[PATCH v4 0/1] Fix and improve zcrypt reply message checks

[PATCH v4 0/1] Fix and improve zcrypt reply message checks

[Harald Freudenberger]

Fix and improve zcrypt reply messages checks of type 6 - CCA and EP11
- and type 50 - ICA.

Changelog:
v1: Initial version
v2: Sashiko complained about not checking offset1/count1 at all if
    count2 for an CCA type6 reply is given. And a check like this was
    in place before the rework. So now offset1/count1 is always
    checked and only if count2 is non zero offset2/count2 is
    additionally checked.
v3: Again Sashiko had some complains which let to a broader review of
    the reply processing functions. Especially the zcrypt_type50.c
    functions convert_type80() and convert_response() got slight but
    significant improvements - and also a mysterious BUG_ON has been
    removed.
v4: Again Sashiko had a complain about my restrictions are too
    tight. So now in convert_response_xcrb() the exact length
    verification is:
	case TYPE86_RSP_CODE:
		...
		if (reply->len < sizeof(struct type86_fmt2_msg) +
		    offsetof(struct CPRBX, cprb_ver_id) +
		    sizeof(msg->cprbx.cprb_ver_id))
			return -EINVAL;
		...
    thus postponing the final length check to the convert function
    (which does the job hopefully correct).

Harald Freudenberger (1):
  s390/zcrypt: Fix and improve zcrypt reply message verification checks

 drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype50.c |  95 ++++++++----
 drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c  | 198 ++++++++++++++++++-------
 2 files changed, 216 insertions(+), 77 deletions(-)

--
2.43.0

[PATCH v4 1/1] s390/zcrypt: Fix and improve zcrypt reply message verification checks

[Harald Freudenberger]

Add or improve checks related to buffer sizes and reply sizes to the
handling of replies from the crypto cards for CCA, EP11 (AP message
type 6) and ICA (AP type 50) messages. The verification code related
to reply field length was not designed well and thus firmware
deficiencies could lead to unexpected behavior in the zcrypt device
driver. Thus improve the code to more closely inspect especially
length fields at message replies.

Add length validation before accessing reply message structures in
zcrypt_msgtype6_receive(), zcrypt_msgtype6_receive_ep11(), and
zcrypt_msgtype50_receive() to prevent out-of-bounds reads and
potential kernel memory disclosure.

Also rework these three functions to validate reply lengths more
carefully before copying data back into the request buffer. Use size_t
for length calculations, reject inconsistent reply sizes, and add
defensive handling for short invalid replies. For XCRB replies,
validate both reply segments and derive the effective message length
from the covered range instead of trusting only the second segment.

Additional improve some of the later invoked evaluation functions
which further check the payload. Add comments about length assumptions
and for the type50 processing rework the payload processing completely
with removing a misplaced BUG_ON().

Fixes: 3b6245fd303f ("s390/zcrypt: Separate msgtype implementation from card modules.")
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
---
 drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype50.c |  95 ++++++++----
 drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c  | 198 ++++++++++++++++++-------
 2 files changed, 216 insertions(+), 77 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype50.c b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype50.c
index d6fc2d8e7fad..5907fb2a6920 100644
--- a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype50.c
+++ b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype50.c
@@ -152,6 +152,11 @@ struct type80_hdr {
 	unsigned char	reserved3[8];
 } __packed;
 
+struct type80_reply {
+	struct type80_hdr hdr;
+	char data[];
+} __packed;
+
 int get_rsa_modex_fc(struct ica_rsa_modexpo *mex, int *fcode)
 {
 	if (!mex->inputdatalength)
@@ -340,32 +345,43 @@ static int ICACRT_msg_to_type50CRT_msg(struct zcrypt_queue *zq,
  * @data: pointer to user output data
  * @length: size of user output data
  *
- * Returns 0 on success or -EFAULT.
+ * Returns 0 on success or neg. errno value on failure.
  */
 static int convert_type80(struct zcrypt_queue *zq,
 			  struct ap_message *reply,
 			  char __user *outputdata,
 			  unsigned int outputdatalength)
 {
-	struct type80_hdr *t80h = reply->msg;
-	unsigned char *data;
+	struct type80_reply *msg = reply->msg;
+	size_t payload_len;
+
+	/*
+	 * reply->len is always >= sizeof(struct type80_reply) here and
+	 * outputdatalength (the modulus size) is guaranteed to be equal to
+	 * inputdatalength and 0 < outputdatalength <= CEX3A_MAX_MOD_SIZE,
+	 * also payload size may be >= outputdatalength.
+	 */
+
+	payload_len = reply->len - sizeof(msg->hdr);
 
-	if (t80h->len < sizeof(*t80h) + outputdatalength) {
-		/* The result is too short, the CEXxA card may not do that.. */
+	if (outputdatalength > payload_len) {
+		/* We expect at least outputdatalength bytes, broken card ? */
 		zq->online = 0;
 		pr_err("Crypto dev=%02x.%04x code=0x%02x => online=0 rc=EAGAIN\n",
 		       AP_QID_CARD(zq->queue->qid),
-		       AP_QID_QUEUE(zq->queue->qid), t80h->code);
+		       AP_QID_QUEUE(zq->queue->qid), msg->hdr.code);
 		ZCRYPT_DBF_ERR("%s dev=%02x.%04x code=0x%02x => online=0 rc=EAGAIN\n",
 			       __func__, AP_QID_CARD(zq->queue->qid),
-			       AP_QID_QUEUE(zq->queue->qid), t80h->code);
+			       AP_QID_QUEUE(zq->queue->qid), msg->hdr.code);
 		ap_send_online_uevent(&zq->queue->ap_dev, zq->online);
 		return -EAGAIN;
 	}
-	BUG_ON(t80h->len > CEX3A_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE);
-	data = reply->msg + t80h->len - outputdatalength;
-	if (copy_to_user(outputdata, data, outputdatalength))
+
+	if (copy_to_user(outputdata,
+			 msg->data + payload_len - outputdatalength,
+			 outputdatalength))
 		return -EFAULT;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -374,14 +390,19 @@ static int convert_response(struct zcrypt_queue *zq,
 			    char __user *outputdata,
 			    unsigned int outputdatalength)
 {
-	/* Response type byte is the second byte in the response. */
-	unsigned char rtype = ((unsigned char *)reply->msg)[1];
+	struct type80_reply *msg = reply->msg;
+
+	/* reply->len is always >= sizeof(struct error_hdr) here */
 
-	switch (rtype) {
+	switch (msg->hdr.type) {
 	case TYPE82_RSP_CODE:
 	case TYPE88_RSP_CODE:
 		return convert_error(zq, reply);
 	case TYPE80_RSP_CODE:
+		if (msg->hdr.code)
+			return convert_error(zq, reply);
+		if (reply->len < sizeof(struct type80_reply))
+			return -EINVAL;
 		return convert_type80(zq, reply,
 				      outputdata, outputdatalength);
 	default: /* Unknown response type, this should NEVER EVER happen */
@@ -389,11 +410,11 @@ static int convert_response(struct zcrypt_queue *zq,
 		pr_err("Crypto dev=%02x.%04x unknown response type 0x%02x => online=0 rc=EAGAIN\n",
 		       AP_QID_CARD(zq->queue->qid),
 		       AP_QID_QUEUE(zq->queue->qid),
-		       (int)rtype);
+		       (int)msg->hdr.type);
 		ZCRYPT_DBF_ERR(
 			"%s dev=%02x.%04x unknown response type 0x%02x => online=0 rc=EAGAIN\n",
 			__func__, AP_QID_CARD(zq->queue->qid),
-			AP_QID_QUEUE(zq->queue->qid), (int)rtype);
+			AP_QID_QUEUE(zq->queue->qid), (int)msg->hdr.type);
 		ap_send_online_uevent(&zq->queue->ap_dev, zq->online);
 		return -EAGAIN;
 	}
@@ -416,26 +437,46 @@ static void zcrypt_msgtype50_receive(struct ap_queue *aq,
 		.reply_code = REP82_ERROR_MACHINE_FAILURE,
 	};
 	struct type80_hdr *t80h;
-	int len;
+	size_t len;
 
 	/* Copy the reply message to the request message buffer. */
 	if (!reply)
 		goto out;	/* ap_msg->rc indicates the error */
+
 	t80h = reply->msg;
-	if (t80h->type == TYPE80_RSP_CODE) {
-		len = t80h->len;
-		if (len > reply->bufsize || len > msg->bufsize ||
-		    len != reply->len) {
-			pr_debug("len mismatch => EMSGSIZE\n");
-			msg->rc = -EMSGSIZE;
+
+	if (reply->len < sizeof(*t80h) ||
+	    t80h->type != TYPE80_RSP_CODE) {
+		if (reply->len < sizeof(error_reply)) {
+			/* total broken reply, use static error reply instead */
+			memcpy(msg->msg, &error_reply, sizeof(error_reply));
+			msg->len = sizeof(error_reply);
 			goto out;
+		} else {
+			/* malformed reply, convert function will handle this */
+			len = reply->len;
+			goto copy_len_and_out;
 		}
-		memcpy(msg->msg, reply->msg, len);
-		msg->len = len;
-	} else {
-		memcpy(msg->msg, reply->msg, sizeof(error_reply));
-		msg->len = sizeof(error_reply);
 	}
+
+	len = t80h->len;
+
+copy_len_and_out:
+	if (len != reply->len) {
+		msg->rc = -EMSGSIZE;
+		pr_debug("len %zu rpl.len %zu mismatch, msg.rc=%d\n",
+			 len, reply->len, msg->rc);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (len > reply->bufsize || len > msg->bufsize) {
+		msg->rc = -EMSGSIZE;
+		pr_debug("len %zu exceeds buf %zu/%zu, msg.rc=%d\n",
+			 len, reply->bufsize, msg->bufsize, msg->rc);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	memcpy(msg->msg, reply->msg, len);
+	msg->len = len;
+
 out:
 	complete(&msg->response.work);
 }
diff --git a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c
index 3df1d676de5d..9bd08f0376c3 100644
--- a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c
+++ b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c
@@ -766,6 +766,15 @@ static int convert_type86_rng(struct zcrypt_queue *zq,
 
 	if (msg->cprbx.ccp_rtcode != 0 || msg->cprbx.ccp_rscode != 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	/*
+	 * Note that offset2 and count2 have already been checked in
+	 * zcrypt_msgtype6_receive(). So only check for valid count2
+	 * and for not exceeding the hard coded rng buffer size.
+	 */
+	if (!msg->fmt2.count2)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (msg->fmt2.count2 > ZCRYPT_RNG_BUFFER_SIZE)
+		return -EMSGSIZE;
 	memcpy(buffer, data + msg->fmt2.offset2, msg->fmt2.count2);
 	return msg->fmt2.count2;
 }
@@ -777,11 +786,15 @@ static int convert_response_ica(struct zcrypt_queue *zq,
 {
 	struct type86x_reply *msg = reply->msg;
 
+	/* reply->len is always >= sizeof(struct error_hdr) here */
+
 	switch (msg->hdr.type) {
 	case TYPE82_RSP_CODE:
 	case TYPE88_RSP_CODE:
 		return convert_error(zq, reply);
 	case TYPE86_RSP_CODE:
+		if (reply->len < sizeof(struct type86x_reply))
+			return -EINVAL;
 		if (msg->cprbx.ccp_rtcode &&
 		    msg->cprbx.ccp_rscode == 0x14f &&
 		    outputdatalength > 256) {
@@ -820,6 +833,8 @@ static int convert_response_xcrb(bool userspace, struct zcrypt_queue *zq,
 {
 	struct type86x_reply *msg = reply->msg;
 
+	/* reply->len is always >= sizeof(struct error_hdr) here */
+
 	switch (msg->hdr.type) {
 	case TYPE82_RSP_CODE:
 	case TYPE88_RSP_CODE:
@@ -827,9 +842,16 @@ static int convert_response_xcrb(bool userspace, struct zcrypt_queue *zq,
 		return convert_error(zq, reply);
 	case TYPE86_RSP_CODE:
 		if (msg->hdr.reply_code) {
-			xcrb->status = msg->fmt2.apfs;
+			if (reply->len < sizeof(struct type86_fmt2_msg))
+				xcrb->status = 0x0008044DL;
+			else
+				xcrb->status = msg->fmt2.apfs;
 			return convert_error(zq, reply);
 		}
+		if (reply->len < sizeof(struct type86_fmt2_msg) +
+		    offsetof(struct CPRBX, cprb_ver_id) +
+		    sizeof(msg->cprbx.cprb_ver_id))
+			return -EINVAL;
 		if (msg->cprbx.cprb_ver_id == 0x02)
 			return convert_type86_xcrb(userspace, zq, reply, xcrb);
 		fallthrough;	/* wrong cprb version is an unknown response */
@@ -854,11 +876,15 @@ static int convert_response_ep11_xcrb(bool userspace, struct zcrypt_queue *zq,
 {
 	struct type86_ep11_reply *msg = reply->msg;
 
+	/* reply->len is always >= sizeof(struct error_hdr) here */
+
 	switch (msg->hdr.type) {
 	case TYPE82_RSP_CODE:
 	case TYPE87_RSP_CODE:
 		return convert_error(zq, reply);
 	case TYPE86_RSP_CODE:
+		if (reply->len < sizeof(struct type86_ep11_reply))
+			return -EINVAL;
 		if (msg->hdr.reply_code)
 			return convert_error(zq, reply);
 		if (msg->cprbx.cprb_ver_id == 0x04)
@@ -885,6 +911,8 @@ static int convert_response_rng(struct zcrypt_queue *zq,
 {
 	struct type86x_reply *msg = reply->msg;
 
+	/* reply->len is always >= sizeof(struct error_hdr) here */
+
 	switch (msg->hdr.type) {
 	case TYPE82_RSP_CODE:
 	case TYPE88_RSP_CODE:
@@ -892,6 +920,8 @@ static int convert_response_rng(struct zcrypt_queue *zq,
 	case TYPE86_RSP_CODE:
 		if (msg->hdr.reply_code)
 			return -EINVAL;
+		if (reply->len < sizeof(struct type86x_reply))
+			return -EINVAL;
 		if (msg->cprbx.cprb_ver_id == 0x02)
 			return convert_type86_rng(zq, reply, data);
 		fallthrough;	/* wrong cprb version is an unknown response */
@@ -928,48 +958,85 @@ static void zcrypt_msgtype6_receive(struct ap_queue *aq,
 	};
 	struct ap_response_type *resp_type = &msg->response;
 	struct type86x_reply *t86r;
-	int len;
+	size_t minlen, len;
 
 	/* Copy the reply message to the request message buffer. */
 	if (!reply)
 		goto out;	/* ap_msg->rc indicates the error */
+
 	t86r = reply->msg;
-	if (t86r->hdr.type == TYPE86_RSP_CODE &&
-	    t86r->cprbx.cprb_ver_id == 0x02) {
-		switch (resp_type->type) {
-		case CEXXC_RESPONSE_TYPE_ICA:
-			len = sizeof(struct type86x_reply) + t86r->length;
-			if (len > reply->bufsize || len > msg->bufsize ||
-			    len != reply->len) {
-				pr_debug("len mismatch => EMSGSIZE\n");
-				msg->rc = -EMSGSIZE;
-				goto out;
-			}
-			memcpy(msg->msg, reply->msg, len);
-			msg->len = len;
-			break;
-		case CEXXC_RESPONSE_TYPE_XCRB:
-			if (t86r->fmt2.count2)
-				len = t86r->fmt2.offset2 + t86r->fmt2.count2;
-			else
-				len = t86r->fmt2.offset1 + t86r->fmt2.count1;
-			if (len > reply->bufsize || len > msg->bufsize ||
-			    len != reply->len) {
-				pr_debug("len mismatch => EMSGSIZE\n");
+	minlen = sizeof(t86r->hdr) + sizeof(t86r->fmt2) +
+		offsetof(struct CPRBX, cprb_ver_id) +
+		sizeof(t86r->cprbx.cprb_ver_id);
+
+	if (reply->len < minlen ||
+	    t86r->hdr.type != TYPE86_RSP_CODE ||
+	    t86r->cprbx.cprb_ver_id != 0x02) {
+		if (reply->len < sizeof(error_reply)) {
+			/* total broken reply, use static error reply instead */
+			memcpy(msg->msg, &error_reply, sizeof(error_reply));
+			msg->len = sizeof(error_reply);
+			goto out;
+		} else {
+			/* malformed reply, convert function will handle this */
+			len = reply->len;
+			goto copy_len_and_out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	switch (resp_type->type) {
+	case CEXXC_RESPONSE_TYPE_ICA:
+		if (reply->len < sizeof(struct type86x_reply)) {
+			msg->rc = -EMSGSIZE;
+			pr_debug("rpl.len %zu < struct type86_reply, msg.rc=%d\n",
+				 reply->len, msg->rc);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		len = sizeof(struct type86x_reply) + (size_t)t86r->length;
+		break;
+	case CEXXC_RESPONSE_TYPE_XCRB:
+		len = (size_t)t86r->fmt2.offset1 + (size_t)t86r->fmt2.count1;
+		if (len > reply->len) {
+			msg->rc = -EMSGSIZE;
+			pr_debug("offset1 %u count1 %u rpl.len %zu mismatch, msg.rc=%d\n",
+				 t86r->fmt2.offset1, t86r->fmt2.count1,
+				 reply->len, msg->rc);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (t86r->fmt2.count2) {
+			len = (size_t)t86r->fmt2.offset2 +
+				(size_t)t86r->fmt2.count2;
+			if (len > reply->len) {
 				msg->rc = -EMSGSIZE;
+				pr_debug("offset2 %u count2 %u rpl.len %zu mismatch, msg.rc=%d\n",
+					 t86r->fmt2.offset2, t86r->fmt2.count2,
+					 reply->len, msg->rc);
 				goto out;
 			}
-			memcpy(msg->msg, reply->msg, len);
-			msg->len = len;
-			break;
-		default:
-			memcpy(msg->msg, &error_reply, sizeof(error_reply));
-			msg->len = sizeof(error_reply);
 		}
-	} else {
-		memcpy(msg->msg, reply->msg, sizeof(error_reply));
+		break;
+	default:
+		memcpy(msg->msg, &error_reply, sizeof(error_reply));
 		msg->len = sizeof(error_reply);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+copy_len_and_out:
+	if (len != reply->len) {
+		msg->rc = -EMSGSIZE;
+		pr_debug("len %zu rpl.len %zu mismatch, msg.rc=%d\n",
+			 len, reply->len, msg->rc);
+		goto out;
 	}
+	if (len > reply->bufsize || len > msg->bufsize) {
+		msg->rc = -EMSGSIZE;
+		pr_debug("len %zu exceeds buf %zu/%zu, msg.rc=%d\n",
+			 len, reply->bufsize, msg->bufsize, msg->rc);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	memcpy(msg->msg, reply->msg, len);
+	msg->len = len;
+
 out:
 	complete(&resp_type->work);
 }
@@ -992,34 +1059,65 @@ static void zcrypt_msgtype6_receive_ep11(struct ap_queue *aq,
 	};
 	struct ap_response_type *resp_type = &msg->response;
 	struct type86_ep11_reply *t86r;
-	int len;
+	size_t minlen, len;
 
 	/* Copy the reply message to the request message buffer. */
 	if (!reply)
 		goto out;	/* ap_msg->rc indicates the error */
+
 	t86r = reply->msg;
-	if (t86r->hdr.type == TYPE86_RSP_CODE &&
-	    t86r->cprbx.cprb_ver_id == 0x04) {
-		switch (resp_type->type) {
-		case CEXXC_RESPONSE_TYPE_EP11:
-			len = t86r->fmt2.offset1 + t86r->fmt2.count1;
-			if (len > reply->bufsize || len > msg->bufsize ||
-			    len != reply->len) {
-				pr_debug("len mismatch => EMSGSIZE\n");
-				msg->rc = -EMSGSIZE;
-				goto out;
-			}
-			memcpy(msg->msg, reply->msg, len);
-			msg->len = len;
-			break;
-		default:
+	minlen = sizeof(t86r->hdr) + sizeof(t86r->fmt2) +
+		offsetof(struct ep11_cprb, cprb_ver_id) +
+		sizeof(t86r->cprbx.cprb_ver_id);
+
+	if (reply->len < minlen ||
+	    t86r->hdr.type != TYPE86_RSP_CODE ||
+	    t86r->cprbx.cprb_ver_id != 0x04) {
+		if (reply->len < sizeof(error_reply)) {
+			/* total broken reply, use static error reply instead */
 			memcpy(msg->msg, &error_reply, sizeof(error_reply));
 			msg->len = sizeof(error_reply);
+			goto out;
+		} else {
+			/* malformed reply, convert function will handle this */
+			len = reply->len;
+			goto copy_len_and_out;
 		}
-	} else {
-		memcpy(msg->msg, reply->msg, sizeof(error_reply));
+	}
+
+	switch (resp_type->type) {
+	case CEXXC_RESPONSE_TYPE_EP11:
+		len = (size_t)t86r->fmt2.offset1 + (size_t)t86r->fmt2.count1;
+		if (len > reply->len) {
+			msg->rc = -EMSGSIZE;
+			pr_debug("offset1 %u count1 %u rpl.len %zu mismatch, msg.rc=%d\n",
+				 t86r->fmt2.offset1, t86r->fmt2.count1,
+				 reply->len, msg->rc);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		memcpy(msg->msg, &error_reply, sizeof(error_reply));
 		msg->len = sizeof(error_reply);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+copy_len_and_out:
+	if (len != reply->len) {
+		msg->rc = -EMSGSIZE;
+		pr_debug("len %zu rpl.len %zu mismatch, msg.rc=%d\n",
+			 len, reply->len, msg->rc);
+		goto out;
 	}
+	if (len > reply->bufsize || len > msg->bufsize) {
+		msg->rc = -EMSGSIZE;
+		pr_debug("len %zu exceeds buf %zu/%zu, msg.rc=%d\n",
+			 len, reply->bufsize, msg->bufsize, msg->rc);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	memcpy(msg->msg, reply->msg, len);
+	msg->len = len;
+
 out:
 	complete(&resp_type->work);
 }
-- 
2.43.0

Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] s390/zcrypt: Fix and improve zcrypt reply message verification checks

[sashiko-bot]

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] Strict length checks placed before error checks in convert_response_ica and convert_response_ep11_xcrb break retry logic for short error replies.
--

commit 8039067e4a9fd6e25e23de18df187889de05156f
Author: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>

s390/zcrypt: Fix and improve zcrypt reply message verification checks

This commit improves boundary checks and reply size validations in the
zcrypt device driver to prevent out-of-bounds memory accesses. Length
validations are added before processing reply structures for CCA, EP11,
and ICA messages.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

> diff --git a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c
> index 3df1d676de5d8..9bd08f0376c33 100644
> --- a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c
> +++ b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -777,11 +786,15 @@ static int convert_response_ica(struct zcrypt_queue *zq,
>  {
>  	struct type86x_reply *msg = reply->msg;
>  
> +	/* reply->len is always >= sizeof(struct error_hdr) here */
> +
>  	switch (msg->hdr.type) {
>  	case TYPE82_RSP_CODE:
>  	case TYPE88_RSP_CODE:
>  		return convert_error(zq, reply);
>  	case TYPE86_RSP_CODE:
> +		if (reply->len < sizeof(struct type86x_reply))
> +			return -EINVAL;

[Severity: High]
Does this length check preempt the error handling for short hardware error
replies? 

If the hardware returns a short TYPE86 error reply (such as format 1 TYPE86
errors which are only 8 bytes), it appears this will immediately return
-EINVAL before the msg->hdr.reply_code check can process it.

This bypasses the error conversion and retry logic in convert_error() for
transient hardware or bus errors (e.g., REP82_ERROR_TRANSPORT_FAIL), causing
them to falsely propagate as invalid arguments to userspace applications
instead of being retried.

>  		if (msg->cprbx.ccp_rtcode &&
>  		    msg->cprbx.ccp_rscode == 0x14f &&
>  		    outputdatalength > 256) {
[ ... ]
> @@ -854,11 +876,15 @@ static int convert_response_ep11_xcrb(bool userspace, struct zcrypt_queue *zq,
>  {
>  	struct type86_ep11_reply *msg = reply->msg;
>  
> +	/* reply->len is always >= sizeof(struct error_hdr) here */
> +
>  	switch (msg->hdr.type) {
>  	case TYPE82_RSP_CODE:
>  	case TYPE87_RSP_CODE:
>  		return convert_error(zq, reply);
>  	case TYPE86_RSP_CODE:
> +		if (reply->len < sizeof(struct type86_ep11_reply))
> +			return -EINVAL;

[Severity: High]
Similarly, does this strict length check break the error processing and retry
mechanism for EP11 requests if a short TYPE86 error reply is returned?

>  		if (msg->hdr.reply_code)
>  			return convert_error(zq, reply);
>  		if (msg->cprbx.cprb_ver_id == 0x04)

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260911130544.43484-2-freude@linux.ibm.com?part=1