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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Theodore Tso <tytso@mit.edu>,
	Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
	"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.17 031/111] random: group initialization wait functions
Date: Fri, 27 May 2022 10:49:03 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220527084823.886956683@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220527084819.133490171@linuxfoundation.org>

From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>

commit 5f1bb112006b104b3e2a1e1b39bbb9b2617581e6 upstream.

This pulls all of the readiness waiting-focused functions into the first
labeled section.

No functional changes.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/char/random.c |  333 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
 1 file changed, 172 insertions(+), 161 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -201,44 +201,197 @@
 #include <asm/irq_regs.h>
 #include <asm/io.h>
 
-enum {
-	POOL_BITS = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE * 8,
-	POOL_MIN_BITS = POOL_BITS /* No point in settling for less. */
-};
-
-/*
- * Static global variables
- */
-static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait);
-static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
-
-static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock);
-static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list);
+/*********************************************************************
+ *
+ * Initialization and readiness waiting.
+ *
+ * Much of the RNG infrastructure is devoted to various dependencies
+ * being able to wait until the RNG has collected enough entropy and
+ * is ready for safe consumption.
+ *
+ *********************************************************************/
 
 /*
  * crng_init =  0 --> Uninitialized
  *		1 --> Initialized
  *		2 --> Initialized from input_pool
  *
- * crng_init is protected by primary_crng->lock, and only increases
+ * crng_init is protected by base_crng->lock, and only increases
  * its value (from 0->1->2).
  */
 static int crng_init = 0;
 #define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1))
-static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
-static void process_random_ready_list(void);
-static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
+/* Various types of waiters for crng_init->2 transition. */
+static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait);
+static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock);
+static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list);
 
+/* Control how we warn userspace. */
 static struct ratelimit_state unseeded_warning =
 	RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_unseeded_randomness", HZ, 3);
 static struct ratelimit_state urandom_warning =
 	RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_urandom_randomness", HZ, 3);
-
 static int ratelimit_disable __read_mostly;
-
 module_param_named(ratelimit_disable, ratelimit_disable, int, 0644);
 MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disable random ratelimit suppression");
 
+/*
+ * Returns whether or not the input pool has been seeded and thus guaranteed
+ * to supply cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the
+ * /dev/urandom device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,
+ * ,u64,int,long} family of functions.
+ *
+ * Returns: true if the input pool has been seeded.
+ *          false if the input pool has not been seeded.
+ */
+bool rng_is_initialized(void)
+{
+	return crng_ready();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(rng_is_initialized);
+
+/* Used by wait_for_random_bytes(), and considered an entropy collector, below. */
+static void try_to_generate_entropy(void);
+
+/*
+ * Wait for the input pool to be seeded and thus guaranteed to supply
+ * cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the /dev/urandom
+ * device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,u64,int,long}
+ * family of functions. Using any of these functions without first calling
+ * this function forfeits the guarantee of security.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 if the input pool has been seeded.
+ *          -ERESTARTSYS if the function was interrupted by a signal.
+ */
+int wait_for_random_bytes(void)
+{
+	if (likely(crng_ready()))
+		return 0;
+
+	do {
+		int ret;
+		ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready(), HZ);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret;
+
+		try_to_generate_entropy();
+	} while (!crng_ready());
+
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes);
+
+/*
+ * Add a callback function that will be invoked when the input
+ * pool is initialised.
+ *
+ * returns: 0 if callback is successfully added
+ *	    -EALREADY if pool is already initialised (callback not called)
+ *	    -ENOENT if module for callback is not alive
+ */
+int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy)
+{
+	struct module *owner;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	int err = -EALREADY;
+
+	if (crng_ready())
+		return err;
+
+	owner = rdy->owner;
+	if (!try_module_get(owner))
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
+	if (crng_ready())
+		goto out;
+
+	owner = NULL;
+
+	list_add(&rdy->list, &random_ready_list);
+	err = 0;
+
+out:
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
+
+	module_put(owner);
+
+	return err;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_random_ready_callback);
+
+/*
+ * Delete a previously registered readiness callback function.
+ */
+void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+	struct module *owner = NULL;
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
+	if (!list_empty(&rdy->list)) {
+		list_del_init(&rdy->list);
+		owner = rdy->owner;
+	}
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
+
+	module_put(owner);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback);
+
+static void process_random_ready_list(void)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+	struct random_ready_callback *rdy, *tmp;
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(rdy, tmp, &random_ready_list, list) {
+		struct module *owner = rdy->owner;
+
+		list_del_init(&rdy->list);
+		rdy->func(rdy);
+		module_put(owner);
+	}
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
+}
+
+#define warn_unseeded_randomness(previous) \
+	_warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *)_RET_IP_, (previous))
+
+static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller, void **previous)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
+	const bool print_once = false;
+#else
+	static bool print_once __read_mostly;
+#endif
+
+	if (print_once || crng_ready() ||
+	    (previous && (caller == READ_ONCE(*previous))))
+		return;
+	WRITE_ONCE(*previous, caller);
+#ifndef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
+	print_once = true;
+#endif
+	if (__ratelimit(&unseeded_warning))
+		printk_deferred(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n",
+				func_name, caller, crng_init);
+}
+
+
+enum {
+	POOL_BITS = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE * 8,
+	POOL_MIN_BITS = POOL_BITS /* No point in settling for less. */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Static global variables
+ */
+static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait);
+
+static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
+
 /**********************************************************************
  *
  * OS independent entropy store.   Here are the functions which handle
@@ -322,22 +475,6 @@ static void fast_mix(u32 pool[4])
 	pool[2] = c;  pool[3] = d;
 }
 
-static void process_random_ready_list(void)
-{
-	unsigned long flags;
-	struct random_ready_callback *rdy, *tmp;
-
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
-	list_for_each_entry_safe(rdy, tmp, &random_ready_list, list) {
-		struct module *owner = rdy->owner;
-
-		list_del_init(&rdy->list);
-		rdy->func(rdy);
-		module_put(owner);
-	}
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
-}
-
 static void credit_entropy_bits(size_t nbits)
 {
 	unsigned int entropy_count, orig, add;
@@ -387,8 +524,6 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct crng, crngs
 	.lock = INIT_LOCAL_LOCK(crngs.lock),
 };
 
-static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait);
-
 /*
  * crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service
  * path.  So we can't afford to dilly-dally. Returns the number of
@@ -909,29 +1044,6 @@ static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, siz
 	return true;
 }
 
-#define warn_unseeded_randomness(previous) \
-	_warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *)_RET_IP_, (previous))
-
-static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller, void **previous)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
-	const bool print_once = false;
-#else
-	static bool print_once __read_mostly;
-#endif
-
-	if (print_once || crng_ready() ||
-	    (previous && (caller == READ_ONCE(*previous))))
-		return;
-	WRITE_ONCE(*previous, caller);
-#ifndef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
-	print_once = true;
-#endif
-	if (__ratelimit(&unseeded_warning))
-		printk_deferred(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n",
-				func_name, caller, crng_init);
-}
-
 /*
  * This function is the exported kernel interface.  It returns some
  * number of good random numbers, suitable for key generation, seeding
@@ -1033,107 +1145,6 @@ static void try_to_generate_entropy(void
 }
 
 /*
- * Wait for the urandom pool to be seeded and thus guaranteed to supply
- * cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the /dev/urandom
- * device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,u64,int,long}
- * family of functions. Using any of these functions without first calling
- * this function forfeits the guarantee of security.
- *
- * Returns: 0 if the urandom pool has been seeded.
- *          -ERESTARTSYS if the function was interrupted by a signal.
- */
-int wait_for_random_bytes(void)
-{
-	if (likely(crng_ready()))
-		return 0;
-
-	do {
-		int ret;
-		ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready(), HZ);
-		if (ret)
-			return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret;
-
-		try_to_generate_entropy();
-	} while (!crng_ready());
-
-	return 0;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes);
-
-/*
- * Returns whether or not the urandom pool has been seeded and thus guaranteed
- * to supply cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the
- * /dev/urandom device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,
- * ,u64,int,long} family of functions.
- *
- * Returns: true if the urandom pool has been seeded.
- *          false if the urandom pool has not been seeded.
- */
-bool rng_is_initialized(void)
-{
-	return crng_ready();
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(rng_is_initialized);
-
-/*
- * Add a callback function that will be invoked when the nonblocking
- * pool is initialised.
- *
- * returns: 0 if callback is successfully added
- *	    -EALREADY if pool is already initialised (callback not called)
- *	    -ENOENT if module for callback is not alive
- */
-int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy)
-{
-	struct module *owner;
-	unsigned long flags;
-	int err = -EALREADY;
-
-	if (crng_ready())
-		return err;
-
-	owner = rdy->owner;
-	if (!try_module_get(owner))
-		return -ENOENT;
-
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
-	if (crng_ready())
-		goto out;
-
-	owner = NULL;
-
-	list_add(&rdy->list, &random_ready_list);
-	err = 0;
-
-out:
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
-
-	module_put(owner);
-
-	return err;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_random_ready_callback);
-
-/*
- * Delete a previously registered readiness callback function.
- */
-void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy)
-{
-	unsigned long flags;
-	struct module *owner = NULL;
-
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
-	if (!list_empty(&rdy->list)) {
-		list_del_init(&rdy->list);
-		owner = rdy->owner;
-	}
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
-
-	module_put(owner);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback);
-
-/*
  * This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random
  * number generator if it is available. It is not recommended for
  * use. Use get_random_bytes() instead. It returns the number of



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-05-27  9:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 118+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-05-27  8:48 [PATCH 5.17 000/111] 5.17.12-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 001/111] HID: amd_sfh: Add support for sensor discovery Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 002/111] KVM: x86/mmu: fix NULL pointer dereference on guest INVPCID Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 003/111] random: use computational hash for entropy extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 004/111] random: simplify entropy debiting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 005/111] random: use linear min-entropy accumulation crediting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 006/111] random: always wake up entropy writers after extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 007/111] random: make credit_entropy_bits() always safe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 008/111] random: remove use_input_pool parameter from crng_reseed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 009/111] random: remove batched entropy locking Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 010/111] random: fix locking in crng_fast_load() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 011/111] random: use RDSEED instead of RDRAND in entropy extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 012/111] random: get rid of secondary crngs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 013/111] random: inline leaves of rand_initialize() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 014/111] random: ensure early RDSEED goes through mixer on init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 015/111] random: do not xor RDRAND when writing into /dev/random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 016/111] random: absorb fast pool into input pool after fast load Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 017/111] random: use simpler fast key erasure flow on per-cpu keys Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 018/111] random: use hash function for crng_slow_load() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 019/111] random: make more consistent use of integer types Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 020/111] random: remove outdated INT_MAX >> 6 check in urandom_read() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 021/111] random: zero buffer after reading entropy from userspace Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 022/111] random: fix locking for crng_init in crng_reseed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 023/111] random: tie batched entropy generation to base_crng generation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 024/111] random: remove ifdefd out interrupt bench Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 025/111] random: remove unused tracepoints Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 026/111] random: add proper SPDX header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 027/111] random: deobfuscate irq u32/u64 contributions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 028/111] random: introduce drain_entropy() helper to declutter crng_reseed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 029/111] random: remove useless header comment Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 030/111] random: remove whitespace and reorder includes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 032/111] random: group crng functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 033/111] random: group entropy extraction functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 034/111] random: group entropy collection functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 035/111] random: group userspace read/write functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 036/111] random: group sysctl functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 037/111] random: rewrite header introductory comment Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 038/111] random: defer fast pool mixing to worker Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 039/111] random: do not take pool spinlock at boot Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 040/111] random: unify early init crng load accounting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 041/111] random: check for crng_init == 0 in add_device_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 042/111] random: pull add_hwgenerator_randomness() declaration into random.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 043/111] random: clear fast pool, crng, and batches in cpuhp bring up Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 044/111] random: round-robin registers as ulong, not u32 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 045/111] random: only wake up writers after zap if threshold was passed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 046/111] random: cleanup UUID handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 047/111] random: unify cycles_t and jiffies usage and types Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 048/111] random: do crng pre-init loading in worker rather than irq Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 049/111] random: give sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed a more sensible value Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 050/111] random: dont let 644 read-only sysctls be written to Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 051/111] random: replace custom notifier chain with standard one Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 052/111] random: use SipHash as interrupt entropy accumulator Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 053/111] random: make consistent usage of crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 054/111] random: reseed more often immediately after booting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 055/111] random: check for signal and try earlier when generating entropy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 056/111] random: skip fast_init if hwrng provides large chunk of entropy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 057/111] random: treat bootloader trust toggle the same way as cpu trust toggle Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 058/111] random: re-add removed comment about get_random_{u32,u64} reseeding Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 059/111] random: mix build-time latent entropy into pool at init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 060/111] random: do not split fast init input in add_hwgenerator_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 061/111] random: do not allow user to keep crng key around on stack Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 062/111] random: check for signal_pending() outside of need_resched() check Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 063/111] random: check for signals every PAGE_SIZE chunk of /dev/[u]random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 064/111] random: allow partial reads if later user copies fail Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 065/111] random: make random_get_entropy() return an unsigned long Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 066/111] random: document crng_fast_key_erasure() destination possibility Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 067/111] random: fix sysctl documentation nits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 068/111] init: call time_init() before rand_initialize() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 069/111] ia64: define get_cycles macro for arch-override Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 070/111] s390: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 071/111] parisc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 072/111] alpha: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 073/111] powerpc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 074/111] timekeeping: Add raw clock fallback for random_get_entropy() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 075/111] m68k: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 076/111] riscv: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 077/111] mips: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of just c0 random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 078/111] arm: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 079/111] nios2: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 080/111] x86/tsc: Use " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 081/111] um: use " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 082/111] sparc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 083/111] xtensa: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 084/111] random: insist on random_get_entropy() existing in order to simplify Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 085/111] random: do not use batches when !crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 086/111] random: use first 128 bits of input as fast init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 087/111] random: do not pretend to handle premature next security model Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 088/111] random: order timer entropy functions below interrupt functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 089/111] random: do not use input pool from hard IRQs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 090/111] random: help compiler out with fast_mix() by using simpler arguments Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 091/111] siphash: use one source of truth for siphash permutations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 092/111] random: use symbolic constants for crng_init states Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 093/111] random: avoid initializing twice in credit race Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 094/111] random: move initialization out of reseeding hot path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 095/111] random: remove ratelimiting for in-kernel unseeded randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 096/111] random: use proper jiffies comparison macro Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 097/111] random: handle latent entropy and command line from random_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 098/111] random: credit architectural init the exact amount Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 099/111] random: use static branch for crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 100/111] random: remove extern from functions in header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 101/111] random: use proper return types on get_random_{int,long}_wait() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 102/111] random: make consistent use of buf and len Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 103/111] random: move initialization functions out of hot pages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 104/111] random: move randomize_page() into mm where it belongs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 105/111] random: unify batched entropy implementations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 106/111] random: convert to using fops->read_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 107/111] random: convert to using fops->write_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 108/111] random: wire up fops->splice_{read,write}_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 109/111] random: check for signals after page of pool writes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 110/111] ACPI: sysfs: Fix BERT error region memory mapping Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 111/111] ALSA: ctxfi: Add SB046x PCI ID Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 22:39 ` [PATCH 5.17 000/111] 5.17.12-rc1 review Guenter Roeck
2022-05-28  2:00 ` Justin Forbes
2022-05-28 10:43 ` Naresh Kamboju
2022-05-28 11:06 ` Ron Economos
2022-05-28 15:01 ` Fox Chen
2022-05-28 15:25 ` Sudip Mukherjee

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