From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: "Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>, "J�rgen Gro" <jgross@suse.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>, "Xin Li" <xin@zytor.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org,
x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/5] x86/its: explicitly manage permissions for ITS pages
Date: Tue, 3 Jun 2025 17:36:41 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aD8IeQLZUDvgoQZm@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250603135845.GA38114@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net>
On Tue, Jun 03, 2025 at 03:58:45PM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 03, 2025 at 02:14:44PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> > From: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>
> >
> > execmem_alloc() sets permissions differently depending on the kernel
> > configuration, CPU support for PSE and whether a page is allocated
> > before or after mark_rodata_ro().
> >
> > Add tracking for pages allocated for ITS when patching the core kernel
> > and make sure the permissions for ITS pages are explicitly managed for
> > both kernel and module allocations.
> >
> > Fixes: 872df34d7c51 ("x86/its: Use dynamic thunks for indirect branches")
> > Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
> > Co-developed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
> > ---
>
> How about something like this on top?
Works for me :)
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
> @@ -121,7 +121,6 @@ struct its_array its_pages;
> static void *__its_alloc(struct its_array *pages)
> {
> void *page __free(execmem) = execmem_alloc(EXECMEM_MODULE_TEXT, PAGE_SIZE);
> -
> if (!page)
> return NULL;
>
> @@ -172,6 +171,9 @@ static void *its_init_thunk(void *thunk,
>
> static void its_pages_protect(struct its_array *pages)
> {
> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX))
> + return;
> +
But modules generally use STRICT_MODULE_RWX.
Do you want to make the its pages stricter than normal module text?
> for (int i = 0; i < pages->num; i++) {
> void *page = pages->pages[i];
> execmem_restore_rox(page, PAGE_SIZE);
> @@ -180,8 +182,7 @@ static void its_pages_protect(struct its
>
> static void its_fini_core(void)
> {
> - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX))
> - its_pages_protect(&its_pages);
> + its_pages_protect(&its_pages);
> kfree(its_pages.pages);
> }
>
> @@ -207,8 +208,7 @@ void its_fini_mod(struct module *mod)
> its_page = NULL;
> mutex_unlock(&text_mutex);
>
> - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX))
> - its_pages_protect(&mod->arch.its_pages);
> + its_pages_protect(&mod->arch.its_pages);
> }
--
Sincerely yours,
Mike.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-06-03 14:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-06-03 11:14 [PATCH 0/5] Fixes for ITS mitigation and execmem Mike Rapoport
2025-06-03 11:14 ` [PATCH 1/5] x86/mm/pat: don't collapse pages without PSE set Mike Rapoport
2025-06-03 11:14 ` [PATCH 2/5] x86/Kconfig: only enable ROX cache in execmem when STRICT_MODULE_RWX is set Mike Rapoport
2025-06-11 9:30 ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Mike Rapoport (Microsoft)
2025-06-03 11:14 ` [PATCH 3/5] x86/its: move its_pages array to struct mod_arch_specific Mike Rapoport
2025-06-03 11:18 ` kernel test robot
2025-06-11 9:30 ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Mike Rapoport (Microsoft)
2025-06-03 11:14 ` [PATCH 4/5] x86/its: explicitly manage permissions for ITS pages Mike Rapoport
2025-06-03 13:58 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-06-03 14:36 ` Mike Rapoport [this message]
2025-06-03 14:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-06-11 21:09 ` Chuck Zmudzinski
2025-06-05 9:23 ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-06-11 9:30 ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra (Intel)
2025-06-03 11:14 ` [PATCH 5/5] Revert "mm/execmem: Unify early execmem_cache behaviour" Mike Rapoport
2025-06-11 9:30 ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Mike Rapoport (Microsoft)
2025-06-10 6:00 ` [PATCH 0/5] Fixes for ITS mitigation and execmem Jürgen Groß
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