From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Theodore Tso <tytso@mit.edu>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.17 012/111] random: get rid of secondary crngs
Date: Fri, 27 May 2022 10:48:44 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220527084820.922972262@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220527084819.133490171@linuxfoundation.org>
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
commit a9412d510ab9a9ba411fea612903631d2e1f1601 upstream.
As the comment said, this is indeed a "hack". Since it was introduced,
it's been a constant state machine nightmare, with lots of subtle early
boot issues and a wildly complex set of machinery to keep everything in
sync. Rather than continuing to play whack-a-mole with this approach,
this commit simply removes it entirely. This commit is preparation for
"random: use simpler fast key erasure flow on per-cpu keys" in this
series, which introduces a simpler (and faster) mechanism to accomplish
the same thing.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 227 +++++++++++---------------------------------------
1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 173 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -323,14 +323,11 @@ static struct crng_state primary_crng =
* its value (from 0->1->2).
*/
static int crng_init = 0;
-static bool crng_need_final_init = false;
#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1))
static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
-static unsigned long crng_global_init_time = 0;
#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2 * CHACHA_KEY_SIZE)
-static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]);
-static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng,
- u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used);
+static void extract_crng(u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]);
+static void crng_backtrack_protect(u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used);
static void process_random_ready_list(void);
static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
@@ -365,7 +362,7 @@ static struct {
static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
-static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng);
+static void crng_reseed(void);
/*
* This function adds bytes into the entropy "pool". It does not
@@ -464,7 +461,7 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(int nbit
trace_credit_entropy_bits(nbits, entropy_count, _RET_IP_);
if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_count >= POOL_MIN_BITS)
- crng_reseed(&primary_crng);
+ crng_reseed();
}
/*********************************************************************
@@ -477,16 +474,7 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(int nbit
static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait);
-/*
- * Hack to deal with crazy userspace progams when they are all trying
- * to access /dev/urandom in parallel. The programs are almost
- * certainly doing something terribly wrong, but we'll work around
- * their brain damage.
- */
-static struct crng_state **crng_node_pool __read_mostly;
-
static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void);
-static void numa_crng_init(void);
static bool trust_cpu __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU);
static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg)
@@ -495,24 +483,6 @@ static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *
}
early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_trust_cpu);
-static bool crng_init_try_arch(struct crng_state *crng)
-{
- int i;
- bool arch_init = true;
- unsigned long rv;
-
- for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) {
- if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
- !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) {
- rv = random_get_entropy();
- arch_init = false;
- }
- crng->state[i] ^= rv;
- }
-
- return arch_init;
-}
-
static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_early(void)
{
int i;
@@ -531,100 +501,17 @@ static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_ea
return arch_init;
}
-static void crng_initialize_secondary(struct crng_state *crng)
-{
- chacha_init_consts(crng->state);
- _get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(u32) * 12);
- crng_init_try_arch(crng);
- crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1;
-}
-
-static void __init crng_initialize_primary(void)
+static void __init crng_initialize(void)
{
extract_entropy(&primary_crng.state[4], sizeof(u32) * 12);
if (crng_init_try_arch_early() && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) {
invalidate_batched_entropy();
- numa_crng_init();
crng_init = 2;
pr_notice("crng init done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n");
}
primary_crng.init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1;
}
-static void crng_finalize_init(void)
-{
- if (!system_wq) {
- /* We can't call numa_crng_init until we have workqueues,
- * so mark this for processing later. */
- crng_need_final_init = true;
- return;
- }
-
- invalidate_batched_entropy();
- numa_crng_init();
- crng_init = 2;
- crng_need_final_init = false;
- process_random_ready_list();
- wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
- kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
- pr_notice("crng init done\n");
- if (unseeded_warning.missed) {
- pr_notice("%d get_random_xx warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
- unseeded_warning.missed);
- unseeded_warning.missed = 0;
- }
- if (urandom_warning.missed) {
- pr_notice("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
- urandom_warning.missed);
- urandom_warning.missed = 0;
- }
-}
-
-static void do_numa_crng_init(struct work_struct *work)
-{
- int i;
- struct crng_state *crng;
- struct crng_state **pool;
-
- pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL);
- for_each_online_node(i) {
- crng = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct crng_state),
- GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i);
- spin_lock_init(&crng->lock);
- crng_initialize_secondary(crng);
- pool[i] = crng;
- }
- /* pairs with READ_ONCE() in select_crng() */
- if (cmpxchg_release(&crng_node_pool, NULL, pool) != NULL) {
- for_each_node(i)
- kfree(pool[i]);
- kfree(pool);
- }
-}
-
-static DECLARE_WORK(numa_crng_init_work, do_numa_crng_init);
-
-static void numa_crng_init(void)
-{
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA))
- schedule_work(&numa_crng_init_work);
-}
-
-static struct crng_state *select_crng(void)
-{
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA)) {
- struct crng_state **pool;
- int nid = numa_node_id();
-
- /* pairs with cmpxchg_release() in do_numa_crng_init() */
- pool = READ_ONCE(crng_node_pool);
- if (pool && pool[nid])
- return pool[nid];
- }
-
- return &primary_crng;
-}
-
/*
* crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service
* path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally. Returns the number of
@@ -702,68 +589,71 @@ static int crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp,
return 1;
}
-static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng)
+static void crng_reseed(void)
{
unsigned long flags;
- int i;
+ int i, entropy_count;
union {
u8 block[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];
u32 key[8];
} buf;
- if (crng == &primary_crng) {
- int entropy_count;
- do {
- entropy_count = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count);
- if (entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS)
- return;
- } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count, 0) != entropy_count);
- extract_entropy(buf.key, sizeof(buf.key));
- wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
- kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
- } else {
- _extract_crng(&primary_crng, buf.block);
- _crng_backtrack_protect(&primary_crng, buf.block,
- CHACHA_KEY_SIZE);
- }
- spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
+ do {
+ entropy_count = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count);
+ if (entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS)
+ return;
+ } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count, 0) != entropy_count);
+ extract_entropy(buf.key, sizeof(buf.key));
+ wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
+ kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
- crng->state[i + 4] ^= buf.key[i];
+ primary_crng.state[i + 4] ^= buf.key[i];
memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf));
- WRITE_ONCE(crng->init_time, jiffies);
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
- if (crng == &primary_crng && crng_init < 2)
- crng_finalize_init();
+ WRITE_ONCE(primary_crng.init_time, jiffies);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+ if (crng_init < 2) {
+ invalidate_batched_entropy();
+ crng_init = 2;
+ process_random_ready_list();
+ wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
+ kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
+ pr_notice("crng init done\n");
+ if (unseeded_warning.missed) {
+ pr_notice("%d get_random_xx warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
+ unseeded_warning.missed);
+ unseeded_warning.missed = 0;
+ }
+ if (urandom_warning.missed) {
+ pr_notice("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
+ urandom_warning.missed);
+ urandom_warning.missed = 0;
+ }
+ }
}
-static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE])
+static void extract_crng(u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE])
{
unsigned long flags, init_time;
if (crng_ready()) {
- init_time = READ_ONCE(crng->init_time);
- if (time_after(READ_ONCE(crng_global_init_time), init_time) ||
- time_after(jiffies, init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL))
- crng_reseed(crng);
- }
- spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
- chacha20_block(&crng->state[0], out);
- if (crng->state[12] == 0)
- crng->state[13]++;
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
-}
-
-static void extract_crng(u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE])
-{
- _extract_crng(select_crng(), out);
+ init_time = READ_ONCE(primary_crng.init_time);
+ if (time_after(jiffies, init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL))
+ crng_reseed();
+ }
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+ chacha20_block(&primary_crng.state[0], out);
+ if (primary_crng.state[12] == 0)
+ primary_crng.state[13]++;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
}
/*
* Use the leftover bytes from the CRNG block output (if there is
* enough) to mutate the CRNG key to provide backtracking protection.
*/
-static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng,
- u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
+static void crng_backtrack_protect(u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
{
unsigned long flags;
u32 *s, *d;
@@ -774,17 +664,12 @@ static void _crng_backtrack_protect(stru
extract_crng(tmp);
used = 0;
}
- spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
s = (u32 *)&tmp[used];
- d = &crng->state[4];
+ d = &primary_crng.state[4];
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
*d++ ^= *s++;
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
-}
-
-static void crng_backtrack_protect(u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
-{
- _crng_backtrack_protect(select_crng(), tmp, used);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
}
static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
@@ -1371,10 +1256,7 @@ static void __init init_std_data(void)
int __init rand_initialize(void)
{
init_std_data();
- if (crng_need_final_init)
- crng_finalize_init();
- crng_initialize_primary();
- crng_global_init_time = jiffies;
+ crng_initialize();
if (ratelimit_disable) {
urandom_warning.interval = 0;
unseeded_warning.interval = 0;
@@ -1544,8 +1426,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f,
return -EPERM;
if (crng_init < 2)
return -ENODATA;
- crng_reseed(&primary_crng);
- WRITE_ONCE(crng_global_init_time, jiffies - 1);
+ crng_reseed();
return 0;
default:
return -EINVAL;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-05-27 8:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 118+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-05-27 8:48 [PATCH 5.17 000/111] 5.17.12-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 001/111] HID: amd_sfh: Add support for sensor discovery Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 002/111] KVM: x86/mmu: fix NULL pointer dereference on guest INVPCID Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 003/111] random: use computational hash for entropy extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 004/111] random: simplify entropy debiting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 005/111] random: use linear min-entropy accumulation crediting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 006/111] random: always wake up entropy writers after extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 007/111] random: make credit_entropy_bits() always safe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 008/111] random: remove use_input_pool parameter from crng_reseed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 009/111] random: remove batched entropy locking Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 010/111] random: fix locking in crng_fast_load() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 011/111] random: use RDSEED instead of RDRAND in entropy extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 013/111] random: inline leaves of rand_initialize() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 014/111] random: ensure early RDSEED goes through mixer on init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 015/111] random: do not xor RDRAND when writing into /dev/random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 016/111] random: absorb fast pool into input pool after fast load Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 017/111] random: use simpler fast key erasure flow on per-cpu keys Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 018/111] random: use hash function for crng_slow_load() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 019/111] random: make more consistent use of integer types Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 020/111] random: remove outdated INT_MAX >> 6 check in urandom_read() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 021/111] random: zero buffer after reading entropy from userspace Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 022/111] random: fix locking for crng_init in crng_reseed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 023/111] random: tie batched entropy generation to base_crng generation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 024/111] random: remove ifdefd out interrupt bench Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 025/111] random: remove unused tracepoints Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 026/111] random: add proper SPDX header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 027/111] random: deobfuscate irq u32/u64 contributions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 028/111] random: introduce drain_entropy() helper to declutter crng_reseed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 029/111] random: remove useless header comment Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 030/111] random: remove whitespace and reorder includes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 031/111] random: group initialization wait functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 032/111] random: group crng functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 033/111] random: group entropy extraction functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 034/111] random: group entropy collection functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 035/111] random: group userspace read/write functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 036/111] random: group sysctl functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 037/111] random: rewrite header introductory comment Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 038/111] random: defer fast pool mixing to worker Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 039/111] random: do not take pool spinlock at boot Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 040/111] random: unify early init crng load accounting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 041/111] random: check for crng_init == 0 in add_device_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 042/111] random: pull add_hwgenerator_randomness() declaration into random.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 043/111] random: clear fast pool, crng, and batches in cpuhp bring up Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 044/111] random: round-robin registers as ulong, not u32 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 045/111] random: only wake up writers after zap if threshold was passed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 046/111] random: cleanup UUID handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 047/111] random: unify cycles_t and jiffies usage and types Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 048/111] random: do crng pre-init loading in worker rather than irq Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 049/111] random: give sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed a more sensible value Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 050/111] random: dont let 644 read-only sysctls be written to Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 051/111] random: replace custom notifier chain with standard one Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 052/111] random: use SipHash as interrupt entropy accumulator Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 053/111] random: make consistent usage of crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 054/111] random: reseed more often immediately after booting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 055/111] random: check for signal and try earlier when generating entropy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 056/111] random: skip fast_init if hwrng provides large chunk of entropy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 057/111] random: treat bootloader trust toggle the same way as cpu trust toggle Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 058/111] random: re-add removed comment about get_random_{u32,u64} reseeding Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 059/111] random: mix build-time latent entropy into pool at init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 060/111] random: do not split fast init input in add_hwgenerator_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 061/111] random: do not allow user to keep crng key around on stack Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 062/111] random: check for signal_pending() outside of need_resched() check Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 063/111] random: check for signals every PAGE_SIZE chunk of /dev/[u]random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 064/111] random: allow partial reads if later user copies fail Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 065/111] random: make random_get_entropy() return an unsigned long Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 066/111] random: document crng_fast_key_erasure() destination possibility Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 067/111] random: fix sysctl documentation nits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 068/111] init: call time_init() before rand_initialize() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 069/111] ia64: define get_cycles macro for arch-override Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 070/111] s390: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 071/111] parisc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 072/111] alpha: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 073/111] powerpc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 074/111] timekeeping: Add raw clock fallback for random_get_entropy() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 075/111] m68k: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 076/111] riscv: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 077/111] mips: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of just c0 random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 078/111] arm: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 079/111] nios2: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 080/111] x86/tsc: Use " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 081/111] um: use " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 082/111] sparc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 083/111] xtensa: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 084/111] random: insist on random_get_entropy() existing in order to simplify Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 085/111] random: do not use batches when !crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 086/111] random: use first 128 bits of input as fast init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 087/111] random: do not pretend to handle premature next security model Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 088/111] random: order timer entropy functions below interrupt functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 089/111] random: do not use input pool from hard IRQs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 090/111] random: help compiler out with fast_mix() by using simpler arguments Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 091/111] siphash: use one source of truth for siphash permutations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 092/111] random: use symbolic constants for crng_init states Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 093/111] random: avoid initializing twice in credit race Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 094/111] random: move initialization out of reseeding hot path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 095/111] random: remove ratelimiting for in-kernel unseeded randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 096/111] random: use proper jiffies comparison macro Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 097/111] random: handle latent entropy and command line from random_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 098/111] random: credit architectural init the exact amount Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 099/111] random: use static branch for crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 100/111] random: remove extern from functions in header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 101/111] random: use proper return types on get_random_{int,long}_wait() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 102/111] random: make consistent use of buf and len Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 103/111] random: move initialization functions out of hot pages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 104/111] random: move randomize_page() into mm where it belongs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 105/111] random: unify batched entropy implementations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 106/111] random: convert to using fops->read_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 107/111] random: convert to using fops->write_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 108/111] random: wire up fops->splice_{read,write}_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 109/111] random: check for signals after page of pool writes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 110/111] ACPI: sysfs: Fix BERT error region memory mapping Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 111/111] ALSA: ctxfi: Add SB046x PCI ID Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 22:39 ` [PATCH 5.17 000/111] 5.17.12-rc1 review Guenter Roeck
2022-05-28 2:00 ` Justin Forbes
2022-05-28 10:43 ` Naresh Kamboju
2022-05-28 11:06 ` Ron Economos
2022-05-28 15:01 ` Fox Chen
2022-05-28 15:25 ` Sudip Mukherjee
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