* [PATCH v2 1/2] capabilities: Check PR_SET_SECUREBITS with ns_capable()
2026-11-17 10:17 [PATCH v2 0/2] Fix LSM mediation of PR_SET_SECUREBITS Mickaël Salaün
@ 2026-11-17 10:17 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:23 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 10:17 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] selftests/landlock: Test PR_SET_SECUREBITS mediation Mickaël Salaün
1 sibling, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2026-11-17 10:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore, Serge Hallyn
Cc: Mickaël Salaün, Ada Smith, Christian Brauner,
Günther Noack, John Johansen, KP Singh, Matt Bobrowski,
Stephen Smalley, apparmor, bpf, kernel-team, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, selinux, James Morris, Serge Hallyn,
stable
PR_SET_SECUREBITS checks CAP_SETPCAP with cap_capable(), which skips the
LSM capable hooks, so a task can change privileged securebits despite an
LSM denial.
Use ns_capable() instead, as PR_CAPBSET_DROP already does. Move the
check to a helper that only requires CAP_SETPCAP when needed, so that
changes limited to the unprivileged securebits still do not reach the
LSMs or set PF_SUPERPRIV.
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Cc: Matt Bobrowski <matt@bobrowski.net>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn (AMD) <sergeh@kernel.org>
Fixes: 3898b1b4ebff ("capabilities: implement per-process securebits")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---
Changes since v1:
https://patch.msgid.link/20261110202811.2409395-2-mic@digikod.net
- Check the non-change case separately, with its own comment (suggested
by Serge Hallyn).
- Shorten the commit message (suggested by Serge Hallyn).
- Add Serge Hallyn's Reviewed-by.
---
security/commoncap.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index d47ab3022343..9794a594bdd9 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -1283,6 +1283,26 @@ static int cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
return commit_creds(new);
}
+/*
+ * Doing anything with securebits requires privilege (go read about the
+ * "sendmail capabilities bug"), except for unprivileged bits. Indeed, the
+ * SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED bits are not restrictions enforced by the kernel but
+ * by user space on itself. Only checking CAP_SETPCAP when it is needed keeps
+ * LSMs from seeing (and logging) a capability check for unprivileged changes.
+ */
+static bool securebits_need_setpcap(unsigned long old, unsigned long new)
+{
+ const unsigned long unpriv_and_locks = SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED |
+ SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED << 1;
+ const unsigned long changed = old ^ new;
+
+ /* For legacy reasons, a non-change requires privilege. */
+ if (!changed)
+ return true;
+
+ return changed & ~unpriv_and_locks;
+}
+
/**
* cap_task_prctl - Implement process control functions for this security module
* @option: The process control function requested
@@ -1346,28 +1366,9 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
/* cannot change a locked bit */
return -EPERM;
- /*
- * Doing anything requires privilege (go read about the
- * "sendmail capabilities bug"), except for unprivileged bits.
- * Indeed, the SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED bits are not
- * restrictions enforced by the kernel but by user space on
- * itself.
- */
- if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user_ns,
- CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_OPT_NONE) != 0) {
- const unsigned long unpriv_and_locks =
- SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED |
- SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED << 1;
- const unsigned long changed = old->securebits ^ arg2;
-
- /* For legacy reason, denies non-change. */
- if (!changed)
- return -EPERM;
-
- /* Denies privileged changes. */
- if (changed & ~unpriv_and_locks)
- return -EPERM;
- }
+ if (securebits_need_setpcap(old->securebits, arg2) &&
+ !ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETPCAP))
+ return -EPERM;
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
--
2.56.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 2/2] selftests/landlock: Test PR_SET_SECUREBITS mediation
2026-11-17 10:17 [PATCH v2 0/2] Fix LSM mediation of PR_SET_SECUREBITS Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:17 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] capabilities: Check PR_SET_SECUREBITS with ns_capable() Mickaël Salaün
@ 2026-11-17 10:17 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:23 ` sashiko-bot
1 sibling, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2026-11-17 10:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore, Serge Hallyn
Cc: Mickaël Salaün, Ada Smith, Christian Brauner,
Günther Noack, John Johansen, KP Singh, Matt Bobrowski,
Stephen Smalley, apparmor, bpf, kernel-team, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, selinux, Serge Hallyn
The preceding commoncap fix routes the CAP_SETPCAP check for privileged
PR_SET_SECUREBITS requests through the ordinary capable hooks. Add a
focused Landlock regression test for this path.
Keep CAP_SETPCAP effective to isolate Landlock mediation and run the
audit case in a child domain. A privileged change returns EPERM and
emits an exact CAP_SETPCAP record, then an unprivileged-only change
succeeds. After the child exits, require the domain deallocation record
to report exactly one denial; this proves that the second operation did
not create a hidden denial without relying on an asynchronous no-record
timeout.
The existing check-exec securebits fixture already covers commoncap's
privileged, unprivileged, locked, and user-namespace semantics. Without
the preceding fix, this Landlock audit test fails.
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 69 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c
index 39ef57a49dc9..144ae866c3bd 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c
@@ -1075,6 +1075,75 @@ TEST_F(cap_audit, denied)
EXPECT_EQ(0, records.domain);
}
+/*
+ * A privileged denial allocates the domain ID. The following unprivileged-only
+ * change must not create a hidden Landlock denial, so the domain's deallocation
+ * record must report exactly one denial.
+ */
+TEST_F(cap_audit, securebits)
+{
+ const unsigned long unpriv = SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE |
+ SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED;
+ __u64 *domain_id, deallocated_dom = 0;
+ unsigned long bits;
+ int err, ruleset_fd, status;
+ pid_t child;
+
+ domain_id = mmap(NULL, sizeof(*domain_id), PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+ MAP_SHARED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
+ ASSERT_NE(MAP_FAILED, domain_id);
+ *domain_id = 0;
+
+ ruleset_fd = create_cap_ruleset();
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+ /* Allow the child to replace the audit filter before exiting. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, add_cap_rule(ruleset_fd, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL));
+
+ child = fork();
+ ASSERT_LE(0, child);
+ if (child == 0) {
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+ set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETPCAP);
+ bits = prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS);
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS,
+ bits | SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_cap(self->audit_fd, CAP_SETPCAP));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_domain_allocated(self->audit_fd,
+ getpid(), domain_id));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, bits | unpriv));
+ clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETPCAP);
+
+ /* Receive the asynchronous domain deallocation record. */
+ set_cap(_metadata, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_filter_drop(self->audit_fd, AUDIT_ADD_RULE));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0,
+ audit_filter_exe(self->audit_fd, &self->audit_filter,
+ AUDIT_DEL_RULE));
+ clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL);
+
+ _exit(_metadata->exit_code);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0));
+ if (WIFSIGNALED(status) || !WIFEXITED(status) ||
+ WEXITSTATUS(status) != EXIT_SUCCESS)
+ _metadata->exit_code = KSFT_FAIL;
+
+ EXPECT_NE(0, *domain_id);
+ err = matches_log_domain_deallocated(self->audit_fd, 1, *domain_id,
+ &deallocated_dom);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, err);
+ EXPECT_EQ(*domain_id, deallocated_dom);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, munmap(domain_id, sizeof(*domain_id)));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+}
+
/*
* Denials in the capset and mmap_addr paths are audited like capable hook
* denials. The vm_enough_memory hook only withholds the admin reserve, with
--
2.56.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread