From: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
To: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>,
linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>,
Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>,
Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>,
Kiryl Shutsemau <kas@kernel.org>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Jonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org>,
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
patches@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 08/11] PCI/TSM: Bind CTLV attestation to connected and locked contexts
Date: Mon, 2 Nov 2026 13:11:14 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <auh9uIC0TrR9pAZR@FV6GYCPJ69> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261030153900.GM3734323@nvidia.com>
Fri, Oct 30, 2026 at 04:39:00PM +0100, jgg@nvidia.com wrote:
>On Fri, Oct 30, 2026 at 03:08:52PM +0100, Jiri Pirko wrote:
>> Wed, Oct 28, 2026 at 04:26:15PM +0100, aneesh.kumar@kernel.org wrote:
>>
>> [..]
>>
>> > available authentication methods for the device.
>> >
>> > When present and the tsm/ attribute directory is present, the
>> >- authenticated attribute is an alias for the device 'connect'
>> >- state. See the 'tsm/connect' attribute for more details.
>> >+ authenticated attribute reports the TSM name only after secure
>> >+ session and stream setup succeed, otherwise an empty string.
>> >+ Connection control uses tsm/connect and tsm/disconnect.
>> > This is a "link" TSM attribute, see
>> > Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-tsm.
>>
>> [..]
>>
>> > static ssize_t authenticated_show(struct device *dev,
>> > struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
>> > {
>> >- /*
>> >- * When the SPDM session established via TSM the 'authenticated' state
>> >- * of the device is identical to the connect state.
>> >- */
>> >- return connect_show(dev, attr, buf);
>> >+ struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(dev);
>> >+ struct pci_tsm_pf0 *pf0;
>> >+ int rc;
>> >+
>> >+ ACQUIRE(rwsem_read_intr, lock)(&pci_tsm_rwsem);
>> >+ rc = ACQUIRE_ERR(rwsem_read_intr, &lock);
>> >+ if (rc)
>> >+ return rc;
>> >+
>> >+ if (!pdev->tsm || !pdev->tsm->dsm_dev)
>> >+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "\n");
>> >+
>> >+ pf0 = to_pci_tsm_pf0(pdev->tsm);
>> >+ if (!pf0 || !pf0->stream_connected || pf0->base_tsm.error)
>> >+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "\n");
>> >+
>> >+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", dev_name(&pdev->tsm->tsm_dev->dev));
>> > }
>> > static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(authenticated);
>>
>> I had in mind removing this attribute alongside the staged connect
>> change and reporting authentication state through SPDM_GET.
>>
>> This instead retains the attribute and changes when it reports the TSM
>> name. Could we settle that together with the SPDM_GET interface rather
>> than maintaining parallel authentication-state queries?
>>
>> Jason, what do you think?
>
>I'm not keen on any of the sysfs, I'd like to understand who is
>expected to use this.
>
>If we imagine a systemd-device-accept-d kind of flow I don't see any
>need to duplicate things in attestation subsystem in sysfs..
>
>I'm not sure 'stream connected' is even right, as in my last note we
>should not consider the thing authenticated until we actually pass
>userspace EVIDENCE_ACCEPT, even if the TSM has established a SPDM
>session.
Agreed. The question if we can legally get rid of it at this point...
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-02 12:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-28 15:26 [RFC PATCH v1 00/11] PCI/TSM: Add CTLV attestation Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/11] attestation: Restrict inherited operations per instance Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 13:29 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/11] attestation: Filter evidence objects " Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 13:44 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-31 6:24 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 19:14 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/11] attestation: Enter secure operation when evidence is accepted Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 13:51 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 15:36 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31 4:09 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 11:28 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/11] attestation: Bind object selection to accepted evidence snapshots Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/11] attestation: Make the evidence-get challenge attribute optional Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/11] PCI/TSM: Describe the PCI attestation control family Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 14:01 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 15:43 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-02 12:45 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-31 4:05 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 11:50 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-31 4:22 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 11:30 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/11] attestation: Add attestation helpers for PCI/TSM integration Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/11] PCI/TSM: Bind CTLV attestation to connected and locked contexts Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 22:56 ` Dave Jiang
2026-10-29 5:30 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-10-29 12:41 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-30 14:04 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 14:08 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 15:39 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-02 12:11 ` Jiri Pirko [this message]
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/11] crypto/ccp: Defer SEV-TIO link setup until evidence acceptance Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/11] virt: coco: arm-cca-host: Publish slot zero and establish streams after acceptance Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-29 16:56 ` Dave Jiang
2026-10-29 17:10 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-30 9:58 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-10-30 13:15 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31 3:47 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 10:11 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-02 17:26 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-02 10:05 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-02 10:22 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-02 17:37 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/11] virt: coco: arm-cca-guest: Refresh selected evidence against trusted digests Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 12:34 ` [RFC PATCH v1 00/11] PCI/TSM: Add CTLV attestation Xu Yilun
2026-10-30 15:32 ` Jason Gunthorpe
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