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From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+git@google.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org, mingo@kernel.org, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Subject: [RFC PATCH PoC 06/11] x86/boot: Created a confined code area for startup code
Date: Wed, 23 Apr 2025 13:09:55 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250423110948.1103030-19-ardb+git@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250423110948.1103030-13-ardb+git@google.com>

From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>

In order to be able to have tight control over which code may execute
from the early 1:1 mapping of memory, but still link vmlinux as a single
executable, prefix all symbol references in startup code with __pi_, and
invoke it from outside using the __pi_ prefix.

HACK: omit sev-status.c for the time being - disentangling that is
rather challenging, and not necessary for a proof of concept
implementation.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/boot/startup/Makefile | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h   |  1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/head64.c       |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S      |  6 +++---
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S |  6 +++---
 5 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/startup/Makefile b/arch/x86/boot/startup/Makefile
index b514f7e81332..4062582144f6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/startup/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/startup/Makefile
@@ -17,8 +17,9 @@ KMSAN_SANITIZE	:= n
 UBSAN_SANITIZE	:= n
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT	:= n
 
-obj-$(CONFIG_X86_64)		+= gdt_idt.o map_kernel.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)	+= sme.o sev-startup.o
+pi-obj-$(CONFIG_X86_64)		+= gdt_idt.o map_kernel.o
+pi-obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += sme.o #sev-startup.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)	+= sev-startup.o
 
 lib-$(CONFIG_X86_64)		+= la57toggle.o
 lib-$(CONFIG_EFI_MIXED)		+= efi-mixed.o
@@ -28,3 +29,16 @@ lib-$(CONFIG_EFI_MIXED)		+= efi-mixed.o
 # to be linked into the decompressor or the EFI stub but not vmlinux
 #
 $(patsubst %.o,$(obj)/%.o,$(lib-y)): OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD := y
+
+#
+# Confine the startup code by prefixing all symbols with __pi_ (for position
+# independent). This ensures that startup code can only call other startup
+# code, or code that has explicitly been made accessible to it via a symbol
+# alias.
+#
+$(obj)/%.pi.o: OBJCOPYFLAGS := --prefix-symbols=__pi_
+$(obj)/%.pi.o: $(obj)/%.o FORCE
+	$(call if_changed,objcopy)
+
+extra-y		:= $(pi-obj-y)
+obj-y		+= $(patsubst %.o,%.pi.o,$(pi-obj-y))
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h
index 6324f4c6c545..895d09faaf83 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ extern void i386_reserve_resources(void);
 extern unsigned long __startup_64(unsigned long p2v_offset, struct boot_params *bp);
 extern void startup_64_setup_gdt_idt(void);
 extern void startup_64_load_idt(void *vc_handler);
+extern void __pi_startup_64_load_idt(void *vc_handler);
 extern void early_setup_idt(void);
 extern void __init do_early_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index b251186a819e..8107cd68bc41 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -320,5 +320,5 @@ void early_setup_idt(void)
 		handler = vc_boot_ghcb;
 	}
 
-	startup_64_load_idt(handler);
+	__pi_startup_64_load_idt(handler);
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
index 0c0d38ebf70b..e448279a0f87 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64)
 	xorl	%edx, %edx
 	wrmsr
 
-	call	startup_64_setup_gdt_idt
+	call	__pi_startup_64_setup_gdt_idt
 
 	/* Now switch to __KERNEL_CS so IRET works reliably */
 	pushq	$__KERNEL_CS
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64)
 	 * subsequent code. Pass the boot_params pointer as the first argument.
 	 */
 	movq	%r15, %rdi
-	call	sme_enable
+	call	__pi_sme_enable
 #endif
 
 	/* Sanitize CPU configuration */
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64)
 	 * programmed into CR3.
 	 */
 	movq	%r15, %rsi
-	call	__startup_64
+	call	__pi___startup_64
 
 	/* Form the CR3 value being sure to include the CR3 modifier */
 	leaq	early_top_pgt(%rip), %rcx
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S
index f8a33b25ae86..edbf9c998848 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 
 	.text
 	.code64
-SYM_FUNC_START(sme_encrypt_execute)
+SYM_FUNC_START(__pi_sme_encrypt_execute)
 
 	/*
 	 * Entry parameters:
@@ -69,9 +69,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(sme_encrypt_execute)
 	ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
 	ret
 	int3
-SYM_FUNC_END(sme_encrypt_execute)
+SYM_FUNC_END(__pi_sme_encrypt_execute)
 
-SYM_FUNC_START(__enc_copy)
+SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(__enc_copy)
 	ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
 /*
  * Routine used to encrypt memory in place.
-- 
2.49.0.805.g082f7c87e0-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-04-23 11:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-04-23 11:09 [RFC PATCH PoC 00/11] x86: strict separation of startup code Ard Biesheuvel
2025-04-23 11:09 ` [RFC PATCH PoC 01/11] x86/linkage: Add SYM_PI_ALIAS() macro helper to emit symbol aliases Ard Biesheuvel
2025-04-24 18:05   ` Ingo Molnar
2025-04-24 18:17     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-04-24 18:23       ` Ingo Molnar
2025-04-23 11:09 ` [RFC PATCH PoC 02/11] x86/boot: Move early_setup_gdt() back into head64.c Ard Biesheuvel
2025-04-23 11:09 ` [RFC PATCH PoC 03/11] x86/boot: Disregard __supported_pte_mask in __startup_64() Ard Biesheuvel
2025-04-23 11:09 ` [RFC PATCH PoC 04/11] x86/boot: Add a bunch of PI aliases Ard Biesheuvel
2025-04-23 11:09 ` [RFC PATCH PoC 05/11] HACK: provide __pti_set_user_pgtbl() to startup code Ard Biesheuvel
2025-04-23 11:09 ` Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
2025-04-23 11:09 ` [RFC PATCH PoC 07/11] HACK: work around sev-startup.c being omitted for now Ard Biesheuvel
2025-04-23 11:09 ` [RFC PATCH PoC 08/11] x86/boot: Move startup code out of __head section Ard Biesheuvel
2025-04-23 11:09 ` [RFC PATCH PoC 09/11] x86/boot: Disallow absolute symbol references in startup code Ard Biesheuvel
2025-04-23 11:09 ` [RFC PATCH PoC 10/11] x86/boot: Revert "Reject absolute references in .head.text" Ard Biesheuvel
2025-04-23 11:10 ` [RFC PATCH PoC 11/11] x86/boot: Get rid of the .head.text section Ard Biesheuvel
2025-04-24 18:09 ` [RFC PATCH PoC 00/11] x86: strict separation of startup code Ingo Molnar
2025-04-24 18:16   ` Ard Biesheuvel

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