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From: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
To: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>,
	 linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>,
	 Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>,
	Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>,
	 Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
	 Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>,
	Kiryl Shutsemau <kas@kernel.org>,
	 Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	 Jonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org>,
	Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
	 Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	 John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	 Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	patches@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 08/11] PCI/TSM: Bind CTLV attestation to connected and locked contexts
Date: Mon, 2 Nov 2026 13:11:14 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <auh9uIC0TrR9pAZR@FV6GYCPJ69> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261030153900.GM3734323@nvidia.com>

Fri, Oct 30, 2026 at 04:39:00PM +0100, jgg@nvidia.com wrote:
>On Fri, Oct 30, 2026 at 03:08:52PM +0100, Jiri Pirko wrote:
>> Wed, Oct 28, 2026 at 04:26:15PM +0100, aneesh.kumar@kernel.org wrote:
>> 
>> [..]
>> 
>> > 		available authentication methods for the device.
>> > 
>> > 		When present and the tsm/ attribute directory is present, the
>> >-		authenticated attribute is an alias for the device 'connect'
>> >-		state. See the 'tsm/connect' attribute for more details.
>> >+		authenticated attribute reports the TSM name only after secure
>> >+		session and stream setup succeed, otherwise an empty string.
>> >+		Connection control uses tsm/connect and tsm/disconnect.
>> > 		This is a "link" TSM attribute, see
>> > 		Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-tsm.
>> 
>> [..]
>> 
>> > static ssize_t authenticated_show(struct device *dev,
>> > 				  struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
>> > {
>> >-	/*
>> >-	 * When the SPDM session established via TSM the 'authenticated' state
>> >-	 * of the device is identical to the connect state.
>> >-	 */
>> >-	return connect_show(dev, attr, buf);
>> >+	struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(dev);
>> >+	struct pci_tsm_pf0 *pf0;
>> >+	int rc;
>> >+
>> >+	ACQUIRE(rwsem_read_intr, lock)(&pci_tsm_rwsem);
>> >+	rc = ACQUIRE_ERR(rwsem_read_intr, &lock);
>> >+	if (rc)
>> >+		return rc;
>> >+
>> >+	if (!pdev->tsm || !pdev->tsm->dsm_dev)
>> >+		return sysfs_emit(buf, "\n");
>> >+
>> >+	pf0 = to_pci_tsm_pf0(pdev->tsm);
>> >+	if (!pf0 || !pf0->stream_connected || pf0->base_tsm.error)
>> >+		return sysfs_emit(buf, "\n");
>> >+
>> >+	return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", dev_name(&pdev->tsm->tsm_dev->dev));
>> > }
>> > static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(authenticated);
>> 
>> I had in mind removing this attribute alongside the staged connect
>> change and reporting authentication state through SPDM_GET.
>> 
>> This instead retains the attribute and changes when it reports the TSM
>> name. Could we settle that together with the SPDM_GET interface rather
>> than maintaining parallel authentication-state queries?
>> 
>> Jason, what do you think?
>
>I'm not keen on any of the sysfs, I'd like to understand who is
>expected to use this.
>
>If we imagine a systemd-device-accept-d kind of flow I don't see any
>need to duplicate things in attestation subsystem in sysfs..
>
>I'm not sure 'stream connected' is even right, as in my last note we
>should not consider the thing authenticated until we actually pass
>userspace EVIDENCE_ACCEPT, even if the TSM has established a SPDM
>session.

Agreed. The question if we can legally get rid of it at this point...

  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-02 12:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-28 15:26 [RFC PATCH v1 00/11] PCI/TSM: Add CTLV attestation Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/11] attestation: Restrict inherited operations per instance Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 13:29   ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/11] attestation: Filter evidence objects " Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 13:44   ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-31  6:24     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 19:14       ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/11] attestation: Enter secure operation when evidence is accepted Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 13:51   ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 15:36     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31  4:09     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 11:28       ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/11] attestation: Bind object selection to accepted evidence snapshots Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/11] attestation: Make the evidence-get challenge attribute optional Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/11] PCI/TSM: Describe the PCI attestation control family Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 14:01   ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 15:43     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-02 12:45       ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-31  4:05     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 11:50       ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-31  4:22     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 11:30       ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/11] attestation: Add attestation helpers for PCI/TSM integration Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/11] PCI/TSM: Bind CTLV attestation to connected and locked contexts Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 22:56   ` Dave Jiang
2026-10-29  5:30     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-10-29 12:41       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-30 14:04   ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 14:08   ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 15:39     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-02 12:11       ` Jiri Pirko [this message]
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/11] crypto/ccp: Defer SEV-TIO link setup until evidence acceptance Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/11] virt: coco: arm-cca-host: Publish slot zero and establish streams after acceptance Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-29 16:56   ` Dave Jiang
2026-10-29 17:10     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-30  9:58       ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-10-30 13:15         ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31  3:47           ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 10:11             ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-02 17:26               ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-02 10:05           ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-02 10:22           ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-02 17:37             ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/11] virt: coco: arm-cca-guest: Refresh selected evidence against trusted digests Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 12:34 ` [RFC PATCH v1 00/11] PCI/TSM: Add CTLV attestation Xu Yilun
2026-10-30 15:32   ` Jason Gunthorpe

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