From: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
To: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
rth@twiddle.net
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] i386: define the AMD 'amd-ssbd' CPUID feature bit
Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2018 18:15:09 -0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180604211509.GA7451@localhost.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180604202205.GH5867@char.us.oracle.com>
On Mon, Jun 04, 2018 at 04:22:05PM -0400, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 04, 2018 at 05:07:01PM -0300, Eduardo Habkost wrote:
> > On Fri, Jun 01, 2018 at 11:38:08AM -0400, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> > > AMD future CPUs expose _two_ ways to utilize the Intel equivalant
> > > of the Speculative Store Bypass Disable. The first is via
> > > the virtualized VIRT_SPEC CTRL MSR (0xC001_011f) and the second
> > > is via the SPEC_CTRL MSR (0x48). The document titled:
> > > 124441_AMD64_SpeculativeStoreBypassDisable_Whitepaper_final.pdf
> > >
> > > gives priority of SPEC CTRL MSR over the VIRT SPEC CTRL MSR.
> > >
> > > A copy of this document is available at
> > > https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199889
> > >
> > > Anyhow, this means that on future AMD CPUs there will be _two_ ways to
> > > deal with SSBD.
> >
> > Does anybody know if there are AMD CPUs where virt-ssbd won't
> > work and would require amd-ssbd to mitigate vulnerabilities?
> >
> > Also, do we have kernel arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c patches, already?
>
> Not yet. They are being discussed right now. I figured I would send
> these patches out as a 'Hey, coming at you!', but failed to change
> the title to be 'RFC'.
OK. I was queueing them on x86-next, but I'm going drop them by
now.
>
> > I prefer to add new CPUID flag names only after the flag name is
> > already agreed upon on the kernel side.
>
> Of course. I will respin once that discussion has calmed down.
Thanks!
BTW, it looks like the patch on LKML[1] will make bit 26 appear
on /proc/cpuinfo as "amd_ssb_no", is that correct? If that's the
case, I'd prefer to make the QEMU flag to match the name used by
Linux, and be called "amd-ssb-no" (which sounds weird to me, but
at least it will be consistent with /proc/cpuinfo).
[1] https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10443689/
--
Eduardo
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
To: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,
rth@twiddle.net
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 1/2] i386: define the AMD 'amd-ssbd' CPUID feature bit
Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2018 18:15:09 -0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180604211509.GA7451@localhost.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180604202205.GH5867@char.us.oracle.com>
On Mon, Jun 04, 2018 at 04:22:05PM -0400, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 04, 2018 at 05:07:01PM -0300, Eduardo Habkost wrote:
> > On Fri, Jun 01, 2018 at 11:38:08AM -0400, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> > > AMD future CPUs expose _two_ ways to utilize the Intel equivalant
> > > of the Speculative Store Bypass Disable. The first is via
> > > the virtualized VIRT_SPEC CTRL MSR (0xC001_011f) and the second
> > > is via the SPEC_CTRL MSR (0x48). The document titled:
> > > 124441_AMD64_SpeculativeStoreBypassDisable_Whitepaper_final.pdf
> > >
> > > gives priority of SPEC CTRL MSR over the VIRT SPEC CTRL MSR.
> > >
> > > A copy of this document is available at
> > > https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199889
> > >
> > > Anyhow, this means that on future AMD CPUs there will be _two_ ways to
> > > deal with SSBD.
> >
> > Does anybody know if there are AMD CPUs where virt-ssbd won't
> > work and would require amd-ssbd to mitigate vulnerabilities?
> >
> > Also, do we have kernel arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c patches, already?
>
> Not yet. They are being discussed right now. I figured I would send
> these patches out as a 'Hey, coming at you!', but failed to change
> the title to be 'RFC'.
OK. I was queueing them on x86-next, but I'm going drop them by
now.
>
> > I prefer to add new CPUID flag names only after the flag name is
> > already agreed upon on the kernel side.
>
> Of course. I will respin once that discussion has calmed down.
Thanks!
BTW, it looks like the patch on LKML[1] will make bit 26 appear
on /proc/cpuinfo as "amd_ssb_no", is that correct? If that's the
case, I'd prefer to make the QEMU flag to match the name used by
Linux, and be called "amd-ssb-no" (which sounds weird to me, but
at least it will be consistent with /proc/cpuinfo).
[1] https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10443689/
--
Eduardo
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-06-04 21:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 58+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-06-01 14:59 [PATCH v1] AMD SSB bits Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-01 14:59 ` [PATCH v1 1/3] x86/bugs: Add AMD's variant of SSB_NO Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-06 12:15 ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-01 14:59 ` [PATCH v1 2/3] x86/bugs: Add AMD's SPEC_CTRL MSR usage Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-02 1:04 ` Tom Lendacky
2018-06-04 20:20 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-04 20:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2018-06-04 20:54 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-06 12:16 ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-01 14:59 ` [PATCH v1 3/3] x86/bugs: Switch the selection of mitigation from CPU vendor to CPU features Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-06 12:16 ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-08 21:30 ` [PATCH v1 3/3] " Tom Lendacky
2018-06-11 14:01 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-12 14:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2018-06-15 18:57 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-15 19:38 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-01 15:38 ` [PATCH QEMU] Patches for new AMD CPU bits Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-01 15:38 ` [Qemu-devel] " Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-01 15:38 ` [PATCH 1/2] i386: define the AMD 'amd-ssbd' CPUID feature bit Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-01 15:38 ` [Qemu-devel] " Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-04 8:54 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-06-04 8:54 ` [Qemu-devel] " Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-06-04 20:20 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-04 20:20 ` [Qemu-devel] " Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-04 20:07 ` Eduardo Habkost
2018-06-04 20:07 ` [Qemu-devel] " Eduardo Habkost
2018-06-04 20:22 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-04 20:22 ` [Qemu-devel] " Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-04 21:15 ` Eduardo Habkost [this message]
2018-06-04 21:15 ` Eduardo Habkost
2018-06-05 21:40 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-05 21:40 ` [Qemu-devel] " Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-13 10:19 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-06-13 10:19 ` [Qemu-devel] " Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-06-13 16:09 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-13 16:09 ` [Qemu-devel] " Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-13 16:21 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-06-13 16:21 ` [Qemu-devel] " Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-06-13 16:34 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-13 16:34 ` [Qemu-devel] " Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-13 16:39 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-06-13 16:39 ` [Qemu-devel] " Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-06-13 16:56 ` Eduardo Habkost
2018-06-13 16:56 ` [Qemu-devel] " Eduardo Habkost
2018-06-05 13:31 ` Tom Lendacky
2018-06-05 13:31 ` [Qemu-devel] " Tom Lendacky
2018-06-05 14:04 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-06-05 14:04 ` [Qemu-devel] " Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-06-06 14:20 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-06-06 14:20 ` [Qemu-devel] " Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-06-08 21:22 ` Tom Lendacky
2018-06-08 21:22 ` [Qemu-devel] " Tom Lendacky
2018-06-01 15:38 ` [PATCH 2/2] i386: Define AMD's no SSB mitigation needed Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-01 15:38 ` [Qemu-devel] " Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-13 21:38 ` [PATCH QEMU] Patches for new AMD CPU bits Eduardo Habkost
2018-06-13 21:38 ` [Qemu-devel] " Eduardo Habkost
2018-06-05 13:23 ` [PATCH v1] AMD SSB bits Tom Lendacky
2018-06-05 20:56 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
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