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From: Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org>
To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev
Cc: kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 04/22] KVM: arm64: nv: Only shadow writable-dirty guest descs as writable
Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2026 13:05:02 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ajrm7rc4WjemIBxE@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260623185810.08CC61F000E9@smtp.kernel.org>

On Tue, Jun 23, 2026 at 06:58:09PM +0000, sashiko-bot@kernel.org wrote:
> Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
> 
> New issues:
> - [High] Uninitialized or incorrectly evaluated `wr->dirty` field during Stage-1 page table walks causes an infinite VNCR trap loop.
> 
> Pre-existing issues:
> - [High] Write-Only VNCR mappings cause an infinite trap loop because KVM falls back to `PAGE_KERNEL_NONE` but considers write faults resolved.
> --
> 
> commit fb5a66a1eb4ac6175aad6cbbd38f45328f4f937b
> Author: Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org>
> 
> KVM: arm64: nv: Only shadow writable-dirty guest descs as writable
>     
> KVM will soon add support for hardware dirty state management for nested
> guests. In order to emulate dirty state transitions on the guest
> desciptor, KVM will need to use read-only hardware mappings and re-walk
> the guest page tables upon taking a permission fault.
>     
> Prepare by limiting shadow stage-2 and shadow VNCR translations to
> read-only for writable-clean guest translations.
> 
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c
> > index 86b499e7a9a06..7a84495a2e6d4 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c
> [ ... ]
> > @@ -1317,6 +1317,7 @@ static void compute_s1_permissions(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> >  			  (pan3_enabled(vcpu, wi->regime) && wr->ux));
> >  	wr->pw &= !pan;
> >  	wr->pr &= !pan;
> > +	wr->dirty = !(wr->desc & BIT(7));
> 
> [Severity: High]
> Could the unconditional use of BIT(7) here cause issues when S1PIE is
> enabled?
> 
> With S1PIE, BIT(7) becomes PIIndex[3], so using it to evaluate the dirty
> state might be incorrect.

Bit 7 is nDirty when using indirect permissions, so this is wrong.

Thanks,
Oliver

  reply	other threads:[~2026-06-23 20:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-06-23 18:41 [PATCH 00/22] KVM: arm64: nv: Implement FEAT_HAFDBS, FEAT_HAFT Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 01/22] KVM: arm64: nv: Introduce struct for stage-2 walk step Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 02/22] KVM: arm64: nv: Consolidate computation of stage-2 permissions Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:57   ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 03/22] KVM: arm64: nv: Get rid of kvm_s2_trans*() accessors Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 04/22] KVM: arm64: nv: Only shadow writable-dirty guest descs as writable Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:58   ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 20:05     ` Oliver Upton [this message]
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 05/22] KVM: arm64: nv: Pass an access descriptor for stage-2 walks Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 19:06   ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 06/22] KVM: arm64: nv: Use a helper for stage-2 descriptor updates Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 07/22] KVM: arm64: nv: Set dirty state at stage-2 Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 19:03   ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 08/22] KVM: arm64: nv: Treat DBM as writable " Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:55   ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 20:08     ` Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 09/22] KVM: arm64: Compute S1 permissions as part of s1_walk() Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 10/22] KVM: arm64: Plumb through access descriptor for stage-1 Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 11/22] KVM: arm64: Use a struct for stage-1 walk context Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 12/22] KVM: arm64: Create helper for stage-1 descriptor updates Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:55   ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 13/22] KVM: arm64: Set dirty state at stage-1 Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:54   ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 14/22] KVM: arm64: Grant write permission when DBM is set at S1 Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:57   ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 15/22] KVM: arm64: Don't update descriptors for "non-arch" access Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 16/22] KVM: arm64: nv: Expose FEAT_HAFDBS Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 19:01   ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 17/22] KVM: arm64: Set Access flag on table descriptors at stage-1 Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 20:56   ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 18/22] KVM: arm64: nv: Set access flag on table descriptors at stage-2 Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 19:05   ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 20:14     ` Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 19/22] KVM: arm64: nv: Expose FEAT_HAFT Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 19:05   ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 18:41 ` [PATCH 20/22] KVM: arm64: selftests: Only test AF behavior for emulated AT insns Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:42 ` [PATCH 21/22] KVM: arm64: selftests: Test AT emulation for FEAT_HAFT Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 19:05   ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 20:17     ` Oliver Upton
2026-06-23 18:42 ` [PATCH 22/22] HACK: KVM: arm64: nv: Set the dirty state for CMOs that fetch for write Oliver Upton

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