From: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: cl@linux-foundation.org, penberg@kernel.org, mpm@selenic.com
Subject: Memory allocator semantics
Date: Thu, 2 Jan 2014 12:33:20 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140102203320.GA27615@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
Hello!
>From what I can see, the Linux-kernel's SLAB, SLOB, and SLUB memory
allocators would deal with the following sort of race:
A. CPU 0: r1 = kmalloc(...); ACCESS_ONCE(gp) = r1;
CPU 1: r2 = ACCESS_ONCE(gp); if (r2) kfree(r2);
However, my guess is that this should be considered an accident of the
current implementation rather than a feature. The reason for this is
that I cannot see how you would usefully do (A) above without also allowing
(B) and (C) below, both of which look to me to be quite destructive:
B. CPU 0: r1 = kmalloc(...); ACCESS_ONCE(shared_x) = r1;
CPU 1: r2 = ACCESS_ONCE(shared_x); if (r2) kfree(r2);
CPU 2: r3 = ACCESS_ONCE(shared_x); if (r3) kfree(r3);
This results in the memory being on two different freelists.
C. CPU 0: r1 = kmalloc(...); ACCESS_ONCE(shared_x) = r1;
CPU 1: r2 = ACCESS_ONCE(shared_x); r2->a = 1; r2->b = 2;
CPU 2: r3 = ACCESS_ONCE(shared_x); if (r3) kfree(r3);
CPU 3: r4 = kmalloc(...); r4->s = 3; r4->t = 4;
This results in the memory being used by two different CPUs,
each of which believe that they have sole access.
But I thought I should ask the experts.
So, am I correct that kernel hackers are required to avoid "drive-by"
kfree()s of kmalloc()ed memory?
Thanx, Paul
PS. To the question "Why would anyone care about (A)?", then answer
is "Inquiring programming-language memory-model designers want
to know."
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: cl@linux-foundation.org, penberg@kernel.org, mpm@selenic.com
Subject: Memory allocator semantics
Date: Thu, 2 Jan 2014 12:33:20 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140102203320.GA27615@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
Hello!
>From what I can see, the Linux-kernel's SLAB, SLOB, and SLUB memory
allocators would deal with the following sort of race:
A. CPU 0: r1 = kmalloc(...); ACCESS_ONCE(gp) = r1;
CPU 1: r2 = ACCESS_ONCE(gp); if (r2) kfree(r2);
However, my guess is that this should be considered an accident of the
current implementation rather than a feature. The reason for this is
that I cannot see how you would usefully do (A) above without also allowing
(B) and (C) below, both of which look to me to be quite destructive:
B. CPU 0: r1 = kmalloc(...); ACCESS_ONCE(shared_x) = r1;
CPU 1: r2 = ACCESS_ONCE(shared_x); if (r2) kfree(r2);
CPU 2: r3 = ACCESS_ONCE(shared_x); if (r3) kfree(r3);
This results in the memory being on two different freelists.
C. CPU 0: r1 = kmalloc(...); ACCESS_ONCE(shared_x) = r1;
CPU 1: r2 = ACCESS_ONCE(shared_x); r2->a = 1; r2->b = 2;
CPU 2: r3 = ACCESS_ONCE(shared_x); if (r3) kfree(r3);
CPU 3: r4 = kmalloc(...); r4->s = 3; r4->t = 4;
This results in the memory being used by two different CPUs,
each of which believe that they have sole access.
But I thought I should ask the experts.
So, am I correct that kernel hackers are required to avoid "drive-by"
kfree()s of kmalloc()ed memory?
Thanx, Paul
PS. To the question "Why would anyone care about (A)?", then answer
is "Inquiring programming-language memory-model designers want
to know."
next reply other threads:[~2014-01-02 20:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-01-02 20:33 Paul E. McKenney [this message]
2014-01-02 20:33 ` Memory allocator semantics Paul E. McKenney
2014-01-03 3:39 ` Josh Triplett
2014-01-03 3:39 ` Josh Triplett
2014-01-03 5:14 ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-01-03 5:14 ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-01-03 5:47 ` Josh Triplett
2014-01-03 5:47 ` Josh Triplett
2014-01-03 7:57 ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-01-03 7:57 ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-01-03 8:42 ` Josh Triplett
2014-01-03 8:42 ` Josh Triplett
2014-02-08 10:27 ` Pekka Enberg
2014-02-08 10:27 ` Pekka Enberg
2014-02-09 2:00 ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-02-09 2:00 ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-02-11 8:50 ` Pekka Enberg
2014-02-11 8:50 ` Pekka Enberg
2014-02-11 12:09 ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-02-11 12:09 ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-02-11 18:43 ` Christoph Lameter
2014-02-11 18:43 ` Christoph Lameter
2014-02-14 17:30 ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-02-14 17:30 ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-02-10 19:07 ` Christoph Lameter
2014-02-10 19:07 ` Christoph Lameter
2014-02-11 12:14 ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-02-11 12:14 ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-02-11 13:20 ` Pekka Enberg
2014-02-11 13:20 ` Pekka Enberg
2014-02-11 15:01 ` Paul E. McKenney
2014-02-11 15:01 ` Paul E. McKenney
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