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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	"Alexander Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Ben Segall" <bsegall@google.com>,
	"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
	"David Hildenbrand" <david@kernel.org>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"Davidlohr Bueso" <dave@stgolabs.net>,
	"Dietmar Eggemann" <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>, "Jan Kara" <jack@suse.cz>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Juri Lelli" <juri.lelli@redhat.com>,
	"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>,
	"K Prateek Nayak" <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>,
	"Liam R. Howlett" <liam@infradead.org>,
	"Lorenzo Stoakes" <ljs@kernel.org>,
	"Manfred Spraul" <manfred@colorfullife.com>,
	"Mel Gorman" <mgorman@suse.de>, "Michal Hocko" <mhocko@suse.com>,
	"Mike Rapoport" <rppt@kernel.org>, "Neal Gompa" <neal@gompa.dev>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"Pavel Tikhomirov" <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Serge Hallyn" <sergeh@kernel.org>,
	"Shuah Khan" <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Steven Rostedt" <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	"Suren Baghdasaryan" <surenb@google.com>,
	"Valentin Schneider" <vschneid@redhat.com>,
	"Vincent Guittot" <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>,
	"Vlastimil Babka" <vbabka@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 06/13] rootns: Add rootns_kill() system call
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 05:09:47 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-220141@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261117050841.3289652-7-jarkko@kernel.org>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential
issues to consider:
- [High] rootns: fork() race in rootns_kill_members() missing
  tasklist_lock
- [High] rootns: missing PID namespace ancestry check in
  rootns_kill_members()
--

commit af3e55bb2ee92ebb14699cd9c72b34e3ddb26ffe
Author: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>

rootns: Add rootns_kill() system call

This commit adds the rootns_kill() system call to walk a root namespace's
PID namespace IDR and send a signal to every member thread group.

> diff --git a/kernel/rootns.c b/kernel/rootns.c
> index 8a1254db69df7..f59b2fe9910de 100644
> --- a/kernel/rootns.c
> +++ b/kernel/rootns.c

[ ... ]

> @@ -390,3 +391,67 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE4(rootns_wait, int, rootnsfd,
>  	return ret;
>  }
>  #endif
> +
> +static int rootns_kill_members(struct rootns *rootns, int sig)
> +{
> +	struct pid_namespace *pid_ns = rootns->ns->pid_ns_for_children;

[Severity: High]
Should rootns_kill_members() verify that the caller's active PID namespace
is equal to or an ancestor of pid_ns before delivering signals?

Without an ancestry check, a caller holding rootnsfd in a sibling or
descendant PID namespace can signal processes outside its PID namespace
hierarchy.  Because kill_pid() passes SEND_SIG_NOINFO to
send_signal_locked():

kernel/signal.c:send_signal_locked() {
    ...
	if (info == SEND_SIG_NOINFO) {
		/* Force if sent from an ancestor pid namespace */
		force = !task_pid_nr_ns(current, task_active_pid_ns(t));
	}
    ...
}

when current has no PID in task_active_pid_ns(t), send_signal_locked()
treats the signal as coming from an ancestor PID namespace and sets
force = true, bypassing SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE and allowing SIGKILL or SIGSTOP
to kill or stop the PID namespace init process.

> +	bool any_success = false;
> +	bool any_other = false;
> +	bool any_perm = false;
> +	int other_err = 0;
> +	struct pid *pid;
> +	int nr;
> +
> +	if (READ_ONCE(rootns->state) != ROOTNS_RUNNING)
> +		return -ESRCH;
> +
> +	scoped_guard(rcu) {
> +		idr_for_each_entry(&pid_ns->idr, pid, nr) {
> +			int err;
> +
> +			if (!pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_TGID))
> +				continue;
> +
> +			err = kill_pid(pid, sig, 0);

[Severity: High]
Can a concurrent fork() still escape signals sent by rootns_kill_members()?

CPU0                              CPU1
copy_process()
  hlist_add_head(&delayed.node,
    &current->signal->multiprocess)
  ...
  pid = alloc_pid(...)
                                  rootns_kill_members()
                                    idr_for_each_entry(&pid_ns->idr, ...)
                                      /* parent: kill_pid() uses
                                       * PIDTYPE_TGID, so delayed.signal
                                       * is not updated */
                                      kill_pid(parent_pid, SIGTERM, 0)
                                      /* child: not attached yet */
                                      !pid_task(child_pid, PIDTYPE_TGID)
                                        -> continue
  write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock)
  p->signal->shared_pending.signal =
    delayed.signal
  attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_TGID)
  attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PID)
  write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock)
                                    /* child escapes SIGTERM */

__send_signal_locked() only records signals in t->signal->multiprocess for
in-flight forks when type > PIDTYPE_TGID, whereas kill_pid() passes
PIDTYPE_TGID.  In addition, because pid_ns->idr is walked without holding
read_lock(&tasklist_lock), a parent at a higher IDR entry can fork and
attach a child at a lower, already-scanned IDR entry (via PID wrap-around
or clone3() set_tid) before the scan reaches the parent, allowing the child
to escape even SIGKILL, or rootns_kill_members() can observe
pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_TGID) before attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PID) completes and
get -ESRCH from kill_pid().

Holding read_lock(&tasklist_lock) during the IDR walk and signaling via
group_send_sig_info(sig, SEND_SIG_NOINFO, task, PIDTYPE_MAX), as
zap_pid_ns_processes() and kill(-1, sig) do, would close these races.

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261117050841.3289652-1-jarkko@kernel.org?part=6

  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-18  5:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-17  5:08 [RFC PATCH 00/13] Namespace for namespace roots Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 01/13] nsproxy: Pass nsproxy to create_new_namespaces() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 02/13] rootns: Add core infrastructure for root namespaces Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 03/13] rootns: Track init lifecycle via copy_process() and pid_namespace Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 04/13] rootns: Add rootns_create() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 05/13] rootns: Add rootns_wait() " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 06/13] rootns: Add rootns_kill() " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 07/13] rootns: Add rootns_enter() " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 17:42   ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-17 20:03     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 20:53       ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 08/13] fs: Support FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS in fsconfig() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 09/13] fs: Support installing rootns mount trees via move_mount() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 10/13] arch: Wire up rootns system calls Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 11/13] docs: Document root namespace uAPI Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 12/13] selftests/rootns: Add root namespace test suite Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18  5:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 13/13] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for ROOT NAMESPACE Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 11:10 ` [RFC PATCH 00/13] Namespace for namespace roots Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 17:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-17 18:48   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 19:10     ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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