From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
To: "Markus Gutschke (顧孟勤)" <markus@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@kernel.org,
linux-mips@linux-mips.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org,
linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86-64: seccomp: fix 32/64 syscall hole
Date: Wed, 6 May 2009 23:29:13 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20090506212913.GC4861@elte.hu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <904b25810905061146ged374f2se0afd24e9e3c1f06@mail.gmail.com>
* Markus Gutschke (顧孟勤) <markus@google.com> wrote:
> On Sat, Feb 28, 2009 at 10:23, Linus Torvalds
> <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
> > And I guess the seccomp interaction means that this is
> > potentially a 2.6.29 thing. Not that I know whether anybody
> > actually _uses_ seccomp. It does seem to be enabled in at least
> > Fedora kernels, but it might not be used anywhere.
>
> In the Linux version of Google Chrome, we are currently working on
> code that will use seccomp for parts of our sandboxing solution.
That's a pretty interesting usage. What would be fallback mode you
are using if the kernel doesnt have seccomp built in? Completely
non-sandboxed? Or a ptrace/PTRACE_SYSCALL based sandbox?
Ingo
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
To: "Markus Gutschke (顧孟勤)" <markus@google.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org,
sparclinux@vger.kernel.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
stable@kernel.org, Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86-64: seccomp: fix 32/64 syscall hole
Date: Wed, 6 May 2009 23:29:13 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20090506212913.GC4861@elte.hu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <904b25810905061146ged374f2se0afd24e9e3c1f06@mail.gmail.com>
* Markus Gutschke (顧孟勤) <markus@google.com> wrote:
> On Sat, Feb 28, 2009 at 10:23, Linus Torvalds
> <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
> > And I guess the seccomp interaction means that this is
> > potentially a 2.6.29 thing. Not that I know whether anybody
> > actually _uses_ seccomp. It does seem to be enabled in at least
> > Fedora kernels, but it might not be used anywhere.
>
> In the Linux version of Google Chrome, we are currently working on
> code that will use seccomp for parts of our sandboxing solution.
That's a pretty interesting usage. What would be fallback mode you
are using if the kernel doesnt have seccomp built in? Completely
non-sandboxed? Or a ptrace/PTRACE_SYSCALL based sandbox?
Ingo
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
To: "Markus Gutschke (顧孟勤)" <markus@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@kernel.org,
linux-mips@linux-mips.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org,
linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86-64: seccomp: fix 32/64 syscall hole
Date: Wed, 06 May 2009 21:29:13 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20090506212913.GC4861@elte.hu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <904b25810905061146ged374f2se0afd24e9e3c1f06@mail.gmail.com>
* Markus Gutschke (顧孟勤) <markus@google.com> wrote:
> On Sat, Feb 28, 2009 at 10:23, Linus Torvalds
> <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
> > And I guess the seccomp interaction means that this is
> > potentially a 2.6.29 thing. Not that I know whether anybody
> > actually _uses_ seccomp. It does seem to be enabled in at least
> > Fedora kernels, but it might not be used anywhere.
>
> In the Linux version of Google Chrome, we are currently working on
> code that will use seccomp for parts of our sandboxing solution.
That's a pretty interesting usage. What would be fallback mode you
are using if the kernel doesnt have seccomp built in? Completely
non-sandboxed? Or a ptrace/PTRACE_SYSCALL based sandbox?
Ingo
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2009-05-06 21:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 84+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-02-28 3:02 [PATCH 0/2] x86-64: 32/64 syscall arch holes Roland McGrath
2009-02-28 3:03 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86-64: syscall-audit: fix 32/64 syscall hole Roland McGrath
2009-02-28 3:04 ` [PATCH 2/2] x86-64: seccomp: " Roland McGrath
2009-02-28 3:36 ` Linus Torvalds
2009-02-28 3:52 ` Linus Torvalds
2009-02-28 4:46 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-02-28 7:25 ` Roland McGrath
2009-02-28 7:25 ` Roland McGrath
2009-02-28 7:25 ` Roland McGrath
2009-02-28 7:31 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-02-28 7:31 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-02-28 7:31 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-02-28 7:36 ` Roland McGrath
2009-02-28 7:36 ` Roland McGrath
2009-02-28 7:36 ` Roland McGrath
2009-02-28 17:23 ` Linus Torvalds
2009-02-28 17:23 ` Linus Torvalds
2009-02-28 17:23 ` Linus Torvalds
2009-02-28 17:46 ` [stable] " Greg KH
2009-02-28 17:46 ` Greg KH
2009-02-28 17:46 ` Greg KH
2009-02-28 17:54 ` Arjan van de Ven
2009-02-28 17:54 ` Arjan van de Ven
2009-02-28 17:54 ` Arjan van de Ven
2009-02-28 18:23 ` Greg KH
2009-02-28 18:23 ` Greg KH
2009-02-28 18:23 ` Greg KH
2009-02-28 20:27 ` Greg KH
2009-02-28 20:27 ` Greg KH
2009-02-28 21:09 ` Benjamin Herrenschmidt
2009-02-28 21:09 ` Benjamin Herrenschmidt
2009-02-28 21:09 ` Benjamin Herrenschmidt
2009-03-02 1:44 ` Roland McGrath
2009-03-02 1:44 ` Roland McGrath
2009-03-02 1:44 ` Roland McGrath
2009-05-06 18:42 ` Markus Gutschke
2009-05-06 18:42 ` Markus Gutschke
2009-05-06 18:46 ` Markus Gutschke (顧孟勤)
2009-05-06 18:46 `
2009-05-06 18:46 ` Markus Gutschke (顧孟勤)
2009-05-06 21:29 ` Ingo Molnar [this message]
2009-05-06 21:29 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-06 21:29 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-06 21:46 ` Markus Gutschke (顧孟勤)
2009-05-06 21:46 `
2009-05-06 21:46 ` Markus Gutschke (顧孟勤)
2009-05-06 21:54 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-06 21:54 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-06 21:54 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-06 22:08 ` Markus Gutschke (顧孟勤)
2009-05-06 22:08 `
2009-05-06 22:08 ` Markus Gutschke (顧孟勤)
2009-05-06 22:13 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-06 22:13 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-06 22:13 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-06 22:21 ` Markus Gutschke (顧孟勤)
2009-05-06 22:21 `
2009-05-06 22:21 ` Markus Gutschke (顧孟勤)
2009-05-07 4:23 ` Nicholas Miell
2009-05-07 4:23 ` Nicholas Miell
2009-05-07 4:23 ` Nicholas Miell
2009-05-07 10:11 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-07 10:11 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-07 10:11 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-10 5:37 ` Pavel Machek
2009-05-10 5:37 ` Pavel Machek
2009-05-10 5:37 ` Pavel Machek
2009-05-08 19:18 ` Andi Kleen
2009-05-08 19:18 ` Andi Kleen
2009-05-08 19:18 ` Andi Kleen
2009-05-07 7:03 ` Roland McGrath
2009-05-07 7:03 ` Roland McGrath
2009-05-07 8:01 ` Markus Gutschke (顧孟勤)
2009-05-07 8:01 `
2009-05-07 8:01 ` Markus Gutschke (顧孟勤)
2009-05-07 7:30 ` Roland McGrath
2009-05-07 7:30 ` Roland McGrath
2009-05-07 7:30 ` Roland McGrath
2009-05-07 7:31 ` Roland McGrath
2009-05-07 7:31 ` Roland McGrath
2009-05-07 7:31 ` Roland McGrath
2009-05-07 7:31 ` Roland McGrath
2009-05-08 1:59 ` David Wagner
2009-05-10 5:36 ` Pavel Machek
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