if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate)
 		inode_unlock(inode);
 

[PATCH 6.6 64/91] usb: usbtest: disable dynamic ID support

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Aleksandr Nogikh <nogikh@google.com>

commit 00e2071f6d5621a5ddea311a5e6b143ae6e474af upstream.

The usbtest driver relies on the driver_info field of struct usb_device_id
to point to a valid struct usbtest_info descriptor. This structure contains
essential test configurations, such as endpoint addresses and test modes,
which are required during probe.

When a user dynamically adds a new device ID via the sysfs new_id
interface without specifying a reference device, the USB core initializes
driver_info to 0 (NULL). When a matching device is subsequently probed,
usbtest_probe() unconditionally casts driver_info to a struct usbtest_info
pointer and dereferences it, leading to a NULL pointer dereference crash:

  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
  0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
  KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
  RIP: 0010:usbtest_probe+0x3b9/0x1280 drivers/usb/misc/usbtest.c:2822

Because usbtest strictly requires pre-defined usbtest_info descriptors
to function, dynamic ID binding via sysfs is fundamentally unsupported
for this driver.

Fix this by setting .no_dynamic_id = 1 on usbtest_driver. This instructs
the USB core to skip creating the new_id and remove_id sysfs interfaces
for usbtest, preventing invalid dynamic ID entries from being created.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+7e1e5911f9eac50bedc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7e1e5911f9eac50bedc7
Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Nogikh <nogikh@google.com>
Tested-by: syzbot@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260806152651.2370795-1-nogikh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/usb/misc/usbtest.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/drivers/usb/misc/usbtest.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/misc/usbtest.c
@@ -3053,6 +3053,7 @@ static struct usb_driver usbtest_driver
 	.disconnect =	usbtest_disconnect,
 	.suspend =	usbtest_suspend,
 	.resume =	usbtest_resume,
+	.no_dynamic_id = 1,
 };
 
 /*-------------------------------------------------------------------------*/

[PATCH 6.6 65/91] usb: gadget: f_tcm: keep port count until LUN teardown completes

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shuangpeng Bai <shuangpeng.kernel@gmail.com>

commit c39d0916da47d94909391876c9e5bd429ea7b1b9 upstream.

tcm_usbg_drop_nexus() permits session removal once tpg_port_count
reaches zero. However, usbg_port_unlink() currently decrements that
count from the fabric_pre_unlink() callback, before core_dev_del_lun()
waits for active se_lun references to drain.

If removal of the last LUN races a nexus removal, the latter can observe
a zero port count and call target_remove_session(). This frees
sess_cmd_map while an in-flight struct usbg_cmd, including its work item,
can still be accessed.

Overlapping the last-LUN unlink with nexus removal reproduces this
lifetime violation as a DEBUG_OBJECTS "free active" warning for
usbg_cmd_work, followed by a target-core BUG/Oops.

The generic target-core unlink path has no callback after
core_dev_del_lun() completes. Add an optional fabric_post_unlink()
callback and use it for the f_tcm port count. The count now remains
nonzero until core_dev_del_lun() has finished draining active LUN
references, preventing nexus removal from freeing the session during
command completion.

Fixes: c52661d60f63 ("usb-gadget: Initial merge of target module for UASP + BOT")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Shuangpeng Bai <shuangpeng.kernel@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260807060733.3186624-1-shuangpeng.kernel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/target/target_core_fabric_configfs.c |    8 ++++++++
 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c          |    2 +-
 include/target/target_core_fabric.h          |    2 ++
 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/target/target_core_fabric_configfs.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_fabric_configfs.c
@@ -690,6 +690,14 @@ static void target_fabric_port_unlink(
 	}
 
 	core_dev_del_lun(se_tpg, lun);
+
+	if (tf->tf_ops->fabric_post_unlink) {
+		/*
+		 * Allow fabrics to release state that must remain valid until
+		 * core_dev_del_lun() has drained all active LUN references.
+		 */
+		tf->tf_ops->fabric_post_unlink(se_tpg, lun);
+	}
 }
 
 static void target_fabric_port_release(struct config_item *item)
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c
@@ -1678,7 +1678,7 @@ static const struct target_core_fabric_o
 	.fabric_enable_tpg		= usbg_enable_tpg,
 	.fabric_drop_tpg		= usbg_drop_tpg,
 	.fabric_post_link		= usbg_port_link,
-	.fabric_pre_unlink		= usbg_port_unlink,
+	.fabric_post_unlink		= usbg_port_unlink,
 	.fabric_init_nodeacl		= usbg_init_nodeacl,
 
 	.tfc_wwn_attrs			= usbg_wwn_attrs,
--- a/include/target/target_core_fabric.h
+++ b/include/target/target_core_fabric.h
@@ -95,6 +95,8 @@ struct target_core_fabric_ops {
 				struct se_lun *);
 	void (*fabric_pre_unlink)(struct se_portal_group *,
 				struct se_lun *);
+	void (*fabric_post_unlink)(struct se_portal_group *se_tpg,
+				   struct se_lun *lun);
 	struct se_tpg_np *(*fabric_make_np)(struct se_portal_group *,
 				struct config_group *, const char *);
 	void (*fabric_drop_np)(struct se_tpg_np *);

[PATCH 6.6 66/91] tls: device: fix out-of-bounds write in tls_append_frag()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>

commit b17cf742eaad70ae29ac558cefb3aa9bbeea03d4 upstream.

Found with syzkaller and a local syzbot instance running on top of a
netdevsim TLS offload emulation; tls_device.c is otherwise only reachable
on a machine with a NIC that implements the offload.

tls_push_data() only checks whether the open record still has room for
another frag at the bottom of its loop, and the MSG_MORE early break
skips that check.  The record survives to the next syscall with the frag
count it already had, and tls_append_frag() does not check either, so
with TLS_TX_ZEROCOPY_RO every splice(SPLICE_F_MORE) of a byte or two adds
a non-coalescing pipe page and num_frags walks off the end of
tls_record_info.frags[MAX_SKB_FRAGS].  Once the record is pushed,
tls_push_record() runs the same index over sg_tx_data[MAX_SKB_FRAGS] and
the sg_set_page() writes land on the destruct_work that follows it, which
the workqueue then calls.

The byte limit is fine because copy drops to 0 and the loop falls through
to the same check; the frag count has no such feedback.

Push the record rather than keep a full one open, which is what a plain
TCP socket does - tcp_sendmsg_locked() uses tcp_mark_push() and
new_segment in both the copy and the MSG_SPLICE_PAGES paths, and tls_sw
already sets full_record when the sk_msg ring fills up, MSG_MORE or not.

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in tls_append_frag ( net/tls/tls_device.c:269)
  Write of size 8 at addr ffff8881104d1530 by task tls_oob/450

  CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 450 Comm: tls_oob Not tainted 7.2.0-rc7+ #329 PREEMPT
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120)
   print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:482)
   kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
   tls_append_frag (net/tls/tls_device.c:269)
   tls_push_data (net/tls/tls_device.c:518)
   tls_device_sendmsg (net/tls/tls_device.c:583)
   inet_sendmsg (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:865)
   sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:775 net/socket.c:790 net/socket.c:813)
   splice_to_socket (fs/splice.c:884)
   do_splice (fs/splice.c:936 fs/splice.c:1349)
   __do_splice (fs/splice.c:1431)
   __x64_sys_splice (fs/splice.c:1634 fs/splice.c:1616)
   do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
   </TASK>

and, once the record is pushed:

  UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/tls/tls_device.c:300:24
  index 18 is out of range for type 'skb_frag_t [17]'
  UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/tls/tls_device.c:301:41
  index 18 is out of range for type 'scatterlist [17]'
  UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/tls/tls_device.c:302:39
  index 18 is out of range for type 'scatterlist [17]'
  UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/tls/tls_device.c:307:38
  index 26 is out of range for type 'scatterlist [17]'

  kernel tried to execute NX-protected page - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffea000411a680
  #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0011) - permissions violation
  Oops: Oops: 0011 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
  Workqueue: ktls_device_destruct 0xffffea000411a680
  RIP: 0010:0xffffea000411a680
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3405 kernel/workqueue.c:3486)
   kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
   ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)
   ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)
   </TASK>

Fixes: e8f69799810c ("net/tls: Add generic NIC offload infrastructure")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260823084758.20936-1-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/tls/tls_device.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/tls/tls_device.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_device.c
@@ -536,7 +536,8 @@ handle_error:
 		if (!size) {
 last_record:
 			tls_push_record_flags = flags;
-			if (flags & MSG_MORE) {
+			if ((flags & MSG_MORE) &&
+			    record->num_frags < MAX_SKB_FRAGS - 1) {
 				more = true;
 				break;
 			}

[PATCH 6.6 67/91] x86/CPU/AMD: Add X86_FEATURE_ZEN5

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>

commit 3e4147f33f8b647775357bae0248b9a2aeebfcd2 upstream.

Add a synthetic feature flag for Zen5.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240104201138.5072-1-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h |    4 +---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c          |   25 +++++++++++++++++++++----
 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -81,10 +81,8 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_K6_MTRR		( 3*32+ 1) /* AMD K6 nonstandard MTRRs */
 #define X86_FEATURE_CYRIX_ARR		( 3*32+ 2) /* Cyrix ARRs (= MTRRs) */
 #define X86_FEATURE_CENTAUR_MCR		( 3*32+ 3) /* Centaur MCRs (= MTRRs) */
-
-/* CPU types for specific tunings: */
 #define X86_FEATURE_K8			( 3*32+ 4) /* "" Opteron, Athlon64 */
-/* FREE, was #define X86_FEATURE_K7			( 3*32+ 5) "" Athlon */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN5		( 3*32+ 5) /* "" CPU based on Zen5 microarchitecture */
 #define X86_FEATURE_P3			( 3*32+ 6) /* "" P3 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_P4			( 3*32+ 7) /* "" P4 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC	( 3*32+ 8) /* TSC ticks at a constant rate */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -669,7 +669,7 @@ static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_
 
 	/* Figure out Zen generations: */
 	switch (c->x86) {
-	case 0x17: {
+	case 0x17:
 		switch (c->x86_model) {
 		case 0x00 ... 0x2f:
 		case 0x50 ... 0x5f:
@@ -685,8 +685,8 @@ static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_
 			goto warn;
 		}
 		break;
-	}
-	case 0x19: {
+
+	case 0x19:
 		switch (c->x86_model) {
 		case 0x00 ... 0x0f:
 		case 0x20 ... 0x5f:
@@ -700,7 +700,17 @@ static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_
 			goto warn;
 		}
 		break;
-	}
+
+	case 0x1a:
+		switch (c->x86_model) {
+		case 0x00 ... 0x0f:
+			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ZEN5);
+			break;
+		default:
+			goto warn;
+		}
+		break;
+
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
@@ -1185,6 +1195,11 @@ static void init_amd_zen4(struct cpuinfo
 	init_amd_zen_common();
 }
 
+static void init_amd_zen5(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+	init_amd_zen_common();
+}
+
 static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	early_init_amd(c);
@@ -1228,6 +1243,8 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86
 		init_amd_zen3(c);
 	else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ZEN4))
 		init_amd_zen4(c);
+	else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ZEN5))
+		init_amd_zen5(c);
 
 	/*
 	 * Enable workaround for FXSAVE leak on CPUs

[PATCH 6.6 68/91] x86/CPU/AMD: Add more models to X86_FEATURE_ZEN5

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>

commit b9328fd636bd50da89e792e135b234ba8e6fe59f upstream.

Add model ranges starting at 0x20, 0x40 and 0x70 to the synthetic
feature flag X86_FEATURE_ZEN5.

Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240124220749.2983-1-mario.limonciello@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -704,6 +704,9 @@ static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_
 	case 0x1a:
 		switch (c->x86_model) {
 		case 0x00 ... 0x0f:
+		case 0x20 ... 0x2f:
+		case 0x40 ... 0x4f:
+		case 0x70 ... 0x7f:
 			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ZEN5);
 			break;
 		default:

[PATCH 6.6 69/91] x86/CPU/AMD: Add models 0x10-0x1f to the Zen5 range

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wenkuan Wang <Wenkuan.Wang@amd.com>

commit 2718a7fdf292b2dcb49c856fa8a6a955ebbbc45f upstream.

Add some more Zen5 models.

Fixes: 3e4147f33f8b ("x86/CPU/AMD: Add X86_FEATURE_ZEN5")
Signed-off-by: Wenkuan Wang <Wenkuan.Wang@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423144111.1362-1-bp@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -703,8 +703,7 @@ static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_
 
 	case 0x1a:
 		switch (c->x86_model) {
-		case 0x00 ... 0x0f:
-		case 0x20 ... 0x2f:
+		case 0x00 ... 0x2f:
 		case 0x40 ... 0x4f:
 		case 0x70 ... 0x7f:
 			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ZEN5);

[PATCH 6.6 70/91] x86/CPU/AMD: Add models 0x60-0x6f to the Zen5 range

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Perry Yuan <perry.yuan@amd.com>

commit bf5641eccf71bcd13a849930e190563c3a19815d upstream.

Add some new Zen5 models for the 0x1A family.

  [ bp: Merge the 0x60 and 0x70 ranges. ]

Signed-off-by: Perry Yuan <perry.yuan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240729064626.24297-1-bp@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -705,7 +705,7 @@ static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_
 		switch (c->x86_model) {
 		case 0x00 ... 0x2f:
 		case 0x40 ... 0x4f:
-		case 0x70 ... 0x7f:
+		case 0x60 ... 0x7f:
 			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ZEN5);
 			break;
 		default:

[PATCH 6.6 71/91] x86/CPU/AMD: Carve out a Zen5 models range

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Pratik Vishwakarma <Pratik.Vishwakarma@amd.com>

commit 52075128273ace53e6254e37899a47d40d4baf45 upstream.

Family 0x1a, model 0xd0..0xd7 belongs to the Zen5 generation. Carve it
out from the larger, Zen6 range where former doesn't belong.

  [ bp: Rewrite commit message, add tags. ]

Fixes: b5f53e6d3d32 ("x86/CPU/AMD: Add more Zen6 models")
Signed-off-by: Pratik Vishwakarma <Pratik.Vishwakarma@amd.com>
[ bp: Backport only the Zen5 bits. ]
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260729055459.15904-1-Pratik.Vishwakarma@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -706,6 +706,7 @@ static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_
 		case 0x00 ... 0x2f:
 		case 0x40 ... 0x4f:
 		case 0x60 ... 0x7f:
+		case 0xd0 ... 0xd7:
 			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ZEN5);
 			break;
 		default:

[PATCH 6.6 72/91] xfrm: espintcp: fix UAF during close

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>

commit deb232e884877bf10b4ce2580909eedec986c284 upstream.

ZDI reported and analyzed a race condition during close for espintcp
sockets:

    espintcp_close() frees emsg->skb via kfree_skb() without holding
    any socket lock. Concurrently, the xfrm_trans_reinject work queue
    invokes esp_output_tcp_finish() -> espintcp_push_skb() ->
    espintcp_push_msgs() -> skb_send_sock_locked(), which reads the
    same skb as a data source.

Fix this by adding a synchronize_rcu() call after resetting sk_prot,
since esp_output_tcp_finish() runs under RCU and won't use a socket
with sk_prot == &tcp_prot.  Simply taking the socket lock in
espintcp_close() could lead to leaks, if esp_output_tcp_finish()
re-adds an skb in the slot we just freed. After this, the existing
barrier() is no longer needed.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e27cca96cd68 ("xfrm: add espintcp (RFC 8229)")
Reported-by: zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Reviewed-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/xfrm/espintcp.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/xfrm/espintcp.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/espintcp.c
@@ -516,7 +516,8 @@ static void espintcp_close(struct sock *
 	strp_stop(&ctx->strp);
 
 	sk->sk_prot = &tcp_prot;
-	barrier();
+
+	synchronize_rcu();
 
 	cancel_work_sync(&ctx->work);
 	strp_done(&ctx->strp);

[PATCH 6.6 73/91] xfrm: drop ESP-in-TCP packets with no ingress device

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhiling Zou <roxy520tt@gmail.com>

commit e1d7c5ac1c246ce5775f604515de0a59fbf2116e upstream.

ESP-in-TCP receives records through the TCP strparser. handle_esp()
restores skb->dev from the saved skb_iif before passing the packet into
the XFRM input path.

Queued TCP data can be processed after the original ingress device has
been removed, for example during veth or net namespace teardown. In that
case dev_get_by_index_rcu() returns NULL. The XFRM IPv4 and IPv6 input
paths both expect skb->dev to be valid while building the route lookup,
so queued ESP-in-TCP data can dereference a NULL device.

Drop the packet if the saved ingress device can no longer be resolved.
Such a packet can no longer be routed through the normal XFRM receive
path, and this preserves the existing behaviour for packets whose ingress
device still exists.

Fixes: e27cca96cd68 ("xfrm: add espintcp (RFC 8229)")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Vega <vega@nebusec.ai>
Signed-off-by: Zhiling Zou <roxy520tt@gmail.com>
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4
Reviewed-by: Ren Wei <enjou1224z@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/xfrm/espintcp.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

--- a/net/xfrm/espintcp.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/espintcp.c
@@ -39,6 +39,11 @@ static void handle_esp(struct sk_buff *s
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	skb->dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif);
+	if (!skb->dev) {
+		XFRM_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_XFRMINERROR);
+		kfree_skb(skb);
+		goto out;
+	}
 	local_bh_disable();
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
 	if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET6)
@@ -47,6 +52,7 @@ static void handle_esp(struct sk_buff *s
 #endif
 		xfrm4_rcv_encap(skb, IPPROTO_ESP, 0, TCP_ENCAP_ESPINTCP);
 	local_bh_enable();
+out:
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 }
 

[PATCH 6.6 74/91] xfrm: ah6: validate routing header segments_left

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada <manizada@pm.me>

commit 7bad4bda74dc4713f398d3b7624ff05478e3a568 upstream.

AH6 rearranges routing-header addresses before computing or verifying the
ICV. ipv6_rearrange_rthdr() assumes that segments_left is not larger than
the number of addresses described by the routing header's hdrlen field.

That assumption does not hold for raw IPv6 HDRINCL packets. A packet with
hdrlen equal to 2 describes one address, but can carry an arbitrary
segments_left value. With segments_left equal to 255, the function moves
its address pointer 4,064 bytes backwards and passes a 4,064-byte length to
memmove(), resulting in an out-of-bounds access.

Validate the invariant locally before modifying the routing header or
performing any address-pointer arithmetic, and propagate malformed-header
errors to the existing AH6 input and output error paths.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: avom-custom-harness:gpt-5.5-qwen3.6-mod-mix
Signed-off-by: Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada <manizada@pm.me>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv6/ah6.c |   29 ++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ipv6/ah6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ah6.c
@@ -232,26 +232,28 @@ static void ipv6_rearrange_destopt(struc
  *	Rearrange the destination address in @iph and the addresses in @rthdr
  *	so that they appear in the order they will at the final destination.
  *	See Appendix A2 of RFC 2402 for details.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, -EINVAL if segments_left exceeds the number of
+ * addresses described by hdrlen.
  */
-static void ipv6_rearrange_rthdr(struct ipv6hdr *iph, struct ipv6_rt_hdr *rthdr)
+static int ipv6_rearrange_rthdr(struct ipv6hdr *iph, struct ipv6_rt_hdr *rthdr)
 {
-	int segments, segments_left;
+	unsigned int segments, segments_left;
 	struct in6_addr *addrs;
 	struct in6_addr final_addr;
 
 	segments_left = rthdr->segments_left;
 	if (segments_left == 0)
-		return;
-	rthdr->segments_left = 0;
+		return 0;
 
-	/* The value of rthdr->hdrlen has been verified either by the system
-	 * call if it is locally generated, or by ipv6_rthdr_rcv() for incoming
-	 * packets.  So we can assume that it is even and that segments is
-	 * greater than or equal to segments_left.
-	 *
-	 * For the same reason we can assume that this option is of type 0.
+	/* Raw locally generated packets can reach AH6 without the invariant
+	 * required by the rt0-style address rearrangement below.
 	 */
 	segments = rthdr->hdrlen >> 1;
+	if (segments_left > segments)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	rthdr->segments_left = 0;
 
 	addrs = ((struct rt0_hdr *)rthdr)->addr;
 	final_addr = addrs[segments - 1];
@@ -261,6 +263,8 @@ static void ipv6_rearrange_rthdr(struct
 
 	addrs[0] = iph->daddr;
 	iph->daddr = final_addr;
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static int ipv6_clear_mutable_options(struct ipv6hdr *iph, int len, int dir)
@@ -273,6 +277,7 @@ static int ipv6_clear_mutable_options(st
 	} exthdr = { .iph = iph };
 	char *end = exthdr.raw + len;
 	int nexthdr = iph->nexthdr;
+	int err;
 
 	exthdr.iph++;
 
@@ -292,7 +297,9 @@ static int ipv6_clear_mutable_options(st
 			break;
 
 		case NEXTHDR_ROUTING:
-			ipv6_rearrange_rthdr(iph, exthdr.rth);
+			err = ipv6_rearrange_rthdr(iph, exthdr.rth);
+			if (err)
+				return err;
 			break;
 
 		default:

[PATCH 6.6 75/91] xfrm: fix xfrm_state_construct() auth-trunc leak

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zihan Xi <zihanx@nebusec.ai>

commit c12cbf56320fb633484ee0ca1fb7d68d6b64b213 upstream.

attach_auth_trunc() can allocate x->aalg while leaving
x->props.aalgo at zero when the selected auth algorithm has no
sadb_alg_id. One real case is cmac(aes).

xfrm_state_construct() then treats !x->props.aalgo as "no auth
algorithm attached yet" and calls attach_auth(). That overwrites
x->aalg and loses the first allocation. Any later failure or teardown
only frees the replacement pointer.

Check whether x->aalg is already attached instead of inferring that
state from x->props.aalgo.

Fixes: 4447bb33f094 ("xfrm: Store aalg in xfrm_state with a user specified truncation length")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Vega <vega@nebusec.ai>
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4
Signed-off-by: Zihan Xi <zihanx@nebusec.ai>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <enjou1224z@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -716,7 +716,7 @@ static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_con
 	if ((err = attach_auth_trunc(&x->aalg, &x->props.aalgo,
 				     attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC], extack)))
 		goto error;
-	if (!x->props.aalgo) {
+	if (!x->aalg) {
 		if ((err = attach_auth(&x->aalg, &x->props.aalgo,
 				       attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH], extack)))
 			goto error;

[PATCH 6.6 76/91] net: bridge: mcast: fix use-after-free of a master VLANs multicast context

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>

commit 50e5c6605cc9c2dd57bd2d1b3459674d19738983 upstream.

br_multicast_toggle_one_vlan() clears BR_VLFLAG_MCAST_ENABLED under
br->multicast_lock before stopping a VLAN's multicast context.  That is
the teardown handshake: lockless readers gate on the flag through
br_multicast_ctx_should_use() -> br_multicast_ctx_vlan_disabled(), so
once it is cleared under the lock no reader can arm the context again.

For a master VLAN the handshake never runs.  __vlan_del() clears
BRIDGE_VLAN_INFO_BRENTRY before calling br_vlan_put_master(), so
br_multicast_toggle_one_vlan(masterv, false) returns early on
!br_vlan_is_brentry(vlan): the flag stays set and br->multicast_lock is
never taken.  br_vlan_put_master() then drains the context in
br_multicast_ctx_deinit() and frees the VLAN through call_rcu(), while a
reader still inside rcu_read_lock() sees the context as enabled and
re-arms it.  The port and port-VLAN branch of the function has no
br_vlan_is_brentry() test and flips the flag under br->multicast_lock,
so it is not affected.

The reader is the bridge transmit path.  For a master VLAN
br_multicast_rcv() selects brmctx = &vlan->br_mcast_ctx with
pmctx = NULL, so IGMP sent to the bridge device re-arms the context's
timers after br_multicast_ctx_deinit() has already stopped them.

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in detach_if_pending+0x412/0x4a0
  Write of size 8 at addr ffff88810ac39918 by task brmc/601
   __mod_timer+0x51a/0xc50
   br_multicast_host_join+0x25b/0x390
   __br_multicast_add_group+0x468/0x530
   br_ip4_multicast_add_group+0x1a0/0x260
   br_multicast_rcv+0x2cda/0x61e0
   br_dev_xmit+0x6c4/0x1540
  Allocated by task 610:
   br_vlan_add+0x111/0xb40
   br_vlan_info+0x370/0x3e0
  Freed by task 0:
   kfree+0x1a7/0x4f0
   rcu_core+0x7dc/0x10a0

Only test br_vlan_is_brentry() when enabling, like the
br_multicast_ctx_vlan_global_disabled() test next to it.  Disabling then
always clears BR_VLFLAG_MCAST_ENABLED under br->multicast_lock before
br_multicast_ctx_deinit() drains the context.

Fixes: 7b54aaaf53cb ("net: bridge: multicast: add vlan state initialization and control")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/D400F6C7-543A-4B79-9E5B-D1D8974DE5C9@doyensec.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/bridge/br_multicast.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/net/bridge/br_multicast.c
+++ b/net/bridge/br_multicast.c
@@ -4312,8 +4312,8 @@ void br_multicast_toggle_one_vlan(struct
 	if (br_vlan_is_master(vlan)) {
 		br = vlan->br;
 
-		if (!br_vlan_is_brentry(vlan) ||
-		    (on &&
+		if (on &&
+		    (!br_vlan_is_brentry(vlan) ||
 		     br_multicast_ctx_vlan_global_disabled(&vlan->br_mcast_ctx)))
 			return;
 

[PATCH 6.6 77/91] ipv6: seg6: clear IPv4 control block on IPIP decapsulation

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>

commit 44930446dde45a7a90fe1446fa38eb0e2c561646 upstream.

End.DX4 and End.DT4 decapsulate an IPv4 packet through
decap_and_validate() and send it directly to IPv4 routing. The inner
packet therefore bypasses ip_rcv_core(), which normally clears IPCB
before IPv4 interprets skb->cb.

The skb instead retains IP6CB data from the outer packet. IP6CB and
IPCB use the same skb->cb storage, so IP6CB(skb)->lastopt overlaps
IPCB(skb)->opt.optlen and srr, while IP6CB(skb)->nhoff overlaps rr and
ts.

The sender can make the stale optlen byte nonzero with a valid outer
extension-header chain. The reproducers put an eight-byte Destination
Options header immediately after the 40-byte IPv6 header and before the
Segment Routing Header. ipv6_destopt_rcv() records the sender-controlled
Destination Options offset in both lastopt and nhoff, setting them to
40. On the reproduced little-endian x86-64 kernel, IPv4 therefore sees
optlen = 40 and rr = 40.

Both tcp_v4_save_options() and __ip_options_echo() skip option copying
when optlen is zero. Here optlen is 40, so the TCP SYN path allocates
room for 40 bytes of option data and calls __ip_options_echo(). The
stale rr value makes that function read inner packet byte 41 as the
Record Route option length. The reproducers set that sender-controlled
byte to 255, so __ip_options_echo() copies 255 bytes into the 40-byte
option-data area.

Separate End.DX4 and End.DT4 reproducers on the unpatched v7.2-rc5
kernel both produced:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo()
  Write of size 255

The relevant End.DX4 call path is:

  __ip_options_echo
  tcp_v4_route_req
  tcp_conn_request
  tcp_v4_conn_request
  tcp_rcv_state_process
  tcp_v4_do_rcv
  tcp_v4_rcv
  ip_protocol_deliver_rcu
  ip_local_deliver_finish
  ip_local_deliver
  input_action_end_dx4_finish
  input_action_end_dx4

The relevant End.DT4 call path is:

  __ip_options_echo
  tcp_v4_route_req
  tcp_conn_request
  tcp_v4_conn_request
  tcp_rcv_state_process
  tcp_v4_do_rcv
  tcp_v4_rcv
  ip_protocol_deliver_rcu
  ip_local_deliver_finish
  ip_local_deliver
  input_action_end_dt4

tcp_v4_save_options() is inlined into the tcp_v4_route_req() path, so
it does not appear as a separate frame.

When decap_and_validate() handles IPPROTO_IPIP, save the ingress
interface from IP6CB, clear IPCB, and restore the saved value. Doing
this in the common decapsulation path covers End.DX4, End.DT4, and
End.DT46's IPv4 arm.

Use IP6CB(skb)->iif rather than skb->skb_iif. These actions run after
l3mdev processing, which can replace skb_iif with the L3 master;
IP6CB iif still records the receiving interface set at IPv6 ingress.

Fixes: 891ef8dd2a8d ("ipv6: sr: implement additional seg6local actions")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Andrea Mayer <andrea.mayer@uniroma2.it>
Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
Co-developed-by: David Lee <david.lee@trailofbits.com>
Signed-off-by: David Lee <david.lee@trailofbits.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrea Mayer <andrea.mayer@uniroma2.it>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260817085839.946321-1-david.lee@trailofbits.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv6/seg6_local.c |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

--- a/net/ipv6/seg6_local.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/seg6_local.c
@@ -256,6 +256,13 @@ static bool decap_and_validate(struct sk
 	if (iptunnel_pull_offloads(skb))
 		return false;
 
+	if (proto == IPPROTO_IPIP) {
+		int iif = IP6CB(skb)->iif;
+
+		memset(IPCB(skb), 0, sizeof(*IPCB(skb)));
+		IPCB(skb)->iif = iif;
+	}
+
 	return true;
 }
 

[PATCH 6.6 78/91] mm/swap: reject swapon() on filesystem-level encrypted files

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>

commit c310a8932a3107c9bc8f01d473e9d085f8aa9c98 upstream.

ext4 and f2fs don't prevent filesystem-level encrypted files from being
set up directly as swap files.  In this case, encryption is bypassed.

No one should be doing this, vs.  the methods of encrypted swap that
actually do work (such as swapping to a dm-crypt device, or swapping to a
loopback device on top of a filesystem-level encrypted file).

Nevertheless, to prevent user error, make swapon() explicitly reject this
case.  Document this behavior in fscrypt.rst as well.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260803180426.3123-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Fixes: 9bd8212f981e ("ext4 crypto: add encryption policy and password salt support")
Fixes: f424f664f0e8 ("f2fs crypto: add encryption policy and password salt support")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Baoquan He <baoquan.he@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Cc: Barry Song <baohua@kernel.org>
Cc: Chris Li <chrisl@kernel.org>
Cc: Kairui Song <kasong@tencent.com>
Cc: Kemeng Shi <shikemeng@huaweicloud.com>
Cc: Nhat Pham <nphamcs@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst |    4 ++++
 mm/swapfile.c                         |    7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)

--- a/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst
@@ -1158,6 +1158,10 @@ astute users may notice some differences
 
 - DAX (Direct Access) is not supported on encrypted files.
 
+- Encrypted files cannot be used directly as swap files.  To swap to
+  an encrypted file, set up a loopback device on top of it.
+  Alternatively, encrypted swap can use a dm-crypt device.
+
 - The maximum length of an encrypted symlink is 2 bytes shorter than
   the maximum length of an unencrypted symlink.  For example, on an
   EXT4 filesystem with a 4K block size, unencrypted symlinks can be up
--- a/mm/swapfile.c
+++ b/mm/swapfile.c
@@ -3051,6 +3051,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(swapon, const char __use
 		error = -EBUSY;
 		goto bad_swap_unlock_inode;
 	}
+	if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)) {
+		pr_warn_once(
+			"Filesystem-level encrypted swapfile '%s' is unsupported. Create a loop device over it, or use dm-crypt\n",
+			name->name);
+		error = -EINVAL;
+		goto bad_swap_unlock_inode;
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Read the swap header.

[PATCH 6.6 79/91] crypto: atmel-tdes - use scatterlist length before DMA mapping

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>

commit ba199bdaa80b09a7dd92f28751de7f3dbb06c510 upstream.

Using sg_dma_len() is only valid after mapping the scatterlist with
dma_map_sg(). However, atmel_tdes_crypt_start() uses it before mapping
to compare input/output lengths and to compute the transfer count.

Use the original scatterlist lengths before DMA mapping to avoid reading
stale or uninitialized DMA lengths when CONFIG_NEED_SG_DMA_LENGTH=y.

Drop the output scatterlist length in the fast path since it is equal to
->in_sg->length and does not change the transfer count.

Fixes: 13802005d8f2 ("crypto: atmel - add Atmel DES/TDES driver")
Fixes: 1f858040c2f7 ("crypto: atmel-tdes - add support for latest release of the IP (0x700)")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/crypto/atmel-tdes.c |    5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/crypto/atmel-tdes.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/atmel-tdes.c
@@ -463,14 +463,13 @@ static int atmel_tdes_crypt_start(struct
 			IS_ALIGNED(dd->out_sg->length, dd->ctx->block_size);
 		fast = in && out;
 
-		if (sg_dma_len(dd->in_sg) != sg_dma_len(dd->out_sg))
+		if (dd->in_sg->length != dd->out_sg->length)
 			fast = 0;
 	}
 
 
 	if (fast)  {
-		count = min_t(size_t, dd->total, sg_dma_len(dd->in_sg));
-		count = min_t(size_t, count, sg_dma_len(dd->out_sg));
+		count = min_t(size_t, dd->total, dd->in_sg->length);
 
 		err = dma_map_sg(dd->dev, dd->in_sg, 1, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
 		if (!err) {

[PATCH 6.6 80/91] crypto: qce - fix CCM AAD buffer underallocation

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Md Sadre Alam <md.alam@oss.qualcomm.com>

commit 7f2345f47dd189625f657cd72437179ab4170ee1 upstream.

The AAD buffer allocated in qce_aead_ccm_prepare_buf_assoclen()
can be smaller than the length later programmed into the DMA
scatterlist.

The allocation size is currently calculated as:

  ALIGN(assoclen, 16) + MAX_CCM_ADATA_HEADER_LEN

while the DMA length is set to:

  ALIGN(assoclen + adata_header_len, 16)

Since ALIGN() does not distribute over addition, the allocation
can be smaller than the DMA length. For example, when
assoclen = 32 and adata_header_len = 2:

  allocation = ALIGN(32, 16) + 6 = 38
  DMA length = ALIGN(32 + 2, 16) = 48

As a result, the QCE hardware can read beyond the allocated
buffer while computing the CBC-MAC over the associated data.
The extra bytes are folded into the authentication tag,
resulting in an incorrect tag and causing CCM self-test
failures such as:

  alg: aead: ccm-aes-qce encryption test failed (wrong result)
  on test vector 8

Fix the allocation by adding the maximum possible AAD header
length before alignment:

  ALIGN(assoclen + MAX_CCM_ADATA_HEADER_LEN, 16)

This guarantees that the allocated buffer is large enough
for the fully padded AAD data for all supported header sizes.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 9363efb4181c ("crypto: qce - Add support for AEAD algorithms")
Signed-off-by: Md Sadre Alam <md.alam@oss.qualcomm.com>
Reviewed-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ qce_aead_ccm_prepare_buf_assoclen(struct
 	/* Get the msg */
 	msg_sg = scatterwalk_ffwd(__sg, req->src, req->assoclen);
 
-	rctx->adata = kzalloc((ALIGN(assoclen, 16) + MAX_CCM_ADATA_HEADER_LEN) *
+	rctx->adata = kzalloc(ALIGN(assoclen + MAX_CCM_ADATA_HEADER_LEN, 16) *
 			       sizeof(unsigned char), GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (!rctx->adata)
 		return -ENOMEM;

[PATCH 6.6 81/91] crypto: mxs-dcp - fix source scatterlist length access

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>

commit c5bcb084a9871e5b62afb5f48b60adfa13b5d9f8 upstream.

mxs_dcp_aes_block_crypt() uses sg_dma_len() without mapping the source
scatterlist with dma_map_sg() first. Therefore, sg_dma_len() is invalid
and could return zero or a stale DMA length, causing encryption and
decryption to process the wrong number of bytes when
CONFIG_NEED_SG_DMA_LENGTH=y.

Use the original scatterlist length instead.

Fixes: 15b59e7c3733 ("crypto: mxs - Add Freescale MXS DCP driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ static int mxs_dcp_aes_block_crypt(struc
 
 	for_each_sg(req->src, src, sg_nents(req->src), i) {
 		src_buf = sg_virt(src);
-		len = sg_dma_len(src);
+		len = src->length;
 		tlen += len;
 		limit_hit = tlen > req->cryptlen;
 

[PATCH 6.6 82/91] crypto: qce - Remove unsafe/deprecated algorithms

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>

commit 7e28b0a5c4b7d075b98ce6d8f5290a9d3deb5b92 upstream.

Remove algorithms that are either unsafe or deprecated and have no
in-kernel users that cannot be served by the ARM CE implementations.

AES-ECB reveals plaintext patterns (identical plaintext blocks produce
identical ciphertext blocks) and should not be exposed as a hardware-
accelerated primitive. DES, Triple DES and HMAC-SHA1 have been
deprecated for years.

Remove sha1, ecb(aes), ecb(des), cbc(des), ecb(des3_ede), cbc(des3_ede),
hmac(sha1) and all AEAD variants built on these primitives as well as
authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(des)). Also clean up the - now dead - code,
flags and constants.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Kuldeep Singh <kuldeep.singh@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c     |   56 ------------------------
 drivers/crypto/qce/common.c   |   55 +++++------------------
 drivers/crypto/qce/common.h   |   16 +-----
 drivers/crypto/qce/regs-v5.h  |    4 -
 drivers/crypto/qce/sha.c      |   30 ------------
 drivers/crypto/qce/sha.h      |    1 
 drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c |   97 ------------------------------------------
 7 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 239 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c
@@ -8,8 +8,6 @@
 #include <crypto/gcm.h>
 #include <crypto/authenc.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
-#include <crypto/internal/des.h>
-#include <crypto/sha1.h>
 #include <crypto/sha2.h>
 #include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
 #include "aead.h"
@@ -597,7 +595,6 @@ static int qce_aead_setkey(struct crypto
 	struct qce_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
 	struct crypto_authenc_keys authenc_keys;
 	unsigned long flags = to_aead_tmpl(tfm)->alg_flags;
-	u32 _key[6];
 	int err;
 
 	err = crypto_authenc_extractkeys(&authenc_keys, key, keylen);
@@ -608,26 +605,7 @@ static int qce_aead_setkey(struct crypto
 	    authenc_keys.authkeylen > QCE_MAX_KEY_SIZE)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (IS_DES(flags)) {
-		err = verify_aead_des_key(tfm, authenc_keys.enckey, authenc_keys.enckeylen);
-		if (err)
-			return err;
-	} else if (IS_3DES(flags)) {
-		err = verify_aead_des3_key(tfm, authenc_keys.enckey, authenc_keys.enckeylen);
-		if (err)
-			return err;
-		/*
-		 * The crypto engine does not support any two keys
-		 * being the same for triple des algorithms. The
-		 * verify_skcipher_des3_key does not check for all the
-		 * below conditions. Schedule fallback in this case.
-		 */
-		memcpy(_key, authenc_keys.enckey, DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE);
-		if (!((_key[0] ^ _key[2]) | (_key[1] ^ _key[3])) ||
-		    !((_key[2] ^ _key[4]) | (_key[3] ^ _key[5])) ||
-		    !((_key[0] ^ _key[4]) | (_key[1] ^ _key[5])))
-			ctx->need_fallback = true;
-	} else if (IS_AES(flags)) {
+	if (IS_AES(flags)) {
 		/* No random key sizes */
 		if (authenc_keys.enckeylen != AES_KEYSIZE_128 &&
 		    authenc_keys.enckeylen != AES_KEYSIZE_192 &&
@@ -699,38 +677,6 @@ struct qce_aead_def {
 
 static const struct qce_aead_def aead_def[] = {
 	{
-		.flags          = QCE_ALG_DES | QCE_MODE_CBC | QCE_HASH_SHA1_HMAC,
-		.name           = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(des))",
-		.drv_name       = "authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-des-qce",
-		.blocksize      = DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.ivsize         = DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.maxauthsize	= SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
-	},
-	{
-		.flags          = QCE_ALG_3DES | QCE_MODE_CBC | QCE_HASH_SHA1_HMAC,
-		.name           = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(des3_ede))",
-		.drv_name       = "authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-3des-qce",
-		.blocksize      = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.ivsize         = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.maxauthsize	= SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
-	},
-	{
-		.flags          = QCE_ALG_DES | QCE_MODE_CBC | QCE_HASH_SHA256_HMAC,
-		.name           = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(des))",
-		.drv_name       = "authenc-hmac-sha256-cbc-des-qce",
-		.blocksize      = DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.ivsize         = DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.maxauthsize	= SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
-	},
-	{
-		.flags          = QCE_ALG_3DES | QCE_MODE_CBC | QCE_HASH_SHA256_HMAC,
-		.name           = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(des3_ede))",
-		.drv_name       = "authenc-hmac-sha256-cbc-3des-qce",
-		.blocksize      = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.ivsize         = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.maxauthsize	= SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
-	},
-	{
 		.flags          =  QCE_ALG_AES | QCE_MODE_CBC | QCE_HASH_SHA256_HMAC,
 		.name           = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))",
 		.drv_name       = "authenc-hmac-sha256-cbc-aes-qce",
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/common.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/common.c
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
-#include <crypto/sha1.h>
 #include <crypto/sha2.h>
 
 #include "cipher.h"
@@ -115,18 +114,16 @@ static u32 qce_auth_cfg(unsigned long fl
 			cfg |= AUTH_KEY_SZ_AES256 << AUTH_KEY_SIZE_SHIFT;
 	}
 
-	if (IS_SHA1(flags) || IS_SHA1_HMAC(flags))
-		cfg |= AUTH_SIZE_SHA1 << AUTH_SIZE_SHIFT;
-	else if (IS_SHA256(flags) || IS_SHA256_HMAC(flags))
+	if (IS_SHA256(flags) || IS_SHA256_HMAC(flags))
 		cfg |= AUTH_SIZE_SHA256 << AUTH_SIZE_SHIFT;
 	else if (IS_CMAC(flags))
 		cfg |= AUTH_SIZE_ENUM_16_BYTES << AUTH_SIZE_SHIFT;
 	else if (IS_CCM(flags))
 		cfg |= (auth_size - 1) << AUTH_SIZE_SHIFT;
 
-	if (IS_SHA1(flags) || IS_SHA256(flags))
+	if (IS_SHA256(flags))
 		cfg |= AUTH_MODE_HASH << AUTH_MODE_SHIFT;
-	else if (IS_SHA1_HMAC(flags) || IS_SHA256_HMAC(flags))
+	else if (IS_SHA256_HMAC(flags))
 		cfg |= AUTH_MODE_HMAC << AUTH_MODE_SHIFT;
 	else if (IS_CCM(flags))
 		cfg |= AUTH_MODE_CCM << AUTH_MODE_SHIFT;
@@ -191,7 +188,7 @@ static int qce_setup_regs_ahash(struct c
 	else
 		qce_cpu_to_be32p_array(auth, rctx->digest, digestsize);
 
-	iv_words = (IS_SHA1(rctx->flags) || IS_SHA1_HMAC(rctx->flags)) ? 5 : 8;
+	iv_words = 8;
 	qce_write_array(qce, REG_AUTH_IV0, (u32 *)auth, iv_words);
 
 	if (rctx->first_blk)
@@ -243,19 +240,8 @@ static u32 qce_encr_cfg(unsigned long fl
 
 	if (IS_AES(flags))
 		cfg |= ENCR_ALG_AES << ENCR_ALG_SHIFT;
-	else if (IS_DES(flags) || IS_3DES(flags))
-		cfg |= ENCR_ALG_DES << ENCR_ALG_SHIFT;
-
-	if (IS_DES(flags))
-		cfg |= ENCR_KEY_SZ_DES << ENCR_KEY_SZ_SHIFT;
-
-	if (IS_3DES(flags))
-		cfg |= ENCR_KEY_SZ_3DES << ENCR_KEY_SZ_SHIFT;
 
 	switch (flags & QCE_MODE_MASK) {
-	case QCE_MODE_ECB:
-		cfg |= ENCR_MODE_ECB << ENCR_MODE_SHIFT;
-		break;
 	case QCE_MODE_CBC:
 		cfg |= ENCR_MODE_CBC << ENCR_MODE_SHIFT;
 		break;
@@ -340,13 +326,7 @@ static int qce_setup_regs_skcipher(struc
 
 	encr_cfg = qce_encr_cfg(flags, keylen);
 
-	if (IS_DES(flags)) {
-		enciv_words = 2;
-		enckey_words = 2;
-	} else if (IS_3DES(flags)) {
-		enciv_words = 2;
-		enckey_words = 6;
-	} else if (IS_AES(flags)) {
+	if (IS_AES(flags)) {
 		if (IS_XTS(flags))
 			qce_xtskey(qce, ctx->enc_key, ctx->enc_keylen,
 				   rctx->cryptlen);
@@ -357,14 +337,12 @@ static int qce_setup_regs_skcipher(struc
 
 	qce_write_array(qce, REG_ENCR_KEY0, (u32 *)enckey, enckey_words);
 
-	if (!IS_ECB(flags)) {
-		if (IS_XTS(flags))
-			qce_xts_swapiv(enciv, rctx->iv, ivsize);
-		else
-			qce_cpu_to_be32p_array(enciv, rctx->iv, ivsize);
+	if (IS_XTS(flags))
+		qce_xts_swapiv(enciv, rctx->iv, ivsize);
+	else
+		qce_cpu_to_be32p_array(enciv, rctx->iv, ivsize);
 
-		qce_write_array(qce, REG_CNTR0_IV0, (u32 *)enciv, enciv_words);
-	}
+	qce_write_array(qce, REG_CNTR0_IV0, (u32 *)enciv, enciv_words);
 
 	if (IS_ENCRYPT(flags))
 		encr_cfg |= BIT(ENCODE_SHIFT);
@@ -393,10 +371,6 @@ static int qce_setup_regs_skcipher(struc
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_QCE_AEAD
-static const u32 std_iv_sha1[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE / sizeof(u32)] = {
-	SHA1_H0, SHA1_H1, SHA1_H2, SHA1_H3, SHA1_H4, 0, 0, 0
-};
-
 static const u32 std_iv_sha256[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE / sizeof(u32)] = {
 	SHA256_H0, SHA256_H1, SHA256_H2, SHA256_H3,
 	SHA256_H4, SHA256_H5, SHA256_H6, SHA256_H7
@@ -473,13 +447,8 @@ static int qce_setup_regs_aead(struct cr
 	/* Write initial authentication IV only for HMAC algorithms */
 	if (IS_SHA_HMAC(rctx->flags)) {
 		/* Write default authentication iv */
-		if (IS_SHA1_HMAC(rctx->flags)) {
-			auth_ivsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
-			memcpy(authiv, std_iv_sha1, auth_ivsize);
-		} else if (IS_SHA256_HMAC(rctx->flags)) {
-			auth_ivsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
-			memcpy(authiv, std_iv_sha256, auth_ivsize);
-		}
+		auth_ivsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+		memcpy(authiv, std_iv_sha256, auth_ivsize);
 		authiv_words = auth_ivsize / sizeof(u32);
 		qce_write_array(qce, REG_AUTH_IV0, (u32 *)authiv, authiv_words);
 	} else if (IS_CCM(rctx->flags)) {
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/common.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/common.h
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 
 /* IV length in bytes */
 #define QCE_AES_IV_LENGTH		AES_BLOCK_SIZE
-/* max of AES_BLOCK_SIZE, DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE */
+/* max of AES_BLOCK_SIZE */
 #define QCE_MAX_IV_SIZE			AES_BLOCK_SIZE
 
 /* maximum nonce bytes  */
@@ -33,14 +33,10 @@
 #define QCE_MAX_ALIGN_SIZE		64
 
 /* cipher algorithms */
-#define QCE_ALG_DES			BIT(0)
-#define QCE_ALG_3DES			BIT(1)
 #define QCE_ALG_AES			BIT(2)
 
 /* hash and hmac algorithms */
-#define QCE_HASH_SHA1			BIT(3)
 #define QCE_HASH_SHA256			BIT(4)
-#define QCE_HASH_SHA1_HMAC		BIT(5)
 #define QCE_HASH_SHA256_HMAC		BIT(6)
 #define QCE_HASH_AES_CMAC		BIT(7)
 
@@ -58,21 +54,15 @@
 #define QCE_ENCRYPT			BIT(30)
 #define QCE_DECRYPT			BIT(31)
 
-#define IS_DES(flags)			(flags & QCE_ALG_DES)
-#define IS_3DES(flags)			(flags & QCE_ALG_3DES)
 #define IS_AES(flags)			(flags & QCE_ALG_AES)
 
-#define IS_SHA1(flags)			(flags & QCE_HASH_SHA1)
 #define IS_SHA256(flags)		(flags & QCE_HASH_SHA256)
-#define IS_SHA1_HMAC(flags)		(flags & QCE_HASH_SHA1_HMAC)
 #define IS_SHA256_HMAC(flags)		(flags & QCE_HASH_SHA256_HMAC)
 #define IS_CMAC(flags)			(flags & QCE_HASH_AES_CMAC)
-#define IS_SHA(flags)			(IS_SHA1(flags) || IS_SHA256(flags))
-#define IS_SHA_HMAC(flags)		\
-		(IS_SHA1_HMAC(flags) || IS_SHA256_HMAC(flags))
+#define IS_SHA(flags)			IS_SHA256(flags)
+#define IS_SHA_HMAC(flags)		IS_SHA256_HMAC(flags)
 
 #define IS_CBC(mode)			(mode & QCE_MODE_CBC)
-#define IS_ECB(mode)			(mode & QCE_MODE_ECB)
 #define IS_CTR(mode)			(mode & QCE_MODE_CTR)
 #define IS_XTS(mode)			(mode & QCE_MODE_XTS)
 #define IS_CCM(mode)			(mode & QCE_MODE_CCM)
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/regs-v5.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/regs-v5.h
@@ -203,7 +203,6 @@
 
 #define AUTH_SIZE_SHIFT			9
 #define AUTH_SIZE_MASK			GENMASK(13, 9)
-#define AUTH_SIZE_SHA1			0
 #define AUTH_SIZE_SHA256		1
 #define AUTH_SIZE_ENUM_1_BYTES		0
 #define AUTH_SIZE_ENUM_2_BYTES		1
@@ -284,15 +283,12 @@
 
 #define ENCR_KEY_SZ_SHIFT		3
 #define ENCR_KEY_SZ_MASK		GENMASK(5, 3)
-#define ENCR_KEY_SZ_DES			0
-#define ENCR_KEY_SZ_3DES		1
 #define ENCR_KEY_SZ_AES128		0
 #define ENCR_KEY_SZ_AES256		2
 
 #define ENCR_ALG_SHIFT			0
 #define ENCR_ALG_MASK			GENMASK(2, 0)
 #define ENCR_ALG_NONE			0
-#define ENCR_ALG_DES			1
 #define ENCR_ALG_AES			2
 #define ENCR_ALG_KASUMI			4
 #define ENCR_ALG_SNOW_3G		5
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/sha.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/sha.c
@@ -24,10 +24,6 @@ struct qce_sha_saved_state {
 
 static LIST_HEAD(ahash_algs);
 
-static const u32 std_iv_sha1[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE / sizeof(u32)] = {
-	SHA1_H0, SHA1_H1, SHA1_H2, SHA1_H3, SHA1_H4, 0, 0, 0
-};
-
 static const u32 std_iv_sha256[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE / sizeof(u32)] = {
 	SHA256_H0, SHA256_H1, SHA256_H2, SHA256_H3,
 	SHA256_H4, SHA256_H5, SHA256_H6, SHA256_H7
@@ -348,9 +344,7 @@ static int qce_ahash_hmac_setkey(struct
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	if (digestsize == SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
-		alg_name = "sha1-qce";
-	else if (digestsize == SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)
+	if (digestsize == SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)
 		alg_name = "sha256-qce";
 	else
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -412,15 +406,6 @@ struct qce_ahash_def {
 
 static const struct qce_ahash_def ahash_def[] = {
 	{
-		.flags		= QCE_HASH_SHA1,
-		.name		= "sha1",
-		.drv_name	= "sha1-qce",
-		.digestsize	= SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
-		.blocksize	= SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.statesize	= sizeof(struct qce_sha_saved_state),
-		.std_iv		= std_iv_sha1,
-	},
-	{
 		.flags		= QCE_HASH_SHA256,
 		.name		= "sha256",
 		.drv_name	= "sha256-qce",
@@ -430,15 +415,6 @@ static const struct qce_ahash_def ahash_
 		.std_iv		= std_iv_sha256,
 	},
 	{
-		.flags		= QCE_HASH_SHA1_HMAC,
-		.name		= "hmac(sha1)",
-		.drv_name	= "hmac-sha1-qce",
-		.digestsize	= SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
-		.blocksize	= SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.statesize	= sizeof(struct qce_sha_saved_state),
-		.std_iv		= std_iv_sha1,
-	},
-	{
 		.flags		= QCE_HASH_SHA256_HMAC,
 		.name		= "hmac(sha256)",
 		.drv_name	= "hmac-sha256-qce",
@@ -475,9 +451,7 @@ static int qce_ahash_register_one(const
 	alg->halg.digestsize = def->digestsize;
 	alg->halg.statesize = def->statesize;
 
-	if (IS_SHA1(def->flags))
-		tmpl->hash_zero = sha1_zero_message_hash;
-	else if (IS_SHA256(def->flags))
+	if (IS_SHA256(def->flags))
 		tmpl->hash_zero = sha256_zero_message_hash;
 
 	base = &alg->halg.base;
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/sha.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/sha.h
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@
 #define _SHA_H_
 
 #include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
-#include <crypto/sha1.h>
 #include <crypto/sha2.h>
 
 #include "common.h"
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c
@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <crypto/aes.h>
-#include <crypto/internal/des.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
 
 #include "cipher.h"
@@ -208,51 +207,6 @@ static int qce_skcipher_setkey(struct cr
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static int qce_des_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *ablk, const u8 *key,
-			  unsigned int keylen)
-{
-	struct qce_cipher_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(ablk);
-	int err;
-
-	err = verify_skcipher_des_key(ablk, key);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
-	ctx->enc_keylen = keylen;
-	memcpy(ctx->enc_key, key, keylen);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int qce_des3_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *ablk, const u8 *key,
-			   unsigned int keylen)
-{
-	struct qce_cipher_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(ablk);
-	u32 _key[6];
-	int err;
-
-	err = verify_skcipher_des3_key(ablk, key);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
-	/*
-	 * The crypto engine does not support any two keys
-	 * being the same for triple des algorithms. The
-	 * verify_skcipher_des3_key does not check for all the
-	 * below conditions. Return -ENOKEY in case any two keys
-	 * are the same. Revisit to see if a fallback cipher
-	 * is needed to handle this condition.
-	 */
-	memcpy(_key, key, DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE);
-	if (!((_key[0] ^ _key[2]) | (_key[1] ^ _key[3])) ||
-	    !((_key[2] ^ _key[4]) | (_key[3] ^ _key[5])) ||
-	    !((_key[0] ^ _key[4]) | (_key[1] ^ _key[5])))
-		return -ENOKEY;
-
-	ctx->enc_keylen = keylen;
-	memcpy(ctx->enc_key, key, keylen);
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static int qce_skcipher_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, int encrypt)
 {
 	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
@@ -275,7 +229,7 @@ static int qce_skcipher_crypt(struct skc
 	 * ECB and CBC algorithms require message lengths to be
 	 * multiples of block size.
 	 */
-	if (IS_ECB(rctx->flags) || IS_CBC(rctx->flags))
+	if (IS_CBC(rctx->flags))
 		if (!IS_ALIGNED(req->cryptlen, blocksize))
 			return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -359,15 +313,6 @@ struct qce_skcipher_def {
 
 static const struct qce_skcipher_def skcipher_def[] = {
 	{
-		.flags		= QCE_ALG_AES | QCE_MODE_ECB,
-		.name		= "ecb(aes)",
-		.drv_name	= "ecb-aes-qce",
-		.blocksize	= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.ivsize		= 0,
-		.min_keysize	= AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
-		.max_keysize	= AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
-	},
-	{
 		.flags		= QCE_ALG_AES | QCE_MODE_CBC,
 		.name		= "cbc(aes)",
 		.drv_name	= "cbc-aes-qce",
@@ -395,42 +340,6 @@ static const struct qce_skcipher_def skc
 		.min_keysize	= AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE * 2,
 		.max_keysize	= AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE * 2,
 	},
-	{
-		.flags		= QCE_ALG_DES | QCE_MODE_ECB,
-		.name		= "ecb(des)",
-		.drv_name	= "ecb-des-qce",
-		.blocksize	= DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.ivsize		= 0,
-		.min_keysize	= DES_KEY_SIZE,
-		.max_keysize	= DES_KEY_SIZE,
-	},
-	{
-		.flags		= QCE_ALG_DES | QCE_MODE_CBC,
-		.name		= "cbc(des)",
-		.drv_name	= "cbc-des-qce",
-		.blocksize	= DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.ivsize		= DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.min_keysize	= DES_KEY_SIZE,
-		.max_keysize	= DES_KEY_SIZE,
-	},
-	{
-		.flags		= QCE_ALG_3DES | QCE_MODE_ECB,
-		.name		= "ecb(des3_ede)",
-		.drv_name	= "ecb-3des-qce",
-		.blocksize	= DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.ivsize		= 0,
-		.min_keysize	= DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE,
-		.max_keysize	= DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE,
-	},
-	{
-		.flags		= QCE_ALG_3DES | QCE_MODE_CBC,
-		.name		= "cbc(des3_ede)",
-		.drv_name	= "cbc-3des-qce",
-		.blocksize	= DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.ivsize		= DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.min_keysize	= DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE,
-		.max_keysize	= DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE,
-	},
 };
 
 static int qce_skcipher_register_one(const struct qce_skcipher_def *def,
@@ -455,9 +364,7 @@ static int qce_skcipher_register_one(con
 	alg->ivsize			= def->ivsize;
 	alg->min_keysize		= def->min_keysize;
 	alg->max_keysize		= def->max_keysize;
-	alg->setkey			= IS_3DES(def->flags) ? qce_des3_setkey :
-					  IS_DES(def->flags) ? qce_des_setkey :
-					  qce_skcipher_setkey;
+	alg->setkey			= qce_skcipher_setkey;
 	alg->encrypt			= qce_skcipher_encrypt;
 	alg->decrypt			= qce_skcipher_decrypt;
 

[PATCH 6.6 83/91] KVM: s390: vsie: zero stale crypto bits

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>

commit 34d5b5b646c91cfb9338d7a12c955a70ffb8c66b upstream.

When shadowing crypto access bits from a format0 apcb (crycb 0 or 1),
the bits 64..255 are unchanged from whatever is in the vsie page in the
crycb and thus in the apcb. This gives a nested guest potential access
to a device no longer available. Zero out the remaining bits.

Fixes: 6b79de4b056e ("KVM: s390: vsie: allow guest FORMAT-1 CRYCB on host FORMAT-2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Message-ID: <20260811153738.206885-3-borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ static int setup_apcb10(struct kvm_vcpu
 			    sizeof(struct kvm_s390_apcb0)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
+	memset(apcb_s, 0, sizeof(*apcb_s));
 	apcb_s->apm[0] = apcb_h->apm[0] & tmp.apm[0];
 	apcb_s->aqm[0] = apcb_h->aqm[0] & tmp.aqm[0] & 0xffff000000000000UL;
 	apcb_s->adm[0] = apcb_h->adm[0] & tmp.adm[0] & 0xffff000000000000UL;

[PATCH 6.6 84/91] usb: core: Add lock to usb_wakeup_notification()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Griffin Kroah-Hartman <griffin@kroah.com>

commit e263e18a9e7b1ff3e7301f0801c6ff87c31adfb6 upstream.

Add a spin lock to usb_wakeup notification to prevent a race condition
with dereferencing freed memory. This could be hit by the xHCI driver as
it calls this function from an IRQ and could race with the
hub_disconnect() function, which properly grabs this lock to protect the
state of the device.

Assisted-by: gkh_clanker_t1000
Signed-off-by: Griffin Kroah-Hartman <griffin@kroah.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260713-usb_core_patches_1-v1-3-7721c2b33f53@kroah.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/usb/core/hub.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
@@ -727,10 +727,12 @@ void usb_wakeup_notification(struct usb_
 {
 	struct usb_hub *hub;
 	struct usb_port *port_dev;
+	unsigned long flags;
 
 	if (!hdev)
 		return;
 
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&device_state_lock, flags);
 	hub = usb_hub_to_struct_hub(hdev);
 	if (hub) {
 		port_dev = hub->ports[portnum - 1];
@@ -740,6 +742,7 @@ void usb_wakeup_notification(struct usb_
 		set_bit(portnum, hub->wakeup_bits);
 		kick_hub_wq(hub);
 	}
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&device_state_lock, flags);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usb_wakeup_notification);
 

[PATCH 6.6 85/91] usb: core: Strengthen error handling in hub_hub_status()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Griffin Kroah-Hartman <griffin@kroah.com>

commit a29496745aa335d97f617385809583241e118610 upstream.

Add additional error handling after the call to get_hub_status() in
hub_hub_status().

get_hub_status() uses usb_control_msg() which does not verify that the
message is the correct length, substituting it for
usb_control_msg_recv() would also solve this issue but increase memory
allocations.

Instead, error handling is copied from the method used in
hub_ext_port_status(), which shares the same flow of logic as
hub_hub_status().

Assisted-by: gkh_clanker_t1000
Signed-off-by: Griffin Kroah-Hartman <griffin@kroah.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260722-usb_core_patches_2-v3-1-87622252bfdd@kroah.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/usb/core/hub.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
@@ -968,10 +968,12 @@ static int hub_hub_status(struct usb_hub
 
 	mutex_lock(&hub->status_mutex);
 	ret = get_hub_status(hub->hdev, &hub->status->hub);
-	if (ret < 0) {
+	if (ret < (int)sizeof(hub->status->hub)) {
 		if (ret != -ENODEV)
 			dev_err(hub->intfdev,
 				"%s failed (err = %d)\n", __func__, ret);
+		if (ret >= 0)
+			ret = -EIO;
 	} else {
 		*status = le16_to_cpu(hub->status->hub.wHubStatus);
 		*change = le16_to_cpu(hub->status->hub.wHubChange);

[PATCH 6.6 86/91] ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in snd_usbmidi_novation_output()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Marouane El Moufid <eun0us@espilon.net>

commit 1035a8f63bae28e498b0e7b5ac91d749844a7158 upstream.

snd_usbmidi_novation_output() lays out a two-byte header at
transfer_buffer[0..1] and passes &transfer_buffer[2] together with a
length of ep->max_transfer - 2 to snd_rawmidi_transmit():

	count = snd_rawmidi_transmit(ep->ports[0].substream,
				     &transfer_buffer[2],
				     ep->max_transfer - 2);

ep->max_transfer comes from the output endpoint's wMaxPacketSize via
usb_maxpacket(). A malformed or malicious device can advertise a bulk
OUT endpoint with a wMaxPacketSize of 1 - the USB core only clamps this
value downwards - so ep->max_transfer becomes 1 and the count argument
becomes -1.

snd_rawmidi_transmit() passes the negative count on to
__snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek(), where "if (count1 > count) count1 = count"
leaves count1 negative; get_aligned_size() keeps it negative for a
byte-stream substream, so the following memcpy(buffer, ..., count1) runs
with a (size_t)-1 length and writes far past the transfer buffer, which
was allocated with usb_alloc_coherent(ep->max_transfer).

This is the same class of bug that was fixed for snd_usbmidi_akai_output()
in commit 0970274613fb ("ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in
snd_usbmidi_akai_output()"); the novation output routine was left
unguarded. Bail out when the endpoint cannot hold the two-byte header
plus at least one payload byte.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marouane El Moufid <eun0us@espilon.net>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/178749334830.543645.13722252148340572274@espilon.net
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 sound/usb/midi.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/sound/usb/midi.c
+++ b/sound/usb/midi.c
@@ -878,6 +878,8 @@ static void snd_usbmidi_novation_output(
 
 	if (!ep->ports[0].active)
 		return;
+	if (ep->max_transfer < 3)
+		return;
 	transfer_buffer = urb->transfer_buffer;
 	count = snd_rawmidi_transmit(ep->ports[0].substream,
 				     &transfer_buffer[2],

[PATCH 6.6 87/91] ALSA: usb-audio: Complete cleanup after system-resume errors

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Will Porter <mrwillporter@gmail.com>

commit 1739a976312e110c93a8dee66a1cdf893a1b187e upstream.

A failed system resume can leave the card unusable until reboot.
usb_audio_resume() jumps to err_out when snd_usb_pcm_resume() or
snd_usb_mixer_resume() fails. The error path skips the out: block, which
restores D0 and decrements chip->num_suspended_intf.

The card stays in SNDRV_CTL_POWER_D3hot, so later control access blocks in
snd_power_ref_and_wait(). USB core logs an interface resume callback error.
It does not retry that callback, so a later callback cannot complete the
skipped cleanup.

usb_audio_suspend() increments num_suspended_intf before returning success.
A system-resume callback must consume the system-suspend count even if a
component resume fails. Otherwise, the stranded count skews later suspend
and resume cycles.

Do not apply this cleanup to runtime-resume errors. Runtime PM can retry
-EAGAIN or -EBUSY without another suspend callback. The count must continue
to describe that suspended interface. Other runtime-resume errors latch
runtime_error in the PM core and do not cause an immediate callback retry.

Both parts of the system-resume error path are longstanding. Commit
88a8516a2128a ("ALSA: usbaudio: implement USB autosuspend") introduced
err_out past the D0 restore. Commit 862b2509d157c ("ALSA: usb-audio: Fix
inconsistent card PM state after resume") later moved
num_suspended_intf-- into the out: block. The error path now skips both
operations.

No third-party code is needed to reach the error path.
snd_usb_mixer_resume() ends in snd_usb_mixer_activate(), which returns the
result of usb_submit_urb() for devices that have a mixer status URB. Its
mixer->private_resume hook can also fail through scarlett2_init_notify().
snd_usb_pcm_resume() issues a SET_CUR request to a UAC3 power domain. It
can return -EPIPE or -EIO when the device stalls the request.

Route a component error through out: only when system_suspend is nonzero.
Continue to return runtime-resume errors through err_out. Later component
resume stages remain skipped. The original error still reaches USB core.
A later transfer can fail if the device did not recover.

I reproduced the system-resume failure on an Audient iD14 MkI with an
out-of-tree diagnostic mixer resume hook. An injected -EIO on the unpatched
core left control readers in uninterruptible sleep in
snd_power_ref_and_wait() until a reboot. With this patch, the same failure
restored control access. A second system suspend and resume also succeeded
after I disabled fault injection.

Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5
Assisted-by: Antigravity:gemini-3.1-pro-high
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6-sol
Fixes: 88a8516a2128a ("ALSA: usbaudio: implement USB autosuspend")
Fixes: 862b2509d157c ("ALSA: usb-audio: Fix inconsistent card PM state after resume")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Porter <mrwillporter@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260824225757.26749-1-mrwillporter@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 sound/usb/card.c |   14 ++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/sound/usb/card.c
+++ b/sound/usb/card.c
@@ -1122,8 +1122,11 @@ static int usb_audio_resume(struct usb_i
 
 	list_for_each_entry(as, &chip->pcm_list, list) {
 		err = snd_usb_pcm_resume(as);
-		if (err < 0)
-			goto err_out;
+		if (err < 0) {
+			if (!chip->system_suspend)
+				goto err_out;
+			goto out;
+		}
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -1132,8 +1135,11 @@ static int usb_audio_resume(struct usb_i
 	 */
 	list_for_each_entry(mixer, &chip->mixer_list, list) {
 		err = snd_usb_mixer_resume(mixer);
-		if (err < 0)
-			goto err_out;
+		if (err < 0) {
+			if (!chip->system_suspend)
+				goto err_out;
+			goto out;
+		}
 	}
 
 	list_for_each(p, &chip->midi_list) {

[PATCH 6.6 88/91] USB: serial: option: fix slab OOB read in interrupt URB callback

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jiale Yao <yaojiale02@163.com>

commit 885d802f544ca7bfa8f3984d94233cce715bb6b3 upstream.

The interrupt URB buffer is allocated in setup_port_interrupt_in() based
on the endpoint's wMaxPacketSize:

    buffer_size = usb_endpoint_maxp(epd);
    port->interrupt_in_buffer = kmalloc(buffer_size, GFP_KERNEL);

When a USB device declares wMaxPacketSize = 8 on its interrupt IN
endpoint, the buffer is allocated from kmalloc-8 cache (exactly
8 bytes).

If the device sends a short packet (actual_length < wMaxPacketSize),
the URB completes with status == 0 and the callback proceeds to read:

    data[sizeof(struct usb_ctrlrequest)]

which evaluates to data[8], accessing 1 byte beyond the allocated 8-byte
buffer. This results in a slab out-of-bounds read.

Fix this by adding the missing bounds check: first verify that the
actual length is large enough to contain the struct usb_ctrlrequest
header before accessing req_pkt->bRequestType and req_pkt->bRequest,
and then verify that there is an additional byte for the modem signal
state before reading data[sizeof(struct usb_ctrlrequest)] inside the
conditional.  Use sizeof(*req_pkt) instead of sizeof(struct
usb_ctrlrequest) for consistency.

Assisted-by: Claude:deepseek-v4-pro
Signed-off-by: Jiale Yao <yaojiale02@163.com>
Fixes: 58cfe9113e48 ("[PATCH] USB: add Option Card driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org	# v2.6.12
[ johan: use dev_err(); split signals declaration and initialisation ]
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/usb/serial/option.c |   20 +++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
@@ -2691,12 +2691,26 @@ static void option_instat_callback(struc
 			dev_dbg(dev, "%s: NULL req_pkt\n", __func__);
 			return;
 		}
+
+		if (urb->actual_length < sizeof(*req_pkt)) {
+			dev_err(dev, "%s: short packet: %u bytes\n", __func__,
+				urb->actual_length);
+			return;
+		}
+
 		if ((req_pkt->bRequestType == 0xA1) &&
 				(req_pkt->bRequest == 0x20)) {
+			unsigned char signals;
 			int old_dcd_state;
-			unsigned char signals = *((unsigned char *)
-					urb->transfer_buffer +
-					sizeof(struct usb_ctrlrequest));
+
+			if (urb->actual_length < sizeof(*req_pkt) + 1) {
+				dev_err(dev, "%s: short interrupt transfer: %u bytes\n",
+					__func__, urb->actual_length);
+				return;
+			}
+
+			signals = *((unsigned char *)urb->transfer_buffer +
+					sizeof(*req_pkt));
 
 			dev_dbg(dev, "%s: signal x%x\n", __func__, signals);
 

[PATCH 6.6 89/91] USB: serial: spcp8x5: drop broken carrier detect support

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>

commit d37186bd95a07e334447f47274a38a311dad2172 upstream.

The driver does not support modem status notifications and instead used
to fetch the modem status once at open() and subsequently operate on and
report stale state.

As part of fixing this, a call to fetch the status was added to
carrier_raised(), which does not work as that callback must not sleep
(e.g. unlike tiocmget()).

Drop the broken carrier detect support.

Fixes: e1ed212d8593 ("USB: spcp8x5: add proper modem-status support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org	# 3.10
Reported-by: syzbot+3b514b87202742f22c44@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/6a73cea2.01d0871a.3a0d52.000d.GAE@google.com
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/usb/serial/spcp8x5.c |   13 -------------
 1 file changed, 13 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/serial/spcp8x5.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/spcp8x5.c
@@ -247,18 +247,6 @@ static void spcp8x5_set_work_mode(struct
 		dev_err(&port->dev, "failed to set work mode: %d\n", ret);
 }
 
-static int spcp8x5_carrier_raised(struct usb_serial_port *port)
-{
-	u8 msr;
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = spcp8x5_get_msr(port, &msr);
-	if (ret || msr & MSR_STATUS_LINE_DCD)
-		return 1;
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static void spcp8x5_dtr_rts(struct usb_serial_port *port, int on)
 {
 	struct spcp8x5_private *priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
@@ -471,7 +459,6 @@ static struct usb_serial_driver spcp8x5_
 	.num_bulk_out		= 1,
 	.open			= spcp8x5_open,
 	.dtr_rts		= spcp8x5_dtr_rts,
-	.carrier_raised		= spcp8x5_carrier_raised,
 	.set_termios		= spcp8x5_set_termios,
 	.init_termios		= spcp8x5_init_termios,
 	.tiocmget		= spcp8x5_tiocmget,

[PATCH 6.6 90/91] USB: c67x00: fix use-after-free in c67x00_add_iso_urb()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shuangpeng Bai <shuangpeng.kernel@gmail.com>

commit b1e24de475bf2d66fffc9103f3444b783527d55a upstream.

When TD creation fails for the last packet of an isochronous URB,
c67x00_add_iso_urb() gives the URB back before updating the endpoint
scheduling state.

c67x00_giveback_urb() frees the URB private data, and the completion
callback may release the final URB reference. The following accesses to
urbp->ep_data, urb->interval, and urbp->cnt can therefore use freed
memory.

Update next_frame and cnt before giving back the failed final packet,
making the giveback the last operation that uses the URB and its private
data.

Fixes: e9b29ffc519b ("USB: add Cypress c67x00 OTG controller HCD driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Shuangpeng Bai <shuangpeng.kernel@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260806013502.322067-1-shuangpeng.kernel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/usb/c67x00/c67x00-sched.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/c67x00/c67x00-sched.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/c67x00/c67x00-sched.c
@@ -761,13 +761,13 @@ static int c67x00_add_iso_urb(struct c67
 				ret);
 			urb->iso_frame_desc[urbp->cnt].actual_length = 0;
 			urb->iso_frame_desc[urbp->cnt].status = ret;
-			if (urbp->cnt + 1 == urb->number_of_packets)
-				c67x00_giveback_urb(c67x00, urb, 0);
 		}
 
 		urbp->ep_data->next_frame =
 		    frame_add(urbp->ep_data->next_frame, urb->interval);
 		urbp->cnt++;
+		if (ret && urbp->cnt == urb->number_of_packets)
+			c67x00_giveback_urb(c67x00, urb, 0);
 	}
 	return 0;
 }

[PATCH 6.6 91/91] usb: usbfs: fix use-after-free of usb_device in usbdev_release()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Miguel Peñaranda <mig.penaranda07@gmail.com>

commit 0dd68b5d01d022fc9c5e71c82a82b0a94d3d0671 upstream.

usbdev_release() drops its reference to the struct usb_device before
draining the list of completed async URBs, but that drain path reads back
through the same object: free_async() calls dec_usb_memory_use_count()
for any URB whose buffer came from the usbfs mmap() region, and its first
statement is bus_to_hcd(ps->dev->bus).

After a disconnect the usbfs reference can be the last one, in which case
usb_put_dev() frees the device and the subsequent loop reads offset 80 of
freed memory and uses the result as a struct usb_hcd *, which
hcd_buffer_free_pages() then dereferences.

This is reachable by an unprivileged process that has read/write access to
a /dev/bus/usb node: mmap() the fd, submit one URB with a buffer inside the
mapping, wait for the device to be unplugged, then munmap() and close().
It reproduces on every attempt rather than being a race, because a live
MAP_SHARED vma holds a reference on the struct file, so usbdev_release()
cannot run until the last vma is gone and the freeing branch of
dec_usb_memory_use_count() is always taken.

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dec_usb_memory_use_count+0x3ae/0x410
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880122ee050 by task poc/769
  CPU: 1 UID: 1000 PID: 769 Comm: poc Tainted: G    B    6.12.94 #3

  Call Trace:
   dec_usb_memory_use_count+0x3ae/0x410
   free_async+0x2aa/0x4f0
   usbdev_release+0x375/0x460
   __fput+0x3ea/0xb50
   __x64_sys_close+0x86/0x100

  Allocated by task 11:
   usb_alloc_dev+0x55/0xd90
   hub_event+0x2524/0x43d0

  Freed by task 769:
   kfree+0x121/0x360
   device_release+0xd2/0x280
   usb_put_dev+0x23/0x30
   usbdev_release+0x2d8/0x460

Release the device reference after the drain loop instead. Nothing between
the two points requires it to have been dropped.

Fixes: f7d34b445abc ("USB: Add support for usbfs zerocopy.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5
Signed-off-by: Miguel Peñaranda <mig.penaranda07@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260810121209.795089-1-mig.penaranda07@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/usb/core/devio.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/core/devio.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/devio.c
@@ -1110,7 +1110,6 @@ static int usbdev_release(struct inode *
 	if (!ps->suspend_allowed)
 		usb_autosuspend_device(dev);
 	usb_unlock_device(dev);
-	usb_put_dev(dev);
 	put_pid(ps->disc_pid);
 	put_cred(ps->cred);
 
@@ -1119,6 +1118,7 @@ static int usbdev_release(struct inode *
 		free_async(as);
 		as = async_getcompleted(ps);
 	}
+	usb_put_dev(dev);
 
 	kfree(ps);
 	return 0;

Re: [PATCH 6.6 00/91] 6.6.156-rc1 review

[Francesco Dolcini]

On Mon, Aug 31, 2026 at 03:33:48PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.156 release.
> There are 91 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.

Tested-by: Francesco Dolcini <francesco.dolcini@toradex.com>

Re: [PATCH 6.6 00/91] 6.6.156-rc1 review

[Florian Fainelli]

On 8/31/2026 6:33 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.156 release.
> There are 91 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Wed, 02 Sep 2026 13:32:19 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.6.156-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> 	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.6.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
> 
> thanks,
> 
> greg k-h

On ARCH_BRCMSTB using 32-bit and 64-bit ARM kernels, build tested on 
BMIPS_GENERIC:

Tested-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli@broadcom.com>
-- 
Florian

Re: [PATCH 6.6 00/91] 6.6.156-rc1 review

[Wentao Guan]

Hi,

Build tested in our x86,arm64,loongarch,riscv config successfully without error.

Tested-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>

Best Regards
Wentao Guan

Log:
Linux version 6.6.156-rc1-arm64-desktop-hwe-g658884b4c6d2 (guanwentao@uos-PC) (aarch64-linux-gnu-gcc-12 (Deepin 12.3.0-17deepin8) 12.3.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Deepin) 2.41) # SMP PREEMPT 
Linux version 6.6.156-rc1-arm64-desktop-hwe-g658884b4c6d2 (guanwentao@uos-PC) (aarch64-linux-gnu-gcc-12 (Deepin 12.3.0-17deepin8) 12.3.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Deepin) 2.41) #2 SMP PREEMPT Tue Sep  1 01:40:37 CST 2026
Linux version 6.6.156-rc1-loong64-desktop-hwe-g658884b4c6d2 (guanwentao@uos-PC) (loongarch64-linux-gnu-gcc-12 (Deepin 12.3.0-17deepin8) 12.3.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Deepin) 2.41) # SMP PREEMPT 
Linux version 6.6.156-rc1-loong64-desktop-hwe-g658884b4c6d2 (guanwentao@uos-PC) (loongarch64-linux-gnu-gcc-12 (Deepin 12.3.0-17deepin8) 12.3.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Deepin) 2.41) #3 SMP PREEMPT Tue Sep  1 01:56:17 CST 2026
Linux version 6.6.156-rc1-riscv64-desktop-hwe+ (guanwentao@uos-PC) (riscv64-linux-gnu-gcc-12 (Deepin 12.3.0-17deepin8) 12.3.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Deepin) 2.41) # SMP 
Linux version 6.6.156-rc1-riscv64-desktop-hwe+ (guanwentao@uos-PC) (riscv64-linux-gnu-gcc-12 (Deepin 12.3.0-17deepin8) 12.3.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Deepin) 2.41) #4 SMP Tue Sep  1 02:11:55 CST 2026
Linux version 6.6.156-rc1-amd64-desktop-hwe-g658884b4c6d2 (guanwentao@uos-PC) (gcc (Deepin 12.3.0-17deepin18) 12.3.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Deepin) 2.41) # SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC 
Linux version 6.6.156-rc1-amd64-desktop-hwe-g658884b4c6d2 (guanwentao@uos-PC) (gcc (Deepin 12.3.0-17deepin18) 12.3.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Deepin) 2.41) #1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Tue Sep  1 01:25:21 CST 2026

Re: [PATCH 6.6 00/91] 6.6.156-rc1 review

[Brett A C Sheffield]

# Librecast Test Results

020/020 [ OK ] liblcrq
010/010 [ OK ] libmld
120/120 [ OK ] liblibrecast

CPU/kernel: Linux auntie 6.6.156-rc1-g658884b4c6d2 #1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Mon Aug 31 19:09:36 -00 2026 x86_64 AMD Ryzen 9 9950X 16-Core Processor AuthenticAMD GNU/Linux

Tested-by: Brett A C Sheffield <bacs@librecast.net>

Re: [PATCH 6.6 00/91] 6.6.156-rc1 review

[Peter Schneider]

Am 31.08.2026 um 15:33 schrieb Greg Kroah-Hartman:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.156 release.
> There are 91 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.

Builds, boots and works on my 2-socket Ivy Bridge Xeon E5-2697 v2 server. No dmesg oddities or regressions found.

Tested-by: Peter Schneider <pschneider1968@googlemail.com>


Beste Grüße,
Peter Schneider

-- 
Climb the mountain not to plant your flag, but to embrace the challenge,
enjoy the air and behold the view. Climb it so you can see the world,
not so the world can see you.                    -- David McCullough Jr.

OpenPGP:  0xA3828BD796CCE11A8CADE8866E3A92C92C3FF244
Download: https://www.peters-netzplatz.de/download/pschneider1968_pub.asc
https://keys.mailvelope.com/pks/lookup?op=get&search=pschneider1968@googlemail.com
https://keys.mailvelope.com/pks/lookup?op=get&search=pschneider1968@gmail.com

Re: [PATCH 6.6 00/91] 6.6.156-rc1 review

[Pavel Machek]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 502 bytes --]

Hi!

> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.156 release.
> There are 91 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.

CIP testing did not find any problems here:

https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-testing/linux-stable-rc-ci/-/tree/linux-6.6.y

Tested-by: Pavel Machek (CIP) <pavel@nabladev.com>

Best regards,
                                                                Pavel

[-- Attachment #2: signature.asc --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 195 bytes --]

Re: [PATCH 6.6 00/91] 6.6.156-rc1 review

[Shuah Khan]

On 8/31/26 07:33, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.156 release.
> There are 91 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Wed, 02 Sep 2026 13:32:19 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.6.156-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> 	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.6.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
> 
> thanks,
> 
> greg k-h
> 

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

Tested-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>

thanks,
-- Shuah

Re: [PATCH 6.6 00/91] 6.6.156-rc1 review

[Ron Economos]

On 8/31/26 06:33, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.156 release.
> There are 91 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed, 02 Sep 2026 13:32:19 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.6.156-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> 	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.6.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h

Built and booted successfully on RISC-V RV64 (HiFive Unmatched).

Tested-by: Ron Economos <re@w6rz.net>

Re: [PATCH 6.6 00/91] 6.6.156-rc1 review

[Barry K. Nathan]

On 8/31/26 6:33 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.156 release.
> There are 91 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Wed, 02 Sep 2026 13:32:19 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.6.156-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> 	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.6.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
> 
> thanks,
> 
> greg k-h

Tested on an amd64 laptop (Lenovo ThinkPad T14 Gen 1). Working well,
no regressions observed.

Tested-by: Barry K. Nathan <barryn@pobox.com>

-- 
-Barry K. Nathan  <barryn@pobox.com>