* [PATCH v2 01/15] xen/arm: kernel: Don't hardcode flash address
2014-03-17 14:05 [PATCH v2 00/15] Add support for XSM Julien Grall
@ 2014-03-17 14:05 ` Julien Grall
2014-03-17 14:05 ` [PATCH v2 02/15] xen/arm: Remove the parameter "attrindx" in copy_from_paddr Julien Grall
` (14 subsequent siblings)
15 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Julien Grall @ 2014-03-17 14:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel; +Cc: stefano.stabellini, Julien Grall, tim, ian.campbell
Xen is loaded either by U-boot or the bootwrapper. Both of them
correctly set xen multiboot module for the kernel in the device tree.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
---
Changes in v2:
- Fix typo in commit title
---
xen/arch/arm/kernel.c | 29 ++++++++++-------------------
xen/arch/arm/kernel.h | 1 -
2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/kernel.c b/xen/arch/arm/kernel.c
index 1e3107d..492ce6d 100644
--- a/xen/arch/arm/kernel.c
+++ b/xen/arch/arm/kernel.c
@@ -16,10 +16,6 @@
#include "kernel.h"
-/* Store kernel in first 8M of flash */
-#define KERNEL_FLASH_ADDRESS 0x00000000UL
-#define KERNEL_FLASH_SIZE 0x00800000UL
-
#define ZIMAGE32_MAGIC_OFFSET 0x24
#define ZIMAGE32_START_OFFSET 0x28
#define ZIMAGE32_END_OFFSET 0x2c
@@ -124,7 +120,6 @@ static void kernel_zimage_load(struct kernel_info *info)
{
paddr_t load_addr = info->zimage.load_addr;
paddr_t paddr = info->zimage.kernel_addr;
- paddr_t attr = info->load_attr;
paddr_t len = info->zimage.len;
unsigned long offs;
@@ -150,7 +145,7 @@ static void kernel_zimage_load(struct kernel_info *info)
dst = map_domain_page(ma>>PAGE_SHIFT);
- copy_from_paddr(dst + s, paddr + offs, l, attr);
+ copy_from_paddr(dst + s, paddr + offs, l, BUFFERABLE);
unmap_domain_page(dst);
offs += l;
@@ -316,7 +311,7 @@ static int kernel_try_elf_prepare(struct kernel_info *info,
if ( info->kernel_img == NULL )
panic("Cannot allocate temporary buffer for kernel");
- copy_from_paddr(info->kernel_img, addr, size, info->load_attr);
+ copy_from_paddr(info->kernel_img, addr, size, BUFFERABLE);
if ( (rc = elf_init(&info->elf.elf, info->kernel_img, size )) != 0 )
goto err;
@@ -367,21 +362,17 @@ int kernel_prepare(struct kernel_info *info)
paddr_t start, size;
- if ( early_info.modules.nr_mods < MOD_KERNEL )
- {
- printk("No boot modules found, trying flash\n");
- start = KERNEL_FLASH_ADDRESS;
- size = KERNEL_FLASH_SIZE;
- info->load_attr = DEV_SHARED;
- }
- else
+ start = early_info.modules.module[MOD_KERNEL].start;
+ size = early_info.modules.module[MOD_KERNEL].size;
+
+ if ( !size )
{
- printk("Loading kernel from boot module %d\n", MOD_KERNEL);
- start = early_info.modules.module[MOD_KERNEL].start;
- size = early_info.modules.module[MOD_KERNEL].size;
- info->load_attr = BUFFERABLE;
+ printk(XENLOG_ERR "Missing kernel boot module?\n");
+ return -ENOENT;
}
+ printk("Loading kernel from boot module %d\n", MOD_KERNEL);
+
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_64
rc = kernel_try_zimage64_prepare(info, start, size);
if (rc < 0)
diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/kernel.h b/xen/arch/arm/kernel.h
index b48c2c9..ad2956b 100644
--- a/xen/arch/arm/kernel.h
+++ b/xen/arch/arm/kernel.h
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ struct kernel_info {
};
void (*load)(struct kernel_info *info);
- int load_attr;
};
int kernel_prepare(struct kernel_info *info);
--
1.7.10.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 02/15] xen/arm: Remove the parameter "attrindx" in copy_from_paddr
2014-03-17 14:05 [PATCH v2 00/15] Add support for XSM Julien Grall
2014-03-17 14:05 ` [PATCH v2 01/15] xen/arm: kernel: Don't hardcode flash address Julien Grall
@ 2014-03-17 14:05 ` Julien Grall
2014-03-18 17:18 ` Ian Campbell
2014-03-17 14:05 ` [PATCH v2 03/15] xen/arm: Correctly define size_t Julien Grall
` (13 subsequent siblings)
15 siblings, 1 reply; 28+ messages in thread
From: Julien Grall @ 2014-03-17 14:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel; +Cc: stefano.stabellini, Julien Grall, tim, ian.campbell
copy_from_paddr is only used with BUFFERABLE, there is some place where
DEV_SHARED was used by mistake.
The parameter "attrindx" can be safely remove and let copy_from_paddr to map
every page with BUFFERABLE attribute.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
---
Changes in v2:
- s/copy_paddr/copy_from_paddr/ in commit message
- Fix compilation on ARM64 (forgot to remove one BUFFERABLE in setup.c)
---
xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c | 2 +-
xen/arch/arm/kernel.c | 15 +++++++--------
xen/arch/arm/setup.c | 4 ++--
xen/include/asm-arm/setup.h | 2 +-
4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c b/xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c
index 5ca2f15..7bb2c28 100644
--- a/xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c
+++ b/xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c
@@ -976,7 +976,7 @@ static void initrd_load(struct kernel_info *kinfo)
dst = map_domain_page(ma>>PAGE_SHIFT);
- copy_from_paddr(dst + s, paddr + offs, l, BUFFERABLE);
+ copy_from_paddr(dst + s, paddr + offs, l);
unmap_domain_page(dst);
offs += l;
diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/kernel.c b/xen/arch/arm/kernel.c
index 492ce6d..0bc7eb1 100644
--- a/xen/arch/arm/kernel.c
+++ b/xen/arch/arm/kernel.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ struct minimal_dtb_header {
* @paddr: source physical address
* @len: length to copy
*/
-void copy_from_paddr(void *dst, paddr_t paddr, unsigned long len, int attrindx)
+void copy_from_paddr(void *dst, paddr_t paddr, unsigned long len)
{
void *src = (void *)FIXMAP_ADDR(FIXMAP_MISC);
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ void copy_from_paddr(void *dst, paddr_t paddr, unsigned long len, int attrindx)
s = paddr & (PAGE_SIZE-1);
l = min(PAGE_SIZE - s, len);
- set_fixmap(FIXMAP_MISC, p, attrindx);
+ set_fixmap(FIXMAP_MISC, p, BUFFERABLE);
memcpy(dst, src + s, l);
clean_xen_dcache_va_range(dst, l);
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static void kernel_zimage_load(struct kernel_info *info)
dst = map_domain_page(ma>>PAGE_SHIFT);
- copy_from_paddr(dst + s, paddr + offs, l, BUFFERABLE);
+ copy_from_paddr(dst + s, paddr + offs, l);
unmap_domain_page(dst);
offs += l;
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ static int kernel_try_zimage64_prepare(struct kernel_info *info,
if ( size < sizeof(zimage) )
return -EINVAL;
- copy_from_paddr(&zimage, addr, sizeof(zimage), DEV_SHARED);
+ copy_from_paddr(&zimage, addr, sizeof(zimage));
if ( zimage.magic0 != ZIMAGE64_MAGIC_V0 &&
zimage.magic1 != ZIMAGE64_MAGIC_V1 )
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ static int kernel_try_zimage32_prepare(struct kernel_info *info,
if ( size < ZIMAGE32_HEADER_LEN )
return -EINVAL;
- copy_from_paddr(zimage, addr, sizeof(zimage), DEV_SHARED);
+ copy_from_paddr(zimage, addr, sizeof(zimage));
if (zimage[ZIMAGE32_MAGIC_OFFSET/4] != ZIMAGE32_MAGIC)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -239,8 +239,7 @@ static int kernel_try_zimage32_prepare(struct kernel_info *info,
*/
if ( addr + end - start + sizeof(dtb_hdr) <= size )
{
- copy_from_paddr(&dtb_hdr, addr + end - start,
- sizeof(dtb_hdr), DEV_SHARED);
+ copy_from_paddr(&dtb_hdr, addr + end - start, sizeof(dtb_hdr));
if (be32_to_cpu(dtb_hdr.magic) == DTB_MAGIC) {
end += be32_to_cpu(dtb_hdr.total_size);
@@ -311,7 +310,7 @@ static int kernel_try_elf_prepare(struct kernel_info *info,
if ( info->kernel_img == NULL )
panic("Cannot allocate temporary buffer for kernel");
- copy_from_paddr(info->kernel_img, addr, size, BUFFERABLE);
+ copy_from_paddr(info->kernel_img, addr, size);
if ( (rc = elf_init(&info->elf.elf, info->kernel_img, size )) != 0 )
goto err;
diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/setup.c b/xen/arch/arm/setup.c
index 4a3016a..d59e7f8 100644
--- a/xen/arch/arm/setup.c
+++ b/xen/arch/arm/setup.c
@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ static void __init setup_mm(unsigned long dtb_paddr, size_t dtb_size)
/* Copy the DTB. */
fdt = mfn_to_virt(alloc_boot_pages(dtb_pages, 1));
- copy_from_paddr(fdt, dtb_paddr, dtb_size, BUFFERABLE);
+ copy_from_paddr(fdt, dtb_paddr, dtb_size);
device_tree_flattened = fdt;
/* Add non-xenheap memory */
@@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ static void __init setup_mm(unsigned long dtb_paddr, size_t dtb_size)
/* Copy the DTB. */
fdt = mfn_to_virt(alloc_boot_pages(dtb_pages, 1));
- copy_from_paddr(fdt, dtb_paddr, dtb_size, BUFFERABLE);
+ copy_from_paddr(fdt, dtb_paddr, dtb_size);
device_tree_flattened = fdt;
setup_frametable_mappings(ram_start, ram_end);
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-arm/setup.h b/xen/include/asm-arm/setup.h
index 44a3b4d..b09f688 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-arm/setup.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/setup.h
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
void arch_init_memory(void);
-void copy_from_paddr(void *dst, paddr_t paddr, unsigned long len, int attrindx);
+void copy_from_paddr(void *dst, paddr_t paddr, unsigned long len);
void arch_get_xen_caps(xen_capabilities_info_t *info);
--
1.7.10.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 03/15] xen/arm: Correctly define size_t
2014-03-17 14:05 [PATCH v2 00/15] Add support for XSM Julien Grall
2014-03-17 14:05 ` [PATCH v2 01/15] xen/arm: kernel: Don't hardcode flash address Julien Grall
2014-03-17 14:05 ` [PATCH v2 02/15] xen/arm: Remove the parameter "attrindx" in copy_from_paddr Julien Grall
@ 2014-03-17 14:05 ` Julien Grall
2014-03-17 14:05 ` [PATCH v2 04/15] xen/arm: next_module: Skip module if the size is 0 Julien Grall
` (12 subsequent siblings)
15 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Julien Grall @ 2014-03-17 14:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel; +Cc: stefano.stabellini, Julien Grall, tim, ian.campbell
Flask code use %zu to print size_t variable. On ARM, size_t always defined
to unsigned long which make ARM build failed.
Fix it by using __SIZE_TYPE__.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
---
xen/include/asm-arm/types.h | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-arm/types.h b/xen/include/asm-arm/types.h
index 6875a62..183f3e0 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-arm/types.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/types.h
@@ -55,7 +55,11 @@ typedef u64 register_t;
#define PRIregister "lx"
#endif
+#if defined(__SIZE_TYPE__)
+typedef __SIZE_TYPE__ size_t;
+#else
typedef unsigned long size_t;
+#endif
typedef char bool_t;
#define test_and_set_bool(b) xchg(&(b), 1)
--
1.7.10.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 04/15] xen/arm: next_module: Skip module if the size is 0
2014-03-17 14:05 [PATCH v2 00/15] Add support for XSM Julien Grall
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2014-03-17 14:05 ` [PATCH v2 03/15] xen/arm: Correctly define size_t Julien Grall
@ 2014-03-17 14:05 ` Julien Grall
2014-03-17 14:05 ` [PATCH v2 05/15] xen/xsm: xsm functions for PCI passthrough is not x86 specific Julien Grall
` (11 subsequent siblings)
15 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Julien Grall @ 2014-03-17 14:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel; +Cc: stefano.stabellini, Julien Grall, tim, ian.campbell
When the the module size is 0, it means that the module was not provided by
the user. It can happen, if the user choose to boot without initrd.
In this case, both fields (start and size) are zeroed. Therefore, next_module
will return 0 every time if there is other non-zero module after this one. This
can happen when the XSM module is added.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
---
Changes in v2:
- Fix typo in commit message
---
xen/arch/arm/setup.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/setup.c b/xen/arch/arm/setup.c
index d59e7f8..215ec24 100644
--- a/xen/arch/arm/setup.c
+++ b/xen/arch/arm/setup.c
@@ -284,6 +284,9 @@ static paddr_t __init next_module(paddr_t s, paddr_t *end)
paddr_t mod_s = mi->module[i].start;
paddr_t mod_e = mod_s + mi->module[i].size;
+ if ( !mi->module[i].size )
+ continue;
+
if ( mod_s < s )
continue;
if ( mod_s > lowest )
--
1.7.10.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 05/15] xen/xsm: xsm functions for PCI passthrough is not x86 specific
2014-03-17 14:05 [PATCH v2 00/15] Add support for XSM Julien Grall
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2014-03-17 14:05 ` [PATCH v2 04/15] xen/arm: next_module: Skip module if the size is 0 Julien Grall
@ 2014-03-17 14:05 ` Julien Grall
2014-03-17 14:05 ` [PATCH v2 06/15] xen/xsm: xsm_do_mca is " Julien Grall
` (10 subsequent siblings)
15 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Julien Grall @ 2014-03-17 14:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel; +Cc: stefano.stabellini, Julien Grall, tim, ian.campbell
Protect xsm functions for PCI passthrough by HAS_PASSTHROUGH && HAS_PCI
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Ian campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
---
xen/include/xsm/dummy.h | 3 +
xen/include/xsm/xsm.h | 4 ++
xen/xsm/dummy.c | 2 +
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c | 143 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
4 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
index 3bcd941..76f9280 100644
--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
@@ -317,6 +317,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int xsm_set_pod_target(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d)
return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
}
+#if defined(HAS_PASSTHROUGH) && defined(HAS_PCI)
static XSM_INLINE int xsm_get_device_group(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG uint32_t machine_bdf)
{
XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
@@ -341,6 +342,8 @@ static XSM_INLINE int xsm_deassign_device(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, uint
return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
}
+#endif /* HAS_PASSTHROUGH && HAS_PCI */
+
static XSM_INLINE int xsm_resource_plug_core(XSM_DEFAULT_VOID)
{
XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
index de9cf86..11218b6 100644
--- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
+++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
@@ -111,10 +111,12 @@ struct xsm_operations {
int (*iomem_mapping) (struct domain *d, uint64_t s, uint64_t e, uint8_t allow);
int (*pci_config_permission) (struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf, uint16_t start, uint16_t end, uint8_t access);
+#if defined(HAS_PASSTHROUGH) && defined(HAS_PCI)
int (*get_device_group) (uint32_t machine_bdf);
int (*test_assign_device) (uint32_t machine_bdf);
int (*assign_device) (struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf);
int (*deassign_device) (struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf);
+#endif
int (*resource_plug_core) (void);
int (*resource_unplug_core) (void);
@@ -427,6 +429,7 @@ static inline int xsm_pci_config_permission (xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d
return xsm_ops->pci_config_permission(d, machine_bdf, start, end, access);
}
+#if defined(HAS_PASSTHROUGH) && defined(HAS_PCI)
static inline int xsm_get_device_group(xsm_default_t def, uint32_t machine_bdf)
{
return xsm_ops->get_device_group(machine_bdf);
@@ -446,6 +449,7 @@ static inline int xsm_deassign_device(xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, uint3
{
return xsm_ops->deassign_device(d, machine_bdf);
}
+#endif /* HAS_PASSTHROUGH && HAS_PCI) */
static inline int xsm_resource_plug_pci (xsm_default_t def, uint32_t machine_bdf)
{
diff --git a/xen/xsm/dummy.c b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
index 3fe4c59..627edcc 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/dummy.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
@@ -85,10 +85,12 @@ void xsm_fixup_ops (struct xsm_operations *ops)
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, iomem_mapping);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, pci_config_permission);
+#if defined(HAS_PASSTHROUGH) && defined(HAS_PCI)
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, get_device_group);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, test_assign_device);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, assign_device);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, deassign_device);
+#endif
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, resource_plug_core);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, resource_unplug_core);
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
index 96276ac..7329f31 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
@@ -1102,6 +1102,72 @@ static int flask_hvm_param_nested(struct domain *d)
return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_HVM, HVM__NESTED);
}
+#if defined(HAS_PASSTHROUGH) && defined(HAS_PCI)
+static int flask_get_device_group(uint32_t machine_bdf)
+{
+ u32 rsid;
+ int rc = -EPERM;
+
+ rc = security_device_sid(machine_bdf, &rsid);
+ if ( rc )
+ return rc;
+
+ return avc_current_has_perm(rsid, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, RESOURCE__STAT_DEVICE, NULL);
+}
+
+static int flask_test_assign_device(uint32_t machine_bdf)
+{
+ u32 rsid;
+ int rc = -EPERM;
+
+ rc = security_device_sid(machine_bdf, &rsid);
+ if ( rc )
+ return rc;
+
+ return avc_current_has_perm(rsid, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, RESOURCE__STAT_DEVICE, NULL);
+}
+
+static int flask_assign_device(struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf)
+{
+ u32 dsid, rsid;
+ int rc = -EPERM;
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+
+ rc = current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, RESOURCE__ADD);
+ if ( rc )
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = security_device_sid(machine_bdf, &rsid);
+ if ( rc )
+ return rc;
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DEV);
+ ad.device = (unsigned long) machine_bdf;
+ rc = avc_current_has_perm(rsid, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, RESOURCE__ADD_DEVICE, &ad);
+ if ( rc )
+ return rc;
+
+ dsid = domain_sid(d);
+ return avc_has_perm(dsid, rsid, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, RESOURCE__USE, &ad);
+}
+
+static int flask_deassign_device(struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf)
+{
+ u32 rsid;
+ int rc = -EPERM;
+
+ rc = current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, RESOURCE__REMOVE);
+ if ( rc )
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = security_device_sid(machine_bdf, &rsid);
+ if ( rc )
+ return rc;
+
+ return avc_current_has_perm(rsid, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, RESOURCE__REMOVE_DEVICE, NULL);
+}
+#endif /* HAS_PASSTHROUGH && HAS_PCI */
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86
static int flask_shadow_control(struct domain *d, uint32_t op)
{
@@ -1355,70 +1421,6 @@ static int flask_priv_mapping(struct domain *d, struct domain *t)
return domain_has_perm(d, t, SECCLASS_MMU, MMU__TARGET_HACK);
}
-static int flask_get_device_group(uint32_t machine_bdf)
-{
- u32 rsid;
- int rc = -EPERM;
-
- rc = security_device_sid(machine_bdf, &rsid);
- if ( rc )
- return rc;
-
- return avc_current_has_perm(rsid, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, RESOURCE__STAT_DEVICE, NULL);
-}
-
-static int flask_test_assign_device(uint32_t machine_bdf)
-{
- u32 rsid;
- int rc = -EPERM;
-
- rc = security_device_sid(machine_bdf, &rsid);
- if ( rc )
- return rc;
-
- return avc_current_has_perm(rsid, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, RESOURCE__STAT_DEVICE, NULL);
-}
-
-static int flask_assign_device(struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf)
-{
- u32 dsid, rsid;
- int rc = -EPERM;
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
-
- rc = current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, RESOURCE__ADD);
- if ( rc )
- return rc;
-
- rc = security_device_sid(machine_bdf, &rsid);
- if ( rc )
- return rc;
-
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DEV);
- ad.device = (unsigned long) machine_bdf;
- rc = avc_current_has_perm(rsid, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, RESOURCE__ADD_DEVICE, &ad);
- if ( rc )
- return rc;
-
- dsid = domain_sid(d);
- return avc_has_perm(dsid, rsid, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, RESOURCE__USE, &ad);
-}
-
-static int flask_deassign_device(struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf)
-{
- u32 rsid;
- int rc = -EPERM;
-
- rc = current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, RESOURCE__REMOVE);
- if ( rc )
- return rc;
-
- rc = security_device_sid(machine_bdf, &rsid);
- if ( rc )
- return rc;
-
- return avc_current_has_perm(rsid, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, RESOURCE__REMOVE_DEVICE, NULL);
-}
-
static int flask_bind_pt_irq (struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_bind_pt_irq *bind)
{
u32 dsid, rsid;
@@ -1540,6 +1542,14 @@ static struct xsm_operations flask_ops = {
.add_to_physmap = flask_add_to_physmap,
.remove_from_physmap = flask_remove_from_physmap,
+
+#if defined(HAS_PASSTHROUGH) && defined(HAS_PCI)
+ .get_device_group = flask_get_device_group,
+ .test_assign_device = flask_test_assign_device,
+ .assign_device = flask_assign_device,
+ .deassign_device = flask_deassign_device,
+#endif
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86
.shadow_control = flask_shadow_control,
.hvm_set_pci_intx_level = flask_hvm_set_pci_intx_level,
@@ -1557,15 +1567,12 @@ static struct xsm_operations flask_ops = {
.mmuext_op = flask_mmuext_op,
.update_va_mapping = flask_update_va_mapping,
.priv_mapping = flask_priv_mapping,
- .get_device_group = flask_get_device_group,
- .test_assign_device = flask_test_assign_device,
- .assign_device = flask_assign_device,
- .deassign_device = flask_deassign_device,
.bind_pt_irq = flask_bind_pt_irq,
.unbind_pt_irq = flask_unbind_pt_irq,
.ioport_permission = flask_ioport_permission,
.ioport_mapping = flask_ioport_mapping,
#endif
+
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM
.map_gmfn_foreign = flask_map_gmfn_foreign,
#endif
--
1.7.10.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 06/15] xen/xsm: xsm_do_mca is x86 specific
2014-03-17 14:05 [PATCH v2 00/15] Add support for XSM Julien Grall
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2014-03-17 14:05 ` [PATCH v2 05/15] xen/xsm: xsm functions for PCI passthrough is not x86 specific Julien Grall
@ 2014-03-17 14:05 ` Julien Grall
2014-03-17 14:05 ` [PATCH v2 07/15] xen/xsm: flask: Fix compilation when CONFIG_COMPAT=n Julien Grall
` (9 subsequent siblings)
15 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Julien Grall @ 2014-03-17 14:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel; +Cc: stefano.stabellini, Julien Grall, tim, ian.campbell
xsm_do_mca is only used by x86. Only define the function for x86 to
avoid usage on ARM.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
---
xen/include/xsm/dummy.h | 12 ++++++------
xen/include/xsm/xsm.h | 12 ++++++------
xen/xsm/dummy.c | 2 +-
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c | 12 ++++++------
4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
index 76f9280..e722155 100644
--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
@@ -140,12 +140,6 @@ static XSM_INLINE int xsm_readconsole(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG uint32_t clear)
return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, NULL);
}
-static XSM_INLINE int xsm_do_mca(XSM_DEFAULT_VOID)
-{
- XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_PRIV);
- return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, NULL);
-}
-
static XSM_INLINE int xsm_alloc_security_domain(struct domain *d)
{
return 0;
@@ -496,6 +490,12 @@ static XSM_INLINE int xsm_hvm_param_nested(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d)
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86
+static XSM_INLINE int xsm_do_mca(XSM_DEFAULT_VOID)
+{
+ XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_PRIV);
+ return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, NULL);
+}
+
static XSM_INLINE int xsm_shadow_control(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, uint32_t op)
{
XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
index 11218b6..15acb3b 100644
--- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
+++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
@@ -61,7 +61,6 @@ struct xsm_operations {
int (*domctl) (struct domain *d, int cmd);
int (*sysctl) (int cmd);
int (*readconsole) (uint32_t clear);
- int (*do_mca) (void);
int (*evtchn_unbound) (struct domain *d, struct evtchn *chn, domid_t id2);
int (*evtchn_interdomain) (struct domain *d1, struct evtchn *chn1,
@@ -139,6 +138,7 @@ struct xsm_operations {
int (*hvm_param_nested) (struct domain *d);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86
+ int (*do_mca) (void);
int (*shadow_control) (struct domain *d, uint32_t op);
int (*hvm_set_pci_intx_level) (struct domain *d);
int (*hvm_set_isa_irq_level) (struct domain *d);
@@ -223,11 +223,6 @@ static inline int xsm_readconsole (xsm_default_t def, uint32_t clear)
return xsm_ops->readconsole(clear);
}
-static inline int xsm_do_mca(xsm_default_t def)
-{
- return xsm_ops->do_mca();
-}
-
static inline int xsm_evtchn_unbound (xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d1, struct evtchn *chn,
domid_t id2)
{
@@ -524,6 +519,11 @@ static inline int xsm_hvm_param_nested (xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d)
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86
+static inline int xsm_do_mca(xsm_default_t def)
+{
+ return xsm_ops->do_mca();
+}
+
static inline int xsm_shadow_control (xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, uint32_t op)
{
return xsm_ops->shadow_control(d, op);
diff --git a/xen/xsm/dummy.c b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
index 627edcc..b79e10f 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/dummy.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
@@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ void xsm_fixup_ops (struct xsm_operations *ops)
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, domctl);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sysctl);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, readconsole);
- set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, do_mca);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, evtchn_unbound);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, evtchn_interdomain);
@@ -115,6 +114,7 @@ void xsm_fixup_ops (struct xsm_operations *ops)
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, remove_from_physmap);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, do_mca);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, shadow_control);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, hvm_set_pci_intx_level);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, hvm_set_isa_irq_level);
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
index 7329f31..65343f3 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
@@ -798,11 +798,6 @@ static int flask_readconsole(uint32_t clear)
return domain_has_xen(current->domain, perms);
}
-static int flask_do_mca(void)
-{
- return domain_has_xen(current->domain, XEN__MCA_OP);
-}
-
static inline u32 resource_to_perm(uint8_t access)
{
if ( access )
@@ -1169,6 +1164,11 @@ static int flask_deassign_device(struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf)
#endif /* HAS_PASSTHROUGH && HAS_PCI */
#ifdef CONFIG_X86
+static int flask_do_mca(void)
+{
+ return domain_has_xen(current->domain, XEN__MCA_OP);
+}
+
static int flask_shadow_control(struct domain *d, uint32_t op)
{
u32 perm;
@@ -1472,7 +1472,6 @@ static struct xsm_operations flask_ops = {
.domctl = flask_domctl,
.sysctl = flask_sysctl,
.readconsole = flask_readconsole,
- .do_mca = flask_do_mca,
.evtchn_unbound = flask_evtchn_unbound,
.evtchn_interdomain = flask_evtchn_interdomain,
@@ -1551,6 +1550,7 @@ static struct xsm_operations flask_ops = {
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86
+ .do_mca = flask_do_mca,
.shadow_control = flask_shadow_control,
.hvm_set_pci_intx_level = flask_hvm_set_pci_intx_level,
.hvm_set_isa_irq_level = flask_hvm_set_isa_irq_level,
--
1.7.10.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 07/15] xen/xsm: flask: Fix compilation when CONFIG_COMPAT=n
2014-03-17 14:05 [PATCH v2 00/15] Add support for XSM Julien Grall
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2014-03-17 14:05 ` [PATCH v2 06/15] xen/xsm: xsm_do_mca is " Julien Grall
@ 2014-03-17 14:05 ` Julien Grall
2014-03-18 17:20 ` Ian Campbell
2014-03-17 14:05 ` [PATCH v2 08/15] xen/xsm: flask: Rename variable "bool" in "b" Julien Grall
` (8 subsequent siblings)
15 siblings, 1 reply; 28+ messages in thread
From: Julien Grall @ 2014-03-17 14:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel; +Cc: stefano.stabellini, Julien Grall, tim, ian.campbell
The commit f7d29f7b "flask: add compat mode guest support" introduces
build breakage on ARM when XSM is enabled. It's because ARM doesn't use
compat mode.
flask_op.c:794:34: fatal error: compat/event_channel.h: No such file or directory
#include <compat/event_channel.h>
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
---
Changes in v2:
- It doesn't compile when CONFIG_COMPAT=n, not y
- Invert both operand of the &&
---
xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c b/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c
index 3b84679..9dd9081 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c
@@ -785,7 +785,7 @@ ret_t do_flask_op(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xsm_op_t) u_flask_op)
return rv;
}
-#ifndef COMPAT
+#if defined(CONFIG_COMPAT) && !defined(COMPAT)
#undef _copy_to_guest
#define _copy_to_guest copy_to_compat
#undef _copy_from_guest
--
1.7.10.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v2 07/15] xen/xsm: flask: Fix compilation when CONFIG_COMPAT=n
2014-03-17 14:05 ` [PATCH v2 07/15] xen/xsm: flask: Fix compilation when CONFIG_COMPAT=n Julien Grall
@ 2014-03-18 17:20 ` Ian Campbell
0 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Ian Campbell @ 2014-03-18 17:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Julien Grall; +Cc: xen-devel, tim, stefano.stabellini
On Mon, 2014-03-17 at 14:05 +0000, Julien Grall wrote:
> The commit f7d29f7b "flask: add compat mode guest support" introduces
> build breakage on ARM when XSM is enabled. It's because ARM doesn't use
> compat mode.
>
> flask_op.c:794:34: fatal error: compat/event_channel.h: No such file or directory
> #include <compat/event_channel.h>
>
> Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
> Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v2 08/15] xen/xsm: flask: Rename variable "bool" in "b"
2014-03-17 14:05 [PATCH v2 00/15] Add support for XSM Julien Grall
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2014-03-17 14:05 ` [PATCH v2 07/15] xen/xsm: flask: Fix compilation when CONFIG_COMPAT=n Julien Grall
@ 2014-03-17 14:05 ` Julien Grall
2014-03-17 14:05 ` [PATCH v2 09/15] xen/xsm: flask: MSI is PCI specific Julien Grall
` (7 subsequent siblings)
15 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Julien Grall @ 2014-03-17 14:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel; +Cc: stefano.stabellini, Julien Grall, tim, ian.campbell
On ARM, the compilation is failing with the following error:
In file included from flask_op.c:21:0:
./include/conditional.h:24:43: error: two or more data types in declaration specifiers
./include/conditional.h:25:42: error: two or more data types in declaration specifiers
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
---
xen/xsm/flask/include/conditional.h | 4 ++--
xen/xsm/flask/ss/services.c | 14 +++++++-------
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/include/conditional.h b/xen/xsm/flask/include/conditional.h
index 043cfd8..9055340 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/include/conditional.h
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/include/conditional.h
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ int security_set_bools(int len, int *values);
int security_find_bool(const char *name);
-char *security_get_bool_name(unsigned int bool);
-int security_get_bool_value(unsigned int bool);
+char *security_get_bool_name(unsigned int b);
+int security_get_bool_value(unsigned int b);
#endif
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/services.c b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/services.c
index aebbec7..59234ff 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/services.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/services.c
@@ -1958,7 +1958,7 @@ out:
return rc;
}
-int security_get_bool_value(unsigned int bool)
+int security_get_bool_value(unsigned int b)
{
int rc = 0;
unsigned int len;
@@ -1966,19 +1966,19 @@ int security_get_bool_value(unsigned int bool)
POLICY_RDLOCK;
len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
- if ( bool >= len )
+ if ( b >= len )
{
rc = -ENOENT;
goto out;
}
- rc = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[bool]->state;
+ rc = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[b]->state;
out:
POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
return rc;
}
-char *security_get_bool_name(unsigned int bool)
+char *security_get_bool_name(unsigned int b)
{
unsigned int len;
char *rv = NULL;
@@ -1986,16 +1986,16 @@ char *security_get_bool_name(unsigned int bool)
POLICY_RDLOCK;
len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
- if ( bool >= len )
+ if ( b >= len )
{
goto out;
}
- len = strlen(policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[bool]) + 1;
+ len = strlen(policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[b]) + 1;
rv = xmalloc_array(char, len);
if ( !rv )
goto out;
- memcpy(rv, policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[bool], len);
+ memcpy(rv, policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[b], len);
out:
POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
return rv;
--
1.7.10.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 09/15] xen/xsm: flask: MSI is PCI specific
2014-03-17 14:05 [PATCH v2 00/15] Add support for XSM Julien Grall
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2014-03-17 14:05 ` [PATCH v2 08/15] xen/xsm: flask: Rename variable "bool" in "b" Julien Grall
@ 2014-03-17 14:05 ` Julien Grall
2014-03-18 17:22 ` Ian Campbell
2014-03-17 14:06 ` [PATCH v2 10/15] xen/xsm: flask: flask_copying_string is taking a XEN_GUEST_HANDLE as first param Julien Grall
` (6 subsequent siblings)
15 siblings, 1 reply; 28+ messages in thread
From: Julien Grall @ 2014-03-17 14:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel; +Cc: stefano.stabellini, Julien Grall, tim, ian.campbell
MSI is not yet support on ARM and will break the compilation when XSM_ENABLE=y.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
---
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
index 65343f3..56c7645 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
@@ -19,7 +19,9 @@
#include <xen/errno.h>
#include <xen/guest_access.h>
#include <xen/xenoprof.h>
+#ifdef HAS_PCI
#include <asm/msi.h>
+#endif
#include <public/xen.h>
#include <public/physdev.h>
#include <public/platform.h>
@@ -100,7 +102,6 @@ static int domain_has_xen(struct domain *d, u32 perms)
static int get_irq_sid(int irq, u32 *sid, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
{
- struct irq_desc *desc = irq_to_desc(irq);
if ( irq >= nr_irqs || irq < 0 )
return -EINVAL;
if ( irq < nr_static_irqs ) {
@@ -110,15 +111,21 @@ static int get_irq_sid(int irq, u32 *sid, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
}
return security_irq_sid(irq, sid);
}
- if ( desc->msi_desc && desc->msi_desc->dev ) {
- struct pci_dev *dev = desc->msi_desc->dev;
- u32 sbdf = (dev->seg << 16) | (dev->bus << 8) | dev->devfn;
- if (ad) {
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(ad, DEV);
- ad->device = sbdf;
+#ifdef HAS_PCI
+ {
+ struct irq_desc *desc = irq_to_desc(irq);
+ if ( desc->msi_desc && desc->msi_desc->dev ) {
+ struct pci_dev *dev = desc->msi_desc->dev;
+ u32 sbdf = (dev->seg << 16) | (dev->bus << 8) | dev->devfn;
+ if (ad) {
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(ad, DEV);
+ ad->device = sbdf;
+ }
+ return security_device_sid(sbdf, sid);
}
- return security_device_sid(sbdf, sid);
}
+#endif
+
if (ad) {
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(ad, IRQ);
ad->irq = irq;
@@ -825,21 +832,34 @@ static int flask_map_domain_pirq (struct domain *d)
return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, RESOURCE__ADD);
}
+static int flask_map_domain_msi (struct domain *d, int irq, void *data,
+ u32 *sid, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+{
+#ifdef HAS_PCI
+ struct msi_info *msi = data;
+
+ u32 machine_bdf = (msi->seg << 16) | (msi->bus << 8) | msi->devfn;
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(ad, DEV);
+ ad->device = machine_bdf;
+
+ return security_device_sid(machine_bdf, sid);
+#else
+ return -EINVAL;
+#endif
+}
+
static int flask_map_domain_irq (struct domain *d, int irq, void *data)
{
u32 sid, dsid;
int rc = -EPERM;
- struct msi_info *msi = data;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
- if ( irq >= nr_static_irqs && msi ) {
- u32 machine_bdf = (msi->seg << 16) | (msi->bus << 8) | msi->devfn;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DEV);
- ad.device = machine_bdf;
- rc = security_device_sid(machine_bdf, &sid);
+ if ( irq >= nr_static_irqs && data ) {
+ rc = flask_map_domain_msi(d, irq, data, &sid, &ad);
} else {
rc = get_irq_sid(irq, &sid, &ad);
}
+
if ( rc )
return rc;
@@ -858,18 +878,30 @@ static int flask_unmap_domain_pirq (struct domain *d)
return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_RESOURCE, RESOURCE__REMOVE);
}
+static int flask_unmap_domain_msi (struct domain *d, int irq, void *data,
+ u32 *sid, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+{
+#ifdef HAS_PCI
+ struct msi_info *msi = data;
+ u32 machine_bdf = (msi->seg << 16) | (msi->bus << 8) | msi->devfn;
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(ad, DEV);
+ ad->device = machine_bdf;
+
+ return security_device_sid(machine_bdf, sid);
+#else
+ return -EINVAL;
+#endif
+}
+
static int flask_unmap_domain_irq (struct domain *d, int irq, void *data)
{
u32 sid;
int rc = -EPERM;
- struct msi_info *msi = data;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
- if ( irq >= nr_static_irqs && msi ) {
- u32 machine_bdf = (msi->seg << 16) | (msi->bus << 8) | msi->devfn;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DEV);
- ad.device = machine_bdf;
- rc = security_device_sid(machine_bdf, &sid);
+ if ( irq >= nr_static_irqs && data ) {
+ rc = flask_unmap_domain_msi(d, irq, data, &sid, &ad);
} else {
rc = get_irq_sid(irq, &sid, &ad);
}
--
1.7.10.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 10/15] xen/xsm: flask: flask_copying_string is taking a XEN_GUEST_HANDLE as first param
2014-03-17 14:05 [PATCH v2 00/15] Add support for XSM Julien Grall
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2014-03-17 14:05 ` [PATCH v2 09/15] xen/xsm: flask: MSI is PCI specific Julien Grall
@ 2014-03-17 14:06 ` Julien Grall
2014-03-17 15:39 ` Jan Beulich
2014-03-17 14:06 ` [PATCH v2 11/15] xen/xsm: flask: Add missing header in hooks.c Julien Grall
` (5 subsequent siblings)
15 siblings, 1 reply; 28+ messages in thread
From: Julien Grall @ 2014-03-17 14:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel; +Cc: stefano.stabellini, Julien Grall, tim, ian.campbell
Rather than x86, on ARM XEN_GUEST_HANDLE and XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM are
not compatible. This will result to a compilation failure on ARM when XSM
will be enabled.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
---
xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c b/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c
index 9dd9081..85a615b 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ static int domain_has_security(struct domain *d, u32 perms)
perms, NULL);
}
-static int flask_copyin_string(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(char) u_buf, char **buf,
+static int flask_copyin_string(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(char) u_buf, char **buf,
size_t size, size_t max_size)
{
char *tmp;
--
1.7.10.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v2 10/15] xen/xsm: flask: flask_copying_string is taking a XEN_GUEST_HANDLE as first param
2014-03-17 14:06 ` [PATCH v2 10/15] xen/xsm: flask: flask_copying_string is taking a XEN_GUEST_HANDLE as first param Julien Grall
@ 2014-03-17 15:39 ` Jan Beulich
2014-03-17 15:46 ` Julien Grall
2014-03-17 17:00 ` Stefano Stabellini
0 siblings, 2 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2014-03-17 15:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stefano.stabellini, Julien Grall; +Cc: xen-devel, tim, ian.campbell
>>> On 17.03.14 at 15:06, Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org> wrote:
> Rather than x86, on ARM XEN_GUEST_HANDLE and XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM are
> not compatible. This will result to a compilation failure on ARM when XSM
> will be enabled.
>
> Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
> Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
> ---
> xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c b/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c
> index 9dd9081..85a615b 100644
> --- a/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c
> +++ b/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c
> @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ static int domain_has_security(struct domain *d, u32 perms)
> perms, NULL);
> }
>
> -static int flask_copyin_string(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(char) u_buf, char **buf,
> +static int flask_copyin_string(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(char) u_buf, char **buf,
Wasn't the original intention for them to be converted when passed
to functions, rather than getting passed verbatim?
Jan
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 10/15] xen/xsm: flask: flask_copying_string is taking a XEN_GUEST_HANDLE as first param
2014-03-17 15:39 ` Jan Beulich
@ 2014-03-17 15:46 ` Julien Grall
2014-03-17 16:33 ` Jan Beulich
2014-03-17 17:00 ` Stefano Stabellini
1 sibling, 1 reply; 28+ messages in thread
From: Julien Grall @ 2014-03-17 15:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jan Beulich; +Cc: xen-devel, stefano.stabellini, ian.campbell, tim
Hi Jan,
On 03/17/2014 03:39 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 17.03.14 at 15:06, Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org> wrote:
>> Rather than x86, on ARM XEN_GUEST_HANDLE and XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM are
>> not compatible. This will result to a compilation failure on ARM when XSM
>> will be enabled.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
>> Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
>> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
>> ---
>> xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c | 2 +-
>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c b/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c
>> index 9dd9081..85a615b 100644
>> --- a/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c
>> +++ b/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c
>> @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ static int domain_has_security(struct domain *d, u32 perms)
>> perms, NULL);
>> }
>>
>> -static int flask_copyin_string(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(char) u_buf, char **buf,
>> +static int flask_copyin_string(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(char) u_buf, char **buf,
>
> Wasn't the original intention for them to be converted when passed
> to functions, rather than getting passed verbatim?
I didn't find any place where the conversation is made. If we are going
to this solution, can you give me pointer on how to do the conversation?
Regards,
--
Julien Grall
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 10/15] xen/xsm: flask: flask_copying_string is taking a XEN_GUEST_HANDLE as first param
2014-03-17 15:46 ` Julien Grall
@ 2014-03-17 16:33 ` Jan Beulich
0 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2014-03-17 16:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Julien Grall; +Cc: xen-devel, stefano.stabellini, ian.campbell, tim
>>> On 17.03.14 at 16:46, Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org> wrote:
> Hi Jan,
>
> On 03/17/2014 03:39 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> On 17.03.14 at 15:06, Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org> wrote:
>>> Rather than x86, on ARM XEN_GUEST_HANDLE and XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM are
>>> not compatible. This will result to a compilation failure on ARM when XSM
>>> will be enabled.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
>>> Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
>>> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
>>> ---
>>> xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c | 2 +-
>>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c b/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c
>>> index 9dd9081..85a615b 100644
>>> --- a/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c
>>> +++ b/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c
>>> @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ static int domain_has_security(struct domain *d, u32 perms)
>>> perms, NULL);
>>> }
>>>
>>> -static int flask_copyin_string(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(char) u_buf, char
> **buf,
>>> +static int flask_copyin_string(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(char) u_buf, char **buf,
>>
>> Wasn't the original intention for them to be converted when passed
>> to functions, rather than getting passed verbatim?
>
> I didn't find any place where the conversation is made. If we are going
> to this solution, can you give me pointer on how to do the conversation?
To clarify this is actually why I had moved Stefano from Cc to To.
Jan
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 10/15] xen/xsm: flask: flask_copying_string is taking a XEN_GUEST_HANDLE as first param
2014-03-17 15:39 ` Jan Beulich
2014-03-17 15:46 ` Julien Grall
@ 2014-03-17 17:00 ` Stefano Stabellini
1 sibling, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Stefano Stabellini @ 2014-03-17 17:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jan Beulich
Cc: xen-devel, Julien Grall, stefano.stabellini, ian.campbell, tim
On Mon, 17 Mar 2014, Jan Beulich wrote:
> >>> On 17.03.14 at 15:06, Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org> wrote:
> > Rather than x86, on ARM XEN_GUEST_HANDLE and XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM are
> > not compatible. This will result to a compilation failure on ARM when XSM
> > will be enabled.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
> > Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
> > Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
> > ---
> > xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c | 2 +-
> > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c b/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c
> > index 9dd9081..85a615b 100644
> > --- a/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c
> > +++ b/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c
> > @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ static int domain_has_security(struct domain *d, u32 perms)
> > perms, NULL);
> > }
> >
> > -static int flask_copyin_string(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(char) u_buf, char **buf,
> > +static int flask_copyin_string(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(char) u_buf, char **buf,
>
> Wasn't the original intention for them to be converted when passed
> to functions, rather than getting passed verbatim?
The change is correct: flask_copyin_string is always called passing
struct field pointers as first argument. It is never called passing
hypercall arguments directly.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v2 11/15] xen/xsm: flask: Add missing header in hooks.c
2014-03-17 14:05 [PATCH v2 00/15] Add support for XSM Julien Grall
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2014-03-17 14:06 ` [PATCH v2 10/15] xen/xsm: flask: flask_copying_string is taking a XEN_GUEST_HANDLE as first param Julien Grall
@ 2014-03-17 14:06 ` Julien Grall
2014-03-17 14:06 ` [PATCH v2 12/15] xen/xsm: Don't use multiboot by default to initialize XSM Julien Grall
` (4 subsequent siblings)
15 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Julien Grall @ 2014-03-17 14:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel; +Cc: stefano.stabellini, Julien Grall, tim, ian.campbell
nr_static_irqs and nr_irqs is defined in asm/irq.h (on both x86 and ARM).
Include directly the header in hooks.c to avoid compilation failure on ARM.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
---
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
index 56c7645..ba719de 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
*/
#include <xen/init.h>
+#include <xen/irq.h>
#include <xen/lib.h>
#include <xen/sched.h>
#include <xen/paging.h>
--
1.7.10.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 12/15] xen/xsm: Don't use multiboot by default to initialize XSM
2014-03-17 14:05 [PATCH v2 00/15] Add support for XSM Julien Grall
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2014-03-17 14:06 ` [PATCH v2 11/15] xen/xsm: flask: Add missing header in hooks.c Julien Grall
@ 2014-03-17 14:06 ` Julien Grall
2014-03-17 14:06 ` [PATCH v2 13/15] xen/xsm: Add xsm_core_init function Julien Grall
` (3 subsequent siblings)
15 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Julien Grall @ 2014-03-17 14:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: stefano.stabellini, Keir Fraser, Julien Grall, tim, ian.campbell
Multiboot protocol is only used by x86. When XSM support for ARM will be
introduced, another way will be used to retrieve the policy blob.
Introduce CONFIG_MULTIBOOT to compile XSM specific multiboot code and
rename xsm_init into xsm_multiboot_init to avoid confusion.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
---
xen/arch/x86/setup.c | 2 +-
xen/include/asm-x86/config.h | 2 ++
xen/include/xsm/xsm.h | 23 +++++++++++++++--------
xen/xsm/xsm_core.c | 9 ++++++---
xen/xsm/xsm_policy.c | 10 +++++++---
5 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
index 4dbf2b7..e9c2c51 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
@@ -1251,7 +1251,7 @@ void __init noreturn __start_xen(unsigned long mbi_p)
bitmap_fill(module_map, mbi->mods_count);
__clear_bit(0, module_map); /* Dom0 kernel is always first */
- xsm_init(module_map, mbi, bootstrap_map);
+ xsm_multiboot_init(module_map, mbi, bootstrap_map);
microcode_grab_module(module_map, mbi, bootstrap_map);
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/config.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/config.h
index 99d0e2c..24f95a3 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/config.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/config.h
@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@
#define CONFIG_KEXEC 1
#define CONFIG_WATCHDOG 1
+#define CONFIG_MULTIBOOT 1
+
#define HZ 100
#define OPT_CONSOLE_STR "vga"
diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
index 15acb3b..4863e41 100644
--- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
+++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
@@ -643,11 +643,15 @@ static inline int xsm_map_gmfn_foreign (xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, str
#endif /* XSM_NO_WRAPPERS */
-extern int xsm_init(unsigned long *module_map, const multiboot_info_t *mbi,
- void *(*bootstrap_map)(const module_t *));
-extern int xsm_policy_init(unsigned long *module_map,
- const multiboot_info_t *mbi,
- void *(*bootstrap_map)(const module_t *));
+#ifdef CONFIG_MULTIBOOT
+extern int xsm_multiboot_init(unsigned long *module_map,
+ const multiboot_info_t *mbi,
+ void *(*bootstrap_map)(const module_t *));
+extern int xsm_multiboot_policy_init(unsigned long *module_map,
+ const multiboot_info_t *mbi,
+ void *(*bootstrap_map)(const module_t *));
+#endif
+
extern int register_xsm(struct xsm_operations *ops);
extern int unregister_xsm(struct xsm_operations *ops);
@@ -658,12 +662,15 @@ extern void xsm_fixup_ops(struct xsm_operations *ops);
#include <xsm/dummy.h>
-static inline int xsm_init (unsigned long *module_map,
- const multiboot_info_t *mbi,
- void *(*bootstrap_map)(const module_t *))
+#ifdef CONFIG_MULTIBOOT
+static inline int xsm_multiboot_init (unsigned long *module_map,
+ const multiboot_info_t *mbi,
+ void *(*bootstrap_map)(const module_t *))
{
return 0;
}
+#endif
+
#endif /* XSM_ENABLE */
#endif /* __XSM_H */
diff --git a/xen/xsm/xsm_core.c b/xen/xsm/xsm_core.c
index b16c071..11a9ca7 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/xsm_core.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/xsm_core.c
@@ -43,8 +43,10 @@ static void __init do_xsm_initcalls(void)
}
}
-int __init xsm_init(unsigned long *module_map, const multiboot_info_t *mbi,
- void *(*bootstrap_map)(const module_t *))
+#ifdef CONFIG_MULTIBOOT
+int __init xsm_multiboot_init(unsigned long *module_map,
+ const multiboot_info_t *mbi,
+ void *(*bootstrap_map)(const module_t *))
{
int ret = 0;
@@ -52,7 +54,7 @@ int __init xsm_init(unsigned long *module_map, const multiboot_info_t *mbi,
if ( XSM_MAGIC )
{
- ret = xsm_policy_init(module_map, mbi, bootstrap_map);
+ ret = xsm_multiboot_policy_init(module_map, mbi, bootstrap_map);
if ( ret )
{
bootstrap_map(NULL);
@@ -75,6 +77,7 @@ int __init xsm_init(unsigned long *module_map, const multiboot_info_t *mbi,
return 0;
}
+#endif
int register_xsm(struct xsm_operations *ops)
{
diff --git a/xen/xsm/xsm_policy.c b/xen/xsm/xsm_policy.c
index 0186f30..3d5f66a 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/xsm_policy.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/xsm_policy.c
@@ -19,15 +19,18 @@
*/
#include <xsm/xsm.h>
+#ifdef CONFIG_MULTIBOOT
#include <xen/multiboot.h>
+#endif
#include <xen/bitops.h>
char *__initdata policy_buffer = NULL;
u32 __initdata policy_size = 0;
-int __init xsm_policy_init(unsigned long *module_map,
- const multiboot_info_t *mbi,
- void *(*bootstrap_map)(const module_t *))
+#ifdef CONFIG_MULTIBOOT
+int __init xsm_multiboot_policy_init(unsigned long *module_map,
+ const multiboot_info_t *mbi,
+ void *(*bootstrap_map)(const module_t *))
{
int i;
module_t *mod = (module_t *)__va(mbi->mods_addr);
@@ -65,3 +68,4 @@ int __init xsm_policy_init(unsigned long *module_map,
return rc;
}
+#endif
--
1.7.10.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 13/15] xen/xsm: Add xsm_core_init function
2014-03-17 14:05 [PATCH v2 00/15] Add support for XSM Julien Grall
` (11 preceding siblings ...)
2014-03-17 14:06 ` [PATCH v2 12/15] xen/xsm: Don't use multiboot by default to initialize XSM Julien Grall
@ 2014-03-17 14:06 ` Julien Grall
2014-03-18 17:23 ` Ian Campbell
2014-03-17 14:06 ` [PATCH v2 14/15] xen/xsm: Add support for device tree Julien Grall
` (2 subsequent siblings)
15 siblings, 1 reply; 28+ messages in thread
From: Julien Grall @ 2014-03-17 14:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: stefano.stabellini, Daniel De Graaf, Julien Grall, tim,
ian.campbell
This function contains non-specific architecture code (mostly the tail of
xsm_multiboot_init). It will be used later to avoid code duplication.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Cc: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
---
Changes in v2:
- Patch added
---
xen/xsm/xsm_core.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/xsm/xsm_core.c b/xen/xsm/xsm_core.c
index 11a9ca7..24b0ff4 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/xsm_core.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/xsm_core.c
@@ -43,6 +43,21 @@ static void __init do_xsm_initcalls(void)
}
}
+static int __init xsm_core_init(void)
+{
+ if ( verify(&dummy_xsm_ops) )
+ {
+ printk("%s could not verify "
+ "dummy_xsm_ops structure.\n", __FUNCTION__);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ xsm_ops = &dummy_xsm_ops;
+ do_xsm_initcalls();
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_MULTIBOOT
int __init xsm_multiboot_init(unsigned long *module_map,
const multiboot_info_t *mbi,
@@ -63,16 +78,7 @@ int __init xsm_multiboot_init(unsigned long *module_map,
}
}
- if ( verify(&dummy_xsm_ops) )
- {
- bootstrap_map(NULL);
- printk("%s could not verify "
- "dummy_xsm_ops structure.\n", __FUNCTION__);
- return -EIO;
- }
-
- xsm_ops = &dummy_xsm_ops;
- do_xsm_initcalls();
+ ret = xsm_core_init();
bootstrap_map(NULL);
return 0;
--
1.7.10.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v2 13/15] xen/xsm: Add xsm_core_init function
2014-03-17 14:06 ` [PATCH v2 13/15] xen/xsm: Add xsm_core_init function Julien Grall
@ 2014-03-18 17:23 ` Ian Campbell
0 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Ian Campbell @ 2014-03-18 17:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Julien Grall; +Cc: xen-devel, Daniel De Graaf, tim, stefano.stabellini
On Mon, 2014-03-17 at 14:06 +0000, Julien Grall wrote:
> This function contains non-specific architecture code (mostly the tail of
> xsm_multiboot_init). It will be used later to avoid code duplication.
>
> Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
> Cc: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
(needs Daniel's ack though)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v2 14/15] xen/xsm: Add support for device tree
2014-03-17 14:05 [PATCH v2 00/15] Add support for XSM Julien Grall
` (12 preceding siblings ...)
2014-03-17 14:06 ` [PATCH v2 13/15] xen/xsm: Add xsm_core_init function Julien Grall
@ 2014-03-17 14:06 ` Julien Grall
2014-03-18 17:24 ` Ian Campbell
2014-03-17 14:06 ` [PATCH v2 15/15] xen/arm: Add support for XSM Julien Grall
2014-03-21 12:14 ` [PATCH v2 00/15] " Ian Campbell
15 siblings, 1 reply; 28+ messages in thread
From: Julien Grall @ 2014-03-17 14:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel; +Cc: stefano.stabellini, Julien Grall, tim, ian.campbell
This patch adds a new module "xen,xsm-blob" to allow the user to load the XSM
policy when Xen is booting.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
---
Changes in v2:
- Use xsm_core_init function
---
docs/misc/arm/device-tree/booting.txt | 1 +
xen/common/device_tree.c | 2 ++
xen/include/xen/device_tree.h | 3 ++-
xen/include/xsm/xsm.h | 12 +++++++++++
xen/xsm/xsm_core.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
xen/xsm/xsm_policy.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
6 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/docs/misc/arm/device-tree/booting.txt b/docs/misc/arm/device-tree/booting.txt
index 07fde27..85988fb 100644
--- a/docs/misc/arm/device-tree/booting.txt
+++ b/docs/misc/arm/device-tree/booting.txt
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ Each node contains the following properties:
- "linux-zimage" -- the dom0 kernel
- "linux-initrd" -- the dom0 ramdisk
+ - "xsm-blob" -- XSM policy blob
- reg
diff --git a/xen/common/device_tree.c b/xen/common/device_tree.c
index 55716a8..91146fb 100644
--- a/xen/common/device_tree.c
+++ b/xen/common/device_tree.c
@@ -354,6 +354,8 @@ static void __init process_multiboot_node(const void *fdt, int node,
nr = MOD_KERNEL;
else if ( fdt_node_check_compatible(fdt, node, "xen,linux-initrd") == 0)
nr = MOD_INITRD;
+ else if ( fdt_node_check_compatible(fdt, node, "xen,xsm-blob") == 0 )
+ nr = MOD_XSM;
else
early_panic("%s not a known xen multiboot type\n", name);
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/device_tree.h b/xen/include/xen/device_tree.h
index 9a8c3de..76faf11 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/device_tree.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/device_tree.h
@@ -24,7 +24,8 @@
#define MOD_FDT 1
#define MOD_KERNEL 2
#define MOD_INITRD 3
-#define NR_MODULES 4
+#define MOD_XSM 4
+#define NR_MODULES 5
#define MOD_DISCARD_FIRST MOD_FDT
diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
index 4863e41..2cd3a3b 100644
--- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
+++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
@@ -652,6 +652,11 @@ extern int xsm_multiboot_policy_init(unsigned long *module_map,
void *(*bootstrap_map)(const module_t *));
#endif
+#ifdef HAS_DEVICE_TREE
+extern int xsm_dt_init(void);
+extern int xsm_dt_policy_init(void);
+#endif
+
extern int register_xsm(struct xsm_operations *ops);
extern int unregister_xsm(struct xsm_operations *ops);
@@ -671,6 +676,13 @@ static inline int xsm_multiboot_init (unsigned long *module_map,
}
#endif
+#ifdef HAS_DEVICE_TREE
+static inline int xsm_dt_init(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
#endif /* XSM_ENABLE */
#endif /* __XSM_H */
diff --git a/xen/xsm/xsm_core.c b/xen/xsm/xsm_core.c
index 24b0ff4..ecf9096 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/xsm_core.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/xsm_core.c
@@ -85,6 +85,33 @@ int __init xsm_multiboot_init(unsigned long *module_map,
}
#endif
+#ifdef HAS_DEVICE_TREE
+int __init xsm_dt_init(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ printk("XSM Framework v" XSM_FRAMEWORK_VERSION " initialized\n");
+
+ if ( XSM_MAGIC )
+ {
+ ret = xsm_dt_policy_init();
+ if ( ret )
+ {
+ printk("%s: Error initializing policy (rc = %d).\n",
+ __FUNCTION__, ret);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = xsm_core_init();
+
+ if ( policy_buffer )
+ xfree(policy_buffer);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
int register_xsm(struct xsm_operations *ops)
{
if ( verify(ops) )
diff --git a/xen/xsm/xsm_policy.c b/xen/xsm/xsm_policy.c
index 3d5f66a..a0dee09 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/xsm_policy.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/xsm_policy.c
@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@
#include <xen/multiboot.h>
#endif
#include <xen/bitops.h>
+#ifdef HAS_DEVICE_TREE
+# include <asm/setup.h>
+# include <xen/device_tree.h>
+#endif
char *__initdata policy_buffer = NULL;
u32 __initdata policy_size = 0;
@@ -69,3 +73,36 @@ int __init xsm_multiboot_policy_init(unsigned long *module_map,
return rc;
}
#endif
+
+#ifdef HAS_DEVICE_TREE
+int __init xsm_dt_policy_init(void)
+{
+ paddr_t paddr = early_info.modules.module[MOD_XSM].start;
+ paddr_t len = early_info.modules.module[MOD_XSM].size;
+ xsm_magic_t magic;
+
+ if ( !len )
+ return 0;
+
+ copy_from_paddr(&magic, paddr, sizeof(magic));
+
+ if ( magic != XSM_MAGIC )
+ {
+ printk(XENLOG_ERR "xsm: Invalid magic for XSM blob got 0x%x "
+ "expected 0x%x\n", magic, XSM_MAGIC);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ printk("xsm: Policy len = 0x%"PRIpaddr" start at 0x%"PRIpaddr"\n",
+ len, paddr);
+
+ policy_buffer = xmalloc_bytes(len);
+ if ( !policy_buffer )
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ copy_from_paddr(policy_buffer, paddr, len);
+ policy_size = len;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
--
1.7.10.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v2 14/15] xen/xsm: Add support for device tree
2014-03-17 14:06 ` [PATCH v2 14/15] xen/xsm: Add support for device tree Julien Grall
@ 2014-03-18 17:24 ` Ian Campbell
2014-03-18 17:34 ` Andrew Cooper
0 siblings, 1 reply; 28+ messages in thread
From: Ian Campbell @ 2014-03-18 17:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Julien Grall; +Cc: xen-devel, tim, stefano.stabellini
On Mon, 2014-03-17 at 14:06 +0000, Julien Grall wrote:
> This patch adds a new module "xen,xsm-blob" to allow the user to load the XSM
> policy when Xen is booting.
>
> Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
> Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
> +
> + if ( policy_buffer )
> + xfree(policy_buffer);
Is xfree(NULL) not ok in the same way free(NULL) is?
> +
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 14/15] xen/xsm: Add support for device tree
2014-03-18 17:24 ` Ian Campbell
@ 2014-03-18 17:34 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-03-18 20:52 ` Julien Grall
0 siblings, 1 reply; 28+ messages in thread
From: Andrew Cooper @ 2014-03-18 17:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ian Campbell; +Cc: xen-devel, Julien Grall, tim, stefano.stabellini
On 18/03/14 17:24, Ian Campbell wrote:
> On Mon, 2014-03-17 at 14:06 +0000, Julien Grall wrote:
>> This patch adds a new module "xen,xsm-blob" to allow the user to load the XSM
>> policy when Xen is booting.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
>> Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
>> +
>> + if ( policy_buffer )
>> + xfree(policy_buffer);
> Is xfree(NULL) not ok in the same way free(NULL) is?
xfree(NULL) is perfectly fine. The code should be tweaked.
~Andrew
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 14/15] xen/xsm: Add support for device tree
2014-03-18 17:34 ` Andrew Cooper
@ 2014-03-18 20:52 ` Julien Grall
0 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Julien Grall @ 2014-03-18 20:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrew Cooper, Ian Campbell; +Cc: xen-devel, tim, stefano.stabellini
Hi Andrew and Ian,
On 03/18/2014 05:34 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 18/03/14 17:24, Ian Campbell wrote:
>> On Mon, 2014-03-17 at 14:06 +0000, Julien Grall wrote:
>>> This patch adds a new module "xen,xsm-blob" to allow the user to load the XSM
>>> policy when Xen is booting.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
>>> Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
>> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
>>> +
>>> + if ( policy_buffer )
>>> + xfree(policy_buffer);
>> Is xfree(NULL) not ok in the same way free(NULL) is?
>
> xfree(NULL) is perfectly fine. The code should be tweaked.
I will remove the if in the next version.
Regards,
--
Julien Grall
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v2 15/15] xen/arm: Add support for XSM
2014-03-17 14:05 [PATCH v2 00/15] Add support for XSM Julien Grall
` (13 preceding siblings ...)
2014-03-17 14:06 ` [PATCH v2 14/15] xen/xsm: Add support for device tree Julien Grall
@ 2014-03-17 14:06 ` Julien Grall
2014-03-21 12:14 ` [PATCH v2 00/15] " Ian Campbell
15 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Julien Grall @ 2014-03-17 14:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel; +Cc: stefano.stabellini, Julien Grall, tim, ian.campbell
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
---
xen/arch/arm/setup.c | 2 ++
xen/arch/arm/traps.c | 1 +
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/setup.c b/xen/arch/arm/setup.c
index 215ec24..154b707 100644
--- a/xen/arch/arm/setup.c
+++ b/xen/arch/arm/setup.c
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
#include <asm/platform.h>
#include <asm/procinfo.h>
+#include <xsm/xsm.h>
struct cpuinfo_arm __read_mostly boot_cpu_data;
@@ -721,6 +722,7 @@ void __init start_xen(unsigned long boot_phys_offset,
gic_route_ppis();
gic_route_spis();
+ xsm_dt_init();
init_maintenance_interrupt();
init_timer_interrupt();
diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/traps.c b/xen/arch/arm/traps.c
index 21c7b26..f967d2f 100644
--- a/xen/arch/arm/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/arm/traps.c
@@ -1006,6 +1006,7 @@ static arm_hypercall_t arm_hypercall_table[] = {
HYPERCALL(sched_op, 2),
HYPERCALL(console_io, 3),
HYPERCALL(xen_version, 2),
+ HYPERCALL(xsm_op, 1),
HYPERCALL(event_channel_op, 2),
HYPERCALL(physdev_op, 2),
HYPERCALL(sysctl, 2),
--
1.7.10.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v2 00/15] Add support for XSM
2014-03-17 14:05 [PATCH v2 00/15] Add support for XSM Julien Grall
` (14 preceding siblings ...)
2014-03-17 14:06 ` [PATCH v2 15/15] xen/arm: Add support for XSM Julien Grall
@ 2014-03-21 12:14 ` Ian Campbell
15 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Ian Campbell @ 2014-03-21 12:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Julien Grall; +Cc: xen-devel, Daniel De Graaf, tim, stefano.stabellini
On Mon, 2014-03-17 at 14:05 +0000, Julien Grall wrote:
> Hello all,
>
> This patch series aims to add support for XSM on ARM.
> I've tried to boot Xen on my board with the policy provided in the repository
> (see tools/flask/policy). It boots with few warnings because some hypercall
> are not describe in the policy.
>
> The series is divided following:
> - #1-2: It's unrelated to this series, but the function copy_paddr
> will be used later
> - #3: Define correctly size_t on ARM
> - #4: Bug fix when xen is booting with XSM blob and without initrd
> - #5-6: XSM movement to be able to use it on ARM
> - #7-11: Compilation fix for ARM
> - #12-14: Rework XSM initialization
> - #15: Add XSM support for ARM
As I read it this just needs Daniel's ack to #13 and the xfree cleanup
to #14 before it can go in.
But everything up to #11 seems like it can go in now, so I've applied
that subset.
Ian
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread