From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
"Alexander Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Ben Segall" <bsegall@google.com>,
"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
"David Hildenbrand" <david@kernel.org>,
"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Davidlohr Bueso" <dave@stgolabs.net>,
"Dietmar Eggemann" <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>, "Jan Kara" <jack@suse.cz>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Juri Lelli" <juri.lelli@redhat.com>,
"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>,
"K Prateek Nayak" <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>,
"Liam R. Howlett" <liam@infradead.org>,
"Lorenzo Stoakes" <ljs@kernel.org>,
"Manfred Spraul" <manfred@colorfullife.com>,
"Mel Gorman" <mgorman@suse.de>, "Michal Hocko" <mhocko@suse.com>,
"Mike Rapoport" <rppt@kernel.org>, "Neal Gompa" <neal@gompa.dev>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"Pavel Tikhomirov" <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>,
"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Serge Hallyn" <sergeh@kernel.org>,
"Shuah Khan" <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Steven Rostedt" <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
"Suren Baghdasaryan" <surenb@google.com>,
"Valentin Schneider" <vschneid@redhat.com>,
"Vincent Guittot" <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>,
"Vlastimil Babka" <vbabka@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 04/13] rootns: Add rootns_create() system call
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 05:09:44 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-220139@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261117050841.3289652-5-jarkko@kernel.org>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential
issues to consider:
- [High] rootns: cred->user mismatch in create_rootns_creds() when
ROOTNS_USER is set
- [High] rootns: UAF via unreferenced pid_ns_for_children->rootns in
create_rootns()
--
commit b0275fb9f88bbbd1444c1c6937b46e36c52e8fe7
Author: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
rootns: Add rootns_create() system call
This commit adds the rootns_create() system call to allocate a detached
root namespace with dedicated mount and PID namespaces plus optional
namespaces selected by flags, returning a control file descriptor.
> diff --git a/kernel/rootns.c b/kernel/rootns.c
> index e3b203322ae23..904d75ce9d909 100644
> --- a/kernel/rootns.c
> +++ b/kernel/rootns.c
> @@ -145,3 +145,143 @@ void exit_rootns(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns, struct task_struct *tsk)
> wake_up_poll(&c->waitq, EPOLLHUP);
> put_rootns(c);
> }
> +
> +/*
> + * Create credentials for a rootns. Drop keyrings from the new credential to
> + * avoid unnecessary pinning.
> + */
> +static const struct cred *create_rootns_creds(unsigned int flags)
> +{
> + struct cred *new;
> + int ret;
> +
> + new = prepare_creds();
> + if (!new)
> + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
> + key_put(new->thread_keyring);
> + new->thread_keyring = NULL;
> + key_put(new->process_keyring);
> + new->process_keyring = NULL;
> + key_put(new->session_keyring);
> + new->session_keyring = NULL;
> + key_put(new->request_key_auth);
> + new->request_key_auth = NULL;
> +#endif
> + if (!(flags & ROOTNS_USER))
> + return new;
> +
> + ret = create_user_ns(new);
> + if (ret < 0)
> + goto err;
> + new->euid = new->user_ns->owner;
> + new->egid = new->user_ns->group;
> +
> + new->uid = new->euid;
> + new->suid = new->euid;
> + new->fsuid = new->euid;
> + new->gid = new->egid;
> + new->sgid = new->egid;
> + new->fsgid = new->egid;
> + ret = set_cred_ucounts(new);
[Severity: High]
Does updating new->uid to new->euid without updating new->user leave
new->user pointing to the caller's old real UID user_struct?
prepare_creds() clones new->user from current->cred->user. When the
caller's real UID differs from its effective UID (for example, a manager
process with real UID 0 that switched its effective UID via seteuid()
before calling rootns_create(ROOTNS_USER)), tasks entering the rootns
inherit new->user == INIT_USER while running as the unprivileged UID,
bypassing RLIMIT_NPROC checks in copy_process() and misattributing
per-user_struct resource accounting.
Updating new->user via alloc_uid(new->uid) and freeing the old reference
with free_uid(), as set_user() does in kernel/sys.c, would keep new->user
consistent with new->uid.
> + if (ret < 0)
> + goto err;
> + return new;
> +
> +err:
> + abort_creds(new);
> + return ERR_PTR(ret);
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Create a new rootns.
> + */
> +static struct rootns *create_rootns(unsigned int flags)
> +{
[ ... ]
> + ns = create_new_namespaces(clone_flags, current->nsproxy, cred->user_ns,
> + NULL);
> + if (IS_ERR(ns)) {
> + ret = PTR_ERR(ns);
> + goto err_put;
> + }
> +
> + c->ns = ns;
> + ns->rootns = c;
> + ns->pid_ns_for_children->rootns = c;
> + nsproxy_ns_active_get(ns);
[Severity: High]
Can storing an uncounted pointer in ns->pid_ns_for_children->rootns before
copy_rootns() runs lead to a use-after-free in exit_rootns()?
create_new_namespaces() adds ns->pid_ns_for_children to the namespace tree
and nsproxy_ns_active_get() marks it active, while the reference on c that
pairs with exit_rootns() -> put_rootns(c) is only taken later in
copy_rootns() when c->state is ROOTNS_FORKING:
kernel/rootns.c:copy_rootns() {
...
scoped_guard(spinlock, &c->lock) {
get_rootns(c);
WRITE_ONCE(c->init_pid, get_task_pid(tsk, PIDTYPE_TGID));
WRITE_ONCE(c->state, ROOTNS_RUNNING);
}
}
A process with CAP_SYS_ADMIN in init_user_ns and init_pid_ns can open the
active PID namespace via open_by_handle_at(FD_NSFS_ROOT, ...), enter it
with setns(), and fork a child that becomes child_reaper without going
through ROOTNS_FORKING. If the rootns fd was already closed, put_rootns()
frees c without clearing pid_ns->rootns, and when that child exits,
zap_pid_ns_processes() -> exit_rootns() dereferences and frees c a second
time. If the rootns fd is still open when the child exits, exit_rootns()
drops the control fd's sole reference on c, freeing it while the fd still
references it.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261117050841.3289652-1-jarkko@kernel.org?part=4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-18 5:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-17 5:08 [RFC PATCH 00/13] Namespace for namespace roots Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 01/13] nsproxy: Pass nsproxy to create_new_namespaces() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 5:09 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 02/13] rootns: Add core infrastructure for root namespaces Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 5:09 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 03/13] rootns: Track init lifecycle via copy_process() and pid_namespace Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 5:09 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 04/13] rootns: Add rootns_create() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 5:09 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 05/13] rootns: Add rootns_wait() " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 5:09 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 06/13] rootns: Add rootns_kill() " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 5:09 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 07/13] rootns: Add rootns_enter() " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 17:42 ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-17 20:03 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 20:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-18 5:09 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 08/13] fs: Support FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS in fsconfig() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 5:09 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 09/13] fs: Support installing rootns mount trees via move_mount() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 5:09 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 10/13] arch: Wire up rootns system calls Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 5:09 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 11/13] docs: Document root namespace uAPI Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 5:09 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 12/13] selftests/rootns: Add root namespace test suite Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 5:09 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 13/13] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for ROOT NAMESPACE Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 11:10 ` [RFC PATCH 00/13] Namespace for namespace roots Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 17:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-17 18:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 19:10 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=sashiko-outbox-220139@kernel.org \
--to=sashiko-bot@kernel.org \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=brauner@kernel.org \
--cc=bsegall@google.com \
--cc=corbet@lwn.net \
--cc=dave@stgolabs.net \
--cc=david@kernel.org \
--cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
--cc=dietmar.eggemann@arm.com \
--cc=jack@suse.cz \
--cc=jarkko@kernel.org \
--cc=juri.lelli@redhat.com \
--cc=kees@kernel.org \
--cc=kprateek.nayak@amd.com \
--cc=liam@infradead.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=ljs@kernel.org \
--cc=manfred@colorfullife.com \
--cc=mgorman@suse.de \
--cc=mhocko@suse.com \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=neal@gompa.dev \
--cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com \
--cc=rdunlap@infradead.org \
--cc=rostedt@goodmis.org \
--cc=rppt@kernel.org \
--cc=sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=sergeh@kernel.org \
--cc=skhan@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=surenb@google.com \
--cc=vbabka@kernel.org \
--cc=vincent.guittot@linaro.org \
--cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
--cc=vschneid@redhat.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox