* Re: 098bcea71b8d security relevant [not found] ` <2026111606-uneaten-passport-9d89@gregkh> @ 2026-11-16 10:49 ` Petr Tesarik 2026-11-16 10:55 ` Greg KH 0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread From: Petr Tesarik @ 2026-11-16 10:49 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Greg KH; +Cc: Borislav Petkov, Andrea Mattiazzo, cve, stable On Mon, 16 Nov 2026 10:54:47 +0100 Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > On Mon, Nov 16, 2026 at 09:41:33AM +0100, Petr Tesarik wrote: > > On Fri, 13 Nov 2026 22:24:19 -0800 > > Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> wrote: > > > > > On Fri, Nov 13, 2026 at 02:30:48PM -0500, Greg KH wrote: > > > > System configurations do not seem to meet the cve.org definition of > > > > vulnerability, right? > > > > > > Yah, a system without any microcode loaded by the BIOS is not the common > > > situation but rather an exception. > > > > One of the systems used by SUSE Performance Team boots the kernel > > without applying any microcode patch first. We assumed that the > > microcode from early initrd was applied in that case, but it was > > applied only to BSP, leaving all other CPUs unpatched. > > > > Thank you for explaining to me that failing to apply a security fix > > (i.e. failing to load the available microcode update) is not security > > relevant, because the admin should know better and update their BIOS > > instead. > > I'm not saying it is not security relevant, only that it does not match > the definition of what cve.org considers a vulnerability and so is > allowed to have a CVE id assigned to. Many such security things like > this fall into this category, as you know. > > > I still do not like the fact that the Linux kernel then lies about the > > vulnerability status under /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/, > > because those files are based solely on data from BSP; > > cpu_show_common() contains: > > > > if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(bug)) > > return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n"); > > > > This gives the admin a false sense of security, but I agree it can be > > perceived as a configuration issue: The admin should not rely on that > > data, because they can simply check /proc/cpuinfo to see for themselves > > that all APs actually do not have any microcode applied to them, and > > then go read AMD errata to understand which CPU vulnerabilities are > > mitigated with a microcode update. > > So is this bug not fixed? If so, it probably should be. It is fixed with 098bcea71b8d (by correctly updating the AP microcode). I guess the commit should be included in stable branches even if it is not a security fix. Petr T ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* Re: 098bcea71b8d security relevant 2026-11-16 10:49 ` 098bcea71b8d security relevant Petr Tesarik @ 2026-11-16 10:55 ` Greg KH 0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread From: Greg KH @ 2026-11-16 10:55 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Petr Tesarik; +Cc: Borislav Petkov, Andrea Mattiazzo, cve, stable On Mon, Nov 16, 2026 at 11:49:02AM +0100, Petr Tesarik wrote: > On Mon, 16 Nov 2026 10:54:47 +0100 > Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > > On Mon, Nov 16, 2026 at 09:41:33AM +0100, Petr Tesarik wrote: > > > On Fri, 13 Nov 2026 22:24:19 -0800 > > > Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> wrote: > > > > > > > On Fri, Nov 13, 2026 at 02:30:48PM -0500, Greg KH wrote: > > > > > System configurations do not seem to meet the cve.org definition of > > > > > vulnerability, right? > > > > > > > > Yah, a system without any microcode loaded by the BIOS is not the common > > > > situation but rather an exception. > > > > > > One of the systems used by SUSE Performance Team boots the kernel > > > without applying any microcode patch first. We assumed that the > > > microcode from early initrd was applied in that case, but it was > > > applied only to BSP, leaving all other CPUs unpatched. > > > > > > Thank you for explaining to me that failing to apply a security fix > > > (i.e. failing to load the available microcode update) is not security > > > relevant, because the admin should know better and update their BIOS > > > instead. > > > > I'm not saying it is not security relevant, only that it does not match > > the definition of what cve.org considers a vulnerability and so is > > allowed to have a CVE id assigned to. Many such security things like > > this fall into this category, as you know. > > > > > I still do not like the fact that the Linux kernel then lies about the > > > vulnerability status under /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/, > > > because those files are based solely on data from BSP; > > > cpu_show_common() contains: > > > > > > if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(bug)) > > > return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n"); > > > > > > This gives the admin a false sense of security, but I agree it can be > > > perceived as a configuration issue: The admin should not rely on that > > > data, because they can simply check /proc/cpuinfo to see for themselves > > > that all APs actually do not have any microcode applied to them, and > > > then go read AMD errata to understand which CPU vulnerabilities are > > > mitigated with a microcode update. > > > > So is this bug not fixed? If so, it probably should be. > > It is fixed with 098bcea71b8d (by correctly updating the AP microcode). > I guess the commit should be included in stable branches even if it is > not a security fix. It is in the 6.18.y and 7.2 and newer kernels already. If it needs to go to older kernel releases, let stable@vger.kernel.org know with a working backport and they will be glad to queue it up. thanks, greg k-h ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2026-11-16 10:55 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
[not found] <c78fbc1b-b190-4111-a6a8-f456b5c85a51@suse.de>
[not found] ` <2026111326-acre-backhand-a1d5@gregkh>
[not found] ` <20261113202510.2107c905@mordecai>
[not found] ` <2026111303-colonial-wrongly-7d9c@gregkh>
[not found] ` <20261114062419.GBavf-kxerE_YDukB7@fat_crate.local>
[not found] ` <20261116094133.4aa496f0@mordecai>
[not found] ` <2026111606-uneaten-passport-9d89@gregkh>
2026-11-16 10:49 ` 098bcea71b8d security relevant Petr Tesarik
2026-11-16 10:55 ` Greg KH
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox