From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, "Borislav Petkov" <bp@suse.de>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Subject: [Part1 PATCH v4 16/17] X86/KVM: Unencrypt shared per-cpu variables when SEV is active
Date: Sat, 16 Sep 2017 07:34:17 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170916123418.37807-17-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170916123418.37807-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
When SEV is active, guest memory is encrypted with guest-specific key, a
guest memory region shared with hypervisor must be mapped as unencrypted
before we share it.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
index 874827b0d7ca..9ccb48b027e4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
@@ -75,8 +75,8 @@ static int parse_no_kvmclock_vsyscall(char *arg)
early_param("no-kvmclock-vsyscall", parse_no_kvmclock_vsyscall);
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct kvm_vcpu_pv_apf_data, apf_reason) __aligned(64);
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct kvm_steal_time, steal_time) __aligned(64);
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU_UNENCRYPTED(struct kvm_vcpu_pv_apf_data, apf_reason) __aligned(64);
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU_UNENCRYPTED(struct kvm_steal_time, steal_time) __aligned(64);
static int has_steal_clock = 0;
/*
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ static void kvm_register_steal_time(void)
cpu, (unsigned long long) slow_virt_to_phys(st));
}
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, kvm_apic_eoi) = KVM_PV_EOI_DISABLED;
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU_UNENCRYPTED(unsigned long, kvm_apic_eoi) = KVM_PV_EOI_DISABLED;
static notrace void kvm_guest_apic_eoi_write(u32 reg, u32 val)
{
@@ -419,9 +419,46 @@ void kvm_disable_steal_time(void)
wrmsr(MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME, 0, 0);
}
+static inline void __init __set_percpu_var_unencrypted(
+ void *var, int size)
+{
+ unsigned long pa = slow_virt_to_phys(var);
+
+ /* decrypt the memory in-place */
+ sme_early_decrypt(pa, size);
+
+ /* clear the C-bit from the page table */
+ early_set_memory_decrypted(pa, size);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Iterate through all possible CPUs and map the memory region pointed
+ * by apf_reason, steal_time and kvm_apic_eoi as unencrypted at once.
+ *
+ * Note: we iterate through all possible CPUs to ensure that CPUs
+ * hotplugged will have their per-cpu variable already mapped as
+ * unencrypted.
+ */
+static void __init set_percpu_unencrypted(void)
+{
+ int cpu;
+
+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+ __set_percpu_var_unencrypted(&per_cpu(apf_reason, cpu),
+ sizeof(struct kvm_vcpu_pv_apf_data));
+ __set_percpu_var_unencrypted(&per_cpu(steal_time, cpu),
+ sizeof(struct kvm_steal_time));
+ __set_percpu_var_unencrypted(&per_cpu(kvm_apic_eoi, cpu),
+ sizeof(unsigned long));
+ }
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
static void __init kvm_smp_prepare_boot_cpu(void)
{
+ if (sev_active())
+ set_percpu_unencrypted();
+
kvm_guest_cpu_init();
native_smp_prepare_boot_cpu();
kvm_spinlock_init();
@@ -489,6 +526,9 @@ void __init kvm_guest_init(void)
kvm_cpu_online, kvm_cpu_down_prepare) < 0)
pr_err("kvm_guest: Failed to install cpu hotplug callbacks\n");
#else
+ if (sev_active())
+ set_percpu_unencrypted();
+
kvm_guest_cpu_init();
#endif
--
2.9.5
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-09-16 12:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-09-16 12:34 [Part1 PATCH v4 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) description Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 15:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 02/17] x86/mm: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-26 19:06 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 03/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 04/17] x86/realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 05/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 06/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 08/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 09/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 10/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-26 19:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 11/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 12/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-26 19:10 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 15:08 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-26 19:08 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 14/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 15:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 15/17] percpu: introduce DEFINE_PER_CPU_UNENCRYPTED Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 3:13 ` Tejun Heo
2017-09-19 10:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-19 13:50 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-20 7:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-20 16:16 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 12:34 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2017-09-19 11:06 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 16/17] X86/KVM: Unencrypt shared per-cpu variables when SEV is active Borislav Petkov
2017-09-19 14:00 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-20 7:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute " Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 11:47 ` Borislav Petkov
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