From: Nicola Vetrini <nicola.vetrini@bugseng.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: "Sergii Dmytruk" <sergii.dmytruk@3mdeb.com>,
xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, "Jan Beulich" <jbeulich@suse.com>,
"Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>,
"Lukasz Hawrylko" <lukasz@hawrylko.pl>,
"Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>,
"Mateusz Mówka" <mateusz.mowka@intel.com>,
"Anthony PERARD" <anthony.perard@vates.tech>,
"Michal Orzel" <michal.orzel@amd.com>,
"Julien Grall" <julien@xen.org>,
"Stefano Stabellini" <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
"Marek Marczykowski-Górecki" <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>,
trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/21] x86: Trenchboot Secure Launch DRTM (Xen)
Date: Tue, 22 Apr 2025 21:01:04 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <a8193a5ef223a3d015f3d6ddbbbc2535@bugseng.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <744934f4-f56f-4dc7-bccb-c32f2829d1da@citrix.com>
On 2025-04-22 19:14, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 22/04/2025 4:06 pm, Sergii Dmytruk wrote:
>> The aim of the [TrenchBoot] project is to provide an implementation of
>> DRTM that is generic enough to cover various use cases:
>> - Intel TXT and AMD SKINIT on x86 CPUs
>> - legacy and UEFI boot
>> - TPM1.2 and TPM2.0
>> - (in the future) DRTM on Arm CPUs
>>
>> DRTM is a version of a measured launch that starts on request rather
>> than at the start of a boot cycle. One of its advantages is in not
>> including the firmware in the chain of trust.
>>
>> Xen already supports DRTM via [tboot] which targets Intel TXT only.
>> tboot employs encapsulates some of the DRTM details within itself
>> while
>> with TrenchBoot Xen (or Linux) is meant to be a self-contained payload
>> for a TrenchBoot-enabled bootloader (think GRUB). The one exception
>> is
>> that UEFI case requires calling back into bootloader to initiate DRTM,
>> which is necessary to give Xen a chance of querying all the
>> information
>> it needs from the firmware before performing DRTM start.
>>
>> From reading the above tboot might seem like a more abstracted, but
>> the
>> reality is that the payload needs to have DRTM-specific knowledge
>> either
>> way. TrenchBoot in principle allows coming up with independent
>> implementations of bootloaders and payloads that are compatible with
>> each other.
>>
>> The "x86/boot: choose AP stack based on APIC ID" patch is shared with
>> [Parallelize AP bring-up] series which is required here because Intel
>> TXT always releases all APs simultaneously. The rest of the patches
>> are
>> unique.
>
> I've stripped out the sha2 patch and fixed up to use the existing sha2,
> then kicked off some CI testing:
>
> https://gitlab.com/xen-project/hardware/xen-staging/-/pipelines/1780285393
> https://cirrus-ci.com/build/5452335868018688
>
> When the dust has settled, I'll talk you through the failures.
>
Accidental use of C18 here
https://saas.eclairit.com:3787/fs/var/local/eclair/xen-project.ecdf/xen-project/hardware/xen-staging/ECLAIR_normal/andrew/tb-v1.1/X86_64/9791028023/PROJECT.ecd;/by_service/MC3A2.D1.1.html
> ~Andrew
--
Nicola Vetrini, B.Sc.
Software Engineer
BUGSENG (https://bugseng.com)
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/nicola-vetrini-a42471253
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-04-22 19:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-04-22 15:06 [PATCH 00/21] x86: Trenchboot Secure Launch DRTM (Xen) Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 01/21] x86/include/asm/intel_txt.h: constants and accessors for TXT registers and heap Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 02/21] include/xen/slr_table.h: Secure Launch Resource Table definitions Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 20:23 ` Andrew Cooper
2025-04-23 14:40 ` Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 20:46 ` ross.philipson
2025-04-23 14:47 ` Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-23 17:33 ` ross.philipson
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 03/21] x86/boot: add MLE header and new entry point Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 04/21] x86/boot/slaunch_early: implement early initialization Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 05/21] x86/boot/slaunch_early: early TXT checks and boot data retrieval Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 06/21] xen/arch/x86: reserve TXT memory Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 07/21] x86/mtrr: expose functions for pausing caching Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 08/21] x86/intel_txt.c: restore boot MTRRs Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 09/21] lib/sha1.c: add file Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:36 ` Jan Beulich
2025-04-22 22:15 ` Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 10/21] lib/sha256.c: " Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:37 ` Andrew Cooper
2025-04-22 22:20 ` Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:39 ` Jan Beulich
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 11/21] x86/tpm.c: code for early hashing and extending PCRs (for TPM1.2) Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 12/21] x86/tpm.c: support extending PCRs of TPM2.0 Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 13/21] x86/hvm: Check for VMX in SMX when slaunch active Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 14/21] x86/tpm.c: implement event log for TPM2.0 Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 15/21] x86/boot: choose AP stack based on APIC ID Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 16/21] x86/smpboot.c: TXT AP bringup Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 17/21] arch/x86: process DRTM policy Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 18/21] x86/boot: find MBI and SLRT on AMD Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 19/21] arch/x86: support slaunch with AMD SKINIT Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 20/21] x86/slaunch: support EFI boot Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 21/21] x86/cpu: report SMX, TXT and SKINIT capabilities Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:23 ` [PATCH 00/21] x86: Trenchboot Secure Launch DRTM (Xen) Jan Beulich
2025-04-22 18:33 ` Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 17:14 ` Andrew Cooper
2025-04-22 19:01 ` Nicola Vetrini [this message]
2025-04-23 13:38 ` Andrew Cooper
2025-04-23 18:45 ` Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-23 20:11 ` Nicola Vetrini
2025-04-23 21:53 ` Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-24 10:54 ` Nicola Vetrini
2025-04-24 18:14 ` Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-23 22:43 ` Andrew Cooper
2025-04-24 18:47 ` Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-24 18:51 ` Andrew Cooper
2025-04-25 13:33 ` Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-23 18:59 ` Daniel P. Smith
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