All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux@armlinux.org.uk, will@kernel.org, guoren@kernel.org,
	bcain@codeaurora.org, geert@linux-m68k.org, monstr@monstr.eu,
	tsbogend@alpha.franken.de, nickhu@andestech.com,
	green.hu@gmail.com, dinguyen@kernel.org, shorne@gmail.com,
	deller@gmx.de, mpe@ellerman.id.au, peterz@infradead.org,
	mingo@redhat.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, hca@linux.ibm.com,
	dalias@libc.org, davem@davemloft.net, richard@nod.at,
	x86@kernel.org, jcmvbkbc@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, ardb@kernel.org,
	linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-csky@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org, linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org, linux-mips@vger.kernel.org,
	openrisc@lists.librecores.org, linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	linux
Subject: [PATCH 04/14] x86: use more conventional access_ok() definition
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 17:34:42 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220214163452.1568807-5-arnd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220214163452.1568807-1-arnd@kernel.org>

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

The way that access_ok() is defined on x86 is slightly different from
most other architectures, and a bit more complex.

The generic version tends to result in the best output on all
architectures, as it results in single comparison against a constant
limit for calls with a known size.

There are a few callers of __range_not_ok(), all of which use TASK_SIZE
as the limit rather than TASK_SIZE_MAX, but I could not see any reason
for picking this. Changing these to call __access_ok() instead uses the
default limit, but keeps the behavior otherwise.

x86 is the only architecture with a WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() checking
access_ok(), but it's probably best to leave that in place.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 38 +++++++++++-----------------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index ac96f9b2d64b..6956a63291b6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -16,30 +16,13 @@
  * Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
  * Returns 0 if the range is valid, nonzero otherwise.
  */
-static inline bool __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, unsigned long limit)
+static inline bool __access_ok(void __user *ptr, unsigned long size)
 {
-	/*
-	 * If we have used "sizeof()" for the size,
-	 * we know it won't overflow the limit (but
-	 * it might overflow the 'addr', so it's
-	 * important to subtract the size from the
-	 * limit, not add it to the address).
-	 */
-	if (__builtin_constant_p(size))
-		return unlikely(addr > limit - size);
-
-	/* Arbitrary sizes? Be careful about overflow */
-	addr += size;
-	if (unlikely(addr < size))
-		return true;
-	return unlikely(addr > limit);
-}
+	unsigned long limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX;
+	unsigned long addr = ptr;
 
-#define __range_not_ok(addr, size, limit)				\
-({									\
-	__chk_user_ptr(addr);						\
-	__chk_range_not_ok((unsigned long __force)(addr), size, limit); \
-})
+	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
+}
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP
 static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
@@ -66,12 +49,15 @@ static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
  * Return: true (nonzero) if the memory block may be valid, false (zero)
  * if it is definitely invalid.
  */
-#define access_ok(addr, size)					\
-({									\
-	WARN_ON_IN_IRQ();						\
-	likely(!__range_not_ok(addr, size, TASK_SIZE_MAX));		\
+#define access_ok(addr, size)		\
+({					\
+	WARN_ON_IN_IRQ();		\
+	likely(__access_ok(addr, size));\
 })
 
+#define __range_not_ok(addr, size, limit)	(!__access_ok(addr, size))
+#define __chk_range_not_ok(addr, size, limit)	(!__access_ok((void __user *)addr, size))
+
 extern int __get_user_1(void);
 extern int __get_user_2(void);
 extern int __get_user_4(void);
-- 
2.29.2

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux@armlinux.org.uk, will@kernel.org, guoren@kernel.org,
	bcain@codeaurora.org, geert@linux-m68k.org, monstr@monstr.eu,
	tsbogend@alpha.franken.de, nickhu@andestech.com,
	green.hu@gmail.com, dinguyen@kernel.org, shorne@gmail.com,
	deller@gmx.de, mpe@ellerman.id.au, peterz@infradead.org,
	mingo@redhat.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, hca@linux.ibm.com,
	dalias@libc.org, davem@davemloft.net, richard@nod.at,
	x86@kernel.org, jcmvbkbc@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, ardb@kernel.org,
	linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-csky@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org, linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org, linux-mips@vger.kernel.org,
	openrisc@lists.librecores.org, linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-sh@vger.kernel.org,
	sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-um@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org
Subject: [PATCH 04/14] x86: use more conventional access_ok() definition
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 17:34:42 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220214163452.1568807-5-arnd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220214163452.1568807-1-arnd@kernel.org>

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

The way that access_ok() is defined on x86 is slightly different from
most other architectures, and a bit more complex.

The generic version tends to result in the best output on all
architectures, as it results in single comparison against a constant
limit for calls with a known size.

There are a few callers of __range_not_ok(), all of which use TASK_SIZE
as the limit rather than TASK_SIZE_MAX, but I could not see any reason
for picking this. Changing these to call __access_ok() instead uses the
default limit, but keeps the behavior otherwise.

x86 is the only architecture with a WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() checking
access_ok(), but it's probably best to leave that in place.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 38 +++++++++++-----------------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index ac96f9b2d64b..6956a63291b6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -16,30 +16,13 @@
  * Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
  * Returns 0 if the range is valid, nonzero otherwise.
  */
-static inline bool __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, unsigned long limit)
+static inline bool __access_ok(void __user *ptr, unsigned long size)
 {
-	/*
-	 * If we have used "sizeof()" for the size,
-	 * we know it won't overflow the limit (but
-	 * it might overflow the 'addr', so it's
-	 * important to subtract the size from the
-	 * limit, not add it to the address).
-	 */
-	if (__builtin_constant_p(size))
-		return unlikely(addr > limit - size);
-
-	/* Arbitrary sizes? Be careful about overflow */
-	addr += size;
-	if (unlikely(addr < size))
-		return true;
-	return unlikely(addr > limit);
-}
+	unsigned long limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX;
+	unsigned long addr = ptr;
 
-#define __range_not_ok(addr, size, limit)				\
-({									\
-	__chk_user_ptr(addr);						\
-	__chk_range_not_ok((unsigned long __force)(addr), size, limit); \
-})
+	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
+}
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP
 static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
@@ -66,12 +49,15 @@ static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
  * Return: true (nonzero) if the memory block may be valid, false (zero)
  * if it is definitely invalid.
  */
-#define access_ok(addr, size)					\
-({									\
-	WARN_ON_IN_IRQ();						\
-	likely(!__range_not_ok(addr, size, TASK_SIZE_MAX));		\
+#define access_ok(addr, size)		\
+({					\
+	WARN_ON_IN_IRQ();		\
+	likely(__access_ok(addr, size));\
 })
 
+#define __range_not_ok(addr, size, limit)	(!__access_ok(addr, size))
+#define __chk_range_not_ok(addr, size, limit)	(!__access_ok((void __user *)addr, size))
+
 extern int __get_user_1(void);
 extern int __get_user_2(void);
 extern int __get_user_4(void);
-- 
2.29.2


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux@armlinux.org.uk, will@kernel.org, guoren@kernel.org,
	bcain@codeaurora.org, geert@linux-m68k.org, monstr@monstr.eu,
	tsbogend@alpha.franken.de, nickhu@andestech.com,
	green.hu@gmail.com, dinguyen@kernel.org, shorne@gmail.com,
	deller@gmx.de, mpe@ellerman.id.au, peterz@infradead.org,
	mingo@redhat.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, hca@linux.ibm.com,
	dalias@libc.org, davem@davemloft.net, richard@nod.at,
	x86@kernel.org, jcmvbkbc@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, ardb@kernel.org,
	linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-csky@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org, linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org, linux-mips@vger.kernel.org,
	openrisc@lists.librecores.org, linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-sh@vger.kernel.org,
	sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-um@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org
Subject: [PATCH 04/14] x86: use more conventional access_ok() definition
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 16:34:42 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220214163452.1568807-5-arnd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220214163452.1568807-1-arnd@kernel.org>

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

The way that access_ok() is defined on x86 is slightly different from
most other architectures, and a bit more complex.

The generic version tends to result in the best output on all
architectures, as it results in single comparison against a constant
limit for calls with a known size.

There are a few callers of __range_not_ok(), all of which use TASK_SIZE
as the limit rather than TASK_SIZE_MAX, but I could not see any reason
for picking this. Changing these to call __access_ok() instead uses the
default limit, but keeps the behavior otherwise.

x86 is the only architecture with a WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() checking
access_ok(), but it's probably best to leave that in place.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 38 +++++++++++-----------------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index ac96f9b2d64b..6956a63291b6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -16,30 +16,13 @@
  * Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
  * Returns 0 if the range is valid, nonzero otherwise.
  */
-static inline bool __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, unsigned long limit)
+static inline bool __access_ok(void __user *ptr, unsigned long size)
 {
-	/*
-	 * If we have used "sizeof()" for the size,
-	 * we know it won't overflow the limit (but
-	 * it might overflow the 'addr', so it's
-	 * important to subtract the size from the
-	 * limit, not add it to the address).
-	 */
-	if (__builtin_constant_p(size))
-		return unlikely(addr > limit - size);
-
-	/* Arbitrary sizes? Be careful about overflow */
-	addr += size;
-	if (unlikely(addr < size))
-		return true;
-	return unlikely(addr > limit);
-}
+	unsigned long limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX;
+	unsigned long addr = ptr;
 
-#define __range_not_ok(addr, size, limit)				\
-({									\
-	__chk_user_ptr(addr);						\
-	__chk_range_not_ok((unsigned long __force)(addr), size, limit); \
-})
+	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
+}
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP
 static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
@@ -66,12 +49,15 @@ static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
  * Return: true (nonzero) if the memory block may be valid, false (zero)
  * if it is definitely invalid.
  */
-#define access_ok(addr, size)					\
-({									\
-	WARN_ON_IN_IRQ();						\
-	likely(!__range_not_ok(addr, size, TASK_SIZE_MAX));		\
+#define access_ok(addr, size)		\
+({					\
+	WARN_ON_IN_IRQ();		\
+	likely(__access_ok(addr, size));\
 })
 
+#define __range_not_ok(addr, size, limit)	(!__access_ok(addr, size))
+#define __chk_range_not_ok(addr, size, limit)	(!__access_ok((void __user *)addr, size))
+
 extern int __get_user_1(void);
 extern int __get_user_2(void);
 extern int __get_user_4(void);
-- 
2.29.2

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux@armlinux.org.uk, will@kernel.org, guoren@kernel.org,
	bcain@codeaurora.org, geert@linux-m68k.org, monstr@monstr.eu,
	tsbogend@alpha.franken.de, nickhu@andestech.com,
	green.hu@gmail.com, dinguyen@kernel.org, shorne@gmail.com,
	deller@gmx.de, mpe@ellerman.id.au, peterz@infradead.org,
	mingo@redhat.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, hca@linux.ibm.com,
	dalias@libc.org, davem@davemloft.net, richard@nod.at,
	x86@kernel.org, jcmvbkbc@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, ardb@kernel.org,
	linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-csky@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org, linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org, linux-mips@vger.kernel.org,
	openrisc@lists.librecores.org, linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-sh@vger.kernel.org,
	sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-um@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org
Subject: [PATCH 04/14] x86: use more conventional access_ok() definition
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 17:34:42 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220214163452.1568807-5-arnd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220214163452.1568807-1-arnd@kernel.org>

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

The way that access_ok() is defined on x86 is slightly different from
most other architectures, and a bit more complex.

The generic version tends to result in the best output on all
architectures, as it results in single comparison against a constant
limit for calls with a known size.

There are a few callers of __range_not_ok(), all of which use TASK_SIZE
as the limit rather than TASK_SIZE_MAX, but I could not see any reason
for picking this. Changing these to call __access_ok() instead uses the
default limit, but keeps the behavior otherwise.

x86 is the only architecture with a WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() checking
access_ok(), but it's probably best to leave that in place.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 38 +++++++++++-----------------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index ac96f9b2d64b..6956a63291b6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -16,30 +16,13 @@
  * Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
  * Returns 0 if the range is valid, nonzero otherwise.
  */
-static inline bool __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, unsigned long limit)
+static inline bool __access_ok(void __user *ptr, unsigned long size)
 {
-	/*
-	 * If we have used "sizeof()" for the size,
-	 * we know it won't overflow the limit (but
-	 * it might overflow the 'addr', so it's
-	 * important to subtract the size from the
-	 * limit, not add it to the address).
-	 */
-	if (__builtin_constant_p(size))
-		return unlikely(addr > limit - size);
-
-	/* Arbitrary sizes? Be careful about overflow */
-	addr += size;
-	if (unlikely(addr < size))
-		return true;
-	return unlikely(addr > limit);
-}
+	unsigned long limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX;
+	unsigned long addr = ptr;
 
-#define __range_not_ok(addr, size, limit)				\
-({									\
-	__chk_user_ptr(addr);						\
-	__chk_range_not_ok((unsigned long __force)(addr), size, limit); \
-})
+	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
+}
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP
 static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
@@ -66,12 +49,15 @@ static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
  * Return: true (nonzero) if the memory block may be valid, false (zero)
  * if it is definitely invalid.
  */
-#define access_ok(addr, size)					\
-({									\
-	WARN_ON_IN_IRQ();						\
-	likely(!__range_not_ok(addr, size, TASK_SIZE_MAX));		\
+#define access_ok(addr, size)		\
+({					\
+	WARN_ON_IN_IRQ();		\
+	likely(__access_ok(addr, size));\
 })
 
+#define __range_not_ok(addr, size, limit)	(!__access_ok(addr, size))
+#define __chk_range_not_ok(addr, size, limit)	(!__access_ok((void __user *)addr, size))
+
 extern int __get_user_1(void);
 extern int __get_user_2(void);
 extern int __get_user_4(void);
-- 
2.29.2


_______________________________________________
linux-riscv mailing list
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux@armlinux.org.uk, will@kernel.org, guoren@kernel.org,
	bcain@codeaurora.org, geert@linux-m68k.org, monstr@monstr.eu,
	tsbogend@alpha.franken.de, nickhu@andestech.com,
	green.hu@gmail.com, dinguyen@kernel.org, shorne@gmail.com,
	deller@gmx.de, mpe@ellerman.id.au, peterz@infradead.org,
	mingo@redhat.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, hca@linux.ibm.com,
	dalias@libc.org, davem@davemloft.net, richard@nod.at,
	x86@kernel.org, jcmvbkbc@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, ardb@kernel.org,
	linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-csky@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org, linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org, linux-mips@vger.kernel.org,
	openrisc@lists.librecores.org, linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-sh@vger.kernel.org,
	sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-um@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org
Subject: [PATCH 04/14] x86: use more conventional access_ok() definition
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 17:34:42 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220214163452.1568807-5-arnd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220214163452.1568807-1-arnd@kernel.org>

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

The way that access_ok() is defined on x86 is slightly different from
most other architectures, and a bit more complex.

The generic version tends to result in the best output on all
architectures, as it results in single comparison against a constant
limit for calls with a known size.

There are a few callers of __range_not_ok(), all of which use TASK_SIZE
as the limit rather than TASK_SIZE_MAX, but I could not see any reason
for picking this. Changing these to call __access_ok() instead uses the
default limit, but keeps the behavior otherwise.

x86 is the only architecture with a WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() checking
access_ok(), but it's probably best to leave that in place.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 38 +++++++++++-----------------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index ac96f9b2d64b..6956a63291b6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -16,30 +16,13 @@
  * Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
  * Returns 0 if the range is valid, nonzero otherwise.
  */
-static inline bool __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, unsigned long limit)
+static inline bool __access_ok(void __user *ptr, unsigned long size)
 {
-	/*
-	 * If we have used "sizeof()" for the size,
-	 * we know it won't overflow the limit (but
-	 * it might overflow the 'addr', so it's
-	 * important to subtract the size from the
-	 * limit, not add it to the address).
-	 */
-	if (__builtin_constant_p(size))
-		return unlikely(addr > limit - size);
-
-	/* Arbitrary sizes? Be careful about overflow */
-	addr += size;
-	if (unlikely(addr < size))
-		return true;
-	return unlikely(addr > limit);
-}
+	unsigned long limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX;
+	unsigned long addr = ptr;
 
-#define __range_not_ok(addr, size, limit)				\
-({									\
-	__chk_user_ptr(addr);						\
-	__chk_range_not_ok((unsigned long __force)(addr), size, limit); \
-})
+	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
+}
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP
 static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
@@ -66,12 +49,15 @@ static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
  * Return: true (nonzero) if the memory block may be valid, false (zero)
  * if it is definitely invalid.
  */
-#define access_ok(addr, size)					\
-({									\
-	WARN_ON_IN_IRQ();						\
-	likely(!__range_not_ok(addr, size, TASK_SIZE_MAX));		\
+#define access_ok(addr, size)		\
+({					\
+	WARN_ON_IN_IRQ();		\
+	likely(__access_ok(addr, size));\
 })
 
+#define __range_not_ok(addr, size, limit)	(!__access_ok(addr, size))
+#define __chk_range_not_ok(addr, size, limit)	(!__access_ok((void __user *)addr, size))
+
 extern int __get_user_1(void);
 extern int __get_user_2(void);
 extern int __get_user_4(void);
-- 
2.29.2


_______________________________________________
linux-snps-arc mailing list
linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-snps-arc

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
To: openrisc@lists.librecores.org
Subject: [OpenRISC] [PATCH 04/14] x86: use more conventional access_ok() definition
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 17:34:42 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220214163452.1568807-5-arnd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220214163452.1568807-1-arnd@kernel.org>

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

The way that access_ok() is defined on x86 is slightly different from
most other architectures, and a bit more complex.

The generic version tends to result in the best output on all
architectures, as it results in single comparison against a constant
limit for calls with a known size.

There are a few callers of __range_not_ok(), all of which use TASK_SIZE
as the limit rather than TASK_SIZE_MAX, but I could not see any reason
for picking this. Changing these to call __access_ok() instead uses the
default limit, but keeps the behavior otherwise.

x86 is the only architecture with a WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() checking
access_ok(), but it's probably best to leave that in place.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 38 +++++++++++-----------------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index ac96f9b2d64b..6956a63291b6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -16,30 +16,13 @@
  * Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
  * Returns 0 if the range is valid, nonzero otherwise.
  */
-static inline bool __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, unsigned long limit)
+static inline bool __access_ok(void __user *ptr, unsigned long size)
 {
-	/*
-	 * If we have used "sizeof()" for the size,
-	 * we know it won't overflow the limit (but
-	 * it might overflow the 'addr', so it's
-	 * important to subtract the size from the
-	 * limit, not add it to the address).
-	 */
-	if (__builtin_constant_p(size))
-		return unlikely(addr > limit - size);
-
-	/* Arbitrary sizes? Be careful about overflow */
-	addr += size;
-	if (unlikely(addr < size))
-		return true;
-	return unlikely(addr > limit);
-}
+	unsigned long limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX;
+	unsigned long addr = ptr;
 
-#define __range_not_ok(addr, size, limit)				\
-({									\
-	__chk_user_ptr(addr);						\
-	__chk_range_not_ok((unsigned long __force)(addr), size, limit); \
-})
+	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
+}
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP
 static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
@@ -66,12 +49,15 @@ static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
  * Return: true (nonzero) if the memory block may be valid, false (zero)
  * if it is definitely invalid.
  */
-#define access_ok(addr, size)					\
-({									\
-	WARN_ON_IN_IRQ();						\
-	likely(!__range_not_ok(addr, size, TASK_SIZE_MAX));		\
+#define access_ok(addr, size)		\
+({					\
+	WARN_ON_IN_IRQ();		\
+	likely(__access_ok(addr, size));\
 })
 
+#define __range_not_ok(addr, size, limit)	(!__access_ok(addr, size))
+#define __chk_range_not_ok(addr, size, limit)	(!__access_ok((void __user *)addr, size))
+
 extern int __get_user_1(void);
 extern int __get_user_2(void);
 extern int __get_user_4(void);
-- 
2.29.2


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: mark.rutland@arm.com, dalias@libc.org,
	linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, linux-sh@vger.kernel.org,
	peterz@infradead.org, jcmvbkbc@gmail.com, guoren@kernel.org,
	sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, will@kernel.org,
	ardb@kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	bcain@codeaurora.org, deller@gmx.de, x86@kernel.org,
	linux@armlinux.org.uk, linux-csky@vger.kernel.org,
	mingo@redhat.com, geert@linux-m68k.org,
	linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org, hca@linux.ibm.com,
	linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-um@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org, openrisc@lists.librecores.org,
	green.hu@gmail.com, shorne@gmail.com,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, monstr@monstr.eu,
	tsbogend@alpha.franken.de, linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org,
	nickhu@andestech.com, linux-mips@vger.kernel.org,
	dinguyen@kernel.org, ebiederm@xmission.com, richard@nod.at,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
	davem@davemloft.net
Subject: [PATCH 04/14] x86: use more conventional access_ok() definition
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 17:34:42 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220214163452.1568807-5-arnd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220214163452.1568807-1-arnd@kernel.org>

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

The way that access_ok() is defined on x86 is slightly different from
most other architectures, and a bit more complex.

The generic version tends to result in the best output on all
architectures, as it results in single comparison against a constant
limit for calls with a known size.

There are a few callers of __range_not_ok(), all of which use TASK_SIZE
as the limit rather than TASK_SIZE_MAX, but I could not see any reason
for picking this. Changing these to call __access_ok() instead uses the
default limit, but keeps the behavior otherwise.

x86 is the only architecture with a WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() checking
access_ok(), but it's probably best to leave that in place.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 38 +++++++++++-----------------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index ac96f9b2d64b..6956a63291b6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -16,30 +16,13 @@
  * Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
  * Returns 0 if the range is valid, nonzero otherwise.
  */
-static inline bool __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, unsigned long limit)
+static inline bool __access_ok(void __user *ptr, unsigned long size)
 {
-	/*
-	 * If we have used "sizeof()" for the size,
-	 * we know it won't overflow the limit (but
-	 * it might overflow the 'addr', so it's
-	 * important to subtract the size from the
-	 * limit, not add it to the address).
-	 */
-	if (__builtin_constant_p(size))
-		return unlikely(addr > limit - size);
-
-	/* Arbitrary sizes? Be careful about overflow */
-	addr += size;
-	if (unlikely(addr < size))
-		return true;
-	return unlikely(addr > limit);
-}
+	unsigned long limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX;
+	unsigned long addr = ptr;
 
-#define __range_not_ok(addr, size, limit)				\
-({									\
-	__chk_user_ptr(addr);						\
-	__chk_range_not_ok((unsigned long __force)(addr), size, limit); \
-})
+	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
+}
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP
 static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
@@ -66,12 +49,15 @@ static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
  * Return: true (nonzero) if the memory block may be valid, false (zero)
  * if it is definitely invalid.
  */
-#define access_ok(addr, size)					\
-({									\
-	WARN_ON_IN_IRQ();						\
-	likely(!__range_not_ok(addr, size, TASK_SIZE_MAX));		\
+#define access_ok(addr, size)		\
+({					\
+	WARN_ON_IN_IRQ();		\
+	likely(__access_ok(addr, size));\
 })
 
+#define __range_not_ok(addr, size, limit)	(!__access_ok(addr, size))
+#define __chk_range_not_ok(addr, size, limit)	(!__access_ok((void __user *)addr, size))
+
 extern int __get_user_1(void);
 extern int __get_user_2(void);
 extern int __get_user_4(void);
-- 
2.29.2


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux@armlinux.org.uk, will@kernel.org, guoren@kernel.org,
	bcain@codeaurora.org, geert@linux-m68k.org, monstr@monstr.eu,
	tsbogend@alpha.franken.de, nickhu@andestech.com,
	green.hu@gmail.com, dinguyen@kernel.org, shorne@gmail.com,
	deller@gmx.de, mpe@ellerman.id.au, peterz@infradead.org,
	mingo@redhat.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, hca@linux.ibm.com,
	dalias@libc.org, davem@davemloft.net, richard@nod.at,
	x86@kernel.org, jcmvbkbc@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, ardb@kernel.org,
	linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-csky@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org, linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org, linux-mips@vger.kernel.org,
	openrisc@lists.librecores.org, linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-sh@vger.kernel.org,
	sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-um@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org
Subject: [PATCH 04/14] x86: use more conventional access_ok() definition
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 17:34:42 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220214163452.1568807-5-arnd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220214163452.1568807-1-arnd@kernel.org>

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

The way that access_ok() is defined on x86 is slightly different from
most other architectures, and a bit more complex.

The generic version tends to result in the best output on all
architectures, as it results in single comparison against a constant
limit for calls with a known size.

There are a few callers of __range_not_ok(), all of which use TASK_SIZE
as the limit rather than TASK_SIZE_MAX, but I could not see any reason
for picking this. Changing these to call __access_ok() instead uses the
default limit, but keeps the behavior otherwise.

x86 is the only architecture with a WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() checking
access_ok(), but it's probably best to leave that in place.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 38 +++++++++++-----------------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index ac96f9b2d64b..6956a63291b6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -16,30 +16,13 @@
  * Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
  * Returns 0 if the range is valid, nonzero otherwise.
  */
-static inline bool __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, unsigned long limit)
+static inline bool __access_ok(void __user *ptr, unsigned long size)
 {
-	/*
-	 * If we have used "sizeof()" for the size,
-	 * we know it won't overflow the limit (but
-	 * it might overflow the 'addr', so it's
-	 * important to subtract the size from the
-	 * limit, not add it to the address).
-	 */
-	if (__builtin_constant_p(size))
-		return unlikely(addr > limit - size);
-
-	/* Arbitrary sizes? Be careful about overflow */
-	addr += size;
-	if (unlikely(addr < size))
-		return true;
-	return unlikely(addr > limit);
-}
+	unsigned long limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX;
+	unsigned long addr = ptr;
 
-#define __range_not_ok(addr, size, limit)				\
-({									\
-	__chk_user_ptr(addr);						\
-	__chk_range_not_ok((unsigned long __force)(addr), size, limit); \
-})
+	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
+}
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP
 static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
@@ -66,12 +49,15 @@ static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
  * Return: true (nonzero) if the memory block may be valid, false (zero)
  * if it is definitely invalid.
  */
-#define access_ok(addr, size)					\
-({									\
-	WARN_ON_IN_IRQ();						\
-	likely(!__range_not_ok(addr, size, TASK_SIZE_MAX));		\
+#define access_ok(addr, size)		\
+({					\
+	WARN_ON_IN_IRQ();		\
+	likely(__access_ok(addr, size));\
 })
 
+#define __range_not_ok(addr, size, limit)	(!__access_ok(addr, size))
+#define __chk_range_not_ok(addr, size, limit)	(!__access_ok((void __user *)addr, size))
+
 extern int __get_user_1(void);
 extern int __get_user_2(void);
 extern int __get_user_4(void);
-- 
2.29.2


_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-02-14 16:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 450+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-02-14 16:34 [PATCH 00/14] clean up asm/uaccess.h, kill set_fs for good Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 01/14] uaccess: fix integer overflow on access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:58   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 16:58     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 16:58     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 16:58     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 16:58     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 16:58     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 16:58     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 16:58     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 02/14] sparc64: add __{get,put}_kernel_nocheck() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] [PATCH 02/14] sparc64: add __{get, put}_kernel_nocheck() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [PATCH 02/14] sparc64: add __{get,put}_kernel_nocheck() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 03/14] nds32: fix access_ok() checks in get/put_user Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 17:01   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:01     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:01     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:01     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:01     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:01     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:01     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:01     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:10     ` David Laight
2022-02-14 17:10       ` David Laight
2022-02-14 17:10       ` [OpenRISC] " David Laight
2022-02-14 17:10       ` David Laight
2022-02-14 17:10       ` David Laight
2022-02-14 17:10       ` David Laight
2022-02-15  9:18     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:18       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:18       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:18       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:18       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:18       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:18       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 10:25       ` Greg KH
2022-02-15 10:25         ` Greg KH
2022-02-15 10:25         ` [OpenRISC] " Greg KH
2022-02-15 10:25         ` Greg KH
2022-02-15 10:25         ` Greg KH
2022-02-15 10:25         ` Greg KH
2022-02-15 10:25         ` Greg KH
2022-02-14 16:34 ` Arnd Bergmann [this message]
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [PATCH 04/14] x86: use more conventional access_ok() definition Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 17:02   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 19:45     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:45       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:45       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:45       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:45       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:45       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:45       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 20:00       ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 20:00         ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 20:00         ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 20:00         ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 20:00         ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 20:00         ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 20:00         ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 20:01       ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:01         ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:01         ` [OpenRISC] " Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:01         ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:01         ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:01         ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:01         ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:17         ` Al Viro
2022-02-14 20:17           ` Al Viro
2022-02-14 20:17           ` [OpenRISC] " Al Viro
2022-02-14 20:17           ` Al Viro
2022-02-14 20:17           ` Al Viro
2022-02-14 20:17           ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  2:47           ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  2:47             ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  2:47             ` [OpenRISC] " Al Viro
2022-02-15  2:47             ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  2:47             ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  2:47             ` Al Viro
2022-02-14 20:24         ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:24           ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:24           ` [OpenRISC] " Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:24           ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:24           ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:24           ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:24           ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:24           ` Linus Torvalds
     [not found]           ` <CAHk-=wgYu67OwP4LhcrPdDVxv2mOsx-Xsc2DKoVW6GZwKFtOYQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2022-02-14 22:13             ` David Laight
2022-02-14 22:13               ` David Laight
2022-02-14 22:13               ` [OpenRISC] " David Laight
2022-02-14 22:13               ` David Laight
2022-02-14 22:13               ` David Laight
2022-02-14 22:13               ` David Laight
2022-02-14 22:13               ` David Laight
2022-02-14 22:13               ` David Laight
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 05/14] uaccess: add generic __{get,put}_kernel_nofault Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] [PATCH 05/14] uaccess: add generic __{get, put}_kernel_nofault Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [PATCH 05/14] uaccess: add generic __{get,put}_kernel_nofault Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 17:02   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` [OpenRISC] [PATCH 05/14] uaccess: add generic __{get, put}_kernel_nofault Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` [PATCH 05/14] uaccess: add generic __{get,put}_kernel_nofault Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-15  0:31   ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:31     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:31     ` [OpenRISC] [PATCH 05/14] uaccess: add generic __{get, put}_kernel_nofault Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:31     ` [PATCH 05/14] uaccess: add generic __{get,put}_kernel_nofault Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:31     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:31     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15 13:16     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 13:16       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 13:16       ` [OpenRISC] [PATCH 05/14] uaccess: add generic __{get, put}_kernel_nofault Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 13:16       ` [PATCH 05/14] uaccess: add generic __{get,put}_kernel_nofault Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 13:16       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 13:16       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 13:16       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 06/14] mips: use simpler access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 07/14] uaccess: generalize access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 17:04   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:04     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:04     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:04     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:04     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:04     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:04     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:04     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:04     ` Christoph Hellwig
     [not found]   ` <20220214163452.1568807-8-arnd-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
2022-02-14 17:15     ` Al Viro
2022-02-14 17:15       ` Al Viro
2022-02-14 17:15       ` [OpenRISC] " Al Viro
2022-02-14 17:15       ` Al Viro
2022-02-14 17:15       ` Al Viro
2022-02-14 17:15       ` Al Viro
2022-02-14 19:25       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:25         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:25         ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:25         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:25         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:25         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:25         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 10:58   ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:58     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:58     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:58     ` [OpenRISC] " Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:58     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:58     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:58     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:58     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 08/14] arm64: simplify access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 21:06   ` Robin Murphy
2022-02-14 21:06     ` Robin Murphy
2022-02-14 21:06     ` [OpenRISC] " Robin Murphy
2022-02-14 21:06     ` Robin Murphy
2022-02-14 21:06     ` Robin Murphy
2022-02-14 21:06     ` Robin Murphy
2022-02-14 21:06     ` Robin Murphy
2022-02-15  8:17   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  8:17     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  8:17     ` [OpenRISC] " Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  8:17     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  8:17     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  8:17     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  8:17     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  9:12     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:12       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:12       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:12       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:12       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:12       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:12       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:21       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  9:21         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  9:21         ` [OpenRISC] " Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  9:21         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  9:21         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  9:21         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  9:21         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  9:39         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:39           ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:39           ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:39           ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:39           ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:39           ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:39           ` Arnd Bergmann
     [not found]           ` <CAK8P3a0NTqK_m7q909d8FN6is8k4_u3zeckC9XOrjEi7kqSvmg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2022-02-15 10:39             ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:39               ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:39               ` [OpenRISC] " Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:39               ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:39               ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:39               ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:37         ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:37           ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:37           ` [OpenRISC] " Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:37           ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:37           ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:37           ` Mark Rutland
     [not found]       ` <CAK8P3a2VfvDkueaJNTA9SiB+PFsi_Q17AX+aL46ueooW2ahmQw-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2022-02-16 19:43         ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-16 19:43           ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-16 19:43           ` [OpenRISC] " Christophe Leroy
2022-02-16 19:43           ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-16 19:43           ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-16 19:43           ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-16 19:43           ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-16 19:43           ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-15  9:30     ` David Laight
2022-02-15  9:30       ` David Laight
2022-02-15  9:30       ` [OpenRISC] " David Laight
2022-02-15  9:30       ` David Laight
2022-02-15  9:30       ` David Laight
2022-02-15  9:30       ` David Laight
2022-02-15  9:30       ` David Laight
2022-02-15  9:30       ` David Laight
2022-02-15 11:24       ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:24         ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:24         ` [OpenRISC] " Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:24         ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:24         ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:24         ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:24         ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:07   ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:07     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:07     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:07     ` [OpenRISC] " Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:07     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:07     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:07     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:07     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 09/14] m68k: drop custom __access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  0:37   ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:37     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:37     ` [OpenRISC] " Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:37     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:37     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:37     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  6:29     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-15  6:29       ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-15  6:29       ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-15  6:29       ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-15  6:29       ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-15  6:29       ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-15  6:29       ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-15  7:13       ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  7:13         ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  7:13         ` [OpenRISC] " Al Viro
2022-02-15  7:13         ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  7:13         ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  7:13         ` Al Viro
2022-02-15 10:02         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 10:02           ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 10:02           ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 10:02           ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 10:02           ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 10:02           ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 10:02           ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 13:28           ` David Laight
2022-02-15 13:28             ` David Laight
2022-02-15 13:28             ` [OpenRISC] " David Laight
2022-02-15 13:28             ` David Laight
2022-02-15 13:28             ` David Laight
2022-02-15 13:28             ` David Laight
2022-02-15 13:28             ` David Laight
2022-02-15 13:28             ` David Laight
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 10/14] uaccess: remove most CONFIG_SET_FS users Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 17:06   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 19:40     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:40       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:40       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:40       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:40       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:40       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:40       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:40       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 11/14] sparc64: remove CONFIG_SET_FS support Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 17:06   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-16 13:06     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:06       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:06       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:06       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:06       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:06       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:06       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:06       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  0:48   ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:48     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:48     ` [OpenRISC] " Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:48     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:48     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:48     ` Al Viro
2022-02-16 13:07     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:07       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:07       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:07       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:07       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:07       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:07       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 12/14] sh: " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 13/14] ia64: " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 14/14] uaccess: drop set_fs leftovers Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  3:03   ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  3:03     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  3:03     ` [OpenRISC] " Al Viro
2022-02-15  3:03     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  3:03     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  3:03     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  7:46     ` Helge Deller
2022-02-15  7:46       ` Helge Deller
2022-02-15  7:46       ` [OpenRISC] " Helge Deller
2022-02-15  7:46       ` Helge Deller
2022-02-15  7:46       ` Helge Deller
2022-02-15  7:46       ` Helge Deller
2022-02-15  7:46       ` Helge Deller
2022-02-15  8:10       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  8:10         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  8:10         ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  8:10         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  8:10         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  8:10         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  8:10         ` Arnd Bergmann
     [not found] ` <20220214163452.1568807-1-arnd-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
2022-02-14 17:35   ` [PATCH 00/14] clean up asm/uaccess.h, kill set_fs for good Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 17:35     ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 17:35     ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 17:35     ` [OpenRISC] " Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 17:35     ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 17:35     ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 17:35     ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 17:35     ` Linus Torvalds

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20220214163452.1568807-5-arnd@kernel.org \
    --to=arnd@kernel.org \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=ardb@kernel.org \
    --cc=arnd@arndb.de \
    --cc=bcain@codeaurora.org \
    --cc=dalias@libc.org \
    --cc=davem@davemloft.net \
    --cc=deller@gmx.de \
    --cc=dinguyen@kernel.org \
    --cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
    --cc=geert@linux-m68k.org \
    --cc=green.hu@gmail.com \
    --cc=guoren@kernel.org \
    --cc=hca@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=hch@lst.de \
    --cc=jcmvbkbc@gmail.com \
    --cc=linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=linux-csky@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org \
    --cc=linux-mips@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=linux@armlinux.org.uk \
    --cc=linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org \
    --cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=monstr@monstr.eu \
    --cc=mpe@ellerman.id.au \
    --cc=nickhu@andestech.com \
    --cc=openrisc@lists.librecores.org \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=richard@nod.at \
    --cc=shorne@gmail.com \
    --cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=tsbogend@alpha.franken.de \
    --cc=will@kernel.org \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.