From: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
To: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
Antoine Tenart <atenart@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v3 09/10] crypto: safexcel - Rework cleanup of sensitive structs in safexcel_aead_setkey
Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 13:57:47 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260805115749.392672-10-thuth@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260805115749.392672-1-thuth@redhat.com>
From: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
The crypto_authenc_keys structure only contains pointers to keys,
but not the key data itself. So explicitly clearing the structure
at the end of safexcel_aead_setkey() is not really necessary.
On the other hand, the crypto_aes_ctx might contain sensitive information,
so this structure should be cleaned up at the end instead. Do this
now via the new __cleanup(aes_zeroize_ctx) marker.
Since __cleanup() and gotos should not be mixed in the same function,
replace the gotos with early return statements, which is fine now
that we dropped the memzero_explicit(&keys, sizeof(keys)) at the end.
Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
---
.../crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_cipher.c | 27 ++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_cipher.c b/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_cipher.c
index a8349b684693e..e94686490bb27 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_cipher.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_cipher.c
@@ -407,17 +407,17 @@ static int safexcel_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *ctfm, const u8 *key,
struct safexcel_cipher_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
struct safexcel_crypto_priv *priv = ctx->base.priv;
struct crypto_authenc_keys keys;
- struct crypto_aes_ctx aes;
- int err = -EINVAL, i;
+ struct crypto_aes_ctx aes __cleanup(aes_zeroize_ctx);
+ int err, i;
const char *alg;
if (unlikely(crypto_authenc_extractkeys(&keys, key, len)))
- goto badkey;
+ return -EINVAL;
if (ctx->mode == CONTEXT_CONTROL_CRYPTO_MODE_CTR_LOAD) {
/* Must have at least space for the nonce here */
if (unlikely(keys.enckeylen < CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE))
- goto badkey;
+ return -EINVAL;
/* last 4 bytes of key are the nonce! */
ctx->nonce = *(u32 *)(keys.enckey + keys.enckeylen -
CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE);
@@ -430,25 +430,25 @@ static int safexcel_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *ctfm, const u8 *key,
case SAFEXCEL_DES:
err = verify_aead_des_key(ctfm, keys.enckey, keys.enckeylen);
if (unlikely(err))
- goto badkey;
+ return err;
break;
case SAFEXCEL_3DES:
err = verify_aead_des3_key(ctfm, keys.enckey, keys.enckeylen);
if (unlikely(err))
- goto badkey;
+ return err;
break;
case SAFEXCEL_AES:
err = aes_expandkey(&aes, keys.enckey, keys.enckeylen);
if (unlikely(err))
- goto badkey;
+ return err;
break;
case SAFEXCEL_SM4:
if (unlikely(keys.enckeylen != SM4_KEY_SIZE))
- goto badkey;
+ return err;
break;
default:
dev_err(priv->dev, "aead: unsupported cipher algorithm\n");
- goto badkey;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
if (priv->flags & EIP197_TRC_CACHE && ctx->base.ctxr_dma) {
@@ -486,24 +486,19 @@ static int safexcel_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *ctfm, const u8 *key,
break;
default:
dev_err(priv->dev, "aead: unsupported hash algorithm\n");
- goto badkey;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
if (safexcel_hmac_setkey(&ctx->base, keys.authkey, keys.authkeylen,
alg, ctx->state_sz))
- goto badkey;
+ return -EINVAL;
/* Now copy the keys into the context */
for (i = 0; i < keys.enckeylen / sizeof(u32); i++)
ctx->key[i] = cpu_to_le32(((u32 *)keys.enckey)[i]);
ctx->key_len = keys.enckeylen;
- memzero_explicit(&keys, sizeof(keys));
return 0;
-
-badkey:
- memzero_explicit(&keys, sizeof(keys));
- return err;
}
static int safexcel_context_control(struct safexcel_cipher_ctx *ctx,
--
2.55.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-05 11:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-05 11:57 [PATCH v3 00/10] crypto: Provide a function for zeroizing crypto_aes_ctx Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 01/10] crypto: Provide a wrapper " Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 02/10] crypto: aspeed - clear the crypto_aes_ctx when done Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 03/10] crypto: inside-secure/eip93 " Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 04/10] crypto: padlock-aes " Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 05/10] crypto: sa2ul " Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 06/10] crypto: arm/aes-neonbs " Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 07/10] crypto: arm64/aes-neonbs " Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 08/10] crypto: qat - zeroize crypto_aes_ctx with __cleanup(aes_zeroize_ctx) Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` Thomas Huth [this message]
2026-08-06 8:10 ` [PATCH v3 09/10] crypto: safexcel - Rework cleanup of sensitive structs in safexcel_aead_setkey Antoine Tenart
2026-08-06 8:18 ` Thomas Huth
2026-08-06 12:37 ` Antoine Tenart
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 10/10] crypto: safexcel - zeroize crypto_aes_ctx with __cleanup(aes_zeroize_ctx) Thomas Huth
2026-08-06 8:17 ` Antoine Tenart
2026-08-05 20:22 ` [PATCH v3 00/10] crypto: Provide a function for zeroizing crypto_aes_ctx Eric Biggers
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