From: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
To: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org>,
Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>, Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>, Linus Walleij <linusw@kernel.org>,
Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>, Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Maxwell Bland <mbland@motorola.com>,
"Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Pierre Langlois <pierre.langlois@arm.com>,
Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Yang Shi <yang@os.amperecomputing.com>,
Yeoreum Yun <yeoreum.yun@arm.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
x86@kernel.org, Lorenzo Stoakes <ljs@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH RFC v7 04/24] arm64: Introduce por_elx_set_pkey_perms() helper
Date: Tue, 05 May 2026 17:05:53 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260505-kpkeys-v7-4-20c0bdd97197@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260505-kpkeys-v7-0-20c0bdd97197@arm.com>
Introduce a helper that sets the permissions of a given pkey
(POIndex) in the POR_ELx format, and make use of it in
arch_set_user_pkey_access().
Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/por.h | 7 +++++++
arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 26 ++++++++++----------------
2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/por.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/por.h
index d913d5b529e4..bffb4d2b1246 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/por.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/por.h
@@ -31,4 +31,11 @@ static inline bool por_elx_allows_exec(u64 por, u8 pkey)
return perm & POE_X;
}
+static inline u64 por_elx_set_pkey_perms(u64 por, u8 pkey, u64 perms)
+{
+ u64 shift = POR_ELx_PERM_SHIFT(pkey);
+
+ return (por & ~(POE_MASK << shift)) | (perms << shift);
+}
+
#endif /* _ASM_ARM64_POR_H */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
index dd85e093ffdb..493310cf0486 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
@@ -2339,8 +2339,8 @@ void __cpu_replace_ttbr1(pgd_t *pgdp, bool cnp)
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
int arch_set_user_pkey_access(int pkey, unsigned long init_val)
{
- u64 new_por;
- u64 old_por;
+ u64 new_perms;
+ u64 por;
if (!system_supports_poe())
return -ENOSPC;
@@ -2354,25 +2354,19 @@ int arch_set_user_pkey_access(int pkey, unsigned long init_val)
return -EINVAL;
/* Set the bits we need in POR: */
- new_por = POE_RWX;
+ new_perms = POE_RWX;
if (init_val & PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE)
- new_por &= ~POE_W;
+ new_perms &= ~POE_W;
if (init_val & PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS)
- new_por &= ~POE_RW;
+ new_perms &= ~POE_RW;
if (init_val & PKEY_DISABLE_READ)
- new_por &= ~POE_R;
+ new_perms &= ~POE_R;
if (init_val & PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE)
- new_por &= ~POE_X;
+ new_perms &= ~POE_X;
- /* Shift the bits in to the correct place in POR for pkey: */
- new_por = POR_ELx_PERM_PREP(pkey, new_por);
-
- /* Get old POR and mask off any old bits in place: */
- old_por = read_sysreg_s(SYS_POR_EL0);
- old_por &= ~(POE_MASK << POR_ELx_PERM_SHIFT(pkey));
-
- /* Write old part along with new part: */
- write_sysreg_s(old_por | new_por, SYS_POR_EL0);
+ por = read_sysreg_s(SYS_POR_EL0);
+ por = por_elx_set_pkey_perms(por, pkey, new_perms);
+ write_sysreg_s(por, SYS_POR_EL0);
return 0;
}
--
2.51.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-05 16:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-05 16:05 [PATCH RFC v7 00/24] pkeys-based page table hardening Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:05 ` [PATCH RFC v7 01/24] mm: Introduce kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:05 ` [PATCH RFC v7 02/24] set_memory: Introduce set_memory_pkey() stub Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:05 ` [PATCH RFC v7 03/24] arm64: mm: Enable overlays for all EL1 indirect permissions Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:05 ` Kevin Brodsky [this message]
2026-05-05 16:05 ` [PATCH RFC v7 05/24] arm64: Implement asm/kpkeys.h using POE Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:05 ` [PATCH RFC v7 06/24] arm64: set_memory: Implement set_memory_pkey() Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:05 ` [PATCH RFC v7 07/24] arm64: Context-switch POR_EL1 Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:05 ` [PATCH RFC v7 08/24] arm64: Initialize POR_EL1 register on cpu_resume() Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:05 ` [PATCH RFC v7 09/24] arm64: Enable kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:05 ` [PATCH RFC v7 10/24] memblock: Move INIT_MEMBLOCK_* macros to header Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 11/24] mm: kpkeys: Introduce kpkeys_hardened_pgtables feature Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 12/24] mm: kpkeys: Protect regular page tables Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 13/24] mm: kpkeys: Introduce early page table allocator Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 14/24] mm: kpkeys: Protect vmemmap page tables Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 15/24] mm: kpkeys: Introduce hook for protecting static " Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 16/24] arm64: kpkeys: Implement arch_supports_kpkeys_early() Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 17/24] arm64: kpkeys: Support KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 18/24] arm64: kpkeys: Ensure the linear map can be modified Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 19/24] arm64: kpkeys: Protect early page tables Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 20/24] arm64: kpkeys: Protect init_pg_dir Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 21/24] arm64: kpkeys: Guard page table writes Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 22/24] arm64: kpkeys: Batch KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES switches Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 23/24] arm64: kpkeys: Enable kpkeys_hardened_pgtables support Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 24/24] mm: Add basic tests for kpkeys_hardened_pgtables Kevin Brodsky
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20260505-kpkeys-v7-4-20c0bdd97197@arm.com \
--to=kevin.brodsky@arm.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=broonie@kernel.org \
--cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=david@kernel.org \
--cc=ira.weiny@intel.com \
--cc=jannh@google.com \
--cc=jeffxu@chromium.org \
--cc=joey.gouly@arm.com \
--cc=kees@kernel.org \
--cc=linusw@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=ljs@kernel.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=maz@kernel.org \
--cc=mbland@motorola.com \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=pierre.langlois@arm.com \
--cc=qperret@google.com \
--cc=rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com \
--cc=rppt@kernel.org \
--cc=ryan.roberts@arm.com \
--cc=tglx@kernel.org \
--cc=vbabka@kernel.org \
--cc=will@kernel.org \
--cc=willy@infradead.org \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
--cc=yang@os.amperecomputing.com \
--cc=yeoreum.yun@arm.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox