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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: "Mark Fasheh" <mark@fasheh.com>,
	dsterba@suse.cz, "Joseph Qi" <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>,
	"Joel Becker" <jlbec@evilplan.org>,
	tytso@mit.edu, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 07/28] exfat: keep the current mount options on remount
Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2026 10:36:24 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-167970@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261012-work-fs-sb_rdonly-v1-7-60743a3dc326@kernel.org>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Medium] exfat: data race and torn struct read during remount options copy
--

commit 2d6a9e734992913f68b1b7acddc9bc5d1eb92428
Author: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>

exfat: keep the current mount options on remount

This commit modifies exfat_init_fs_context() to initialize the filesystem
context with the current superblock mount options during a reconfiguration.
It resolves an issue where remounting without options, such as an emergency
remount, would inadvertently reset mount options like errors=continue to
defaults.

> diff --git a/fs/exfat/super.c b/fs/exfat/super.c
> index a9ea36ba26938..71a348d10c26a 100644
> --- a/fs/exfat/super.c
> +++ b/fs/exfat/super.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -805,6 +807,11 @@ static int exfat_reconfigure(struct fs_context *fc)
>  	}
>  
>  	swap(*cur_opts, *new_opts);

[Severity: Medium]
Could this swap operation race with a concurrent read?

In exfat_init_fs_context(), the mount options struct is read locklessly
before the s_umount lock is acquired. Concurrently modifying the same
struct here via swap(*cur_opts, *new_opts) allows the compiler to use
non-atomic memory operations, which might lead to a torn read.

> +	/*
> +	 * The iocharset can't change, keep the current string. The new
> +	 * options have none if the remount didn't specify one.
> +	 */
> +	swap(cur_opts->iocharset, new_opts->iocharset);
[ ... ]
> @@ -831,23 +838,27 @@ static int exfat_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
>  
>  	if (fc->purpose == FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE && fc->root) {
>  		struct super_block *sb = fc->root->d_sb;
> -		struct exfat_mount_options *cur_opts = &EXFAT_SB(sb)->options;
>  
> -		sbi->options.fs_uid = cur_opts->fs_uid;
> -		sbi->options.fs_gid = cur_opts->fs_gid;
> -		sbi->options.fs_fmask = cur_opts->fs_fmask;
> -		sbi->options.fs_dmask = cur_opts->fs_dmask;
> +		/*
> +		 * Start from the current options so a remount only changes
> +		 * what it specifies. exfat_reconfigure() refuses to change
> +		 * most of them, so a remount that doesn't repeat them all
> +		 * would fail, e.g. emergency remount which passes none. The
> +		 * iocharset string stays with the superblock and is only
> +		 * compared if the remount names one, see exfat_reconfigure().
> +		 */
> +		sbi->options = EXFAT_SB(sb)->options;

[Severity: Medium]
Can this struct assignment race with a concurrent remount?

When a user process calls mount -o remount or fsconfig, exfat_init_fs_context()
is invoked and locklessly reads EXFAT_SB(sb)->options. Concurrently, another
thread executing a remount might be modifying this same struct via
swap(*cur_opts, *new_opts) in exfat_reconfigure().

Since exfat_init_fs_context() executes before s_umount is acquired, this
concurrent access allows the compiler to use non-atomic memory operations.
Could this result in a torn read of the 32-bit word containing the bitfields
such as utf8, sys_tz, discard, or keep_last_dots, yielding an unintended
mixture of old and new options during the remount?

> +		sbi->options.iocharset = NULL;
>  	} else {
>  		sbi->options.fs_uid = current_uid();
>  		sbi->options.fs_gid = current_gid();

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261012-work-fs-sb_rdonly-v1-0-60743a3dc326@kernel.org?part=7

  reply	other threads:[~2026-10-12 10:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 65+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-12 10:20 [PATCH RFC 00/28] fs: don't set SB_RDONLY after filesystem errors Christian Brauner
2026-10-12 10:20 ` [PATCH RFC 01/28] ecryptfs: don't leak the inode when a lookup can't open the lower file Christian Brauner
2026-10-12 10:34   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-12 10:20 ` [PATCH RFC 02/28] ecryptfs: fall back to a read-only " Christian Brauner
2026-10-12 10:32   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-12 10:20 ` [PATCH RFC 03/28] ext2: don't set SB_RDONLY after filesystem errors Christian Brauner
2026-10-12 10:44   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-12 10:20 ` [PATCH RFC 04/28] jfs: " Christian Brauner
2026-10-12 10:41   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-12 10:20 ` [PATCH RFC 05/28] nilfs2: " Christian Brauner
2026-10-12 10:34   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-13 16:01   ` Ryusuke Konishi
2026-10-12 10:20 ` [PATCH RFC 06/28] fat: " Christian Brauner
2026-10-12 10:37   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-12 10:20 ` [PATCH RFC 07/28] exfat: keep the current mount options on remount Christian Brauner
2026-10-12 10:36   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-10-12 10:20 ` [PATCH RFC 08/28] exfat: don't set SB_RDONLY after filesystem errors Christian Brauner
2026-10-12 10:35   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-12 10:20 ` [PATCH RFC 09/28] hfs: don't set SB_RDONLY after MDB write errors Christian Brauner
2026-10-12 10:41   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-12 22:57   ` [Jfs-discussion] " Viacheslav Dubeyko
2026-10-12 10:20 ` [PATCH RFC 10/28] hfsplus: don't set SB_RDONLY when creating the attributes tree Christian Brauner
2026-10-12 10:36   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-12 22:34   ` [Jfs-discussion] " Viacheslav Dubeyko
2026-10-12 10:20 ` [PATCH RFC 11/28] affs: don't set SB_RDONLY after filesystem errors Christian Brauner
2026-10-12 10:41   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-12 10:20 ` [PATCH RFC 12/28] ufs: " Christian Brauner
2026-10-12 10:39   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-12 10:20 ` [PATCH RFC 13/28] hpfs: " Christian Brauner
2026-10-12 10:35   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-12 10:20 ` [PATCH RFC 14/28] ntfs: " Christian Brauner
2026-10-12 10:45   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-12 10:21 ` [PATCH RFC 15/28] ocfs2: keep options that can't change on remount Christian Brauner
2026-10-12 10:45   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-12 10:21 ` [PATCH RFC 16/28] ocfs2: don't set SB_RDONLY after filesystem errors Christian Brauner
2026-10-12 10:59   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-12 10:21 ` [PATCH RFC 17/28] zonefs: don't set SB_RDONLY after I/O errors Christian Brauner
2026-10-12 10:42   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-12 10:21 ` [PATCH RFC 18/28] btrfs: check BTRFS_FS_STATE_RO instead of SB_RDONLY at runtime Christian Brauner
2026-10-12 10:53   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-12 10:21 ` [PATCH RFC 19/28] btrfs: don't set SB_RDONLY after filesystem errors Christian Brauner
2026-10-12 11:05   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-12 10:21 ` [PATCH RFC 20/28] gfs2: wait for a pending withdraw before remounting read-only Christian Brauner
2026-10-12 10:44   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-12 10:21 ` [PATCH RFC 21/28] gfs2: don't set SB_RDONLY on withdraw Christian Brauner
2026-10-12 10:48   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-12 10:21 ` [PATCH RFC 22/28] efivarfs: stop using SB_RDONLY for read-only efivar ops Christian Brauner
2026-10-12 10:52   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-12 10:21 ` [PATCH RFC 23/28] ubifs: don't set SB_RDONLY after errors Christian Brauner
2026-10-12 11:05   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-12 10:21 ` [PATCH RFC 24/28] selftests/filesystems: test filesystem errors while frozen Christian Brauner
2026-10-12 10:47   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-12 10:21 ` [PATCH RFC 25/28] ext4: allow remounting read-only in the emergency state Christian Brauner
2026-10-12 10:49   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-12 16:38   ` Jan Kara
2026-10-12 10:21 ` [PATCH RFC 26/28] selftests/filesystems: test ext4 remounts " Christian Brauner
2026-10-12 10:52   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-12 10:21 ` [PATCH RFC 27/28] xfs: allow remounting read-only after a shutdown Christian Brauner
2026-10-12 10:55   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-13  7:38   ` Christoph Hellwig
2026-10-12 10:21 ` [PATCH RFC 28/28] selftests/filesystems: test xfs remounts " Christian Brauner
2026-10-12 10:51   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-13  7:40   ` Christoph Hellwig
2026-10-12 16:53 ` [PATCH RFC 00/28] fs: don't set SB_RDONLY after filesystem errors Jan Kara
2026-10-13 19:39   ` Christian Brauner

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