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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	"Alexander Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Ben Segall" <bsegall@google.com>,
	"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
	"David Hildenbrand" <david@kernel.org>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"Davidlohr Bueso" <dave@stgolabs.net>,
	"Dietmar Eggemann" <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>, "Jan Kara" <jack@suse.cz>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Juri Lelli" <juri.lelli@redhat.com>,
	"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>,
	"K Prateek Nayak" <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>,
	"Liam R. Howlett" <liam@infradead.org>,
	"Lorenzo Stoakes" <ljs@kernel.org>,
	"Manfred Spraul" <manfred@colorfullife.com>,
	"Mel Gorman" <mgorman@suse.de>, "Michal Hocko" <mhocko@suse.com>,
	"Mike Rapoport" <rppt@kernel.org>, "Neal Gompa" <neal@gompa.dev>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"Pavel Tikhomirov" <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Serge Hallyn" <sergeh@kernel.org>,
	"Shuah Khan" <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Steven Rostedt" <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	"Suren Baghdasaryan" <surenb@google.com>,
	"Valentin Schneider" <vschneid@redhat.com>,
	"Vincent Guittot" <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>,
	"Vlastimil Babka" <vbabka@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 03/13] rootns: Track init lifecycle via copy_process() and pid_namespace
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 05:09:42 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-220138@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261117050841.3289652-4-jarkko@kernel.org>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 4 potential
issues to consider:
- [High] rootns: UAF and refcount imbalance in exit_rootns() via
  unreferenced pid_ns->rootns
- [High] rootns: unreferenced pid_ns->rootns pointer in exit_rootns()
  causes UAF
- [Medium] rootns: copy_rootns() publishes init_pid before
  attach_pid(PIDTYPE_PID)
- [Medium] rootns: missing is_child_reaper() and locked state checks in
  copy_rootns()
--

commit 257575ec869d3f0e55e6c1a6f99ef3b0751d2a44
Author: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>

rootns: Track init lifecycle via copy_process() and pid_namespace

This commit adds rootns lifecycle tracking hooks to copy_process(),
create_new_namespaces(), and zap_pid_ns_processes() to record the
bootstrapped init task's PID and capture its exit status and resource usage
when the PID namespace terminates.

> diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
> index 5efceb8d58a78..99e22b3cd213e 100644
> --- a/kernel/fork.c
> +++ b/kernel/fork.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -2565,6 +2566,7 @@ __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
>  			attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_TGID);
>  			attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PGID);
>  			attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_SID);
> +			copy_rootns(p, NULL);
>  			__this_cpu_inc(process_counts);
>  		} else {
>  			current->signal->nr_threads++;

[Severity: Medium]
Does calling copy_rootns() before attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PID) publish
c->init_pid and ROOTNS_RUNNING before pid->tasks[PIDTYPE_PID] is populated?

CPU0                                    CPU1
copy_process()
  attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_TGID)
  copy_rootns(p, c)
    spin_lock(&c->lock)
    c->init_pid = get_task_pid(p, ...)
    c->state = ROOTNS_RUNNING
    spin_unlock(&c->lock)
                                        __rootns_kill()
                                          spin_lock(&c->lock)
                                          pid = get_pid(c->init_pid)
                                          spin_unlock(&c->lock)
                                          kill_pid(pid, sig, priv)
                                            ...
                                              pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_PID)
                                              --> NULL (-ESRCH)
  attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PID)

__rootns_kill() does not take tasklist_lock, so if a signal is sent during
this window (for example from rootns_release() when ROOTNS_KILL_ON_CLOSE is
set), kill_pid() fails with -ESRCH and drops the signal, leaving the
container init process running.

> diff --git a/kernel/rootns.c b/kernel/rootns.c
> index e75d918b93ec5..e3b203322ae23 100644
> --- a/kernel/rootns.c
> +++ b/kernel/rootns.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -105,3 +106,42 @@ bool is_rootns_file(struct file *file)
>  {
>  	return file->f_op == &rootns_fops;
>  }
> +
> +void copy_rootns(struct task_struct *tsk, struct rootns *c)
> +{
> +	if (likely(!c || READ_ONCE(c->state) != ROOTNS_FORKING))
> +		return;
> +
> +	scoped_guard(spinlock, &c->lock) {
> +		get_rootns(c);
> +		WRITE_ONCE(c->init_pid, get_task_pid(tsk, PIDTYPE_TGID));
> +		WRITE_ONCE(c->state, ROOTNS_RUNNING);
> +	}
> +	wake_up_all(&c->waitq);
> +}

[Severity: Medium]
Can copy_rootns() record a non-reaper task as c->init_pid or race with
exit_rootns() to overwrite ROOTNS_DEAD back to ROOTNS_RUNNING?

In commit "rootns: Add rootns_create() system call", create_rootns() sets
ns->pid_ns_for_children->rootns = c and marks the PID namespace active in
pid_ns_tree before rootns_enter() is called. A host task with
CAP_SYS_ADMIN can open that PID namespace via open_by_handle_at(), join it
via setns(CLONE_NEWPID), and fork() PID 1 without bootstrapping c. Because
copy_process() calls copy_rootns() for any thread_group_leader(p) rather
than checking is_child_reaper(pid), a later rootns_enter() spawns PID 2 and
commits it as c->init_pid.

Furthermore, copy_rootns() checks c->state == ROOTNS_FORKING outside
c->lock without re-checking under the lock:

CPU0                                    CPU1
copy_rootns(tsk, c)
  READ_ONCE(c->state) == ROOTNS_FORKING
                                        zap_pid_ns_processes(pid_ns)
                                          exit_rootns(pid_ns, me)
                                            spin_lock(&c->lock)
                                            c->state = ROOTNS_DEAD
                                            spin_unlock(&c->lock)
                                            put_rootns(c)
  spin_lock(&c->lock)
  get_rootns(c)
  c->init_pid = ...
  c->state = ROOTNS_RUNNING  <-- overwrites ROOTNS_DEAD
  spin_unlock(&c->lock)

Checking is_child_reaper(pid) and re-checking c->state == ROOTNS_FORKING
under c->lock would prevent both issues.

> +
> +void exit_rootns(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns, struct task_struct *tsk)
> +{
> +	struct rootns *c = pid_ns->rootns;
> +	struct task_struct *leader;
> +	struct rusage rusage;
> +	int status;
> +
> +	if (!c)
> +		return;
> +
> +	leader = tsk->group_leader;
> +	status = (tsk->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT) ?
> +		 tsk->signal->group_exit_code : leader->exit_code;
> +	getrusage(leader, RUSAGE_BOTH, &rusage);
> +
> +	scoped_guard(spinlock, &c->lock) {
> +		c->exit_code = status;
> +		c->rusage = rusage;
> +		WRITE_ONCE(c->state, ROOTNS_DEAD);
> +	}
> +
> +	pid_ns->rootns = NULL;
> +	wake_up_poll(&c->waitq, EPOLLHUP);
> +	put_rootns(c);
> +}

[Severity: High]
Can exit_rootns() drop an unheld reference on c when pid_ns was entered
without copy_rootns()?

In commit "rootns: Add rootns_create() system call", create_rootns() sets
ns->pid_ns_for_children->rootns = c without taking a reference on c; the
matching get_rootns(c) only happens in copy_rootns() when bootstrapping in
ROOTNS_FORKING state. If a privileged host process enters pid_ns via
open_by_handle_at() and setns(CLONE_NEWPID) and forks a child reaper,
copy_rootns() is called with c == NULL and never increments c->usage. When
that child reaper exits, zap_pid_ns_processes() -> exit_rootns() sees
pid_ns->rootns == c and calls put_rootns(c), dropping the open rootns file
descriptor's own reference and freeing c while the file descriptor is still
open.

[Severity: High]
Can exit_rootns() dereference a dangling pid_ns->rootns pointer after the
rootns file descriptor has been closed?

Because create_rootns() stores an unreferenced c in pid_ns->rootns and
put_rootns() frees c without clearing pid_ns->rootns, any reference that
outlives the rootns file descriptor before rootns_enter() runs leaves
pid_ns->rootns pointing to freed memory. If a process holds an nsfs file
descriptor to pid_ns, closes the rootns file descriptor (freeing c), and
then enters pid_ns via setns(CLONE_NEWPID), forks, and exits,
zap_pid_ns_processes() -> exit_rootns() dereferences the freed c and
double-frees it via put_rootns(c). Assigning pid_ns->rootns = get_rootns(c)
in copy_rootns() when the bootstrap init task is attached would avoid
storing an unreferenced pointer in create_rootns().

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261117050841.3289652-1-jarkko@kernel.org?part=3

  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-18  5:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-17  5:08 [RFC PATCH 00/13] Namespace for namespace roots Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 01/13] nsproxy: Pass nsproxy to create_new_namespaces() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 02/13] rootns: Add core infrastructure for root namespaces Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 03/13] rootns: Track init lifecycle via copy_process() and pid_namespace Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 04/13] rootns: Add rootns_create() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 05/13] rootns: Add rootns_wait() " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 06/13] rootns: Add rootns_kill() " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 07/13] rootns: Add rootns_enter() " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 17:42   ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-17 20:03     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 20:53       ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 08/13] fs: Support FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS in fsconfig() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 09/13] fs: Support installing rootns mount trees via move_mount() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 10/13] arch: Wire up rootns system calls Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 11/13] docs: Document root namespace uAPI Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 12/13] selftests/rootns: Add root namespace test suite Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 13/13] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for ROOT NAMESPACE Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 11:10 ` [RFC PATCH 00/13] Namespace for namespace roots Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 17:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-17 18:48   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 19:10     ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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