Linux kernel -stable discussions
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Jürgen Groß" <jgross@suse.com>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org,
	x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/5] Fixes for ITS mitigation and execmem
Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2025 08:00:37 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <3faedf73-208b-4d16-9c4e-44eadafb9958@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250603111446.2609381-1-rppt@kernel.org>


[-- Attachment #1.1.1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2131 bytes --]

On 03.06.25 13:14, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> From: "Mike Rapoport (Microsoft)" <rppt@kernel.org>
> 
> Hi,
> 
> Jürgen Groß reported some bugs in interaction of ITS mitigation with
> execmem [1] when running on a Xen PV guest.
> 
> These patches fix the issue by moving all the permissions management of
> ITS memory allocated from execmem into ITS code.
> 
> I didn't test on a real Xen PV guest, but I emulated !PSE variant by
> force-disabling the ROX cache in x86::execmem_arch_setup().
> 
> Peter, I took liberty to put your SoB in the patch that actually
> implements the execmem permissions management in ITS, please let me know
> if I need to update something about the authorship.
> 
> The patches are against v6.15.
> They are also available in git:
> https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rppt/linux.git/log/?h=its-execmem/v1
> 
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250528123557.12847-2-jgross@suse.com/
> 
> Juergen Gross (1):
>    x86/mm/pat: don't collapse pages without PSE set
> 
> Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) (3):
>    x86/Kconfig: only enable ROX cache in execmem when STRICT_MODULE_RWX is set
>    x86/its: move its_pages array to struct mod_arch_specific
>    Revert "mm/execmem: Unify early execmem_cache behaviour"
> 
> Peter Zijlstra (Intel) (1):
>    x86/its: explicitly manage permissions for ITS pages
> 
>   arch/x86/Kconfig              |  2 +-
>   arch/x86/include/asm/module.h |  8 ++++
>   arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 89 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
>   arch/x86/mm/init_32.c         |  3 --
>   arch/x86/mm/init_64.c         |  3 --
>   arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c  |  3 ++
>   include/linux/execmem.h       |  8 +---
>   include/linux/module.h        |  5 --
>   mm/execmem.c                  | 40 ++--------------
>   9 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-)
> 
> 
> base-commit: 0ff41df1cb268fc69e703a08a57ee14ae967d0ca

I have tested this series to work in a Xen PV dom0 with ITS mitigation
being active. I didn't apply any of Peter's suggested add-ons.

Tested-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>


Juergen

[-- Attachment #1.1.2: OpenPGP public key --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-keys, Size: 3743 bytes --]

[-- Attachment #2: OpenPGP digital signature --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 495 bytes --]

      parent reply	other threads:[~2025-06-10  6:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-06-03 11:14 [PATCH 0/5] Fixes for ITS mitigation and execmem Mike Rapoport
2025-06-03 11:14 ` [PATCH 1/5] x86/mm/pat: don't collapse pages without PSE set Mike Rapoport
2025-06-03 11:14 ` [PATCH 2/5] x86/Kconfig: only enable ROX cache in execmem when STRICT_MODULE_RWX is set Mike Rapoport
2025-06-11  9:30   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Mike Rapoport (Microsoft)
2025-06-03 11:14 ` [PATCH 3/5] x86/its: move its_pages array to struct mod_arch_specific Mike Rapoport
2025-06-03 11:18   ` kernel test robot
2025-06-11  9:30   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Mike Rapoport (Microsoft)
2025-06-03 11:14 ` [PATCH 4/5] x86/its: explicitly manage permissions for ITS pages Mike Rapoport
2025-06-03 13:58   ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-06-03 14:36     ` Mike Rapoport
2025-06-03 14:45       ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-06-11 21:09       ` Chuck Zmudzinski
2025-06-05  9:23   ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-06-11  9:30   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra (Intel)
2025-06-03 11:14 ` [PATCH 5/5] Revert "mm/execmem: Unify early execmem_cache behaviour" Mike Rapoport
2025-06-11  9:30   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Mike Rapoport (Microsoft)
2025-06-10  6:00 ` Jürgen Groß [this message]

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=3faedf73-208b-4d16-9c4e-44eadafb9958@suse.com \
    --to=jgross@suse.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=rppt@kernel.org \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    --cc=xin@zytor.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox