public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Theodore Tso <tytso@mit.edu>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
	Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>,
	"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.17 033/111] random: group entropy extraction functions
Date: Fri, 27 May 2022 10:49:05 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220527084824.160650233@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220527084819.133490171@linuxfoundation.org>

From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>

commit a5ed7cb1a7732ef11959332d507889fbc39ebbb4 upstream.

This pulls all of the entropy extraction-focused functions into the
third labeled section.

No functional changes.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/char/random.c |  216 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
 1 file changed, 109 insertions(+), 107 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -895,23 +895,36 @@ size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arc
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
 
+
+/**********************************************************************
+ *
+ * Entropy accumulation and extraction routines.
+ *
+ * Callers may add entropy via:
+ *
+ *     static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes)
+ *
+ * After which, if added entropy should be credited:
+ *
+ *     static void credit_entropy_bits(size_t nbits)
+ *
+ * Finally, extract entropy via these two, with the latter one
+ * setting the entropy count to zero and extracting only if there
+ * is POOL_MIN_BITS entropy credited prior:
+ *
+ *     static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
+ *     static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
+ *
+ **********************************************************************/
+
 enum {
 	POOL_BITS = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE * 8,
 	POOL_MIN_BITS = POOL_BITS /* No point in settling for less. */
 };
 
-/*
- * Static global variables
- */
+/* For notifying userspace should write into /dev/random. */
 static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait);
 
-/**********************************************************************
- *
- * OS independent entropy store.   Here are the functions which handle
- * storing entropy in an entropy pool.
- *
- **********************************************************************/
-
 static struct {
 	struct blake2s_state hash;
 	spinlock_t lock;
@@ -924,28 +937,106 @@ static struct {
 	.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock),
 };
 
-static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
-static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
-
-static void crng_reseed(void);
+static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes)
+{
+	blake2s_update(&input_pool.hash, in, nbytes);
+}
 
 /*
  * This function adds bytes into the entropy "pool".  It does not
  * update the entropy estimate.  The caller should call
  * credit_entropy_bits if this is appropriate.
  */
-static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes)
+static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes)
 {
-	blake2s_update(&input_pool.hash, in, nbytes);
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+	_mix_pool_bytes(in, nbytes);
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
 }
 
-static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes)
+static void credit_entropy_bits(size_t nbits)
+{
+	unsigned int entropy_count, orig, add;
+
+	if (!nbits)
+		return;
+
+	add = min_t(size_t, nbits, POOL_BITS);
+
+	do {
+		orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count);
+		entropy_count = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add);
+	} while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig);
+
+	if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_count >= POOL_MIN_BITS)
+		crng_reseed();
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is an HKDF-like construction for using the hashed collected entropy
+ * as a PRF key, that's then expanded block-by-block.
+ */
+static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
+	u8 seed[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE], next_key[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE];
+	struct {
+		unsigned long rdseed[32 / sizeof(long)];
+		size_t counter;
+	} block;
+	size_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(block.rdseed); ++i) {
+		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&block.rdseed[i]) &&
+		    !arch_get_random_long(&block.rdseed[i]))
+			block.rdseed[i] = random_get_entropy();
+	}
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
-	_mix_pool_bytes(in, nbytes);
+
+	/* seed = HASHPRF(last_key, entropy_input) */
+	blake2s_final(&input_pool.hash, seed);
+
+	/* next_key = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || 0) */
+	block.counter = 0;
+	blake2s(next_key, (u8 *)&block, seed, sizeof(next_key), sizeof(block), sizeof(seed));
+	blake2s_init_key(&input_pool.hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE, next_key, sizeof(next_key));
+
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+	memzero_explicit(next_key, sizeof(next_key));
+
+	while (nbytes) {
+		i = min_t(size_t, nbytes, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+		/* output = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || ++counter) */
+		++block.counter;
+		blake2s(buf, (u8 *)&block, seed, i, sizeof(block), sizeof(seed));
+		nbytes -= i;
+		buf += i;
+	}
+
+	memzero_explicit(seed, sizeof(seed));
+	memzero_explicit(&block, sizeof(block));
+}
+
+/*
+ * First we make sure we have POOL_MIN_BITS of entropy in the pool, and then we
+ * set the entropy count to zero (but don't actually touch any data). Only then
+ * can we extract a new key with extract_entropy().
+ */
+static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
+{
+	unsigned int entropy_count;
+	do {
+		entropy_count = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count);
+		if (entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS)
+			return false;
+	} while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count, 0) != entropy_count);
+	extract_entropy(buf, nbytes);
+	wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
+	kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
+	return true;
 }
 
 struct fast_pool {
@@ -988,24 +1079,6 @@ static void fast_mix(u32 pool[4])
 	pool[2] = c;  pool[3] = d;
 }
 
-static void credit_entropy_bits(size_t nbits)
-{
-	unsigned int entropy_count, orig, add;
-
-	if (!nbits)
-		return;
-
-	add = min_t(size_t, nbits, POOL_BITS);
-
-	do {
-		orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count);
-		entropy_count = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add);
-	} while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig);
-
-	if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_count >= POOL_MIN_BITS)
-		crng_reseed();
-}
-
 /*********************************************************************
  *
  * Entropy input management
@@ -1202,77 +1275,6 @@ void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness);
 #endif
 
-/*********************************************************************
- *
- * Entropy extraction routines
- *
- *********************************************************************/
-
-/*
- * This is an HKDF-like construction for using the hashed collected entropy
- * as a PRF key, that's then expanded block-by-block.
- */
-static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
-{
-	unsigned long flags;
-	u8 seed[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE], next_key[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE];
-	struct {
-		unsigned long rdseed[32 / sizeof(long)];
-		size_t counter;
-	} block;
-	size_t i;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(block.rdseed); ++i) {
-		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&block.rdseed[i]) &&
-		    !arch_get_random_long(&block.rdseed[i]))
-			block.rdseed[i] = random_get_entropy();
-	}
-
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
-
-	/* seed = HASHPRF(last_key, entropy_input) */
-	blake2s_final(&input_pool.hash, seed);
-
-	/* next_key = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || 0) */
-	block.counter = 0;
-	blake2s(next_key, (u8 *)&block, seed, sizeof(next_key), sizeof(block), sizeof(seed));
-	blake2s_init_key(&input_pool.hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE, next_key, sizeof(next_key));
-
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
-	memzero_explicit(next_key, sizeof(next_key));
-
-	while (nbytes) {
-		i = min_t(size_t, nbytes, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
-		/* output = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || ++counter) */
-		++block.counter;
-		blake2s(buf, (u8 *)&block, seed, i, sizeof(block), sizeof(seed));
-		nbytes -= i;
-		buf += i;
-	}
-
-	memzero_explicit(seed, sizeof(seed));
-	memzero_explicit(&block, sizeof(block));
-}
-
-/*
- * First we make sure we have POOL_MIN_BITS of entropy in the pool, and then we
- * set the entropy count to zero (but don't actually touch any data). Only then
- * can we extract a new key with extract_entropy().
- */
-static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
-{
-	unsigned int entropy_count;
-	do {
-		entropy_count = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count);
-		if (entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS)
-			return false;
-	} while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count, 0) != entropy_count);
-	extract_entropy(buf, nbytes);
-	wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
-	kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
-	return true;
-}
-
 /*
  * Each time the timer fires, we expect that we got an unpredictable
  * jump in the cycle counter. Even if the timer is running on another



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-05-27  9:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 118+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-05-27  8:48 [PATCH 5.17 000/111] 5.17.12-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 001/111] HID: amd_sfh: Add support for sensor discovery Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 002/111] KVM: x86/mmu: fix NULL pointer dereference on guest INVPCID Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 003/111] random: use computational hash for entropy extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 004/111] random: simplify entropy debiting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 005/111] random: use linear min-entropy accumulation crediting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 006/111] random: always wake up entropy writers after extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 007/111] random: make credit_entropy_bits() always safe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 008/111] random: remove use_input_pool parameter from crng_reseed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 009/111] random: remove batched entropy locking Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 010/111] random: fix locking in crng_fast_load() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 011/111] random: use RDSEED instead of RDRAND in entropy extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 012/111] random: get rid of secondary crngs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 013/111] random: inline leaves of rand_initialize() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 014/111] random: ensure early RDSEED goes through mixer on init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 015/111] random: do not xor RDRAND when writing into /dev/random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 016/111] random: absorb fast pool into input pool after fast load Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 017/111] random: use simpler fast key erasure flow on per-cpu keys Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 018/111] random: use hash function for crng_slow_load() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 019/111] random: make more consistent use of integer types Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 020/111] random: remove outdated INT_MAX >> 6 check in urandom_read() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 021/111] random: zero buffer after reading entropy from userspace Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 022/111] random: fix locking for crng_init in crng_reseed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 023/111] random: tie batched entropy generation to base_crng generation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 024/111] random: remove ifdefd out interrupt bench Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 025/111] random: remove unused tracepoints Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 026/111] random: add proper SPDX header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.17 027/111] random: deobfuscate irq u32/u64 contributions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 028/111] random: introduce drain_entropy() helper to declutter crng_reseed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 029/111] random: remove useless header comment Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 030/111] random: remove whitespace and reorder includes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 031/111] random: group initialization wait functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 032/111] random: group crng functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 034/111] random: group entropy collection functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 035/111] random: group userspace read/write functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 036/111] random: group sysctl functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 037/111] random: rewrite header introductory comment Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 038/111] random: defer fast pool mixing to worker Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 039/111] random: do not take pool spinlock at boot Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 040/111] random: unify early init crng load accounting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 041/111] random: check for crng_init == 0 in add_device_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 042/111] random: pull add_hwgenerator_randomness() declaration into random.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 043/111] random: clear fast pool, crng, and batches in cpuhp bring up Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 044/111] random: round-robin registers as ulong, not u32 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 045/111] random: only wake up writers after zap if threshold was passed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 046/111] random: cleanup UUID handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 047/111] random: unify cycles_t and jiffies usage and types Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 048/111] random: do crng pre-init loading in worker rather than irq Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 049/111] random: give sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed a more sensible value Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 050/111] random: dont let 644 read-only sysctls be written to Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 051/111] random: replace custom notifier chain with standard one Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 052/111] random: use SipHash as interrupt entropy accumulator Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 053/111] random: make consistent usage of crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 054/111] random: reseed more often immediately after booting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 055/111] random: check for signal and try earlier when generating entropy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 056/111] random: skip fast_init if hwrng provides large chunk of entropy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 057/111] random: treat bootloader trust toggle the same way as cpu trust toggle Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 058/111] random: re-add removed comment about get_random_{u32,u64} reseeding Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 059/111] random: mix build-time latent entropy into pool at init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 060/111] random: do not split fast init input in add_hwgenerator_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 061/111] random: do not allow user to keep crng key around on stack Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 062/111] random: check for signal_pending() outside of need_resched() check Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 063/111] random: check for signals every PAGE_SIZE chunk of /dev/[u]random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 064/111] random: allow partial reads if later user copies fail Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 065/111] random: make random_get_entropy() return an unsigned long Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 066/111] random: document crng_fast_key_erasure() destination possibility Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 067/111] random: fix sysctl documentation nits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 068/111] init: call time_init() before rand_initialize() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 069/111] ia64: define get_cycles macro for arch-override Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 070/111] s390: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 071/111] parisc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 072/111] alpha: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 073/111] powerpc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 074/111] timekeeping: Add raw clock fallback for random_get_entropy() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 075/111] m68k: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 076/111] riscv: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 077/111] mips: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of just c0 random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 078/111] arm: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 079/111] nios2: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 080/111] x86/tsc: Use " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 081/111] um: use " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 082/111] sparc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 083/111] xtensa: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 084/111] random: insist on random_get_entropy() existing in order to simplify Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 085/111] random: do not use batches when !crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 086/111] random: use first 128 bits of input as fast init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.17 087/111] random: do not pretend to handle premature next security model Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 088/111] random: order timer entropy functions below interrupt functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 089/111] random: do not use input pool from hard IRQs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 090/111] random: help compiler out with fast_mix() by using simpler arguments Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 091/111] siphash: use one source of truth for siphash permutations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 092/111] random: use symbolic constants for crng_init states Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 093/111] random: avoid initializing twice in credit race Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 094/111] random: move initialization out of reseeding hot path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 095/111] random: remove ratelimiting for in-kernel unseeded randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 096/111] random: use proper jiffies comparison macro Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 097/111] random: handle latent entropy and command line from random_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 098/111] random: credit architectural init the exact amount Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 099/111] random: use static branch for crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 100/111] random: remove extern from functions in header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 101/111] random: use proper return types on get_random_{int,long}_wait() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 102/111] random: make consistent use of buf and len Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 103/111] random: move initialization functions out of hot pages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 104/111] random: move randomize_page() into mm where it belongs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 105/111] random: unify batched entropy implementations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 106/111] random: convert to using fops->read_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 107/111] random: convert to using fops->write_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 108/111] random: wire up fops->splice_{read,write}_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 109/111] random: check for signals after page of pool writes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 110/111] ACPI: sysfs: Fix BERT error region memory mapping Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.17 111/111] ALSA: ctxfi: Add SB046x PCI ID Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 22:39 ` [PATCH 5.17 000/111] 5.17.12-rc1 review Guenter Roeck
2022-05-28  2:00 ` Justin Forbes
2022-05-28 10:43 ` Naresh Kamboju
2022-05-28 11:06 ` Ron Economos
2022-05-28 15:01 ` Fox Chen
2022-05-28 15:25 ` Sudip Mukherjee

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20220527084824.160650233@linuxfoundation.org \
    --to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=Jason@zx2c4.com \
    --cc=ebiggers@google.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux@dominikbrodowski.net \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=tytso@mit.edu \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox