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* [PATCH v2 0/2] Fix LSM mediation of PR_SET_SECUREBITS
@ 2026-11-17 10:17 Mickaël Salaün
  2026-11-17 10:17 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] capabilities: Check PR_SET_SECUREBITS with ns_capable() Mickaël Salaün
  2026-11-17 10:17 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] selftests/landlock: Test PR_SET_SECUREBITS mediation Mickaël Salaün
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2026-11-17 10:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Paul Moore, Serge Hallyn
  Cc: Mickaël Salaün, Ada Smith, Christian Brauner,
	Günther Noack, John Johansen, KP Singh, Matt Bobrowski,
	Stephen Smalley, apparmor, bpf, kernel-team, linux-kernel,
	linux-security-module, selinux

Hi,

This is series 2 of 3:

  1. fix Landlock mediation of commoncap's capability checks;
* 2. fix PR_SET_SECUREBITS mediation and add focused Landlock tests;
  3. fix Landlock mediation of capabilities guarding LSM policies.

This series applies on top of series 1:
https://patch.msgid.link/20261117101157.2520463-1-mic@digikod.net

Since per-process securebits were introduced, PR_SET_SECUREBITS checks
CAP_SETPCAP with cap_capable() instead of ns_capable(), so LSMs
restricting capabilities through the capable hook (SELinux, AppArmor,
Landlock and BPF LSM programs) cannot deny it.  A task with CAP_SETPCAP
can therefore change privileged securebits, and thus how its
capabilities evolve across UID changes and execve(), without the
expected denial or audit record.

Patch 1 uses ns_capable(), as PR_CAPBSET_DROP already does, for the
changes that require CAP_SETPCAP; changes limited to the unprivileged
securebits still do not check a capability.  It applies cleanly to the
6.18 and 7.2 stable branches; older ones need a simpler adapted
backport.  Patch 2 adds a Landlock audit test that fails without patch
1.  It shares cap_test.c with series 1, which is the only reason for the
ordering.

Paul, John, Stephen, KP and Matt, please check the AppArmor, SELinux and
BPF LSM implications of exposing this CAP_SETPCAP check to the capable
hook.

Changes since v1:
https://patch.msgid.link/20261110202811.2409395-1-mic@digikod.net
- Shorten the commit message of patch 1 and check the non-change case
  separately (suggested by Serge Hallyn).
- Add Serge Hallyn's Reviewed-by.

Regards,

Mickaël Salaün (2):
  capabilities: Check PR_SET_SECUREBITS with ns_capable()
  selftests/landlock: Test PR_SET_SECUREBITS mediation

 security/commoncap.c                        | 45 +++++++-------
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)


base-commit: 7475ea8b58616b33c04afb976cf0fbaad9dd63fb
prerequisite-patch-id: 365071039dd2be439f67707944d12edbe1422d60
prerequisite-patch-id: 021705fb5147cdc8edcac9dbe53c06b854cf976a
prerequisite-patch-id: 1dfd782b28feeac47423e702764778031b850d6c
prerequisite-patch-id: 0bf745b08b99168d266461ef5b0b943a2b71eceb
prerequisite-patch-id: ad96449ac2b66342bdc171582d400276372ce386
prerequisite-patch-id: 39d6ce2bdfc170b545eb2d275ab781e15c9e887a
-- 
2.56.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v2 1/2] capabilities: Check PR_SET_SECUREBITS with ns_capable()
  2026-11-17 10:17 [PATCH v2 0/2] Fix LSM mediation of PR_SET_SECUREBITS Mickaël Salaün
@ 2026-11-17 10:17 ` Mickaël Salaün
  2026-11-17 10:23   ` sashiko-bot
  2026-11-17 10:17 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] selftests/landlock: Test PR_SET_SECUREBITS mediation Mickaël Salaün
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2026-11-17 10:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Paul Moore, Serge Hallyn
  Cc: Mickaël Salaün, Ada Smith, Christian Brauner,
	Günther Noack, John Johansen, KP Singh, Matt Bobrowski,
	Stephen Smalley, apparmor, bpf, kernel-team, linux-kernel,
	linux-security-module, selinux, James Morris, Serge Hallyn,
	stable

PR_SET_SECUREBITS checks CAP_SETPCAP with cap_capable(), which skips the
LSM capable hooks, so a task can change privileged securebits despite an
LSM denial.

Use ns_capable() instead, as PR_CAPBSET_DROP already does.  Move the
check to a helper that only requires CAP_SETPCAP when needed, so that
changes limited to the unprivileged securebits still do not reach the
LSMs or set PF_SUPERPRIV.

Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Cc: Matt Bobrowski <matt@bobrowski.net>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn (AMD) <sergeh@kernel.org>
Fixes: 3898b1b4ebff ("capabilities: implement per-process securebits")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---

Changes since v1:
https://patch.msgid.link/20261110202811.2409395-2-mic@digikod.net
- Check the non-change case separately, with its own comment (suggested
  by Serge Hallyn).
- Shorten the commit message (suggested by Serge Hallyn).
- Add Serge Hallyn's Reviewed-by.
---
 security/commoncap.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index d47ab3022343..9794a594bdd9 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -1283,6 +1283,26 @@ static int cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
 	return commit_creds(new);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Doing anything with securebits requires privilege (go read about the
+ * "sendmail capabilities bug"), except for unprivileged bits.  Indeed, the
+ * SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED bits are not restrictions enforced by the kernel but
+ * by user space on itself.  Only checking CAP_SETPCAP when it is needed keeps
+ * LSMs from seeing (and logging) a capability check for unprivileged changes.
+ */
+static bool securebits_need_setpcap(unsigned long old, unsigned long new)
+{
+	const unsigned long unpriv_and_locks = SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED |
+					       SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED << 1;
+	const unsigned long changed = old ^ new;
+
+	/* For legacy reasons, a non-change requires privilege. */
+	if (!changed)
+		return true;
+
+	return changed & ~unpriv_and_locks;
+}
+
 /**
  * cap_task_prctl - Implement process control functions for this security module
  * @option: The process control function requested
@@ -1346,28 +1366,9 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 			/* cannot change a locked bit */
 			return -EPERM;
 
-		/*
-		 * Doing anything requires privilege (go read about the
-		 * "sendmail capabilities bug"), except for unprivileged bits.
-		 * Indeed, the SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED bits are not
-		 * restrictions enforced by the kernel but by user space on
-		 * itself.
-		 */
-		if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user_ns,
-				CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_OPT_NONE) != 0) {
-			const unsigned long unpriv_and_locks =
-				SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED |
-				SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED << 1;
-			const unsigned long changed = old->securebits ^ arg2;
-
-			/* For legacy reason, denies non-change. */
-			if (!changed)
-				return -EPERM;
-
-			/* Denies privileged changes. */
-			if (changed & ~unpriv_and_locks)
-				return -EPERM;
-		}
+		if (securebits_need_setpcap(old->securebits, arg2) &&
+		    !ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETPCAP))
+			return -EPERM;
 
 		new = prepare_creds();
 		if (!new)
-- 
2.56.0


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v2 2/2] selftests/landlock: Test PR_SET_SECUREBITS mediation
  2026-11-17 10:17 [PATCH v2 0/2] Fix LSM mediation of PR_SET_SECUREBITS Mickaël Salaün
  2026-11-17 10:17 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] capabilities: Check PR_SET_SECUREBITS with ns_capable() Mickaël Salaün
@ 2026-11-17 10:17 ` Mickaël Salaün
  2026-11-17 10:23   ` sashiko-bot
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2026-11-17 10:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Paul Moore, Serge Hallyn
  Cc: Mickaël Salaün, Ada Smith, Christian Brauner,
	Günther Noack, John Johansen, KP Singh, Matt Bobrowski,
	Stephen Smalley, apparmor, bpf, kernel-team, linux-kernel,
	linux-security-module, selinux, Serge Hallyn

The preceding commoncap fix routes the CAP_SETPCAP check for privileged
PR_SET_SECUREBITS requests through the ordinary capable hooks.  Add a
focused Landlock regression test for this path.

Keep CAP_SETPCAP effective to isolate Landlock mediation and run the
audit case in a child domain.  A privileged change returns EPERM and
emits an exact CAP_SETPCAP record, then an unprivileged-only change
succeeds.  After the child exits, require the domain deallocation record
to report exactly one denial; this proves that the second operation did
not create a hidden denial without relying on an asynchronous no-record
timeout.

The existing check-exec securebits fixture already covers commoncap's
privileged, unprivileged, locked, and user-namespace semantics.  Without
the preceding fix, this Landlock audit test fails.

Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 69 insertions(+)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c
index 39ef57a49dc9..144ae866c3bd 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c
@@ -1075,6 +1075,75 @@ TEST_F(cap_audit, denied)
 	EXPECT_EQ(0, records.domain);
 }
 
+/*
+ * A privileged denial allocates the domain ID.  The following unprivileged-only
+ * change must not create a hidden Landlock denial, so the domain's deallocation
+ * record must report exactly one denial.
+ */
+TEST_F(cap_audit, securebits)
+{
+	const unsigned long unpriv = SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE |
+				     SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED;
+	__u64 *domain_id, deallocated_dom = 0;
+	unsigned long bits;
+	int err, ruleset_fd, status;
+	pid_t child;
+
+	domain_id = mmap(NULL, sizeof(*domain_id), PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+			 MAP_SHARED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
+	ASSERT_NE(MAP_FAILED, domain_id);
+	*domain_id = 0;
+
+	ruleset_fd = create_cap_ruleset();
+	ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+	/* Allow the child to replace the audit filter before exiting. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, add_cap_rule(ruleset_fd, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL));
+
+	child = fork();
+	ASSERT_LE(0, child);
+	if (child == 0) {
+		enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+		EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+		set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETPCAP);
+		bits = prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS);
+		EXPECT_EQ(-1, prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS,
+				    bits | SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE));
+		EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
+
+		EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_cap(self->audit_fd, CAP_SETPCAP));
+		EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_domain_allocated(self->audit_fd,
+							  getpid(), domain_id));
+
+		EXPECT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, bits | unpriv));
+		clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETPCAP);
+
+		/* Receive the asynchronous domain deallocation record. */
+		set_cap(_metadata, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL);
+		EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_filter_drop(self->audit_fd, AUDIT_ADD_RULE));
+		EXPECT_EQ(0,
+			  audit_filter_exe(self->audit_fd, &self->audit_filter,
+					   AUDIT_DEL_RULE));
+		clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL);
+
+		_exit(_metadata->exit_code);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0));
+	if (WIFSIGNALED(status) || !WIFEXITED(status) ||
+	    WEXITSTATUS(status) != EXIT_SUCCESS)
+		_metadata->exit_code = KSFT_FAIL;
+
+	EXPECT_NE(0, *domain_id);
+	err = matches_log_domain_deallocated(self->audit_fd, 1, *domain_id,
+					     &deallocated_dom);
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, err);
+	EXPECT_EQ(*domain_id, deallocated_dom);
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, munmap(domain_id, sizeof(*domain_id)));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+}
+
 /*
  * Denials in the capset and mmap_addr paths are audited like capable hook
  * denials.  The vm_enough_memory hook only withholds the admin reserve, with
-- 
2.56.0


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] selftests/landlock: Test PR_SET_SECUREBITS mediation
  2026-11-17 10:17 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] selftests/landlock: Test PR_SET_SECUREBITS mediation Mickaël Salaün
@ 2026-11-17 10:23   ` sashiko-bot
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: sashiko-bot @ 2026-11-17 10:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
  Cc: linux-security-module, selinux

> The preceding commoncap fix routes the CAP_SETPCAP check for privileged
> PR_SET_SECUREBITS requests through the ordinary capable hooks.  Add a
> focused Landlock regression test for this path.
> 
> Keep CAP_SETPCAP effective to isolate Landlock mediation and run the
> audit case in a child domain.  A privileged change returns EPERM and
> emits an exact CAP_SETPCAP record, then an unprivileged-only change
> succeeds.  After the child exits, require the domain deallocation record
> to report exactly one denial; this proves that the second operation did
> not create a hidden denial without relying on an asynchronous no-record
> timeout.
> 
> The existing check-exec securebits fixture already covers commoncap's
> privileged, unprivileged, locked, and user-namespace semantics.  Without
> the preceding fix, this Landlock audit test fails.
> 
> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
> Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>

Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261117101738.2523492-1-mic@digikod.net?part=2


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] capabilities: Check PR_SET_SECUREBITS with ns_capable()
  2026-11-17 10:17 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] capabilities: Check PR_SET_SECUREBITS with ns_capable() Mickaël Salaün
@ 2026-11-17 10:23   ` sashiko-bot
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: sashiko-bot @ 2026-11-17 10:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
  Cc: linux-security-module, selinux

> PR_SET_SECUREBITS checks CAP_SETPCAP with cap_capable(), which skips the
> LSM capable hooks, so a task can change privileged securebits despite an
> LSM denial.
> 
> Use ns_capable() instead, as PR_CAPBSET_DROP already does.  Move the
> check to a helper that only requires CAP_SETPCAP when needed, so that
> changes limited to the unprivileged securebits still do not reach the
> LSMs or set PF_SUPERPRIV.
> 
> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
> Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
> Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> Cc: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
> Cc: Matt Bobrowski <matt@bobrowski.net>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn (AMD) <sergeh@kernel.org>
> Fixes: 3898b1b4ebff ("capabilities: implement per-process securebits")
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>

Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261117101738.2523492-1-mic@digikod.net?part=1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread

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2026-11-17 10:17 [PATCH v2 0/2] Fix LSM mediation of PR_SET_SECUREBITS Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:17 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] capabilities: Check PR_SET_SECUREBITS with ns_capable() Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:23   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 10:17 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] selftests/landlock: Test PR_SET_SECUREBITS mediation Mickaël Salaün
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