From: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
To: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: "Romain Caritey" <Romain.Caritey@microchip.com>,
"Alistair Francis" <alistair.francis@wdc.com>,
"Connor Davis" <connojdavis@gmail.com>,
"Andrew Cooper" <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
"Anthony PERARD" <anthony.perard@vates.tech>,
"Michal Orzel" <michal.orzel@amd.com>,
"Julien Grall" <julien@xen.org>,
"Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>,
"Stefano Stabellini" <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 16/27] xen/riscv: implement IRQ mapping for device passthrough
Date: Mon, 20 Apr 2026 13:39:13 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <00fa439d-0327-4c0c-960d-a810820a6e83@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <a7a4e8c9-d053-4ca7-ac9c-f43ddccf9151@suse.com>
On 4/16/26 2:51 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 14.04.2026 13:29, Oleksii Kurochko wrote:
>> On 4/2/26 2:22 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>> On 10.03.2026 18:08, Oleksii Kurochko wrote:
>>>> --- a/xen/arch/riscv/include/asm/setup.h
>>>> +++ b/xen/arch/riscv/include/asm/setup.h
>>>> @@ -5,6 +5,10 @@
>>>>
>>>> #include <xen/types.h>
>>>>
>>>> +struct domain;
>>>> +struct dt_device_node;
>>>> +struct rangeset;
>>>> +
>>>> #define max_init_domid (0)
>>>>
>>>> void setup_mm(void);
>>>> @@ -13,6 +17,19 @@ void copy_from_paddr(void *dst, paddr_t paddr, unsigned long len);
>>>>
>>>> void init_csr_masks(void);
>>>>
>>>> +/* TODO: move somewhere to common header? */
>>>
>>> Counter question: Why ...
>>>
>>>> +/*
>>>> + * Retrieves the interrupts configuration from a device tree node and maps
>>>> + * those interrupts to the target domain.
>>>> + *
>>>> + * Returns:
>>>> + * < 0 error
>>>> + * 0 success
>>>> + */
>>>> +int map_device_irqs_to_domain(struct domain *d, struct dt_device_node *dev,
>>>> + bool need_mapping,
>>>> + struct rangeset *irq_ranges);
>>>
>>> ... is this not an inline function, when ...
>>>
>>>> --- a/xen/arch/riscv/intc.c
>>>> +++ b/xen/arch/riscv/intc.c
>>>> @@ -79,3 +79,11 @@ int __init intc_make_domu_dt_node(const struct kernel_info *kinfo)
>>>>
>>>> return -ENOSYS;
>>>> }
>>>> +
>>>> +int map_device_irqs_to_domain(struct domain *d, struct dt_device_node *dev,
>>>> + bool need_mapping,
>>>> + struct rangeset *irq_ranges)
>>>> +{
>>>> + return d->arch.vintc->ops->map_device_irqs_to_domain(d, dev, need_mapping,
>>>> + irq_ranges);
>>>> +}
>>>
>>> ... it's merely a wrapper around an indirect function call? And then the
>>> function isn't used anywhere anyway.
>>
>> It is used by dom0less common code and it is a wrapper because Arm has
>> different implementation and Arm doesn't have
>> map_device_irqs_to_domain() in its virtual interrupt controller operations.
>
> But the question wasn't why this is a wrapper, but why this wrapper isn't an
> inline function.
Got you, it could be really inline.
>
>>>> +int vaplic_map_device_irqs_to_domain(struct domain *d,
>>>> + struct dt_device_node *dev,
>>>> + bool need_mapping,
>>>> + struct rangeset *irq_ranges)
>>>> +{
>>>> + unsigned int i, nirq;
>>>> + int res, irq;
>>>> + struct dt_raw_irq rirq;
>>>> + uint32_t *auth_irq_bmp = d->arch.vintc->private;
>>>> + unsigned int reg_num;
>>>> +
>>>> + nirq = dt_number_of_irq(dev);
>>>> +
>>>> + /* Give permission and map IRQs */
>>>> + for ( i = 0; i < nirq; i++ )
>>>> + {
>>>> + res = dt_device_get_raw_irq(dev, i, &rirq);
>>>> + if ( res )
>>>> + {
>>>> + printk(XENLOG_ERR "Unable to retrieve irq %u for %s\n",
>>>> + i, dt_node_full_name(dev));
>>>> + return res;
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>> + /*
>>>> + * Don't map IRQ that have no physical meaning
>>>> + * ie: IRQ whose controller is not APLIC/IMSIC/PLIC.
>>>> + */
>>>> + if ( rirq.controller != dt_interrupt_controller )
>>>> + {
>>>> + dt_dprintk("irq %u not connected to primary controller."
>>>> + "Connected to %s\n", i,
>>>> + dt_node_full_name(rirq.controller));
>>>> + continue;
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>> + irq = platform_get_irq(dev, i);
>>>> + if ( irq < 0 )
>>>> + {
>>>> + printk("Unable to get irq %u for %s\n", i, dt_node_full_name(dev));
>>>> + return irq;
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>> + res = irq_permit_access(d, irq);
>>>> + if ( res )
>>>> + {
>>>> + printk(XENLOG_ERR "Unable to permit to %pd access to IRQ %u\n", d,
>>>> + irq);
>>>
>>> This time the other way around: %d please with plain int. (Again at least
>>> once further down.)
>>>
>>>> + return res;
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>> + reg_num = irq / APLIC_NUM_REGS;
>>>> +
>>>> + if ( is_irq_shared_among_domains(d, irq) )
>>>> + {
>>>> + printk("%s: Shared IRQ isn't supported\n", __func__);
>>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>> + auth_irq_bmp[reg_num] |= BIT(irq % APLIC_NUM_REGS, U);
>>>
>>> ... all of this leaves me with the impression that IRQ numbering isn't really
>>> virtualized. IRQs are merely split into groups, one group per domain (and
>>> maybe some unused). How are you going to fit in truly virtual IRQs?
>>
>> What do you mean by truly virtual IRQs?
>
> Ones where no aspects are represented by any piece of hardware.
>
>> I can't totally agree that the current approach isn't use virtual IRQs,
>> yes, they are 1:1 mapped but on the other side Xen is responsible to
>> give an IRQ number for guest's device and Xen is responsible that guest
>> isn't trying to reach IRQ which not belongs to it.
>
> In a non-virtualized environment I expect IRQs are going to be "sparse"
> (i.e. with perhaps large blocks of items used elsewhere). If you had
> proper translation of IRQ numbers, the same could be true for your
> guests.
Partial FDT, which is used to tell which device be passthroughed to
guest, is using physical IRQ number (which I am just considering for
simplicity to be 1:1 mapped to virtual IRQ number). So if we have the
following configuration:
Physical (bare-metal) IRQ layout is sparse:
IRQ 5 → UART -> domU0
IRQ 23 → Ethernet -> domU1
IRQ 47 → PCIe -> domU0
IRQ 100 → Storage -> domU1
(gaps everywhere, driven by hardware wiring)
For such configuration we will have for each domain auth_irq_bmp[] which
contains:
IRQ 5 and IRQ47 for domU0
and
IRQ 23 and IRQ 100 for domU1
And here vIRQ5 = pIRQ5, vIRQ47 = pIRQ47 and so on. auth_irq_bmp just
transform xIRQ number to bit position which it will have in real APLIC
register. Just as an example, lets take vIRQ5 and vIRQ47.
As reading or writing register setie[k] reads or potentially modifies
the enable bits for interrupt sources k × 32 through k × 32 + 31. For an
implemented interrupt source i within that range, the enable bit for
source i corresponds with register bit (i mod 32).
So for:
- vIRQ5 == pIRQ5 we have to set bit 5 in setie[0]
- vIRQ47 == pIRQ47 we have to set bit 15 in setie[1]
Probably it was not the best idea to declare auth_irq_bmp as it will
look in h/w and maybe just 'bool auth_irq_bmp[1024]' would be more clearer.
So irqs number are still stay "sparsed" in guest.
>
>>>> + dt_dprintk(" - IRQ: %u\n", irq);
>>>> +
>>>> + if ( irq_ranges )
>>>> + {
>>>> + res = rangeset_add_singleton(irq_ranges, irq);
>>>> + if ( res )
>>>> + return res;
>>>> + }
>>>
>>> What is irq_ranges?
>>
>> IIUC based on Arm code irq_ranges is an optional output accumulator, the
>> caller allocates and passes it in when it needs to track which IRQs were
>> mapped (overlay use case), or passes NULL when that tracking is not needed.
>>
>> I added here as map_device_irqs_to_domain() is called from the common
>> code and so maybe one day someone will decide to pass irq_ranges to this
>> functions. At the moment, for RISC-V it is the only one user of
>> map_device_irqs_to_domain() and it passes NULL.
>
> Simply assert then that it's NULL?
Won't BUG_ON() be better here as it BUG_ON() macros is always defined
and doesn't matter if release or debug build are used.
Or maybe you meant:
if ( irq_ranges )
assert_failed("irq_ranges arg isn't supported\n");
>
>>>> @@ -34,6 +142,7 @@ static int __init cf_check vcpu_vaplic_init(struct vcpu *v)
>>>>
>>>> static const struct vintc_ops vaplic_ops = {
>>>> .vcpu_init = vcpu_vaplic_init,
>>>> + .map_device_irqs_to_domain = vaplic_map_device_irqs_to_domain,
>>>> };
>>>
>>> What about the inverse function, needed for domain cleanup?
>>
>> I planned to add it when it will be really needed. At the momemnt, I
>> don't have such use cases.
>
> I.e. if any domain needs re-starting, the entire system needs rebooting?
> Recall that "dom0less" is slightly misleading a name, as it only allows
> there to not be a Dom0. One can be there, and hence re-starting a crashed
> domain ought to be possible. For that, you need to correctly clean up
> after the crashed one.
I haven't investigated yet what will be code path to do a reboot or
re-start crashed domain but based on an implementation of
vaplic_map_device_irqs_to_domain() as nothing is allocated there and
filling of auth_irq_bmp[] is happening there which will stay the same
after reboot if it is just re-used or it will be allocated new one if
crashed domain will just recreate this domain from scratch. So it seems
like it is enough to have only map_device_irqs_to_domain().
~ Oleksii
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-20 11:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 123+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-10 17:08 [PATCH v1 00/27] [RISC-V] Introduce enablemenant of dom0less Oleksii Kurochko
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 01/27] xen/riscv: Implement ARCH_PAGING_MEMPOOL Oleksii Kurochko
2026-03-11 8:18 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-09 10:31 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 02/27] xen/riscv: Implement construct_domain() Oleksii Kurochko
2026-03-24 9:37 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-09 11:26 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-09 12:58 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-09 13:39 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-09 14:01 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-14 6:26 ` Julien Grall
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 03/27] xen/riscv: implement prerequisites for domain_create() Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-01 12:57 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-09 11:55 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 04/27] xen/riscv: rework G-stage mode handling Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-01 13:19 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-07 10:47 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-07 13:43 ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 05/27] xen/riscv: introduce guest riscv,isa string Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-01 13:49 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-10 10:24 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-10 10:50 ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 06/27] xen/riscv: implement make_cpus_node() Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-01 14:11 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-10 11:19 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-10 12:02 ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 07/27] xen/riscv: implement make_timer_node() Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-01 14:24 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-10 11:54 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 08/27] xen/riscv: implement make_arch_nodes() Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-01 14:29 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-10 13:32 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 09/27] xen/riscv: implement make_intc_domU_node() Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-01 14:38 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-10 14:00 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-10 14:23 ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 10/27] xen/riscv: generate IMSIC DT node for guest domains Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-01 15:05 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-10 15:40 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-16 11:42 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-17 8:10 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-17 13:50 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-17 14:01 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-17 14:10 ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 11/27] xen/riscv: create APLIC " Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-01 15:16 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-13 8:43 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-13 8:48 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-16 11:49 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-17 9:01 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-17 13:53 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-17 14:27 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 12/27] xen/riscv: introduce aia_init() and aia_available() Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-02 9:00 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-13 9:32 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-16 12:06 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-17 9:37 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 13/27] xen/riscv: add basic VGEIN management for AIA guests Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-02 10:03 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-13 14:42 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-16 12:21 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-17 11:34 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-17 14:07 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-20 7:52 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 14/27] xen/riscv: introduce per-vCPU IMSIC state Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-02 11:31 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-14 9:22 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-16 12:31 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-16 12:31 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-17 13:47 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-20 8:29 ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 15/27] xen/riscv: add very early virtual APLIC (vAPLIC) initialization support Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-02 11:58 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-14 10:27 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-16 12:42 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-20 10:25 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-20 10:47 ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 16/27] xen/riscv: implement IRQ mapping for device passthrough Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-02 12:22 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-14 11:29 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-16 12:51 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-20 11:39 ` Oleksii Kurochko [this message]
2026-04-20 13:45 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-20 14:34 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-20 15:21 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-20 15:31 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 17/27] xen/riscv: add missing APLIC register offsets, masks to asm/aplic.h Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-02 12:51 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-14 11:42 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 18/27] xen/riscv: add vaplic access check Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-02 13:10 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-14 11:45 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-15 7:35 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-16 13:01 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-20 11:53 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-20 12:03 ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 19/27] xen/riscv: emulate guest writes to virtual APLIC MMIO Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-02 14:18 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-14 16:04 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-16 13:19 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-20 15:02 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-20 15:27 ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 20/27] xen/riscv: emulate guest reads from " Oleksii Kurochko
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 21/27] xen/riscv: introduce (de)initialization helpers for vINTC Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-02 14:58 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-15 7:50 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-16 13:23 ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 22/27] xen/riscv: implement init_intc_phandle() Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-02 15:00 ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 23/27] xen/riscv: call do_initcalls() in start_xen() Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-02 15:01 ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 24/27] xen/riscv: init rcu Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-02 15:03 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-14 11:50 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 25/27] xen/riscv: setup system domains Oleksii Kurochko
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 26/27] xen/riscv: provide init_vuart() Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-07 13:52 ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-10 17:09 ` [PATCH v1 27/27] xen/riscv: add initial dom0less infrastructure support Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-07 14:11 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-15 10:00 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-16 14:13 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-15 10:28 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-16 14:15 ` Jan Beulich
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