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From: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
To: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>,
	 Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	 Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	 Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	 Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	 "David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org>,
	 Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	 Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>, Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
	 Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>, Linus Walleij <linusw@kernel.org>,
	 Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>, Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>,
	 Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Maxwell Bland <mbland@motorola.com>,
	 "Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@kernel.org>,
	 Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	 Pierre Langlois <pierre.langlois@arm.com>,
	 Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>,
	 Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	 Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	 Yang Shi <yang@os.amperecomputing.com>,
	Yeoreum Yun <yeoreum.yun@arm.com>,
	 linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	x86@kernel.org,  Lorenzo Stoakes <ljs@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>,
	 Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH RFC v7 15/24] mm: kpkeys: Introduce hook for protecting static page tables
Date: Tue, 05 May 2026 17:06:04 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260505-kpkeys-v7-15-20c0bdd97197@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260505-kpkeys-v7-0-20c0bdd97197@arm.com>

The kpkeys_hardened_pgtables infrastructure introduced so far allows
compatible architectures to protect all page table pages (PTPs)
allocated at runtime (first via memblock, then the buddy allocator).
Some PTPs are however required even earlier, before any allocator is
available. This is typically needed for mapping the kernel image
itself.

These PTPs are at least as sensitive as those allocated later on,
and should be protected by mapping them with the privileged pkey.
Exactly how these pages are obtained is entirely arch-specific, so
we introduce a hook to let architectures that implement
kpkeys_hardened_pgtables do the right thing.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
 include/linux/kpkeys.h        | 4 ++++
 mm/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.c | 1 +
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/kpkeys.h b/include/linux/kpkeys.h
index 544a2d954bc1..3f7f980f3a7c 100644
--- a/include/linux/kpkeys.h
+++ b/include/linux/kpkeys.h
@@ -142,6 +142,10 @@ void kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_init(void);
 
 phys_addr_t kpkeys_physmem_pgtable_alloc(void);
 
+#ifndef arch_kpkeys_protect_static_pgtables
+static inline void arch_kpkeys_protect_static_pgtables(void) {}
+#endif
+
 #else /* CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES */
 
 static inline bool kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_enabled(void)
diff --git a/mm/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.c b/mm/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.c
index c7a8935571ac..9c6f32741009 100644
--- a/mm/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.c
+++ b/mm/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.c
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ void __init kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_init(void)
 	static_branch_enable(&kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_key);
 
 	ppa_finalize();
+	arch_kpkeys_protect_static_pgtables();
 }
 
 /*

-- 
2.51.2



  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-05-05 16:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-05-05 16:05 [PATCH RFC v7 00/24] pkeys-based page table hardening Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:05 ` [PATCH RFC v7 01/24] mm: Introduce kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:05 ` [PATCH RFC v7 02/24] set_memory: Introduce set_memory_pkey() stub Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:05 ` [PATCH RFC v7 03/24] arm64: mm: Enable overlays for all EL1 indirect permissions Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:05 ` [PATCH RFC v7 04/24] arm64: Introduce por_elx_set_pkey_perms() helper Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:05 ` [PATCH RFC v7 05/24] arm64: Implement asm/kpkeys.h using POE Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:05 ` [PATCH RFC v7 06/24] arm64: set_memory: Implement set_memory_pkey() Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:05 ` [PATCH RFC v7 07/24] arm64: Context-switch POR_EL1 Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:05 ` [PATCH RFC v7 08/24] arm64: Initialize POR_EL1 register on cpu_resume() Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:05 ` [PATCH RFC v7 09/24] arm64: Enable kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:05 ` [PATCH RFC v7 10/24] memblock: Move INIT_MEMBLOCK_* macros to header Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 11/24] mm: kpkeys: Introduce kpkeys_hardened_pgtables feature Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 12/24] mm: kpkeys: Protect regular page tables Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 13/24] mm: kpkeys: Introduce early page table allocator Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 14/24] mm: kpkeys: Protect vmemmap page tables Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` Kevin Brodsky [this message]
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 16/24] arm64: kpkeys: Implement arch_supports_kpkeys_early() Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 17/24] arm64: kpkeys: Support KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 18/24] arm64: kpkeys: Ensure the linear map can be modified Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 19/24] arm64: kpkeys: Protect early page tables Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 20/24] arm64: kpkeys: Protect init_pg_dir Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 21/24] arm64: kpkeys: Guard page table writes Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 22/24] arm64: kpkeys: Batch KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES switches Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 23/24] arm64: kpkeys: Enable kpkeys_hardened_pgtables support Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 24/24] mm: Add basic tests for kpkeys_hardened_pgtables Kevin Brodsky

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