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From: Antoine Tenart <atenart@kernel.org>
To: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	 "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	 Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 09/10] crypto: safexcel - Rework cleanup of sensitive structs in safexcel_aead_setkey
Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2026 14:37:12 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <anR_pXCLY4He5sj6@kwain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <7c456e18-0fff-4d06-a94d-66807b9777ad@redhat.com>

On Thu, Aug 06, 2026 at 10:18:12AM +0200, Thomas Huth wrote:
> On 06/08/2026 10.10, Antoine Tenart wrote:
> > On Wed, Aug 05, 2026 at 01:57:47PM +0200, Thomas Huth wrote:
> >> From: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
> >>
> >> The crypto_authenc_keys structure only contains pointers to keys,
> >> but not the key data itself. So explicitly clearing the structure
> >> at the end of safexcel_aead_setkey() is not really necessary.
> >>
> >> On the other hand, the crypto_aes_ctx might contain sensitive information,
> >> so this structure should be cleaned up at the end instead. Do this
> >> now via the new __cleanup(aes_zeroize_ctx) marker.
> > 
> > Looking at other crypto drivers it seems zeroing the key pointers was
> > explicitly added (sometimes later) and my impression is a good chunk of
> > the users are zeroing it. I don't know whether removing that is fine or
> > not, my limited understanding is that provides in-depth defense against
> > leaking were the key reside in memory. Would love to see an explicit
> > statement from someone with that knowledge.
> 
> It has been suggested by Eric here (unless I got him wrong):
> 
>   https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/20260804185402.GD2904385@google.com/
> 
> ... I should have maybe added that link to this patch description ...

Thanks for the link! Feel free to add it or not in the next revision.

> > (On the other hand mixing gotos and __cleanup is not advised but is that
> > an issue here? Or if zeroing crypto_authenc_keys is actually important
> > can we use __cleanup too?).
> > 
> >> --- a/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_cipher.c
> >> +++ b/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_cipher.c
> >> @@ -407,17 +407,17 @@ static int safexcel_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *ctfm, const u8 *key,
> >>   	struct safexcel_cipher_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
> >>   	struct safexcel_crypto_priv *priv = ctx->base.priv;
> >>   	struct crypto_authenc_keys keys;
> >> -	struct crypto_aes_ctx aes;
> >> -	int err = -EINVAL, i;
> >> +	struct crypto_aes_ctx aes __cleanup(aes_zeroize_ctx);
> >> +	int err, i;
> >>   	const char *alg;
> > 
> >> @@ -430,25 +430,25 @@ static int safexcel_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *ctfm, const u8 *key,
> >>   	case SAFEXCEL_DES:
> >>   		err = verify_aead_des_key(ctfm, keys.enckey, keys.enckeylen);
> >>   		if (unlikely(err))
> >> -			goto badkey;
> >> +			return err;
> >>   		break;
> >>   	case SAFEXCEL_3DES:
> >>   		err = verify_aead_des3_key(ctfm, keys.enckey, keys.enckeylen);
> >>   		if (unlikely(err))
> >> -			goto badkey;
> >> +			return err;
> >>   		break;
> >>   	case SAFEXCEL_AES:
> >>   		err = aes_expandkey(&aes, keys.enckey, keys.enckeylen);
> >>   		if (unlikely(err))
> >> -			goto badkey;
> >> +			return err;
> >>   		break;
> >>   	case SAFEXCEL_SM4:
> >>   		if (unlikely(keys.enckeylen != SM4_KEY_SIZE))
> >> -			goto badkey;
> >> +			return err;
> > 
> > 'err' is uninitialized here. You can use '-EINVAL' instead.
> Oops, good catch, thanks! I will fix it in the next version (assuming that 
> removing the memzero_explicit is ok and we'll keep this patch...)

  reply	other threads:[~2026-08-06 12:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-05 11:57 [PATCH v3 00/10] crypto: Provide a function for zeroizing crypto_aes_ctx Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 01/10] crypto: Provide a wrapper " Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 02/10] crypto: aspeed - clear the crypto_aes_ctx when done Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 03/10] crypto: inside-secure/eip93 " Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 04/10] crypto: padlock-aes " Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 05/10] crypto: sa2ul " Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 06/10] crypto: arm/aes-neonbs " Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 07/10] crypto: arm64/aes-neonbs " Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 08/10] crypto: qat - zeroize crypto_aes_ctx with __cleanup(aes_zeroize_ctx) Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 09/10] crypto: safexcel - Rework cleanup of sensitive structs in safexcel_aead_setkey Thomas Huth
2026-08-06  8:10   ` Antoine Tenart
2026-08-06  8:18     ` Thomas Huth
2026-08-06 12:37       ` Antoine Tenart [this message]
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 10/10] crypto: safexcel - zeroize crypto_aes_ctx with __cleanup(aes_zeroize_ctx) Thomas Huth
2026-08-06  8:17   ` Antoine Tenart
2026-08-05 20:22 ` [PATCH v3 00/10] crypto: Provide a function for zeroizing crypto_aes_ctx Eric Biggers

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