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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	"Alexander Mikhalitsyn" <alex@amutable.com>,
	"Alexander Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@amacapital.net>,
	"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>, "Jan Kara" <jack@suse.cz>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Josef Bacik" <josef@toxicpanda.com>,
	"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>, "Neal Gompa" <neal@gompa.dev>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"Serge Hallyn" <sergeh@kernel.org>,
	"Zygmunt Krynicki" <zygmunt.krynicki@canonical.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v5 17/25] fs: Support FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS in fsconfig()
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 2026 00:10:59 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-227552@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261121000844.1863324-18-jarkko@kernel.org>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential
issues to consider:
- [High] fs: incomplete namespace binding validation in
  fsconfig_set_rootns()
- [Medium] fs: stale fsopen() credentials retained in fc->cred by
  fsconfig_set_rootns()
--

commit f8ec195808901fb7269d7229635728d247b672b9
Author: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>

fs: Support FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS in fsconfig()

This commit adds FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS and the ->set_rootns() fs_context
operation so callers with CAP_SYS_ADMIN in a target rootns user namespace
can bind a newly opened fs_context to that rootns before supplying mount
parameters.

> diff --git a/fs/fsopen.c b/fs/fsopen.c
> index 70024870fefa2..e0d65f6018a7e 100644
> --- a/fs/fsopen.c
> +++ b/fs/fsopen.c
[ ... ]
> +static int fsconfig_set_rootns(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
> +{
[ ... ]
> +	put_net(fc->net_ns);
> +	fc->net_ns = get_net(c->ns->net_ns);
> +	put_user_ns(fc->user_ns);
> +	fc->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns);

[Severity: Medium]
Should fsconfig_set_rootns() also replace fc->cred with get_current_cred()?

alloc_fs_context() sets fc->cred at fsopen() time, when an unprivileged
FS_CONTEXT_AWAITING_NS context has not yet been authorized against any
target namespace.  If the fscontext fd is passed to another task or
credentials change before FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS, consumers such as
dentry_open(..., fc->cred) in fsmount() and proc_fill_super()
(fs_info->mounter_cred) will use the fsopen() caller's credentials rather
than the credentials that authorized FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS.

> +
> +	fc->rootns_bound = true;
> +	fc->rootns_mnt_id = c->ns->mnt_ns->ns.ns_id;
> +
> +	ret = fc->fs_type->init_fs_context(fc);
> +	if (ret < 0) {
> +		fc->rootns_bound = false;
> +		fc->phase = FS_CONTEXT_FAILED;
> +		return ret;
> +	}
> +	fc->need_free = true;
> +
> +	if (fc->ops->set_rootns) {
> +		ret = fc->ops->set_rootns(fc, c);
> +		if (ret < 0) {
> +			fc->rootns_bound = false;
> +			fc->phase = FS_CONTEXT_FAILED;
> +			return ret;
> +		}
> +	}
> +	if (fc->user_ns != user_ns) {
> +		fc->rootns_bound = false;
> +		fc->phase = FS_CONTEXT_FAILED;
> +		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +	}

[Severity: High]
Is checking fc->user_ns != user_ns enough to verify that the filesystem
supports binding to the target rootns?

binder_fs_type sets FS_USERNS_MOUNT, and binderfs_init_fs_context() neither
changes fc->user_ns nor implements ->set_rootns(), so fsconfig_set_rootns()
succeeds with fc->user_ns set to c->user_ns.  When FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE then
runs binderfs_fill_super(), it captures the caller's current IPC namespace
instead of c->ns->ipc_ns:

drivers/android/binder/rust_binderfs.c:binderfs_fill_super() {
    ...
	info->ipc_ns = get_ipc_ns(current->nsproxy->ipc_ns);
    ...
}

drivers/android/binder/rust_binderfs.c:binderfs_binder_device_create() {
    ...
	bool use_reserve = (info->ipc_ns == &init_ipc_ns);
    ...
}

An unprivileged caller in init_ipc_ns that binds a binderfs context to an
unprivileged rootns gets a superblock owned by c->user_ns with
info->ipc_ns == &init_ipc_ns, allowing it to bypass
BINDERFS_MAX_MINOR_CAPPED and allocate from the minor pool reserved for the
initial IPC namespace.

Similarly, sysfs_init_fs_context() and cgroup_init_fs_context() capture
current's net or cgroup namespace and overwrite fc->user_ns with that
namespace's owning user_ns without implementing ->set_rootns(); if
current's net or cgroup namespace happens to be owned by c->user_ns,
fc->user_ns == user_ns holds and the context silently binds to current's
namespace instead of c->ns.

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261121000844.1863324-1-jarkko@kernel.org?part=17

  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-22  0:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-21  0:08 [RFC PATCH v5 00/25] rootns: fd-bound process closures Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 01/25] userns: Factor out idmap validation and commit helpers Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 02/25] userns: Add userns_set_idmap() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 16:09   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 16:49     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 16:53       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  0:10   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 03/25] arch: Wire up " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 15:58   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 18:12     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  0:10   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 04/25] mount: Add mnt_ns_get_root() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 05/25] mount: Enforce mount_too_revealing() for foreign mntns Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 06/25] mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS in move_mount() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  0:10   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 07/25] mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_CLONE with MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  0:10   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 08/25] userns: Factor out install_user_ns_cred() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 09/25] nsfs: Add nsproxy_open_namespace() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 10/25] nsproxy: Pass nsproxy to create_new_namespaces() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 11/25] rootns: Add core infrastructure for root namespaces Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 12/25] rootns: Track init lifecycle via copy_process() and pid_namespace Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  1:32   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 18:08     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 13/25] rootns: Add rootns() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 19:10   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 19:12     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 19:54       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 20:16         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 14/25] rootns: Add ROOTNS_WAIT ioctl Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:17   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:18     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  1:09       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 15/25] rootns: Add ROOTNS_KILL ioctl Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  1:19   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 11:24     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 16/25] fork: Support CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS in clone3() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  0:10   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 17/25] fs: Support FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS in fsconfig() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  0:10   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 18/25] proc: Implement ->set_rootns() fs_context operation Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 19/25] ipc/mqueue: " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 20/25] security: Add rootns LSM hooks Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 11:47   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 21/25] bpf: Register " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 22/25] arch: Wire up rootns() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  0:11   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 23/25] docs: Document root namespace uAPI Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 24/25] selftests/rootns: Add root namespace test suite Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 25/25] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for ROOT NAMESPACE Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 17:21   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  0:11 ` [RFC PATCH v5 00/25] rootns: fd-bound process closures sashiko-bot

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