From: Rodolfo Giometti <giometti@enneenne.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
Demi Marie Obenour <demiobenour@gmail.com>
Cc: "David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
"Herbert Xu" <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"Jens Wiklander" <jenswi@kernel.org>,
"Sumit Garg" <sumit.garg@kernel.org>,
op-tee@lists.trustedfirmware.org,
"Horia Geantă" <horia.geanta@nxp.com>,
"Pankaj Gupta" <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>,
"Sahil Malhotra" <sahil.malhotra@nxp.com>,
"Ahmad Fatoum" <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>,
"Richard Weinberger" <richard@nod.at>,
"Christophe Leroy (CS GROUP)" <chleroy@kernel.org>,
"Eric Biggers" <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Shuah Khan" <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/9] KEYS: keycrypt: keys that user space can use but never read
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 11:19:30 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <6fc1eaee-3a60-49d9-a5a0-74b662f2232f@enneenne.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <av5EyVHnNzT27dyK@kernel.org>
On 19/11/2026 01:37, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
[snip]
> The exitential problem here is that KEYCTL_CRYPT_OPEN creates a circular
> relationship between the keyrings API and a specific key type.
Agreed: it should be a key_type operation, dispatched the way
KEYCTL_PKEY_* dispatches to asym_eds_op, so that keyctl knows no key
type.
> At hardware level I did not see any support for TPM, which narrows down
> the potential user base.
On a TPM system the sw backend can take its master from a TPM-sealed
trusted key, but there keycrypt adds little over a trusted key. The
users are SoCs with a TEE and often no TPM, OP-TEE on i.MX for one.
> The remaining potential user base is further reduced by those that use
> trusted keys; leaving out those who need to solve the assumed problem
> that only this patch set can presumebly sort out.
>
> And we don't really know at this point that cut. This is pretty much
> the break down of what is wrong here.
>
> If there is/was a problem to sort out, it should be so constrained that
> it should be as quick to describe as stepping over a nail really.
The nail: a device must encrypt and decrypt its own files, also from
a minimal initramfs, with a key that root or a kernel exploit can use
on the device but never copy off it. Trusted keys hand their users the
key's bytes (dm-crypt, encrypted keys and AF_ALG read them). CAAM's
"pk" option is the one exception, but even there a new key is drawn
in kernel memory before the CAAM wraps it, and user space reaches it
only through AF_ALG, which the kernel calls insecure and deprecated
(Documentation/crypto/userspace-if.rst, and "Userspace interface
(deprecated)" in crypto/Kconfig), privileged by default, with no
purpose bound to the key. The i.MX93 has no CAAM at all: there the key
can live in OP-TEE, and keycrypt lets the keyring use it without it
ever leaving the TA.
The stream of patch 9 has no user yet and can go.
Ciao,
Rodolfo
--
GNU/Linux Solutions e-mail: giometti@enneenne.com
Linux Device Driver giometti@linux.it
Embedded Systems phone: +39 349 2432127
UNIX programming
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-19 10:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-18 14:04 [RFC PATCH 0/9] KEYS: keycrypt: keys that user space can use but never read Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:04 ` [RFC PATCH 1/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add a key type for keys user space never reads Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:33 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:04 ` [RFC PATCH 2/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the sw backend Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:21 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:04 ` [RFC PATCH 3/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the OP-TEE backend Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:33 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:07 ` [RFC PATCH 4/9] docs: keycrypt: document keycrypt keys Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:19 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:08 ` [RFC PATCH 5/9] MAINTAINERS: add KEYS-KEYCRYPT Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:09 ` [RFC PATCH 6/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the engine tier Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:10 ` [RFC PATCH 7/9] crypto: caam - add an internal cbc(paes) taking the blob's key modifier Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:24 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:11 ` [RFC PATCH 8/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the CAAM backend Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:36 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:12 ` [RFC PATCH 9/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the aes256-gcm-stream algorithm Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:30 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-19 0:25 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-11-19 0:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 14:31 ` [RFC PATCH 0/9] KEYS: keycrypt: keys that user space can use but never read Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 14:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 14:57 ` Marco Felsch
2026-11-18 15:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 10:18 ` Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 23:42 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-11-19 0:37 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 0:43 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-11-19 1:01 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 4:35 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-11-19 5:01 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 10:19 ` Rodolfo Giometti [this message]
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