From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
"Laura Abbott" <labbott@redhat.com>,
"Jérôme Glisse" <jglisse@redhat.com>,
"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Dan Williams" <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [Part1 PATCH v4 10/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages
Date: Sun, 17 Sep 2017 16:07:03 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170917140703.GH4733@nazgul.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170916123418.37807-11-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
On Sat, Sep 16, 2017 at 07:34:11AM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>
> In order for memory pages to be properly mapped when SEV is active, we
> need to use the PAGE_KERNEL protection attribute as the base protection.
> This will insure that memory mapping of, e.g. ACPI tables, receives the
> proper mapping attributes.
>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> Cc: "Jérôme Glisse" <jglisse@redhat.com>
> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: x86@kernel.org
> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
> include/linux/ioport.h | 3 ++
> kernel/resource.c | 19 +++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> index 52cc0f4ed494..812b8a8066ba 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> @@ -27,6 +27,11 @@
>
> #include "physaddr.h"
>
> +struct ioremap_mem_flags {
> + bool system_ram;
> + bool desc_other;
> +};
> +
> /*
> * Fix up the linear direct mapping of the kernel to avoid cache attribute
> * conflicts.
> @@ -56,19 +61,61 @@ int ioremap_change_attr(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size,
> return err;
> }
>
> -static int __ioremap_check_ram(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long nr_pages,
> - void *arg)
> +static int __ioremap_check_ram(struct resource *res)
> {
> + unsigned long start_pfn, stop_pfn;
> unsigned long i;
>
> - for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; ++i)
> - if (pfn_valid(start_pfn + i) &&
> - !PageReserved(pfn_to_page(start_pfn + i)))
> - return 1;
> + if ((res->flags & IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM) != IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM)
> + return 0;
> +
> + start_pfn = (res->start + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> + stop_pfn = (res->end + 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> + if (stop_pfn > start_pfn) {
> + for (i = 0; i < (stop_pfn - start_pfn); ++i)
> + if (pfn_valid(start_pfn + i) &&
> + !PageReserved(pfn_to_page(start_pfn + i)))
> + return 1;
> + }
>
> return 0;
Should return bool I guess.
Btw, this whole resource code is needlessly complex. Trying to follow
through it is one sick brain-twister. One day someone should go and
clean up that silly function pointer passing.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG Nürnberg)
--
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-09-17 14:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-09-16 12:34 [Part1 PATCH v4 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) description Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 15:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 02/17] x86/mm: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-26 19:06 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 03/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 04/17] x86/realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 05/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 06/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 08/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 09/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 10/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:07 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2017-09-26 19:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 11/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 12/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-26 19:10 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 15:08 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-26 19:08 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 14/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 15:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 15/17] percpu: introduce DEFINE_PER_CPU_UNENCRYPTED Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 3:13 ` Tejun Heo
2017-09-19 10:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-19 13:50 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-20 7:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-20 16:16 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 16/17] X86/KVM: Unencrypt shared per-cpu variables when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 11:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-19 14:00 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-20 7:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute " Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 11:47 ` Borislav Petkov
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