Linux kernel -stable discussions
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: "Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>, "J�rgen Gro" <jgross@suse.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>, "Xin Li" <xin@zytor.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org,
	x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/5] x86/its: explicitly manage permissions for ITS pages
Date: Tue, 3 Jun 2025 17:36:41 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aD8IeQLZUDvgoQZm@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250603135845.GA38114@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net>

On Tue, Jun 03, 2025 at 03:58:45PM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 03, 2025 at 02:14:44PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> > From: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>
> > 
> > execmem_alloc() sets permissions differently depending on the kernel
> > configuration, CPU support for PSE and whether a page is allocated
> > before or after mark_rodata_ro().
> > 
> > Add tracking for pages allocated for ITS when patching the core kernel
> > and make sure the permissions for ITS pages are explicitly managed for
> > both kernel and module allocations.
> > 
> > Fixes: 872df34d7c51 ("x86/its: Use dynamic thunks for indirect branches")
> > Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
> > Co-developed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
> > ---
> 
> How about something like this on top?

Works for me :)

> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
> @@ -121,7 +121,6 @@ struct its_array its_pages;
>  static void *__its_alloc(struct its_array *pages)
>  {
>  	void *page __free(execmem) = execmem_alloc(EXECMEM_MODULE_TEXT, PAGE_SIZE);
> -
>  	if (!page)
>  		return NULL;
>  
> @@ -172,6 +171,9 @@ static void *its_init_thunk(void *thunk,
>  
>  static void its_pages_protect(struct its_array *pages)
>  {
> +	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX))
> +		return;
> +

But modules generally use STRICT_MODULE_RWX.
Do you want to make the its pages stricter than normal module text?

>  	for (int i = 0; i < pages->num; i++) {
>  		void *page = pages->pages[i];
>  		execmem_restore_rox(page, PAGE_SIZE);
> @@ -180,8 +182,7 @@ static void its_pages_protect(struct its
>  
>  static void its_fini_core(void)
>  {
> -	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX))
> -		its_pages_protect(&its_pages);
> +	its_pages_protect(&its_pages);
>  	kfree(its_pages.pages);
>  }
>  
> @@ -207,8 +208,7 @@ void its_fini_mod(struct module *mod)
>  	its_page = NULL;
>  	mutex_unlock(&text_mutex);
>  
> -	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX))
> -		its_pages_protect(&mod->arch.its_pages);
> +	its_pages_protect(&mod->arch.its_pages);
>  }

-- 
Sincerely yours,
Mike.

  reply	other threads:[~2025-06-03 14:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-06-03 11:14 [PATCH 0/5] Fixes for ITS mitigation and execmem Mike Rapoport
2025-06-03 11:14 ` [PATCH 1/5] x86/mm/pat: don't collapse pages without PSE set Mike Rapoport
2025-06-03 11:14 ` [PATCH 2/5] x86/Kconfig: only enable ROX cache in execmem when STRICT_MODULE_RWX is set Mike Rapoport
2025-06-11  9:30   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Mike Rapoport (Microsoft)
2025-06-03 11:14 ` [PATCH 3/5] x86/its: move its_pages array to struct mod_arch_specific Mike Rapoport
2025-06-03 11:18   ` kernel test robot
2025-06-11  9:30   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Mike Rapoport (Microsoft)
2025-06-03 11:14 ` [PATCH 4/5] x86/its: explicitly manage permissions for ITS pages Mike Rapoport
2025-06-03 13:58   ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-06-03 14:36     ` Mike Rapoport [this message]
2025-06-03 14:45       ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-06-11 21:09       ` Chuck Zmudzinski
2025-06-05  9:23   ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-06-11  9:30   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra (Intel)
2025-06-03 11:14 ` [PATCH 5/5] Revert "mm/execmem: Unify early execmem_cache behaviour" Mike Rapoport
2025-06-11  9:30   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Mike Rapoport (Microsoft)
2025-06-10  6:00 ` [PATCH 0/5] Fixes for ITS mitigation and execmem Jürgen Groß

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=aD8IeQLZUDvgoQZm@kernel.org \
    --to=rppt@kernel.org \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=jgross@suse.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    --cc=xin@zytor.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox