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From: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
To: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	<x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	"Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
	Shivansh Dhiman <shivansh.dhiman@amd.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>, Zhao Liu <zhao1.liu@intel.com>,
	Yosry Ahmed <yosry@kernel.org>,
	David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>, <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 05/28] x86/cea: Use array indexing to simplify exception stack access
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2026 14:15:10 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1160bdb8-c5a1-47fe-90ed-07dd7a5c7efb@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <64e27c4c-23e1-4539-a812-e81d5f322003@linux.intel.com>

On 10/22/2026 11:07 PM, Binbin Wu wrote:
> On 9/12/2026 5:36 AM, Sohil Mehta wrote:
>> From: "Xin Li (Intel)" <xin@zytor.com>
>>
>> Refactor struct cea_exception_stacks to leverage array indexing for
>> exception stack access, improving code clarity and eliminating the
>> need for the ESTACKS_MEMBERS() macro.
>>
>> Convert __this_cpu_ist_{bottom,top}_va() from macros to functions,
>> allowing removal of the now-obsolete CEA_ESTACK_BOT and CEA_ESTACK_TOP
>> macros.
>>
>> Also drop CEA_ESTACK_SIZE, which just duplicated EXCEPTION_STKSZ.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
>> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
> 
> Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
> 

Thanks!

> One nit below.
> 
> [...]>  
>> +/*
>> + * The exception stack ordering in [cea_]exception_stacks
>> + */
>> +enum exception_stack_ordering {
>> +	ESTACK_DF,
>> +	ESTACK_NMI,
>> +	ESTACK_DB,
>> +	ESTACK_MCE,
>> +	ESTACK_VC,
>> +	ESTACK_VC2,
>> +	N_EXCEPTION_STACKS
>> +};
>> +
>>  /* Macro to enforce the same ordering and stack sizes */
> 
> Nit:
> Is this still hold ? ...
> 

You are right. The comment is stale now. Overall, as the changelog says
the ESTACKS_MEMBERS marco itself is redundant.

I am wondering if the remaining single use of ESTACKS_MEMBERS() should
be simplified as follows:

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
index 509e52fc3a0f..f34062c7bde1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
@@ -31,21 +31,10 @@ enum exception_stack_ordering {

-/* Macro to enforce the same ordering and stack sizes */
-#define ESTACKS_MEMBERS(guardsize, optional_stack_size)                \
-       char    ESTACK_DF_stack_guard[guardsize];               \
-       char    ESTACK_DF_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ];               \
-       char    ESTACK_NMI_stack_guard[guardsize];              \
-       char    ESTACK_NMI_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ];              \
-       char    ESTACK_DB_stack_guard[guardsize];               \
-       char    ESTACK_DB_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ];               \
-       char    ESTACK_MCE_stack_guard[guardsize];              \
-       char    ESTACK_MCE_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ];              \
-       char    ESTACK_VC_stack_guard[guardsize];               \
-       char    ESTACK_VC_stack[optional_stack_size];           \
-       char    ESTACK_VC2_stack_guard[guardsize];              \
-       char    ESTACK_VC2_stack[optional_stack_size];          \
-       char    ESTACK_IST_top_guard[guardsize];                \
-
 /* The exception stacks' physical storage. No guard pages required */
 struct exception_stacks {
-       ESTACKS_MEMBERS(0, VC_EXCEPTION_STKSZ)
+       char    ESTACK_DF_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ];
+       char    ESTACK_NMI_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ];
+       char    ESTACK_DB_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ];
+       char    ESTACK_MCE_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ];
+       char    ESTACK_VC_stack[VC_EXCEPTION_STKSZ];
+       char    ESTACK_VC2_stack[VC_EXCEPTION_STKSZ];
 };



>>  #define ESTACKS_MEMBERS(guardsize, optional_stack_size)		\
>>  	char	ESTACK_DF_stack_guard[guardsize];		\
>> @@ -39,37 +52,22 @@ struct exception_stacks {
>>  
>>  /* The effective cpu entry area mapping with guard pages. */
>>  struct cea_exception_stacks {
>> -	ESTACKS_MEMBERS(PAGE_SIZE, EXCEPTION_STKSZ)
>> +	struct {
>> +		char stack_guard[PAGE_SIZE];
>> +		char stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ];
>> +	} event_stacks[N_EXCEPTION_STACKS];
>> +	char IST_top_guard[PAGE_SIZE];
> 
> ... Before this change, ESTACKS_MEMBERS() is used both in exception_stacks and
> cea_exception_stacks, so ESTACKS_MEMBERS() can enforce the order and stack
> sizes.
> 
> After the change, ESTACKS_MEMBERS() only used in one place, so it doesn't have
> the capability to enforce them.
> 
> The order consistency depends on the consistency b/t ESTACKS_MEMBERS and
> enum exception_stack_ordering now.
> 

IIUC, there is no ordering requirement left to enforce. The mapping is
done per stack by name in cea_map_stack(), right? Also, the size is
already inconsistent due to VC_EXCEPTION_STKSZ being config-dependent.

I think the change in this patch doesn't change any behavior. It only
refactors the macros to improve clarity and converts a couple of them
into functions.

>>  };
> 
> [...]


  reply	other threads:[~2026-10-27 21:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 77+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-09-11 21:36 [PATCH v10 00/28] KVM: Enable FRED support with KVM VMX Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 01/28] KVM: VMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls Sohil Mehta
2026-10-22  9:27   ` Binbin Wu
2026-10-23  2:09     ` Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 02/28] KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:00   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-22  9:48   ` Binbin Wu
2026-10-23  3:10     ` Sohil Mehta
2026-10-26  5:00       ` Sohil Mehta
2026-10-27  1:25         ` Binbin Wu
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 03/28] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:08   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-22 10:19   ` Binbin Wu
2026-10-23  3:13     ` Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 04/28] x86/cea: Prefix event stack names with ESTACK_ Sohil Mehta
2026-10-23  5:58   ` Binbin Wu
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 05/28] x86/cea: Use array indexing to simplify exception stack access Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:57   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-27 23:16     ` Sohil Mehta
2026-10-23  6:07   ` Binbin Wu
2026-10-27 21:15     ` Sohil Mehta [this message]
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 06/28] x86/fred: Export this_cpu_fred_rsp() for KVM usage Sohil Mehta
2026-10-23  6:49   ` Binbin Wu
2026-10-28  0:44     ` Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 07/28] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:10   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-23  7:19   ` Binbin Wu
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 08/28] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR intercepts Sohil Mehta
2026-10-23  8:07   ` Binbin Wu
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 09/28] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Sohil Mehta
2026-09-14  7:04   ` Binbin Wu
2026-09-14 16:14     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2026-09-15  8:43       ` Binbin Wu
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 10/28] KVM: VMX: Add support for saving and restoring FRED MSRs Sohil Mehta
2026-10-23  8:59   ` Binbin Wu
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 11/28] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Sohil Mehta
2026-10-23  9:21   ` Binbin Wu
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 12/28] KVM: x86: Add a new save/restore flag for FRED metadata Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 13/28] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 14/28] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 15/28] KVM: x86: Include CR4.FRED in the emulator CR4 write mask Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:14   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 16/28] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:14   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 17/28] KVM: x86: Handle CR4.FRED when emulating RSM Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:15   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 18/28] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:11   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 19/28] KVM: x86: Advertise support for FRED Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 20/28] KVM: nVMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 21/28] KVM: nVMX: Handle FRED VMCS fields in nested VMX context Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:34   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 22/28] KVM: nVMX: Restrict event data VMCS fields to FRED-supported hosts Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:20   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 23/28] KVM: nVMX: Shadow ORIGINAL_EVENT_DATA and INJECTED_EVENT_DATA fields Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 24/28] KVM: nVMX: Validate FRED-related VMCS fields Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:29   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 25/28] KVM: nVMX: Enable VMX FRED controls Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:37   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 26/28] KVM: selftests: Add FRED MSRs to msrs_test Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 27/28] KVM: selftests: Add a new VM guest mode to run user level code Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 28/28] KVM: selftests: Add fred exception tests Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:32   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-15  6:03 ` [PATCH v10 00/28] KVM: Enable FRED support with KVM VMX Xin Li
2026-10-24 22:59   ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-10-26 16:04     ` Sean Christopherson
2026-10-26 17:22       ` Sohil Mehta
2026-10-26 22:22         ` Sohil Mehta
2026-10-27 17:43       ` Sohil Mehta
2026-09-15 10:00 ` [EXTERNAL] " David Woodhouse
2026-09-24 11:14 ` Shivansh Dhiman
2026-09-24 14:13   ` David Woodhouse
2026-09-25 12:06     ` Shivansh Dhiman
2026-10-28  5:48       ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-10-19 20:46 ` Dave Hansen
2026-10-19 22:19   ` Sohil Mehta

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