From: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
To: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: "Romain Caritey" <Romain.Caritey@microchip.com>,
"Alistair Francis" <alistair.francis@wdc.com>,
"Connor Davis" <connojdavis@gmail.com>,
"Andrew Cooper" <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
"Anthony PERARD" <anthony.perard@vates.tech>,
"Michal Orzel" <michal.orzel@amd.com>,
"Julien Grall" <julien@xen.org>,
"Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>,
"Stefano Stabellini" <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 19/27] xen/riscv: emulate guest writes to virtual APLIC MMIO
Date: Mon, 20 Apr 2026 17:02:13 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <276c68cb-51c0-4775-8b70-3af80d0d0f27@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <910f0720-1e83-4b0d-a1bd-09799d6f8264@suse.com>
On 4/16/26 3:19 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 14.04.2026 18:04, Oleksii Kurochko wrote:
>> On 4/2/26 4:18 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>> On 10.03.2026 18:08, Oleksii Kurochko wrote:
>>>> +static int cf_check vaplic_emulate_store(const struct vcpu *vcpu,
>>>> + unsigned long addr, uint32_t value)
>>>> +{
>>>> + struct vaplic *vaplic = to_vaplic(vcpu->domain->arch.vintc);
>>>> + struct aplic_priv *priv = vaplic->base.info->private;
>>>> + uint32_t offset = addr & APLIC_REG_OFFSET_MASK;
>>>
>>> See ./CODING_STYLE as to uses of fixed-width types.
>>>
>>>> + unsigned long aplic_addr = addr - priv->paddr_start;
>>>> + const uint32_t *auth_irq_bmp = vcpu->domain->arch.vintc->private;
>>>> +
>>>> + switch ( offset )
>>>> + {
>>>> + case APLIC_SETIP_BASE ... APLIC_SETIP_LAST:
>>>
>>> And (taking this just as example) any misaligned accesses falling in this range
>>> are fine?
>>
>> Do you mean something like 0x1C02 instead of 0x1C00 or 0x1C04?
>
> Yes.
>
>>>> + /*
>>>> + * As sourcecfg register starts from 1:
>>>> + * 0x0000 domaincfg
>>>> + * 0x0004 sourcecfg[1]
>>>> + * 0x0008 sourcecfg[2]
>>>> + * ...
>>>> + * 0x0FFC sourcecfg[1023]
>>>> + * It is necessary to calculate an interrupt number by substracting
>>>
>>> Nit: subtracting
>>>
>>>> + * of APLIC_DOMAINCFG instead of APLIC_SOURCECFG_BASE.
>>>> + */
>>>> + if ( !AUTH_IRQ_BIT(regval_to_irqn(offset - APLIC_DOMAINCFG)) )
>>>> + /* interrupt not enabled, ignore it */
>>>
>>> Throughout the series: Please adhere to ./CODING_STYLE.
>>>
>>>> + return 0;
>>>> +
>>>> + break;
>>>
>>> And any value is okay to write?
>>
>> No, it should be in a range
>> [APLIC_SOURCECFG_SM_INACTIVE,APLIC_SOURCECFG_SM_LEVEL_LOW].
>>
>> I will add the check before break:
>> if ( value > APLIC_SOURCECFG_SM_LEVEL_LOW )
>> {
>> gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING,
>> "value(%u) is incorrect for sourcecfg register\n",
>> value);
>> value = APLIC_SOURCECFG_SM_INACTIVE;
>> }
>
> And why would writing APLIC_SOURCECFG_SM_INACTIVE be any better, when
> that's not what the guest wanted? Simply ignore such writes, unless the
> spec mandates specific behavior for out-of-range avlues?
The spec doesn't mandate specific behavior for out-of-range values but I
thought it would be better to make irq inactive instead of just ignoring
so it won't affect somehow potential occurrence of this interrupt.
>
>>>> + case APLIC_TARGET_BASE ... APLIC_TARGET_LAST:
>>>> + struct vcpu *target_vcpu = NULL;
>>>> +
>>>> + /*
>>>> + * Look at vaplic_emulate_load() for explanation why
>>>> + * APLIC_GENMSI is substracted.
>>>> + */
>>>
>>> There's no vaplic_emulate_load() - how can I go look there?
>>
>> It is introduced in the next patch.
>
> As before - it should be possible to review patch series strictly
> sequentially. Further, what if this patch gets committed, and the other
> gets delayed by several months?
Got you, I will re-order patches.
>
>>>> + if ( !AUTH_IRQ_BIT(regval_to_irqn(offset - APLIC_GENMSI)) )
>>>> + /* interrupt not enabled, ignore it */
>>>> + return 0;
>>>> +
>>>> + for ( int i = 0; i < vcpu->domain->max_vcpus; i++ )
>>>
>>> unsigned int
>>>
>>>> + {
>>>> + struct vcpu *v = vcpu->domain->vcpu[i];
>>>> +
>>>> + if ( v->vcpu_id == (value >> APLIC_TARGET_HART_IDX_SHIFT) )
>>>> + {
>>>> + target_vcpu = v;
>>>> + break;
>>>> + }
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>> + ASSERT(target_vcpu);
>>>
>>> What guarantees the pointer to be non-NULL? The incoming value can be
>>> arbitrary, afaict.
>>
>> I didn't understand your point. It is just checking that target_vcpu has
>> been found. If after for() loop the value of target_vcpu is still NULL
>> then something wrong in Xen.
>
> If that's true, then the assertion is fine to have. I can't help the
> impression though that a guest could pick a value such that you can't
> possibly find the target vCPU. Asserting on guest controlled input is
> not okay, as was said several times before.
I will then do domain_crash() that as a value is incorrect in case if
target_vcpu is NULL, I missed that guest could put wrong value.
>
>>>> + if ( !(vaplic->regs.domaincfg & APLIC_DOMAINCFG_DM) )
>>>> + {
>>>> + vaplic_dm_update_target(cpuid_to_hartid(target_vcpu->processor),
>>>> + &value);
>>>> + }
>>>> + else
>>>> + vaplic_update_target(priv->imsic_cfg,
>>>> + vcpu_guest_file_id(target_vcpu),
>>>> + cpuid_to_hartid(target_vcpu->processor),
>>>> + &value);
>>>
>>> I'm struggling with the naming here: When DM is clear, a function with "dm"
>>> in the name is called.
>>
>> it means direct (delivery) mode. Maybe it is better to put dm at the end
>> of the function name? Or it is just better to change it to something else?
>
> Without a better understanding of what is wanted, all I can say is that
> calling something with "dm" in its name when the condition says it's not
> "dm" is confusing.
Basically it should be the following. If domaincfg.DM (here dm is
delivery mode according to spec) is 0 then it means that APLIC works in
direct delivery mode, if DM bit is 1 then MSI delivery mode is used.
So just for clarity I will rename:
- vaplic_dm_update_target -> vaplic_ddm_update_target
- vaplic_update_target -> vaplic_mdm_update_target
Or maybe just s/ddm/direct and s/mdm/msi will be just better in the
function names.
>
>>>> + default:
>>>> + panic("%s: unsupported register offset: %#x\n", __func__, offset);
>>>
>>> Crashing the host for the guest doing something odd? It's odd that the function
>>> only ever returns 0 anyway - it could simply return an error here (if the
>>> itention is to not ignore such writes).
>>
>> But maybe it is a legal offset and we really want to support it?
>
> Still not a reason to crash the entire host?
Agree, domain crash will be more then enough.
Thanks.
~ Oleksii
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-20 15:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 123+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-10 17:08 [PATCH v1 00/27] [RISC-V] Introduce enablemenant of dom0less Oleksii Kurochko
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 01/27] xen/riscv: Implement ARCH_PAGING_MEMPOOL Oleksii Kurochko
2026-03-11 8:18 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-09 10:31 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 02/27] xen/riscv: Implement construct_domain() Oleksii Kurochko
2026-03-24 9:37 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-09 11:26 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-09 12:58 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-09 13:39 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-09 14:01 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-14 6:26 ` Julien Grall
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 03/27] xen/riscv: implement prerequisites for domain_create() Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-01 12:57 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-09 11:55 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 04/27] xen/riscv: rework G-stage mode handling Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-01 13:19 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-07 10:47 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-07 13:43 ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 05/27] xen/riscv: introduce guest riscv,isa string Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-01 13:49 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-10 10:24 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-10 10:50 ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 06/27] xen/riscv: implement make_cpus_node() Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-01 14:11 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-10 11:19 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-10 12:02 ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 07/27] xen/riscv: implement make_timer_node() Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-01 14:24 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-10 11:54 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 08/27] xen/riscv: implement make_arch_nodes() Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-01 14:29 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-10 13:32 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 09/27] xen/riscv: implement make_intc_domU_node() Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-01 14:38 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-10 14:00 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-10 14:23 ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 10/27] xen/riscv: generate IMSIC DT node for guest domains Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-01 15:05 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-10 15:40 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-16 11:42 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-17 8:10 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-17 13:50 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-17 14:01 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-17 14:10 ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 11/27] xen/riscv: create APLIC " Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-01 15:16 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-13 8:43 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-13 8:48 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-16 11:49 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-17 9:01 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-17 13:53 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-17 14:27 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 12/27] xen/riscv: introduce aia_init() and aia_available() Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-02 9:00 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-13 9:32 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-16 12:06 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-17 9:37 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 13/27] xen/riscv: add basic VGEIN management for AIA guests Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-02 10:03 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-13 14:42 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-16 12:21 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-17 11:34 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-17 14:07 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-20 7:52 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 14/27] xen/riscv: introduce per-vCPU IMSIC state Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-02 11:31 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-14 9:22 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-16 12:31 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-17 13:47 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-20 8:29 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-16 12:31 ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 15/27] xen/riscv: add very early virtual APLIC (vAPLIC) initialization support Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-02 11:58 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-14 10:27 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-16 12:42 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-20 10:25 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-20 10:47 ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 16/27] xen/riscv: implement IRQ mapping for device passthrough Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-02 12:22 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-14 11:29 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-16 12:51 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-20 11:39 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-20 13:45 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-20 14:34 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-20 15:21 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-20 15:31 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 17/27] xen/riscv: add missing APLIC register offsets, masks to asm/aplic.h Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-02 12:51 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-14 11:42 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 18/27] xen/riscv: add vaplic access check Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-02 13:10 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-14 11:45 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-15 7:35 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-16 13:01 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-20 11:53 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-20 12:03 ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 19/27] xen/riscv: emulate guest writes to virtual APLIC MMIO Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-02 14:18 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-14 16:04 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-16 13:19 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-20 15:02 ` Oleksii Kurochko [this message]
2026-04-20 15:27 ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 20/27] xen/riscv: emulate guest reads from " Oleksii Kurochko
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 21/27] xen/riscv: introduce (de)initialization helpers for vINTC Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-02 14:58 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-15 7:50 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-16 13:23 ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 22/27] xen/riscv: implement init_intc_phandle() Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-02 15:00 ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 23/27] xen/riscv: call do_initcalls() in start_xen() Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-02 15:01 ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 24/27] xen/riscv: init rcu Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-02 15:03 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-14 11:50 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 25/27] xen/riscv: setup system domains Oleksii Kurochko
2026-03-10 17:08 ` [PATCH v1 26/27] xen/riscv: provide init_vuart() Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-07 13:52 ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-10 17:09 ` [PATCH v1 27/27] xen/riscv: add initial dom0less infrastructure support Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-07 14:11 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-15 10:00 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-16 14:13 ` Jan Beulich
2026-04-15 10:28 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-04-16 14:15 ` Jan Beulich
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