From: Sergii Dmytruk <sergii.dmytruk@3mdeb.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, "Jan Beulich" <jbeulich@suse.com>,
"Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>,
"Lukasz Hawrylko" <lukasz@hawrylko.pl>,
"Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>,
"Mateusz Mówka" <mateusz.mowka@intel.com>,
"Anthony PERARD" <anthony.perard@vates.tech>,
"Michal Orzel" <michal.orzel@amd.com>,
"Julien Grall" <julien@xen.org>,
"Stefano Stabellini" <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
"Marek Marczykowski-Górecki" <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>,
trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/21] x86: Trenchboot Secure Launch DRTM (Xen)
Date: Wed, 23 Apr 2025 21:45:56 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aAk1ZBw8GtoVYoL8@MjU3Nj> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <010709d8-7784-41bf-bcb6-bf04803a75fc@citrix.com>
On Wed, Apr 23, 2025 at 02:38:37PM +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 22/04/2025 6:14 pm, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> > I've stripped out the sha2 patch and fixed up to use the existing sha2,
> > then kicked off some CI testing:
> >
> > https://gitlab.com/xen-project/hardware/xen-staging/-/pipelines/1780285393
> > https://cirrus-ci.com/build/5452335868018688
> >
> > When the dust has settled, I'll talk you through the failures.
>
> And here we go. Interestingly, the FreeBSD testing was entirely happy,
> and that is the rare way around.
>
> For Gitlab, there are several areas.
>
> First, for MISRA. In the job logs, you want the "Browse current
> reports:" link which will give you full details, but it's all pretty
> simple stuff.
Thanks, but that link gives me a list of 5096 failures all over the code
base. Is there any way to see a diff against master?
> kbl-suspend-x86-64-gcc-debug is a real S3 test on KabyLake hardware,
> which appears to have gone to sleep and never woken up. (More likely,
> crashed on wakeup before we got the console up). The AlderLake
> equivalent test seems to be happy, as well as the AMD ones.
Hm, not sure what that could be, but will try to reproduce/guess.
> For the build issues, there are quite a few.
>
> debian-12-x86_64-gcc-ibt is special, using an out-of-tree patch for
> CET-IBT safety. tl;dr function pointer callees need a cf_check
> annotation. But, all the failures here are from sha1, and from bits
> which I don't think want to survive into the final form.
That stuff is gone and the build should succeed the next time.
> Other common failures seem to be:
>
> # take image offset into account
> arch/x86/efi/fixmlehdr xen.efi 0x200000
> Failed to find MLE header in xen.efi
> arch/x86/Makefile:220: recipe for target 'xen.efi' failed
> make[3]: *** [xen.efi] Error 1
>
> ~Andrew
That seems to be the only reason behind the rest of build failures.
I was able to reproduce the failure in Fedora 37 docker. Searching for
the header in 8KiB instead of 4KiB fixes it. Looks like large default
alignment of some toolchains pushes `head.S` to 4 KiB offset.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-04-23 18:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-04-22 15:06 [PATCH 00/21] x86: Trenchboot Secure Launch DRTM (Xen) Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 01/21] x86/include/asm/intel_txt.h: constants and accessors for TXT registers and heap Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 02/21] include/xen/slr_table.h: Secure Launch Resource Table definitions Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 20:23 ` Andrew Cooper
2025-04-23 14:40 ` Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 20:46 ` ross.philipson
2025-04-23 14:47 ` Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-23 17:33 ` ross.philipson
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 03/21] x86/boot: add MLE header and new entry point Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 04/21] x86/boot/slaunch_early: implement early initialization Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 05/21] x86/boot/slaunch_early: early TXT checks and boot data retrieval Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 06/21] xen/arch/x86: reserve TXT memory Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 07/21] x86/mtrr: expose functions for pausing caching Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 08/21] x86/intel_txt.c: restore boot MTRRs Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 09/21] lib/sha1.c: add file Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:36 ` Jan Beulich
2025-04-22 22:15 ` Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 10/21] lib/sha256.c: " Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:37 ` Andrew Cooper
2025-04-22 22:20 ` Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:39 ` Jan Beulich
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 11/21] x86/tpm.c: code for early hashing and extending PCRs (for TPM1.2) Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 12/21] x86/tpm.c: support extending PCRs of TPM2.0 Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 13/21] x86/hvm: Check for VMX in SMX when slaunch active Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 14/21] x86/tpm.c: implement event log for TPM2.0 Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 15/21] x86/boot: choose AP stack based on APIC ID Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 16/21] x86/smpboot.c: TXT AP bringup Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 17/21] arch/x86: process DRTM policy Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 18/21] x86/boot: find MBI and SLRT on AMD Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 19/21] arch/x86: support slaunch with AMD SKINIT Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 20/21] x86/slaunch: support EFI boot Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 21/21] x86/cpu: report SMX, TXT and SKINIT capabilities Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 15:23 ` [PATCH 00/21] x86: Trenchboot Secure Launch DRTM (Xen) Jan Beulich
2025-04-22 18:33 ` Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-22 17:14 ` Andrew Cooper
2025-04-22 19:01 ` Nicola Vetrini
2025-04-23 13:38 ` Andrew Cooper
2025-04-23 18:45 ` Sergii Dmytruk [this message]
2025-04-23 20:11 ` Nicola Vetrini
2025-04-23 21:53 ` Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-24 10:54 ` Nicola Vetrini
2025-04-24 18:14 ` Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-23 22:43 ` Andrew Cooper
2025-04-24 18:47 ` Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-24 18:51 ` Andrew Cooper
2025-04-25 13:33 ` Sergii Dmytruk
2025-04-23 18:59 ` Daniel P. Smith
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