From: Chuck Zmudzinski <brchuckz@netscape.net>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: "Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>, "J�rgen Gro" <jgross@suse.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>, "Xin Li" <xin@zytor.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org,
x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/5] x86/its: explicitly manage permissions for ITS pages
Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2025 17:09:39 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <10895316-e3fd-4483-9986-a6bcb217b20a@netscape.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <aD8IeQLZUDvgoQZm@kernel.org>
On 6/3/25 10:36 AM, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 03, 2025 at 03:58:45PM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > On Tue, Jun 03, 2025 at 02:14:44PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> > > From: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>
> > >
> > > execmem_alloc() sets permissions differently depending on the kernel
> > > configuration, CPU support for PSE and whether a page is allocated
> > > before or after mark_rodata_ro().
> > >
> > > Add tracking for pages allocated for ITS when patching the core kernel
> > > and make sure the permissions for ITS pages are explicitly managed for
> > > both kernel and module allocations.
> > >
> > > Fixes: 872df34d7c51 ("x86/its: Use dynamic thunks for indirect branches")
> > > Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
> > > Co-developed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
> > > Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
> > > ---
> >
> > How about something like this on top?
>
> Works for me :)
>
> > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
> > @@ -121,7 +121,6 @@ struct its_array its_pages;
> > static void *__its_alloc(struct its_array *pages)
> > {
> > void *page __free(execmem) = execmem_alloc(EXECMEM_MODULE_TEXT, PAGE_SIZE);
> > -
> > if (!page)
> > return NULL;
> >
> > @@ -172,6 +171,9 @@ static void *its_init_thunk(void *thunk,
> >
> > static void its_pages_protect(struct its_array *pages)
> > {
> > + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX))
> > + return;
> > +
>
> But modules generally use STRICT_MODULE_RWX.
> Do you want to make the its pages stricter than normal module text?
>
> > for (int i = 0; i < pages->num; i++) {
> > void *page = pages->pages[i];
> > execmem_restore_rox(page, PAGE_SIZE);
> > @@ -180,8 +182,7 @@ static void its_pages_protect(struct its
> >
> > static void its_fini_core(void)
> > {
> > - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX))
> > - its_pages_protect(&its_pages);
> > + its_pages_protect(&its_pages);
> > kfree(its_pages.pages);
> > }
> >
> > @@ -207,8 +208,7 @@ void its_fini_mod(struct module *mod)
> > its_page = NULL;
> > mutex_unlock(&text_mutex);
> >
> > - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX))
> > - its_pages_protect(&mod->arch.its_pages);
> > + its_pages_protect(&mod->arch.its_pages);
> > }
>
I tested the 5-patch series without this 6th patch on top of 6.15.2 released yesterday
and it fixes a crash I get in 6.15.2 in my Xen PV dom0 without this patch set.
I also tried this 6th patch (including Mike's suggested removal of the three lines from
Peter's add-on 6th patch ) but I got a kernel panic in Xen PV dom0 with this extra patch.
Chuck Zmudzinski
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-06-11 21:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-06-03 11:14 [PATCH 0/5] Fixes for ITS mitigation and execmem Mike Rapoport
2025-06-03 11:14 ` [PATCH 1/5] x86/mm/pat: don't collapse pages without PSE set Mike Rapoport
2025-06-03 11:14 ` [PATCH 2/5] x86/Kconfig: only enable ROX cache in execmem when STRICT_MODULE_RWX is set Mike Rapoport
2025-06-11 9:30 ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Mike Rapoport (Microsoft)
2025-06-03 11:14 ` [PATCH 3/5] x86/its: move its_pages array to struct mod_arch_specific Mike Rapoport
2025-06-03 11:18 ` kernel test robot
2025-06-11 9:30 ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Mike Rapoport (Microsoft)
2025-06-03 11:14 ` [PATCH 4/5] x86/its: explicitly manage permissions for ITS pages Mike Rapoport
2025-06-03 13:58 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-06-03 14:36 ` Mike Rapoport
2025-06-03 14:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-06-11 21:09 ` Chuck Zmudzinski [this message]
2025-06-05 9:23 ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-06-11 9:30 ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra (Intel)
2025-06-03 11:14 ` [PATCH 5/5] Revert "mm/execmem: Unify early execmem_cache behaviour" Mike Rapoport
2025-06-11 9:30 ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Mike Rapoport (Microsoft)
2025-06-10 6:00 ` [PATCH 0/5] Fixes for ITS mitigation and execmem Jürgen Groß
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