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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Part1 PATCH v4 15/17] percpu: introduce DEFINE_PER_CPU_UNENCRYPTED
Date: Tue, 19 Sep 2017 12:39:06 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170919103906.GM4733@nazgul.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170916123418.37807-16-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

On Sat, Sep 16, 2017 at 07:34:16AM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> When SEV is active, memory is encrypted with guest-specific key, and if

					  with a

> guest OS wants to share the memory region with hypervisor then it must

the guest OS ...			    with the hypervisor ...

> clear the C-bit (i.e set unencrypted) before sharing it.
> 
> DEFINE_PER_CPU_UNENCRYPTED can be used to define the per-cpu variables
> which will be shared between guest and hypervisor. Currently, KVM defines

		       between a guest and a hypervisor.

> three variables (steal-time, apf_reason, and avic_eio) which are shared
> with hypervisor.

This sentence should be the opening sentence of your commit message.

> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: x86@kernel.org
> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> ---
>  include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h | 11 +++++++++++
>  include/linux/percpu-defs.h       | 15 +++++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h b/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
> index 8acfc1e099e1..363858f43cbc 100644
> --- a/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
> +++ b/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
> @@ -777,6 +777,16 @@
>  #define INIT_RAM_FS
>  #endif
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
> +#define PERCPU_UNENCRYPTED_SECTION					\
> +	. = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);						\
> +	*(.data..percpu..unencrypted)					\
> +	. = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
> +#else
> +#define PERCPU_UNENCRYPTED_SECTION
> +#endif
> +
> +
>  /*
>   * Default discarded sections.
>   *
> @@ -815,6 +825,7 @@
>  	. = ALIGN(cacheline);						\
>  	*(.data..percpu)						\
>  	*(.data..percpu..shared_aligned)				\
> +	PERCPU_UNENCRYPTED_SECTION					\
>  	VMLINUX_SYMBOL(__per_cpu_end) = .;

So looking at this more: I'm wondering if we can simply reuse the
PER_CPU_SHARED_ALIGNED_SECTION definition which is for shared per-CPU
sections. Instead of introducing a special section which is going to be
used only by SEV, practically.

Because "shared" also kinda implies that it is shared by multiple agents
and those agents can just as well be guest and hypervisor. And then that
patch is gone too.

Hmmm...?

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG Nürnberg)
-- 

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-09-19 10:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-09-16 12:34 [Part1 PATCH v4 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) description Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 15:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 02/17] x86/mm: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-26 19:06     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 03/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:04   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 04/17] x86/realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:04   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 05/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:05   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 06/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:05   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:05   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 08/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:05   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 09/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 10/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:07   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-26 19:11     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 11/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:07   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 12/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:41   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-26 19:10     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 15:08   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-26 19:08     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 14/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 15:25   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 15/17] percpu: introduce DEFINE_PER_CPU_UNENCRYPTED Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19  3:13   ` Tejun Heo
2017-09-19 10:39   ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2017-09-19 13:50     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-20  7:34       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-20 16:16         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 16/17] X86/KVM: Unencrypt shared per-cpu variables when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 11:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-19 14:00     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-20  7:39       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute " Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 11:47   ` Borislav Petkov

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