From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Zhentao Guo" <zhentao.guo@amlogic.com>
Cc: devicetree@vger.kernel.org, neil.armstrong@linaro.org,
robh@kernel.org, conor+dt@kernel.org,
linux-amlogic@lists.infradead.org, media-ci@linuxtv.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/6] firmware: meson: sm: video firmware loading via secure monitor
Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2026 08:43:31 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260831084331.86B4F1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260831-b4-s4-vdec-upstream-v8-1-830195b9bd91@amlogic.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Information leak in `serial_show` due to uninitialized kernel heap memory being exposed on short reads.
--
commit 024494408ffd3466033a6280dd28a958f93f1072
Author: Zhentao Guo <zhentao.guo@amlogic.com>
firmware: meson: sm: video firmware loading via secure monitor
Add SM_LOAD_VIDEO_FW to the secure monitor command enum to allow decoder
drivers to load firmware through the meson_sm interface.
> diff --git a/include/linux/firmware/meson/meson_sm.h b/include/linux/firmware/meson/meson_sm.h
> index 3ebc2bd9a9760..3b90b49d05529 100644
> --- a/include/linux/firmware/meson/meson_sm.h
> +++ b/include/linux/firmware/meson/meson_sm.h
> @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ enum {
> SM_THERMAL_CALIB_READ,
> SM_A1_PWRC_SET,
> SM_A1_PWRC_GET,
> + SM_LOAD_VIDEO_FW,
> };
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but while reviewing this secure monitor
addition I noticed a potential information leak in serial_show() in
drivers/firmware/meson/meson_sm.c.
Could a short read in meson_sm_call_read() leak uninitialized kernel memory
to unprivileged local users reading the sysfs serial attribute?
drivers/firmware/meson/meson_sm.c:serial_show() {
...
id_buf = kmalloc(SM_CHIP_ID_LENGTH, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!id_buf)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = meson_sm_call_read(fw, id_buf, SM_CHIP_ID_LENGTH, SM_GET_CHIP_ID,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
if (ret < 0) {
kfree(id_buf);
return ret;
}
ret = sprintf(buf, "%12phN\n", &id_buf[SM_CHIP_ID_OFFSET]);
...
}
If the secure monitor returns a positive size smaller than 16,
meson_sm_call_read() only copies those bytes. The check for ret < 0 will
not catch this short read.
Because id_buf is allocated without zeroing and the sysfs attribute is
world-readable (DEVICE_ATTR_RO), sprintf() will unconditionally format 12
bytes starting at SM_CHIP_ID_OFFSET, which could expose uninitialized
kernel heap memory.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260831-b4-s4-vdec-upstream-v8-0-830195b9bd91@amlogic.com?part=1
_______________________________________________
linux-amlogic mailing list
linux-amlogic@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-amlogic
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Zhentao Guo" <zhentao.guo@amlogic.com>
Cc: devicetree@vger.kernel.org, neil.armstrong@linaro.org,
robh@kernel.org, conor+dt@kernel.org,
linux-amlogic@lists.infradead.org, media-ci@linuxtv.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/6] firmware: meson: sm: video firmware loading via secure monitor
Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2026 08:43:31 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260831084331.86B4F1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260831-b4-s4-vdec-upstream-v8-1-830195b9bd91@amlogic.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Information leak in `serial_show` due to uninitialized kernel heap memory being exposed on short reads.
--
commit 024494408ffd3466033a6280dd28a958f93f1072
Author: Zhentao Guo <zhentao.guo@amlogic.com>
firmware: meson: sm: video firmware loading via secure monitor
Add SM_LOAD_VIDEO_FW to the secure monitor command enum to allow decoder
drivers to load firmware through the meson_sm interface.
> diff --git a/include/linux/firmware/meson/meson_sm.h b/include/linux/firmware/meson/meson_sm.h
> index 3ebc2bd9a9760..3b90b49d05529 100644
> --- a/include/linux/firmware/meson/meson_sm.h
> +++ b/include/linux/firmware/meson/meson_sm.h
> @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ enum {
> SM_THERMAL_CALIB_READ,
> SM_A1_PWRC_SET,
> SM_A1_PWRC_GET,
> + SM_LOAD_VIDEO_FW,
> };
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but while reviewing this secure monitor
addition I noticed a potential information leak in serial_show() in
drivers/firmware/meson/meson_sm.c.
Could a short read in meson_sm_call_read() leak uninitialized kernel memory
to unprivileged local users reading the sysfs serial attribute?
drivers/firmware/meson/meson_sm.c:serial_show() {
...
id_buf = kmalloc(SM_CHIP_ID_LENGTH, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!id_buf)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = meson_sm_call_read(fw, id_buf, SM_CHIP_ID_LENGTH, SM_GET_CHIP_ID,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
if (ret < 0) {
kfree(id_buf);
return ret;
}
ret = sprintf(buf, "%12phN\n", &id_buf[SM_CHIP_ID_OFFSET]);
...
}
If the secure monitor returns a positive size smaller than 16,
meson_sm_call_read() only copies those bytes. The check for ret < 0 will
not catch this short read.
Because id_buf is allocated without zeroing and the sysfs attribute is
world-readable (DEVICE_ATTR_RO), sprintf() will unconditionally format 12
bytes starting at SM_CHIP_ID_OFFSET, which could expose uninitialized
kernel heap memory.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260831-b4-s4-vdec-upstream-v8-0-830195b9bd91@amlogic.com?part=1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-31 8:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-31 8:32 [PATCH v8 0/6] Add Amlogic stateless H.264 video decoder for S4 Zhentao Guo via B4 Relay
2026-08-31 8:32 ` Zhentao Guo
2026-08-31 8:32 ` Zhentao Guo via B4 Relay
2026-08-31 8:32 ` [PATCH v8 1/6] firmware: meson: sm: video firmware loading via secure monitor Zhentao Guo via B4 Relay
2026-08-31 8:32 ` Zhentao Guo
2026-08-31 8:32 ` Zhentao Guo via B4 Relay
2026-08-31 8:43 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-08-31 8:43 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 8:32 ` [PATCH v8 2/6] firmware: meson: sm: Add video firmware loading SMC call Zhentao Guo via B4 Relay
2026-08-31 8:32 ` Zhentao Guo
2026-08-31 8:32 ` Zhentao Guo via B4 Relay
2026-08-31 8:45 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 8:45 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 8:32 ` [PATCH v8 3/6] media: dt-bindings: Add Amlogic V4L2 video decoder Zhentao Guo via B4 Relay
2026-08-31 8:32 ` Zhentao Guo
2026-08-31 8:32 ` Zhentao Guo via B4 Relay
2026-08-31 8:42 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 8:42 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 16:04 ` Conor Dooley
2026-08-31 16:04 ` Conor Dooley
2026-09-01 2:16 ` Zhentao Guo
2026-09-01 2:16 ` Zhentao Guo
2026-08-31 8:32 ` [PATCH v8 4/6] decoder: Add V4L2 stateless H.264 decoder driver Zhentao Guo via B4 Relay
2026-08-31 8:32 ` Zhentao Guo
2026-08-31 8:32 ` Zhentao Guo via B4 Relay
2026-08-31 8:56 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 8:56 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 8:32 ` [PATCH v8 5/6] arm64: dts: amlogic: Add video decoder driver support for S4 SOCs Zhentao Guo via B4 Relay
2026-08-31 8:32 ` Zhentao Guo
2026-08-31 8:32 ` Zhentao Guo via B4 Relay
2026-08-31 8:32 ` [PATCH v8 6/6] arm64: defconfig: Enable CONFIG_VIDEO_AMLOGIC_VDEC Zhentao Guo via B4 Relay
2026-08-31 8:32 ` Zhentao Guo
2026-08-31 8:32 ` Zhentao Guo via B4 Relay
2026-08-31 8:58 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 8:58 ` sashiko-bot
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20260831084331.86B4F1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org \
--to=sashiko-bot@kernel.org \
--cc=conor+dt@kernel.org \
--cc=devicetree@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-amlogic@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=media-ci@linuxtv.org \
--cc=neil.armstrong@linaro.org \
--cc=robh@kernel.org \
--cc=sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=zhentao.guo@amlogic.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.