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From: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
To: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	Antoine Tenart <atenart@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v3 09/10] crypto: safexcel - Rework cleanup of sensitive structs in safexcel_aead_setkey
Date: Wed,  5 Aug 2026 13:57:47 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260805115749.392672-10-thuth@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260805115749.392672-1-thuth@redhat.com>

From: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>

The crypto_authenc_keys structure only contains pointers to keys,
but not the key data itself. So explicitly clearing the structure
at the end of safexcel_aead_setkey() is not really necessary.

On the other hand, the crypto_aes_ctx might contain sensitive information,
so this structure should be cleaned up at the end instead. Do this
now via the new __cleanup(aes_zeroize_ctx) marker.

Since __cleanup() and gotos should not be mixed in the same function,
replace the gotos with early return statements, which is fine now
that we dropped the memzero_explicit(&keys, sizeof(keys)) at the end.

Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
---
 .../crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_cipher.c    | 27 ++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_cipher.c b/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_cipher.c
index a8349b684693e..e94686490bb27 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_cipher.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_cipher.c
@@ -407,17 +407,17 @@ static int safexcel_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *ctfm, const u8 *key,
 	struct safexcel_cipher_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
 	struct safexcel_crypto_priv *priv = ctx->base.priv;
 	struct crypto_authenc_keys keys;
-	struct crypto_aes_ctx aes;
-	int err = -EINVAL, i;
+	struct crypto_aes_ctx aes __cleanup(aes_zeroize_ctx);
+	int err, i;
 	const char *alg;
 
 	if (unlikely(crypto_authenc_extractkeys(&keys, key, len)))
-		goto badkey;
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (ctx->mode == CONTEXT_CONTROL_CRYPTO_MODE_CTR_LOAD) {
 		/* Must have at least space for the nonce here */
 		if (unlikely(keys.enckeylen < CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE))
-			goto badkey;
+			return -EINVAL;
 		/* last 4 bytes of key are the nonce! */
 		ctx->nonce = *(u32 *)(keys.enckey + keys.enckeylen -
 				      CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE);
@@ -430,25 +430,25 @@ static int safexcel_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *ctfm, const u8 *key,
 	case SAFEXCEL_DES:
 		err = verify_aead_des_key(ctfm, keys.enckey, keys.enckeylen);
 		if (unlikely(err))
-			goto badkey;
+			return err;
 		break;
 	case SAFEXCEL_3DES:
 		err = verify_aead_des3_key(ctfm, keys.enckey, keys.enckeylen);
 		if (unlikely(err))
-			goto badkey;
+			return err;
 		break;
 	case SAFEXCEL_AES:
 		err = aes_expandkey(&aes, keys.enckey, keys.enckeylen);
 		if (unlikely(err))
-			goto badkey;
+			return err;
 		break;
 	case SAFEXCEL_SM4:
 		if (unlikely(keys.enckeylen != SM4_KEY_SIZE))
-			goto badkey;
+			return err;
 		break;
 	default:
 		dev_err(priv->dev, "aead: unsupported cipher algorithm\n");
-		goto badkey;
+		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	if (priv->flags & EIP197_TRC_CACHE && ctx->base.ctxr_dma) {
@@ -486,24 +486,19 @@ static int safexcel_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *ctfm, const u8 *key,
 		break;
 	default:
 		dev_err(priv->dev, "aead: unsupported hash algorithm\n");
-		goto badkey;
+		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	if (safexcel_hmac_setkey(&ctx->base, keys.authkey, keys.authkeylen,
 				 alg, ctx->state_sz))
-		goto badkey;
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* Now copy the keys into the context */
 	for (i = 0; i < keys.enckeylen / sizeof(u32); i++)
 		ctx->key[i] = cpu_to_le32(((u32 *)keys.enckey)[i]);
 	ctx->key_len = keys.enckeylen;
 
-	memzero_explicit(&keys, sizeof(keys));
 	return 0;
-
-badkey:
-	memzero_explicit(&keys, sizeof(keys));
-	return err;
 }
 
 static int safexcel_context_control(struct safexcel_cipher_ctx *ctx,
-- 
2.55.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-08-05 11:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-05 11:57 [PATCH v3 00/10] crypto: Provide a function for zeroizing crypto_aes_ctx Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 01/10] crypto: Provide a wrapper " Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 02/10] crypto: aspeed - clear the crypto_aes_ctx when done Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 03/10] crypto: inside-secure/eip93 " Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 04/10] crypto: padlock-aes " Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 05/10] crypto: sa2ul " Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 06/10] crypto: arm/aes-neonbs " Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 07/10] crypto: arm64/aes-neonbs " Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 08/10] crypto: qat - zeroize crypto_aes_ctx with __cleanup(aes_zeroize_ctx) Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` Thomas Huth [this message]
2026-08-06  8:10   ` [PATCH v3 09/10] crypto: safexcel - Rework cleanup of sensitive structs in safexcel_aead_setkey Antoine Tenart
2026-08-06  8:18     ` Thomas Huth
2026-08-06 12:37       ` Antoine Tenart
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 10/10] crypto: safexcel - zeroize crypto_aes_ctx with __cleanup(aes_zeroize_ctx) Thomas Huth
2026-08-06  8:17   ` Antoine Tenart
2026-08-05 20:22 ` [PATCH v3 00/10] crypto: Provide a function for zeroizing crypto_aes_ctx Eric Biggers

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