From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Oliver Upton" <oupton@kernel.org>
Cc: kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, "Marc Zyngier" <maz@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 19/22] KVM: arm64: nv: Expose FEAT_HAFT
Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2026 19:05:34 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260623190535.0BE9E1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260623184201.1518871-20-oupton@kernel.org>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Medium] KVM's AT instruction emulation incorrectly evaluates HD and HAFT without ensuring the Hardware Access Flag (HA) is enabled, leading to unauthorized hardware updates of the Access flag on table descriptors.
--
commit e646aa23aa5bcaa5e6bc04545e6c0d319fc3a058
Author: Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org>
KVM: arm64: nv: Expose FEAT_HAFT
Both stages of translation now support the access flag on table descriptors,
advertise the feature.
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c
> index 6f540d3481d5a..dc2a8b6483c2a 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c
> @@ -1799,7 +1799,7 @@ u64 limit_nv_id_reg(struct kvm *kvm, u32 reg, u64 val)
> if (test_bit(KVM_ARM_VCPU_HAS_EL2_E2H0, kvm->arch.vcpu_features))
> val &= ~ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1_VH;
>
> - val = ID_REG_LIMIT_FIELD_ENUM(val, ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1, HAFDBS, DBM);
> + val = ID_REG_LIMIT_FIELD_ENUM(val, ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1, HAFDBS, HAFT);
[Severity: Medium]
Does exposing HAFT here uncover an issue in AT instruction emulation where
hardware updates are authorized even when the hardware access flag is
disabled?
Looking at setup_s1_walk() in arch/arm64/kvm/at.c, wi->hd and wi->haft
are evaluated without checking if the hardware access flag (HA) is enabled:
arch/arm64/kvm/at.c:setup_s1_walk() {
...
wi->haft = kvm_has_feat(vcpu->kvm, ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1, HAFDBS, HAFT) &&
FIELD_GET(TCR2_EL1_HAFT, effective_tcr2(vcpu, wi->regime));
...
}
Then in should_set_access_flag(), this could return wi->haft for table
descriptors, inadvertently authorizing hardware updates even when HA == 0:
arch/arm64/kvm/at.c:should_set_access_flag() {
...
return kvm_pte_table(ws->desc, ws->level) ? wi->haft : wi->ha;
}
If a nested guest sets TCR_ELx.HD = 1 or TCR2_ELx.HAFT = 1 but leaves
TCR_ELx.HA = 0, and then executes an AT instruction, could KVM incorrectly
evaluate the guest's page table permissions as writable or perform an
unauthorized hardware update of the Access flag on table descriptors?
> break;
>
> case SYS_ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1:
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260623184201.1518871-1-oupton@kernel.org?part=19
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-23 19:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-23 18:41 [PATCH 00/22] KVM: arm64: nv: Implement FEAT_HAFDBS, FEAT_HAFT Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 01/22] KVM: arm64: nv: Introduce struct for stage-2 walk step Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 02/22] KVM: arm64: nv: Consolidate computation of stage-2 permissions Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:57 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 03/22] KVM: arm64: nv: Get rid of kvm_s2_trans*() accessors Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 04/22] KVM: arm64: nv: Only shadow writable-dirty guest descs as writable Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:58 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 20:05 ` Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 05/22] KVM: arm64: nv: Pass an access descriptor for stage-2 walks Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 19:06 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 06/22] KVM: arm64: nv: Use a helper for stage-2 descriptor updates Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 07/22] KVM: arm64: nv: Set dirty state at stage-2 Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 19:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 08/22] KVM: arm64: nv: Treat DBM as writable " Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:55 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 20:08 ` Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 09/22] KVM: arm64: Compute S1 permissions as part of s1_walk() Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 10/22] KVM: arm64: Plumb through access descriptor for stage-1 Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 11/22] KVM: arm64: Use a struct for stage-1 walk context Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 12/22] KVM: arm64: Create helper for stage-1 descriptor updates Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:55 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 13/22] KVM: arm64: Set dirty state at stage-1 Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:54 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 14/22] KVM: arm64: Grant write permission when DBM is set at S1 Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:57 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 15/22] KVM: arm64: Don't update descriptors for "non-arch" access Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 16/22] KVM: arm64: nv: Expose FEAT_HAFDBS Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 19:01 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 17/22] KVM: arm64: Set Access flag on table descriptors at stage-1 Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 20:56 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 18/22] KVM: arm64: nv: Set access flag on table descriptors at stage-2 Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 19:05 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 20:14 ` Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 19/22] KVM: arm64: nv: Expose FEAT_HAFT Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 19:05 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 20/22] KVM: arm64: selftests: Only test AF behavior for emulated AT insns Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:42 ` [PATCH 21/22] KVM: arm64: selftests: Test AT emulation for FEAT_HAFT Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 19:05 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 20:17 ` Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:42 ` [PATCH 22/22] HACK: KVM: arm64: nv: Set the dirty state for CMOs that fetch for write Oliver Upton
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