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From: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
To: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>,
	 Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>,
	Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>,
	 Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
	 Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>,
	Kiryl Shutsemau <kas@kernel.org>,
	 Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	 Jonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org>,
	Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>,
	 Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
	Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
	 Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	 Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	patches@lists.linux.dev, Dan Williams <djbw@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 06/11] PCI/TSM: Describe the PCI attestation control family
Date: Mon, 2 Nov 2026 12:30:48 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <auh0MBdHJw0cqKa8@FV6GYCPJ69> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <yq5ah5i2a487.fsf@kernel.org>

Sat, Oct 31, 2026 at 05:22:48AM +0100, aneesh.kumar@kernel.org wrote:
>Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us> writes:
>
>> Wed, Oct 28, 2026 at 04:26:13PM +0100, aneesh.kumar@kernel.org wrote:
>>
>>
>> [..]
>>
>>
>>>diff --git a/Documentation/ctlv/specs/ctlv-attestation-pci.yaml b/Documentation/ctlv/specs/ctlv-attestation-pci.yaml
>>>new file mode 100644
>>>index 000000000000..edb35cede0c2
>>>--- /dev/null
>>>+++ b/Documentation/ctlv/specs/ctlv-attestation-pci.yaml
>>>@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
>>>+# SPDX-License-Identifier: ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)
>>>+%YAML 1.2
>>>+---
>>>+family:
>>>+  name: ctlv-attestation-pci
>>>+  inherits: ctlv-attestation
>>>+  pre-init: true
>>>+
>>>+attr-groups:
>>>+  - name: pci
>>>+    attrs:
>>>+      - name: name
>>>+        type: string
>>>+        min-length: 1
>>>+        max-length: 31
>>>+      - name: generation
>>>+        type: uint
>>>+        max: 4294967295
>>>+      - name: tsm-id
>>>+        type: uint
>>>+        max: 2147483647
>>>+      - name: connected
>>>+        type: uint
>>>+        max: 1
>>>+      - name: locked
>>>+        type: uint
>>>+        max: 1
>>>+      - name: accepted
>>>+        type: uint
>>>+        max: 1
>>>+      - name: dsm
>>>+        type: string
>>>+        min-length: 1
>>>+        max-length: 31
>>>+
>>>+      - name: object
>>>+        enum: evidence-blob-class
>>>+      - name: challenge
>>>+        type: binary
>>>+        min-length: 32
>>>+        max-length: 32
>>>+
>>>+attr-sets:
>>>+  - name: device-info
>>>+    attrs: pci.name
>>>+  - name: change-reply
>>>+    attrs: pci.generation
>>>+  - name: state-reply
>>>+    attrs:
>>>+      - pci.generation
>>>+      - pci.connected
>>>+      - pci.locked
>>>+      - pci.accepted
>>>+    optional-attrs:
>>>+      - pci.tsm-id
>>>+      - pci.dsm
>>>+
>>>+  - name: refresh-request
>>>+    attrs:
>>>+      - pci.generation
>>>+      - pci.object
>>>+    optional-attrs:
>>>+      - pci.challenge
>>>+
>>>+ops:
>>>+  - name: state-get
>>>+    type: action
>>>+    fd-access: read
>>>+    reply:
>>>+      attrs: state-reply
>>>+  - name: evidence-refresh
>>
>> I'm missing why exactly you need this op. Can't you do whatever is
>> needed in the provider evidence_get implementation? Why it needs to be 2
>> step.
>>
>> Also, why do you think this is provider-specific op?
>>
>
>I was considering evidence-get to return the evidence generated by
>evidence-refresh. Without an explicit refresh, evidence-get would return
>the previously fetched evidence. There is no particular reason for this
>two-step approach; evidence-get could always fetch fresh evidence,
>making evidence-refresh redundant.

Okay. The aim of evidence-get is to do get fresh evidence upon each
call. I will document this more clearly.

  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-02 11:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-28 15:26 [RFC PATCH v1 00/11] PCI/TSM: Add CTLV attestation Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/11] attestation: Restrict inherited operations per instance Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 13:29   ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/11] attestation: Filter evidence objects " Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 13:44   ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-31  6:24     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 19:14       ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/11] attestation: Enter secure operation when evidence is accepted Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 13:51   ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 15:36     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31  4:09     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 11:28       ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/11] attestation: Bind object selection to accepted evidence snapshots Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/11] attestation: Make the evidence-get challenge attribute optional Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/11] PCI/TSM: Describe the PCI attestation control family Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 14:01   ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 15:43     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-02 12:45       ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-31  4:05     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 11:50       ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-31  4:22     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 11:30       ` Jiri Pirko [this message]
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/11] attestation: Add attestation helpers for PCI/TSM integration Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/11] PCI/TSM: Bind CTLV attestation to connected and locked contexts Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 22:56   ` Dave Jiang
2026-10-29  5:30     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-10-29 12:41       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-30 14:04   ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 14:08   ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 15:39     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-02 12:11       ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/11] crypto/ccp: Defer SEV-TIO link setup until evidence acceptance Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/11] virt: coco: arm-cca-host: Publish slot zero and establish streams after acceptance Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-29 16:56   ` Dave Jiang
2026-10-29 17:10     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-30  9:58       ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-10-30 13:15         ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31  3:47           ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 10:11             ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-02 17:26               ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-02 10:05           ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-02 10:22           ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-02 17:37             ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/11] virt: coco: arm-cca-guest: Refresh selected evidence against trusted digests Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 12:34 ` [RFC PATCH v1 00/11] PCI/TSM: Add CTLV attestation Xu Yilun
2026-10-30 15:32   ` Jason Gunthorpe

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