[PATCH RFC v7 21/24] arm64: kpkeys: Guard page table writes

[Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>]

When CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES is enabled, page tables (both
user and kernel) are mapped with a privileged pkey in the linear
mapping. As a result, they can only be written in a privileged
kpkeys context.

Introduce a kpkeys guard that sets POR_EL1 appropriately to allow
writing to page tables, and use this guard wherever necessary. The
scope is kept as small as possible, so that POR_EL1 is quickly reset
to its default value. Where atomics are involved, the guard's scope
encompasses the whole loop to avoid switching POR_EL1 unnecessarily.

This patch is a no-op if CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES is disabled
(default).

Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c            |  2 ++
 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 4dfa42b7d053..20072f32677d 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -39,6 +39,14 @@
 #include <linux/mm_types.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/page_table_check.h>
+#include <linux/kpkeys.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES
+KPKEYS_GUARD_COND(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables, KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES,
+		  kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_enabled())
+#else
+KPKEYS_GUARD_NOOP(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)
+#endif
 
 static inline void emit_pte_barriers(void)
 {
@@ -359,6 +367,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_clear_uffd_wp(pte_t pte)
 
 static inline void __set_pte_nosync(pte_t *ptep, pte_t pte)
 {
+	guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
 	WRITE_ONCE(*ptep, pte);
 }
 
@@ -830,6 +839,7 @@ static inline void set_pmd(pmd_t *pmdp, pmd_t pmd)
 	}
 #endif /* __PAGETABLE_PMD_FOLDED */
 
+	guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
 	WRITE_ONCE(*pmdp, pmd);
 
 	if (pmd_valid(pmd))
@@ -894,6 +904,7 @@ static inline void set_pud(pud_t *pudp, pud_t pud)
 		return;
 	}
 
+	guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
 	WRITE_ONCE(*pudp, pud);
 
 	if (pud_valid(pud))
@@ -975,6 +986,7 @@ static inline void set_p4d(p4d_t *p4dp, p4d_t p4d)
 		return;
 	}
 
+	guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
 	WRITE_ONCE(*p4dp, p4d);
 	queue_pte_barriers();
 }
@@ -1103,6 +1115,7 @@ static inline void set_pgd(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd)
 		return;
 	}
 
+	guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
 	WRITE_ONCE(*pgdp, pgd);
 	queue_pte_barriers();
 }
@@ -1307,6 +1320,7 @@ static inline bool __ptep_test_and_clear_young(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 {
 	pte_t old_pte, pte;
 
+	guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
 	pte = __ptep_get(ptep);
 	do {
 		old_pte = pte;
@@ -1354,7 +1368,10 @@ static inline pte_t __ptep_get_and_clear_anysz(struct mm_struct *mm,
 					       pte_t *ptep,
 					       unsigned long pgsize)
 {
-	pte_t pte = __pte(xchg_relaxed(&pte_val(*ptep), 0));
+	pte_t pte;
+
+	scoped_guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)
+		pte = __pte(xchg_relaxed(&pte_val(*ptep), 0));
 
 	switch (pgsize) {
 	case PAGE_SIZE:
@@ -1427,6 +1444,7 @@ static inline void ___ptep_set_wrprotect(struct mm_struct *mm,
 {
 	pte_t old_pte;
 
+	guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
 	do {
 		old_pte = pte;
 		pte = pte_wrprotect(pte);
@@ -1460,6 +1478,7 @@ static inline void __clear_young_dirty_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 {
 	pte_t old_pte;
 
+	guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
 	do {
 		old_pte = pte;
 
@@ -1507,6 +1526,7 @@ static inline pmd_t pmdp_establish(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 		unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmdp, pmd_t pmd)
 {
 	page_table_check_pmd_set(vma->vm_mm, address, pmdp, pmd);
+	guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
 	return __pmd(xchg_relaxed(&pmd_val(*pmdp), pmd_val(pmd)));
 }
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
index 0f3c5c7ca054..858f5d3e8f22 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
@@ -216,6 +216,8 @@ int __ptep_set_access_flags_anysz(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 	if (pte_same(pte, entry))
 		return 0;
 
+	guard(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables)();
+
 	/* only preserve the access flags and write permission */
 	pte_val(entry) &= PTE_RDONLY | PTE_AF | PTE_WRITE | PTE_DIRTY;
 

-- 
2.51.2