From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [Part1 PATCH v4 16/17] X86/KVM: Unencrypt shared per-cpu variables when SEV is active
Date: Tue, 19 Sep 2017 09:00:39 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <b1a8aed8-6f57-18cf-94b6-58b4ec1563de@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170919110611.GN4733@nazgul.tnic>
On 09/19/2017 06:06 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
...
>> + unsigned long pa = slow_virt_to_phys(var);
>> +
>> + /* decrypt the memory in-place */
>> + sme_early_decrypt(pa, size);
>> +
>> + /* clear the C-bit from the page table */
>> + early_set_memory_decrypted(pa, size);
>
> So those two do a lot of work like TLB flushing and WBINVD for each
> per-CPU variable and normally I'd say you do this on one go instead of
> variable per variable and thus save yourself the subsequent expensive
> invalidation calls but we do it once only during boot so maybe something
> to think about later, when there's more time and boredom.
>
> :)
Yes, we can revisit it later to optimize it.
...
>
> Let it stick out and shorten function name:
>
> for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
> __set_percpu_decrypted(&per_cpu(apf_reason, cpu), sizeof(struct kvm_vcpu_pv_apf_data));
> __set_percpu_decrypted(&per_cpu(steal_time, cpu), sizeof(struct kvm_steal_time));
> __set_percpu_decrypted(&per_cpu(kvm_apic_eoi, cpu), sizeof(unsigned long));
> }
>
> Also, we agreed to call everything that's not encrypted "decrypted" so
> that we have only two different states: encrypted and decrypted and thus
> less confusion.
Will do.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-09-19 14:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-09-16 12:34 [Part1 PATCH v4 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) description Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 15:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 02/17] x86/mm: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-26 19:06 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 03/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 04/17] x86/realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 05/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 06/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 08/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 09/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 10/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-26 19:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 11/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 12/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-26 19:10 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 15:08 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-26 19:08 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 14/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 15:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 15/17] percpu: introduce DEFINE_PER_CPU_UNENCRYPTED Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 3:13 ` Tejun Heo
2017-09-19 10:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-19 13:50 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-20 7:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-20 16:16 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 16/17] X86/KVM: Unencrypt shared per-cpu variables when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 11:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-19 14:00 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2017-09-20 7:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute " Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 11:47 ` Borislav Petkov
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