From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org,
"Sebastian Andrzej Siewior" <bigeasy@linutronix.de>,
"Dominik Brodowski" <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>,
"Eric Biggers" <ebiggers@google.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Jonathan Neuschäfer" <j.neuschaefer@gmx.net>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.17 009/111] random: remove batched entropy locking
Date: Fri, 27 May 2022 10:48:41 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220527084820.419381242@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220527084819.133490171@linuxfoundation.org>
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
commit 77760fd7f7ae3dfd03668204e708d1568d75447d upstream.
Rather than use spinlocks to protect batched entropy, we can instead
disable interrupts locally, since we're dealing with per-cpu data, and
manage resets with a basic generation counter. At the same time, we
can't quite do this on PREEMPT_RT, where we still want spinlocks-as-
mutexes semantics. So we use a local_lock_t, which provides the right
behavior for each. Because this is a per-cpu lock, that generation
counter is still doing the necessary CPU-to-CPU communication.
This should improve performance a bit. It will also fix the linked splat
that Jonathan received with a PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING=y.
Reviewed-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Jonathan Neuschäfer <j.neuschaefer@gmx.net>
Tested-by: Jonathan Neuschäfer <j.neuschaefer@gmx.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YfMa0QgsjCVdRAvJ@latitude/
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1731,13 +1731,16 @@ static int __init random_sysctls_init(vo
device_initcall(random_sysctls_init);
#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
+static atomic_t batch_generation = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+
struct batched_entropy {
union {
u64 entropy_u64[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u64)];
u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
};
+ local_lock_t lock;
unsigned int position;
- spinlock_t batch_lock;
+ int generation;
};
/*
@@ -1749,7 +1752,7 @@ struct batched_entropy {
* point prior.
*/
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64) = {
- .batch_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u64.lock),
+ .lock = INIT_LOCAL_LOCK(batched_entropy_u64.lock)
};
u64 get_random_u64(void)
@@ -1758,67 +1761,65 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void)
unsigned long flags;
struct batched_entropy *batch;
static void *previous;
+ int next_gen;
warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
+ local_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_u64.lock, flags);
batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64);
- spin_lock_irqsave(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
- if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) == 0) {
+
+ next_gen = atomic_read(&batch_generation);
+ if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) == 0 ||
+ next_gen != batch->generation) {
extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u64);
batch->position = 0;
+ batch->generation = next_gen;
}
+
ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position++];
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
+ local_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy_u64.lock, flags);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u64);
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32) = {
- .batch_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u32.lock),
+ .lock = INIT_LOCAL_LOCK(batched_entropy_u32.lock)
};
+
u32 get_random_u32(void)
{
u32 ret;
unsigned long flags;
struct batched_entropy *batch;
static void *previous;
+ int next_gen;
warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
+ local_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_u32.lock, flags);
batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32);
- spin_lock_irqsave(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
- if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) == 0) {
+
+ next_gen = atomic_read(&batch_generation);
+ if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) == 0 ||
+ next_gen != batch->generation) {
extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u32);
batch->position = 0;
+ batch->generation = next_gen;
}
+
ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position++];
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
+ local_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy_u32.lock, flags);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u32);
/* It's important to invalidate all potential batched entropy that might
* be stored before the crng is initialized, which we can do lazily by
- * simply resetting the counter to zero so that it's re-extracted on the
- * next usage. */
+ * bumping the generation counter.
+ */
static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void)
{
- int cpu;
- unsigned long flags;
-
- for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
- struct batched_entropy *batched_entropy;
-
- batched_entropy = per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32, cpu);
- spin_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy->batch_lock, flags);
- batched_entropy->position = 0;
- spin_unlock(&batched_entropy->batch_lock);
-
- batched_entropy = per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64, cpu);
- spin_lock(&batched_entropy->batch_lock);
- batched_entropy->position = 0;
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy->batch_lock, flags);
- }
+ atomic_inc(&batch_generation);
}
/**
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-05-27 8:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 118+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-05-27 8:48 [PATCH 5.17 000/111] 5.17.12-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 001/111] HID: amd_sfh: Add support for sensor discovery Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 002/111] KVM: x86/mmu: fix NULL pointer dereference on guest INVPCID Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 003/111] random: use computational hash for entropy extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 004/111] random: simplify entropy debiting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 005/111] random: use linear min-entropy accumulation crediting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 006/111] random: always wake up entropy writers after extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 007/111] random: make credit_entropy_bits() always safe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 008/111] random: remove use_input_pool parameter from crng_reseed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 010/111] random: fix locking in crng_fast_load() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 011/111] random: use RDSEED instead of RDRAND in entropy extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 012/111] random: get rid of secondary crngs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 013/111] random: inline leaves of rand_initialize() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 014/111] random: ensure early RDSEED goes through mixer on init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 015/111] random: do not xor RDRAND when writing into /dev/random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 016/111] random: absorb fast pool into input pool after fast load Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 017/111] random: use simpler fast key erasure flow on per-cpu keys Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 018/111] random: use hash function for crng_slow_load() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 019/111] random: make more consistent use of integer types Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 020/111] random: remove outdated INT_MAX >> 6 check in urandom_read() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 021/111] random: zero buffer after reading entropy from userspace Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 022/111] random: fix locking for crng_init in crng_reseed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 023/111] random: tie batched entropy generation to base_crng generation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 024/111] random: remove ifdefd out interrupt bench Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 025/111] random: remove unused tracepoints Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 026/111] random: add proper SPDX header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 027/111] random: deobfuscate irq u32/u64 contributions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 028/111] random: introduce drain_entropy() helper to declutter crng_reseed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 029/111] random: remove useless header comment Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 030/111] random: remove whitespace and reorder includes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 031/111] random: group initialization wait functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 032/111] random: group crng functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 033/111] random: group entropy extraction functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 034/111] random: group entropy collection functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 035/111] random: group userspace read/write functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 036/111] random: group sysctl functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 037/111] random: rewrite header introductory comment Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 038/111] random: defer fast pool mixing to worker Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 039/111] random: do not take pool spinlock at boot Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 040/111] random: unify early init crng load accounting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 041/111] random: check for crng_init == 0 in add_device_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 042/111] random: pull add_hwgenerator_randomness() declaration into random.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 043/111] random: clear fast pool, crng, and batches in cpuhp bring up Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 044/111] random: round-robin registers as ulong, not u32 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 045/111] random: only wake up writers after zap if threshold was passed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 046/111] random: cleanup UUID handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 047/111] random: unify cycles_t and jiffies usage and types Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 048/111] random: do crng pre-init loading in worker rather than irq Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 049/111] random: give sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed a more sensible value Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 050/111] random: dont let 644 read-only sysctls be written to Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 051/111] random: replace custom notifier chain with standard one Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 052/111] random: use SipHash as interrupt entropy accumulator Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 053/111] random: make consistent usage of crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 054/111] random: reseed more often immediately after booting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 055/111] random: check for signal and try earlier when generating entropy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 056/111] random: skip fast_init if hwrng provides large chunk of entropy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 057/111] random: treat bootloader trust toggle the same way as cpu trust toggle Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 058/111] random: re-add removed comment about get_random_{u32,u64} reseeding Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 059/111] random: mix build-time latent entropy into pool at init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 060/111] random: do not split fast init input in add_hwgenerator_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 061/111] random: do not allow user to keep crng key around on stack Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 062/111] random: check for signal_pending() outside of need_resched() check Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 063/111] random: check for signals every PAGE_SIZE chunk of /dev/[u]random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 064/111] random: allow partial reads if later user copies fail Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 065/111] random: make random_get_entropy() return an unsigned long Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 066/111] random: document crng_fast_key_erasure() destination possibility Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 067/111] random: fix sysctl documentation nits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 068/111] init: call time_init() before rand_initialize() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 069/111] ia64: define get_cycles macro for arch-override Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 070/111] s390: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 071/111] parisc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 072/111] alpha: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 073/111] powerpc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 074/111] timekeeping: Add raw clock fallback for random_get_entropy() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 075/111] m68k: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 076/111] riscv: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 077/111] mips: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of just c0 random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 078/111] arm: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 079/111] nios2: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 080/111] x86/tsc: Use " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 081/111] um: use " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 082/111] sparc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 083/111] xtensa: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 084/111] random: insist on random_get_entropy() existing in order to simplify Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 085/111] random: do not use batches when !crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 086/111] random: use first 128 bits of input as fast init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 087/111] random: do not pretend to handle premature next security model Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 088/111] random: order timer entropy functions below interrupt functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 089/111] random: do not use input pool from hard IRQs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 090/111] random: help compiler out with fast_mix() by using simpler arguments Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 091/111] siphash: use one source of truth for siphash permutations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 092/111] random: use symbolic constants for crng_init states Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 093/111] random: avoid initializing twice in credit race Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 094/111] random: move initialization out of reseeding hot path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 095/111] random: remove ratelimiting for in-kernel unseeded randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 096/111] random: use proper jiffies comparison macro Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 097/111] random: handle latent entropy and command line from random_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 098/111] random: credit architectural init the exact amount Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 099/111] random: use static branch for crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 100/111] random: remove extern from functions in header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 101/111] random: use proper return types on get_random_{int,long}_wait() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 102/111] random: make consistent use of buf and len Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 103/111] random: move initialization functions out of hot pages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 104/111] random: move randomize_page() into mm where it belongs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 105/111] random: unify batched entropy implementations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 106/111] random: convert to using fops->read_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 107/111] random: convert to using fops->write_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 108/111] random: wire up fops->splice_{read,write}_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 109/111] random: check for signals after page of pool writes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 110/111] ACPI: sysfs: Fix BERT error region memory mapping Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 111/111] ALSA: ctxfi: Add SB046x PCI ID Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 22:39 ` [PATCH 5.17 000/111] 5.17.12-rc1 review Guenter Roeck
2022-05-28 2:00 ` Justin Forbes
2022-05-28 10:43 ` Naresh Kamboju
2022-05-28 11:06 ` Ron Economos
2022-05-28 15:01 ` Fox Chen
2022-05-28 15:25 ` Sudip Mukherjee
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