From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: "Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>, "J�rgen Gro" <jgross@suse.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>, "Xin Li" <xin@zytor.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org,
x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/5] x86/its: explicitly manage permissions for ITS pages
Date: Tue, 3 Jun 2025 15:58:45 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250603135845.GA38114@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250603111446.2609381-5-rppt@kernel.org>
On Tue, Jun 03, 2025 at 02:14:44PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> From: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>
>
> execmem_alloc() sets permissions differently depending on the kernel
> configuration, CPU support for PSE and whether a page is allocated
> before or after mark_rodata_ro().
>
> Add tracking for pages allocated for ITS when patching the core kernel
> and make sure the permissions for ITS pages are explicitly managed for
> both kernel and module allocations.
>
> Fixes: 872df34d7c51 ("x86/its: Use dynamic thunks for indirect branches")
> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
> Co-developed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
> ---
How about something like this on top?
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -121,7 +121,6 @@ struct its_array its_pages;
static void *__its_alloc(struct its_array *pages)
{
void *page __free(execmem) = execmem_alloc(EXECMEM_MODULE_TEXT, PAGE_SIZE);
-
if (!page)
return NULL;
@@ -172,6 +171,9 @@ static void *its_init_thunk(void *thunk,
static void its_pages_protect(struct its_array *pages)
{
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX))
+ return;
+
for (int i = 0; i < pages->num; i++) {
void *page = pages->pages[i];
execmem_restore_rox(page, PAGE_SIZE);
@@ -180,8 +182,7 @@ static void its_pages_protect(struct its
static void its_fini_core(void)
{
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX))
- its_pages_protect(&its_pages);
+ its_pages_protect(&its_pages);
kfree(its_pages.pages);
}
@@ -207,8 +208,7 @@ void its_fini_mod(struct module *mod)
its_page = NULL;
mutex_unlock(&text_mutex);
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX))
- its_pages_protect(&mod->arch.its_pages);
+ its_pages_protect(&mod->arch.its_pages);
}
void its_free_mod(struct module *mod)
@@ -222,40 +222,29 @@ void its_free_mod(struct module *mod)
}
kfree(mod->arch.its_pages.pages);
}
+#endif /* CONFIG_MODULES */
-static void *its_alloc_mod(void)
+static void *its_alloc(void)
{
- void *page = __its_alloc(&its_mod->arch.its_pages);
-
- if (page)
- execmem_make_temp_rw(page, PAGE_SIZE);
+ struct its_array *pages = &its_pages;
+ void *page;
- return page;
-}
-#endif /* CONFIG_MODULES */
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE
+ if (its_mod)
+ pages = &its_mod->arch.its_pages;
+#endif
-static void *its_alloc_core(void)
-{
- void *page = __its_alloc(&its_pages);
+ page = __its_alloc(pages);
+ if (!page)
+ return NULL;
- if (page) {
- execmem_make_temp_rw(page, PAGE_SIZE);
+ execmem_make_temp_rw(page, PAGE_SIZE);
+ if (pages == &its_pages)
set_memory_x((unsigned long)page, 1);
- }
return page;
}
-static void *its_alloc(void)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
- if (its_mod)
- return its_alloc_mod();
-#endif /* CONFIG_MODULES */
-
- return its_alloc_core();
-}
-
static void *its_allocate_thunk(int reg)
{
int size = 3 + (reg / 8);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-06-03 13:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-06-03 11:14 [PATCH 0/5] Fixes for ITS mitigation and execmem Mike Rapoport
2025-06-03 11:14 ` [PATCH 1/5] x86/mm/pat: don't collapse pages without PSE set Mike Rapoport
2025-06-03 11:14 ` [PATCH 2/5] x86/Kconfig: only enable ROX cache in execmem when STRICT_MODULE_RWX is set Mike Rapoport
2025-06-11 9:30 ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Mike Rapoport (Microsoft)
2025-06-03 11:14 ` [PATCH 3/5] x86/its: move its_pages array to struct mod_arch_specific Mike Rapoport
2025-06-03 11:18 ` kernel test robot
2025-06-11 9:30 ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Mike Rapoport (Microsoft)
2025-06-03 11:14 ` [PATCH 4/5] x86/its: explicitly manage permissions for ITS pages Mike Rapoport
2025-06-03 13:58 ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2025-06-03 14:36 ` Mike Rapoport
2025-06-03 14:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-06-11 21:09 ` Chuck Zmudzinski
2025-06-05 9:23 ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-06-11 9:30 ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra (Intel)
2025-06-03 11:14 ` [PATCH 5/5] Revert "mm/execmem: Unify early execmem_cache behaviour" Mike Rapoport
2025-06-11 9:30 ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Mike Rapoport (Microsoft)
2025-06-10 6:00 ` [PATCH 0/5] Fixes for ITS mitigation and execmem Jürgen Groß
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