[PATCH 6.6 000/168] 6.6.161-rc1 review

[PATCH 6.6 000/168] 6.6.161-rc1 review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.161 release.
There are 168 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.

Responses should be made by Fri, 30 Oct 2026 16:59:22 +0000.
Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.6.161-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.6.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
    Linux 6.6.161-rc1

Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
    signal: allow taks to temporarily block TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL

Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
    pid_namespace: prevent TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL from interrupting the reaper

Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
    ptrace: refuse to change the signal mask of a user worker

Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
    signal: don't retarget shared signals in a dying thread group

Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
    signal: only SIGKILL and the freezers interrupt a coredumping task

Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
    coredump: hold RCU while releasing parked threads

Aaron Ahmed <aarnahmd@amazon.com>
    ftrace: Initialize modname and offset in print_rec()

Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>
    asymmetric_keys: reject trust keys without IDs

Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
    keys/trusted_keys: return immediately after TPM unseal failure

Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
    KEYS: trusted: Fix blob allocation size in tpm2_key_decode()

Adrian Martinez <adrimg3196@gmail.com>
    KEYS: Fix key_reject_and_link() race with keyring restriction

Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>
    keys: Protect the read method check against type removal

Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
    keys: make keyring indexes independent of kernel addresses

Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>
    keys: Protect the type name while describing a key

Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>
    keys: Check the authorization payload in process keyring searches

Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>
    keys: Avoid the owner account dereference in named keyring lookup

Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
    io_uring/poll: don't loop on HUP with multiple references

Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
    io_uring/timeout: don't lose a cancel as io-wq arms a timeout

Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
    io_uring/timeout: don't flush with the sequence behind the last flush

Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
    io_uring/timeout: don't put a sequence target behind the last flush

Juanlu Herrero <juanlu@fastmail.com>
    io_uring/poll: avoid retry wakeup loss when dropping ownership

Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
    io_uring: look up the file before queueing to io-wq

Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
    io_uring/timeout: no ABS update of multishot timeouts

Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
    io_uring: don't pass restart error codes to userspace

Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
    io_uring/sqpoll: let the thread sleep on disabled rings

Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
    io_uring/timeout: keep repeat count on multishot update

Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
    io_uring/timeout: don't skip over reached sequences

Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
    io_uring/poll: drop stale double poll entry on rearm

Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
    io_uring/wait: look at all CQ waiters on wake up

Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
    io_uring: wake ring pollers for local task_work

Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
    io_uring/cancel: let CANCEL_ALL find parked requests

Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
    io_uring/cancel: don't default to setting req->work.cancel_seq

Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
    io_uring/cancel: recognize "no timeout" on 32-bit

Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
    io_uring/cancel: don't forget that the work was running

Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
    io_uring/poll: don't lose a cancel as io-wq arms poll

Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
    io_uring/io-wq: let cancel find picked up hashed work

Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
    io_uring/io-wq: don't exit with a creation pending

Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
    io_uring/io-wq: don't strand work when a worker exits

Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
    io_uring: don't flood a cancelling task with task_work

Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
    io_uring/io-wq: don't hide a link from cancellations

Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
    io_uring/io-wq: don't lose the signal that ends work

Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
    io_uring/wait: don't spin on a stuck overflow list

Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
    io-wq: order the exit bit against worker creation task work

Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
    tracing/histograms: Verify event_call identity when updating synth_event refcount

Donggeun Yoo <donggeunyoo.kernel@gmail.com>
    tracing: Fix 64-bit and signed histogram fields on 32-bit kernels

Donggeun Yoo <donggeunyoo.kernel@gmail.com>
    tracing: Unregister field variable histograms when the command fails

Donggeun Yoo <donggeunyoo.kernel@gmail.com>
    tracing: Save the event file instead of the compatible histogram

Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
    tracing: Reject incomplete event filter expressions

Pauli Virtanen <pav@iki.fi>
    Bluetooth: L2CAP: refuse __l2cap_chan_add if chan already has conn

Jonas Köppeler <j.koeppeler@tu-berlin.de>
    net_sched: codel: fix stale state for empty flows in fq_codel

Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
    Revert "srcu: Use irq_work to start GP in tiny SRCU"

Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
    bonding: do not set usable_slaves for broadcast mode

Tonghao Zhang <tonghao@bamaicloud.com>
    net: bonding: update the slave array for broadcast mode

Yun Zhou <yun.zhou@windriver.com>
    xfs: don't hold buffer locks across sync transaction commit in xfs_sync_sb_buf

Frank Sorenson <sorenson@redhat.com>
    cifs: add revalidation on FSCTL failure in smb2_duplicate_extents()

Ben Cressey <ben@cressey.dev>
    dm-integrity: fix infinite loop on discard with large tag size

Jesse Zhang <Jesse.Zhang@amd.com>
    drm/amdgpu: free the userptr ranges when a CS fails after parser_bos

Dibin Moolakadan Subrahmanian <dibin.moolakadan.subrahmanian@intel.com>
    drm/i915/dmc: Harden DMC firmware payload parsing

Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
    futex: Fix mm reuse handling for FUT_OFF_MMSHARED

Wentao Liang <vulab@iscas.ac.cn>
    i2c: viai2c-wmt: Fix clock leak in wmt_i2c_probe()

David Carlier <devnexen@gmail.com>
    gtp: disable BH before calling udp_tunnel_xmit_skb()

Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
    ipv4: udp: Create exceptions before socket matching

Daehyeon Ko <4ncienth@gmail.com>
    vsock/virtio: validate packet source for connected sockets

Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs) <cenzhang@linux.microsoft.com>
    io_uring/cancel: don't spin on local work the task can't run

Chen Cheng <chencheng@fnnas.com>
    dm-integrity: require stable writes for internal hash modes

Taeyang Lee <0wn@theori.io>
    tracing: Keep the predicate limit separate from program capacity

Peter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com>
    ASoC: SOF: ipc4-topology: Fix shift-out-of-bounds for aggregated ALH capture

Aviv Vaknin <vaknins33@gmail.com>
    pid_namespace: make zap_pid_ns_processes() freezable

Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
    exit: move core of do_wait() into helper

Christian König <ckoenig.leichtzumerken@gmail.com>
    drm/exec: don't immediately add prelocked obj to array of locked objs

Stanley Jhu <stanleyjhu@google.com>
    scsi: bsg: Pass reply_len to bsg_setup_queue() to fit UFS ARPMB replies

Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
    ext4: free the sbi after a grace period

Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
    ntfs3: free the sbi after a grace period

Cen Zhang (Microsoft) <cenzhang@linux.microsoft.com>
    watch_queue: Fix note pool publication race in watch_queue_set_size()

K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>
    kernel/watch_queue: Use pipe_buf() to retrieve the pipe buffer

Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
    eventfs: fix SRCU read lock leak in eventfs_iterate()

Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) <ljs@kernel.org>
    perf: Track the perf mlock gift separately

Laurence Oberman <loberman@redhat.com>
    scsi: st: Fix use-after-free race between st_remove() and st_open()

Paulo Alcantara <pc@manguebit.org>
    smb: client: fix multiuser mount with krb5

Frank Sorenson <sorenson@redhat.com>
    smb: client: fix heap overflow in cifs_do_set_acl()

Aohan Mei <henrymei@tencent.com>
    net/sched: cls_flower: validate mask pointer after nla_next()

Aleksandr Khromov <haa@amicon.ru>
    ksmbd: zero the FS_OBJECT_ID_INFORMATION buffer before filling it in

Aleksandr Khromov <haa@amicon.ru>
    ksmbd: initialize FileSystemControlFlags in FS_CONTROL_INFORMATION

Aleksandr Khromov <haa@amicon.ru>
    ksmbd: fill in FileSysIdentifier in FS_POSIX_INFORMATION

Jun Yang <littleddfu@gmail.com>
    net: bridge: mcast: don't truncate the port group walk on teardown

Kairui Song <kasong@tencent.com>
    mm, madvise: fix potential workingset node list_lru leaks

Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com>
    KVM: x86/mmu: Preserve nested TDP shadow page tables if they are used as roots

Matt Fleming <mfleming@cloudflare.com>
    mm/huge_memory: initialise workingset state before folio split

David Rosca <david.rosca@amd.com>
    drm/amdgpu: Fix VCE 3 ring align_mask

Zihan Xi <zihanx@nebusec.ai>
    ipv4: avoid divide by zero in fib_rebalance

Niklas Schnelle <schnelle@linux.ibm.com>
    s390/pci: Fix leak of uninitialized kernel data in SCLP report

Aswin Karuvally <aswin@linux.ibm.com>
    s390/ctcm: Prevent XID null dereference

Florian Schauer <florian@schauer.to>
    page_pool: keep frag_offset aligned for odd-sized requests

Charles Vosburgh <theminershive@gmail.com>
    sctp: validate chunk length in the inqueue parser

Chengfeng Ye <nicoyip.dev@gmail.com>
    tipc: protect node reset trace dump with node lock

Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
    xfs: fix capability check in xfs

Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
    net/iucv: fix the recvmsg window update

Genjian Zhang <zhanggenjian@kylinos.cn>
    dm-ebs: fix incorrect device offset check in ebs_ctr()

Ben Cressey <ben@cressey.dev>
    dm-crypt: fix a tiny race condition in crypt_dec_pending

Benjamin Marzinski <bmarzins@redhat.com>
    dm cache: fix issue with background work locking

Ming-Hung Tsai <mtsai@redhat.com>
    dm cache: fix demotion stats in passthrough mode

Etienne Perot <eperot@google.com>
    cgroup: fix spurious SIGKILL of CLONE_INTO_CGROUP children

Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs) <blbllhy@gmail.com>
    tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CC_INFO)

Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs) <blbllhy@gmail.com>
    tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION)

Heyang Tan <thy15333007817@163.com>
    wifi: p54: validate firmware record lengths

Tengda Wu <wutengda@huaweicloud.com>
    tracing: Fix hist trigger timestamps for buffered events

Amit Machhiwal <amachhiw@linux.ibm.com>
    tracing: Do not initialize tracefs work if tracing is disabled

Taeyang Lee <0wn@theori.io>
    tracing: Check operator stack capacity before pushing

Donggeun Yoo <donggeunyoo.kernel@gmail.com>
    tracing: Fix the shift out of bounds in the log2 histogram modifier

Jesse Zhang <Jesse.Zhang@amd.com>
    drm/amdgpu: don't drop the runtime PM reference twice in amdgpu_gpr

Timur Kristóf <timur.kristof@gmail.com>
    drm/amdgpu/sdma3: Work around POLL_REGMEM / FENCE hang

Yehyeong Lee <yhlee@isslab.korea.ac.kr>
    scsi: libiscsi: Validate the task named by a management response

Yehyeong Lee <yhlee@isslab.korea.ac.kr>
    scsi: libiscsi: Validate the ITT reflected in a Reject PDU

Yehyeong Lee <yhlee@isslab.korea.ac.kr>
    scsi: libiscsi: Reject a negative task index from parse_pdu_itt

Yehyeong Lee <yhlee@isslab.korea.ac.kr>
    scsi: xen/scsifront: Check for a NULL shadow entry on a backend response

Antoine Huret <antoine.huret@bull.com>
    perf: Update cgroup time when rotating multiplexed events

Loic Poulain <loic.poulain@oss.qualcomm.com>
    i2c: qcom-cci: Fix HALT_ACK reset request being dropped

Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
    tracing/histograms: Reject non-stacktrace fields for synthetic stacktrace fields

Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
    tools: gpio: fix building from the top level with O=

Daehyeon Ko <4ncienth@gmail.com>
    sctp: revalidate output stream after association connect wait

Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
    pinctrl: amd: Clear S4 wake bits when firmware has _AEI

Aohan Mei <henrymei@tencent.com>
    net: rds: fix uninitialized trans dereference in CM event handler

Jérémy Jean <Jeremy.Jean@oss.cyber.gouv.fr>
    net/sched: fix use-after-free in __tcf_action_put()

Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
    eventfs: Free the eventfs_inode after an rcu grace period too

Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
    fsnotify: prevent mark additions during connector teardown

Amirmohammad Eftekhar <amirmohammadeftekhar@gmail.com>
    KVM: nVMX: Reset MMU back to the root MMU if loading L2 state fails for !VM-Entry

Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
    unicode: free the map after a grace period

Sung Byeongchan <tjdqudcks0424@naver.com>
    autofs: ignore notification errors from a replaced pipe

Haris Okanovic <harisokn@amazon.com>
    perf: Fix perf_pmu_migrate_context() leaving events behind

Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
    gpio: mxc: fix wakeup_pads bit operations

Alexander Stein <alexander.stein@ew.tq-group.com>
    gpio: mxc: use BIT() macro

Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
    gpio: mxc: fix both_edges bit operations

Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@linaro.org>
    gpio: mxc: use lock guards for the generic GPIO chip lock

Joas Antonio dos Santos <joasantonio108@gmail.com>
    calipso: keep BIG TCP payload_len in calipso_skbuff_setattr()

Alice Mikityanska <alice@isovalent.com>
    net/ipv6: Introduce payload_len helpers

Nicolai Buchwitz <nb@tipi-net.de>
    net: bcmgenet: unshare the skb before writing the control block

Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
    netlink: avoid hashing the network namespace pointer

Xingui Yang <yangxingui@huawei.com>
    scsi: libsas: Fix SMP IO deadlock during HA resume

Martin Kaiser <martin@kaiser.cx>
    tracing: probes: error if BTF is required but unavailable

Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
    pipe: preserve existing fasync readers on writer setup failure

Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
    samples: pidfd: fix userprogs typo

Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>
    ocfs2/dlm: Protect the recovery list during debugfs reads

Linfeng Sun <linfeng.sun.dev@gmail.com>
    scsi: target: iscsi: Fix race in discovery auth updates

Laurence Oberman <loberman@redhat.com>
    scsi: st: Save the visited block for the partition the drive is in

Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
    nios2: fix __wsum type degradation in csum_fold()

Carlos Jones Jr <carlosjr.jones@analog.com>
    spi: tegra114: assert CS GPIO for every transfer in a message

Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
    netlink: reset skb headers before unicast and multicast filtering

HyeongJun An <sammiee5311@gmail.com>
    ASoC: nau8822: Fix the 128x oversampling switch bits

HyeongJun An <sammiee5311@gmail.com>
    ASoC: wm8978: Fix the 128x oversampling switch bits

HyeongJun An <sammiee5311@gmail.com>
    ASoC: max98371: Fix the Speaker DHT Min Volume bits

HyeongJun An <sammiee5311@gmail.com>
    ASoC: pcm3168a: Fix the DAC zero flag polarity bit

HyeongJun An <sammiee5311@gmail.com>
    ASoC: cs42l52: Fix the NG Type Switch bit

HyeongJun An <sammiee5311@gmail.com>
    ASoC: cs42l56: Put the Limiter Cushion control on the limiter register

Avi Weiss <thnkslprpt@gmail.com>
    ASoC: stm32: spdifrx: fix synchronization state check

Sergey Tiraspolsky <stiraspo@gmail.com>
    ASoC: Intel: avs: Reset the stream unless it is already prepared

Allison Henderson <achender@kernel.org>
    net/rds: don't let the rdma_cm destroy an id RDS still owns on route failure

Michal Luczaj <mhal@rbox.co>
    vsock: treat TCP_CLOSING as once-established

Adriel Santos <adriel@adriel.eu>
    pinctrl: qcom: ipq5018: replace gcc_plltest with pwm2 on gpio12

Svyatoslav Ryhel <clamor95@gmail.com>
    power: supply: generic-adc-battery: Fix temperature IIO channel conversion

Gilberto Conde <gilbertorconde@gmail.com>
    pinctrl: qcom: ipq5018: add missing pwm3 function on gpio13

Michael Kelley <mhkelley58@gmail.com>
    Drivers: hv: Don't reset VMBus connection state on error/exit paths

Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
    Drivers: hv: Avoid infinite retry loop in init_vp_index()

Xueqin Luo <luoxueqin@kylinos.cn>
    power: supply: ds2780: Fix ds2780_get_capacity() returning raw value

Karl Mehltretter <kmehltretter@gmail.com>
    power: supply: Fix maintenance charge table kernel-doc

Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com>
    ext4: fallback to complex scan if aligned scan doesn't work

Abdul Wasey <w453y.me@gmail.com>
    mptcp: move the OoO check back into __mptcp_try_fallback()

Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
    blk-mq: reinsert cached request to the list

Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
    blk-mq: pop cached request if it is usable


-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                                           |   4 +-
 arch/nios2/include/asm/checksum.h                  |   2 +-
 arch/s390/pci/pci_sysfs.c                          |   3 +
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c                             |   4 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c                          |   4 +-
 block/blk-mq.c                                     |  32 ++---
 block/bsg-lib.c                                    |  13 +-
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c                  |   8 +-
 drivers/gpio/gpio-mxc.c                            |  69 +++++-----
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_cs.c             |   6 +
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_debugfs.c        |  23 +---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/sdma_v3_0.c             |  25 +++-
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vce_v3_0.c              |   2 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_exec.c                         |  77 ++++++-----
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dmc.c           |  21 ++-
 drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c                          |  12 +-
 drivers/hv/connection.c                            |   1 -
 drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c                             |   1 -
 drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-qcom-cci.c                  |   4 +-
 drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-wmt.c                       |   2 +-
 drivers/md/dm-cache-target.c                       |  59 ++++----
 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c                              |   3 +-
 drivers/md/dm-ebs-target.c                         |   3 +-
 drivers/md/dm-integrity.c                          |   5 +-
 drivers/md/dm-table.c                              |   2 +-
 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c                    |  20 ++-
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmgenet.c     |  10 ++
 drivers/net/gtp.c                                  |   2 +
 drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/fwio.c           |  42 +++++-
 drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-amd.c                      |   9 ++
 drivers/pinctrl/qcom/pinctrl-ipq5018.c             |  10 +-
 drivers/power/supply/ds2780_battery.c              |   2 +-
 drivers/power/supply/generic-adc-battery.c         |   9 +-
 drivers/s390/net/ctcm_mpc.c                        |   3 +-
 drivers/scsi/libiscsi.c                            |  14 +-
 drivers/scsi/libsas/sas_expander.c                 |  14 +-
 drivers/scsi/mpi3mr/mpi3mr_app.c                   |   2 +-
 drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_fc.c                   |   5 +-
 drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_iscsi.c                |   3 +-
 drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_sas.c                  |   6 +-
 drivers/scsi/st.c                                  |  18 ++-
 drivers/scsi/xen-scsifront.c                       |   1 +
 drivers/spi/spi-tegra114.c                         |   7 +
 drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_configfs.c       |  26 +++-
 drivers/ufs/core/ufs_bsg.c                         |   3 +-
 fs/autofs/waitq.c                                  |  25 +++-
 fs/coredump.c                                      |  16 +--
 fs/ext4/ext4.h                                     |   2 +
 fs/ext4/extents_status.c                           |   7 +-
 fs/ext4/extents_status.h                           |   1 +
 fs/ext4/mballoc.c                                  |  21 +--
 fs/ext4/super.c                                    |  13 +-
 fs/notify/mark.c                                   |  11 ++
 fs/ntfs3/ntfs_fs.h                                 |   1 +
 fs/ntfs3/super.c                                   |  29 +++-
 fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmcommon.h                           |   2 +
 fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdebug.c                            |   5 +-
 fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmrecovery.c                         |   2 +-
 fs/pipe.c                                          |   6 +-
 fs/smb/client/cifssmb.c                            |  13 +-
 fs/smb/client/connect.c                            |  21 ++-
 fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c                            |   7 +-
 fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c                            |   5 +
 fs/tracefs/event_inode.c                           |  16 ++-
 fs/unicode/utf8-core.c                             |  21 ++-
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c                             |  17 +--
 fs/xfs/xfs_fsmap.c                                 |   2 +-
 fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c                                 |   2 +-
 fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c                                  |   2 +-
 include/drm/drm_exec.h                             |   9 +-
 include/linux/bsg-lib.h                            |   3 +-
 include/linux/cgroup-defs.h                        |   5 +-
 include/linux/device-mapper.h                      |   5 +
 include/linux/fsnotify_backend.h                   |   1 +
 include/linux/futex.h                              |  14 +-
 include/linux/io_uring_types.h                     |   6 +-
 include/linux/ipv6.h                               |  22 +++
 include/linux/key-type.h                           |   1 +
 include/linux/key.h                                |   5 +
 include/linux/mm_types.h                           |   3 +
 include/linux/power_supply.h                       |   6 +-
 include/linux/sched.h                              |   2 +-
 include/linux/sched/signal.h                       |  27 +++-
 include/linux/sched/user.h                         |   8 +-
 include/linux/srcutiny.h                           |   4 -
 include/linux/unicode.h                            |   1 +
 include/net/af_vsock.h                             |   3 +
 include/net/codel_impl.h                           |   1 +
 include/net/ipv6.h                                 |   2 -
 include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_ipv6.h             |   4 +-
 io_uring/cancel.c                                  |  36 +++--
 io_uring/cancel.h                                  |  12 ++
 io_uring/io-wq.c                                   | 112 ++++++++++++---
 io_uring/io-wq.h                                   |   4 +-
 io_uring/io_uring.c                                | 144 +++++++++++++++-----
 io_uring/io_uring.h                                |  44 +++++-
 io_uring/poll.c                                    |  48 +++++--
 io_uring/rw.c                                      |  18 ---
 io_uring/sqpoll.c                                  |   7 +
 io_uring/tctx.c                                    |   1 +
 io_uring/timeout.c                                 |  88 +++++++++---
 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c                             |   6 +-
 kernel/events/core.c                               |  33 ++---
 kernel/exit.c                                      |  51 ++++---
 kernel/fork.c                                      |   3 +
 kernel/futex/core.c                                |  49 +++----
 kernel/pid_namespace.c                             |   5 +-
 kernel/ptrace.c                                    |   6 +
 kernel/rcu/srcutiny.c                              |  19 +--
 kernel/signal.c                                    |   4 +
 kernel/trace/ftrace.c                              |   4 +-
 kernel/trace/trace.c                               |   6 +
 kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c                 |  15 ++-
 kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c                   |  52 +++----
 kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c                  |  10 ++
 kernel/trace/trace_probe.c                         |   3 +-
 kernel/trace/trace_synth.h                         |   1 +
 kernel/watch_queue.c                               |  16 ++-
 mm/huge_memory.c                                   |   2 +
 mm/khugepaged.c                                    |   3 +
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c                         |   7 +-
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c                         |   2 +
 net/bridge/br_multicast.c                          |  13 +-
 net/bridge/br_netfilter_ipv6.c                     |   2 +-
 net/bridge/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bridge.c         |   4 +-
 net/core/page_pool.c                               |   3 +-
 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c                           |   2 +-
 net/ipv4/tcp.c                                     |  18 ++-
 net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c                                |   4 +-
 net/ipv4/tcp_dctcp.c                               |   4 +-
 net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c                           |   2 +-
 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c                              |   2 +-
 net/ipv4/udp.c                                     |  11 +-
 net/ipv6/calipso.c                                 |   6 +-
 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c                               |   2 +-
 net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c                             |   7 +-
 net/ipv6/output_core.c                             |   7 +-
 net/iucv/af_iucv.c                                 |  42 +++---
 net/mptcp/protocol.c                               |   7 -
 net/mptcp/protocol.h                               |   8 ++
 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c                    |   2 +-
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_ovs.c                   |   2 +-
 net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c                      |   2 +-
 net/netlink/af_netlink.c                           |  10 +-
 net/rds/rdma_transport.c                           |  38 +++++-
 net/sched/act_api.c                                |  11 +-
 net/sched/cls_flower.c                             |   5 +
 net/sched/sch_cake.c                               |   2 +-
 net/sctp/inqueue.c                                 |   6 +-
 net/sctp/socket.c                                  |  33 +++--
 net/tipc/node.c                                    |   2 +
 net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c                           |  49 +++++--
 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c            |   3 +-
 samples/pidfd/Makefile                             |   2 +-
 security/keys/key.c                                |  13 +-
 security/keys/keyctl.c                             |  15 ++-
 security/keys/keyring.c                            | 150 +++++++++++----------
 security/keys/process_keys.c                       |   5 +-
 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c          |   4 +-
 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c          |   2 +-
 sound/soc/codecs/cs42l52.c                         |   2 +-
 sound/soc/codecs/cs42l56.c                         |   2 +-
 sound/soc/codecs/max98371.c                        |   2 +-
 sound/soc/codecs/nau8822.c                         |   4 +-
 sound/soc/codecs/pcm3168a.c                        |   2 +-
 sound/soc/codecs/wm8978.c                          |   4 +-
 sound/soc/intel/avs/pcm.c                          |   2 +-
 sound/soc/sof/ipc4-topology.c                      |  16 ++-
 sound/soc/stm/stm32_spdifrx.c                      |   2 +-
 tools/gpio/Makefile                                |   6 +
 .../test.d/filter/event-filter-incomplete.tc       |  24 ++++
 171 files changed, 1611 insertions(+), 736 deletions(-)

[PATCH 6.6 001/168] blk-mq: pop cached request if it is usable

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit dc278e9bf2b9513a763353e6b9cc21e0f532954e ]

When submitting a bio to blk-mq, if the task should sleep after peeking
a cached request, but before it pops it, the plug flushes and calls
blk_mq_free_plug_rqs, freeing the cached_rqs. This creates a
use-after-free bug. Fix this by popping the cached request before any
possible blocking calls if it is suitable for use.

Popping this request first holds a queue reference, so avoid any
serialization races with queue freezes and can safely proceed with
dispatching that request to the driver. This potentially increases a
timing window from when a driver wants to freeze its queue to when
requests stop being dispatched. That scenario is off the fast path
though, and drivers need to appropriately handle requests during a
freeze request anyway.

The downside is the popped element needs to be individually freed when
we performed a bio plug merge. The cached request would have had to be
freed later anyway, but this patch does it inline with building the plug
list instead of after flushing it.

Fixes: b0077e269f6c1 ("blk-mq: make sure active queue usage is held for bio_integrity_prep()")
Fixes: 7b4f36cd22a65 ("block: ensure we hold a queue reference when using queue limits")
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260521190253.242065-1-kbusch@meta.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Assisted-by: LLM
[ Backport to 6.6.y: Pop a suitable request from the older cached_rq list
  before fallible preparation, then initialize it after preparation. The
  target has three preparation or merge exits; the following correction
  restores the request on each exit. ]
Signed-off-by: Artem Dinaburg <artem@trailofbits.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 block/blk-mq.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/block/blk-mq.c b/block/blk-mq.c
index 4c1c5a261d0cf..1ad77737b27d3 100644
--- a/block/blk-mq.c
+++ b/block/blk-mq.c
@@ -2984,17 +2984,7 @@ static bool blk_mq_can_use_cached_rq(struct request *rq, struct blk_plug *plug,
 	if (op_is_flush(rq->cmd_flags) != op_is_flush(bio->bi_opf))
 		return false;
 
-	/*
-	 * If any qos ->throttle() end up blocking, we will have flushed the
-	 * plug and hence killed the cached_rq list as well. Pop this entry
-	 * before we throttle.
-	 */
 	plug->cached_rq = rq_list_next(rq);
-	rq_qos_throttle(rq->q, bio);
-
-	blk_mq_rq_time_init(rq, 0);
-	rq->cmd_flags = bio->bi_opf;
-	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rq->queuelist);
 	return true;
 }
 
@@ -3027,20 +3017,30 @@ void blk_mq_submit_bio(struct bio *bio)
 		rq = rq_list_peek(&plug->cached_rq);
 		if (rq && rq->q != q)
 			rq = NULL;
+		if (rq && !blk_mq_can_use_cached_rq(rq, plug, bio))
+			rq = NULL;
 	}
 	if (rq) {
 		if (unlikely(bio_may_exceed_limits(bio, &q->limits))) {
 			bio = __bio_split_to_limits(bio, &q->limits, &nr_segs);
-			if (!bio)
+			if (!bio) {
+				blk_mq_free_request(rq);
 				return;
+			}
 		}
-		if (!bio_integrity_prep(bio))
+		if (!bio_integrity_prep(bio)) {
+			blk_mq_free_request(rq);
 			return;
-		if (blk_mq_attempt_bio_merge(q, bio, nr_segs))
+		}
+		if (blk_mq_attempt_bio_merge(q, bio, nr_segs)) {
+			blk_mq_free_request(rq);
 			return;
-		if (blk_mq_can_use_cached_rq(rq, plug, bio))
-			goto done;
-		percpu_ref_get(&q->q_usage_counter);
+		}
+		rq_qos_throttle(rq->q, bio);
+		blk_mq_rq_time_init(rq, 0);
+		rq->cmd_flags = bio->bi_opf;
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rq->queuelist);
+		goto done;
 	} else {
 		if (unlikely(bio_queue_enter(bio)))
 			return;
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 002/168] blk-mq: reinsert cached request to the list

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit b051bb6bf0a231117036aa607cadf55be8e63910 ]

A previous commit removed an optimization out of caution for a scenario
that turns out not to be real: all the "queue_exit" goto's are safe to
reinsert the request into the cached_rq's plug list as they are either
from a non-blocking path, or a successful merge that already holds the
queue reference. This optimization is most needed for small sequential
workloads that successfully merge into larger requests.

Fixes: dc278e9bf2b9 ("blk-mq: pop cached request if it is usable")
Suggested-by: Ming Lei <tom.leiming@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@nvidia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260526153531.2365935-1-kbusch@meta.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Assisted-by: LLM
[ Backport to 6.6.y: Reinsert with rq_list_add() on each of the three
  target preparation or merge exits; the target has a single cached_rq
  list and no shared queue_exit label. ]
Signed-off-by: Artem Dinaburg <artem@trailofbits.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 block/blk-mq.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/block/blk-mq.c b/block/blk-mq.c
index 1ad77737b27d3..e3fb9222c5ee0 100644
--- a/block/blk-mq.c
+++ b/block/blk-mq.c
@@ -3024,16 +3024,16 @@ void blk_mq_submit_bio(struct bio *bio)
 		if (unlikely(bio_may_exceed_limits(bio, &q->limits))) {
 			bio = __bio_split_to_limits(bio, &q->limits, &nr_segs);
 			if (!bio) {
-				blk_mq_free_request(rq);
+				rq_list_add(&plug->cached_rq, rq);
 				return;
 			}
 		}
 		if (!bio_integrity_prep(bio)) {
-			blk_mq_free_request(rq);
+			rq_list_add(&plug->cached_rq, rq);
 			return;
 		}
 		if (blk_mq_attempt_bio_merge(q, bio, nr_segs)) {
-			blk_mq_free_request(rq);
+			rq_list_add(&plug->cached_rq, rq);
 			return;
 		}
 		rq_qos_throttle(rq->q, bio);
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 003/168] mptcp: move the OoO check back into __mptcp_try_fallback()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Abdul Wasey <w453y.me@gmail.com>

The 6.6.y backport of upstream commit 1bba3f219c5e ("mptcp: do not
fallback when OoO is present") put the out-of-order queue check
in __mptcp_finish_join() instead of __mptcp_try_fallback().

So the fix itself is missing, as fallback still happens with OoO data
queued. Worse, the passive side now refuses every MP_JOIN while its
OoO queue is not empty, which is the normal state of a connection
already sending data over more than one subflow. The joining subflow
is reset, so such a connection can't add a new path, and a path that
comes back after an outage can't rejoin while data is in flight.

Move the check to __mptcp_try_fallback(), as upstream does. On this
branch that function is in protocol.h.

Tested on 6.6.159 in netns: 6 connections (5 uploading) over two paths,
then a third endpoint added mid-transfer. Without this patch only the
idle connection gets a subflow on the new path and the other 5 joins
are reset. With it, all 6 join. Same result in 3 of 3 runs each.

Fixes: 642561238c98 ("mptcp: do not fallback when OoO is present")
Signed-off-by: Abdul Wasey <w453y.me@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/mptcp/protocol.c | 7 -------
 net/mptcp/protocol.h | 8 ++++++++
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/mptcp/protocol.c b/net/mptcp/protocol.c
index 3e8e5aae4dc4f..7b08b5899ef39 100644
--- a/net/mptcp/protocol.c
+++ b/net/mptcp/protocol.c
@@ -923,13 +923,6 @@ static bool __mptcp_finish_join(struct mptcp_sock *msk, struct sock *ssk)
 	if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
 		return false;
 
-	/* The caller possibly is not holding the msk socket lock, but
-	 * in the fallback case only the current subflow is touching
-	 * the OoO queue.
-	 */
-	if (!RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&msk->out_of_order_queue))
-		return false;
-
 	spin_lock_bh(&msk->fallback_lock);
 	if (!msk->allow_subflows) {
 		spin_unlock_bh(&msk->fallback_lock);
diff --git a/net/mptcp/protocol.h b/net/mptcp/protocol.h
index 64c6a6cb3d99c..1cf67a557ff0d 100644
--- a/net/mptcp/protocol.h
+++ b/net/mptcp/protocol.h
@@ -1127,6 +1127,14 @@ static inline bool __mptcp_try_fallback(struct mptcp_sock *msk)
 		pr_debug("TCP fallback already done (msk=%p)\n", msk);
 		return true;
 	}
+
+	/* The caller possibly is not holding the msk socket lock, but
+	 * in the fallback case only the current subflow is touching
+	 * the OoO queue.
+	 */
+	if (!RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&msk->out_of_order_queue))
+		return false;
+
 	spin_lock_bh(&msk->fallback_lock);
 	if (!msk->allow_infinite_fallback) {
 		spin_unlock_bh(&msk->fallback_lock);
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 004/168] ext4: fallback to complex scan if aligned scan doesnt work

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com>

[ Upstream commit 1f6bc02f18489b9c9ea39b068d0695fb0e4567e9 ]

Currently in case the goal length is a multiple of stripe size we use
ext4_mb_scan_aligned() to find the stripe size aligned physical blocks.
In case we are not able to find any, we again go back to calling
ext4_mb_choose_next_group() to search for a different suitable block
group. However, since the linear search always begins from the start,
most of the times we end up with the same BG and the cycle continues.

With large fliesystems, the CPU can be stuck in this loop for hours
which can slow down the whole system. Hence, until we figure out a
better way to continue the search (rather than starting from beginning)
in ext4_mb_choose_next_group(), lets just fallback to
ext4_mb_complex_scan_group() in case aligned scan fails, as it is much
more likely to find the needed blocks.

Signed-off-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ee033f6dfa0a7f2934437008a909c3788233950f.1702455010.git.ojaswin@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Fixes: 83e80a6e3543 ("ext4: use buckets for cr 1 block scan instead of rbtree")
Signed-off-by: Hamza Mahfooz <hamzamahfooz@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/ext4/mballoc.c | 21 +++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/ext4/mballoc.c b/fs/ext4/mballoc.c
index 4ec4388932eaf..646f55ba0dd1b 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/mballoc.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/mballoc.c
@@ -2954,14 +2954,19 @@ ext4_mb_regular_allocator(struct ext4_allocation_context *ac)
 			ac->ac_groups_scanned++;
 			if (cr == CR_POWER2_ALIGNED)
 				ext4_mb_simple_scan_group(ac, &e4b);
-			else if ((cr == CR_GOAL_LEN_FAST ||
-				 cr == CR_BEST_AVAIL_LEN) &&
-				 sbi->s_stripe &&
-				 !(ac->ac_g_ex.fe_len %
-				 EXT4_B2C(sbi, sbi->s_stripe)))
-				ext4_mb_scan_aligned(ac, &e4b);
-			else
-				ext4_mb_complex_scan_group(ac, &e4b);
+			else {
+				bool is_stripe_aligned = sbi->s_stripe &&
+					!(ac->ac_g_ex.fe_len %
+					  EXT4_B2C(sbi, sbi->s_stripe));
+
+				if ((cr == CR_GOAL_LEN_FAST ||
+				     cr == CR_BEST_AVAIL_LEN) &&
+				    is_stripe_aligned)
+					ext4_mb_scan_aligned(ac, &e4b);
+
+				if (ac->ac_status == AC_STATUS_CONTINUE)
+					ext4_mb_complex_scan_group(ac, &e4b);
+			}
 
 			ext4_unlock_group(sb, group);
 			ext4_mb_unload_buddy(&e4b);
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 005/168] power: supply: Fix maintenance charge table kernel-doc

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Karl Mehltretter <kmehltretter@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 45d4af4e80a25881b6b75e8e34872c555c43a41d ]

struct power_supply_maintenance_charge_table contains
charge_safety_timer_minutes, but its kernel-doc describes
safety_timer_minutes. This leaves the real member undescribed and adds a
nonexistent member to the generated documentation.

Use the member's actual name.

Fixes: d72ce7d32478 ("power: supply: ab8500: Standardize maintenance charging")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Karl Mehltretter <kmehltretter@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260909064623.90737-1-kmehltretter@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 include/linux/power_supply.h | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/power_supply.h b/include/linux/power_supply.h
index 85b86768c0b91..aa20bf8c3366d 100644
--- a/include/linux/power_supply.h
+++ b/include/linux/power_supply.h
@@ -365,9 +365,9 @@ struct power_supply_vbat_ri_table {
  * @charge_voltage_max_uv: maintenance charging voltage that is usually a bit
  *   lower than the constant_charge_voltage_max_uv. We can apply this settings
  *   charge_current_max_ua until we get back up to this voltage.
- * @safety_timer_minutes: maintenance charging safety timer, with an expiry
- *   time in minutes. We will only use maintenance charging in this setting
- *   for a certain amount of time, then we will first move to the next
+ * @charge_safety_timer_minutes: maintenance charging safety timer, with an
+ *   expiry time in minutes. We will only use maintenance charging in this
+ *   setting for a certain amount of time, then we will first move to the next
  *   maintenance charge current and voltage pair in respective array and wait
  *   for the next safety timer timeout, or, if we reached the last maintencance
  *   charging setting, disable charging until we reach
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 006/168] power: supply: ds2780: Fix ds2780_get_capacity() returning raw value

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Xueqin Luo <luoxueqin@kylinos.cn>

[ Upstream commit a58cbc8b36ec0cd00d2ba3de7d003de818a27523 ]

ds2780_get_capacity() returns the raw register value instead of 0 on
success.  The capacity is already stored in *capacity, so the function
should return 0 to indicate success.

Fixes: 275ac74629c4 ("w1: add Maxim/Dallas DS2780 Stand-Alone Fuel Gauge IC support")
Signed-off-by: Xueqin Luo <luoxueqin@kylinos.cn>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260901072954.1953121-1-luoxueqin@kylinos.cn
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/power/supply/ds2780_battery.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/power/supply/ds2780_battery.c b/drivers/power/supply/ds2780_battery.c
index 1e7f297f6cb18..7219ee3def5ad 100644
--- a/drivers/power/supply/ds2780_battery.c
+++ b/drivers/power/supply/ds2780_battery.c
@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ static int ds2780_get_capacity(struct ds2780_device_info *dev_info,
 		return ret;
 
 	*capacity = raw;
-	return raw;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static int ds2780_get_status(struct ds2780_device_info *dev_info, int *status)
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 007/168] Drivers: hv: Avoid infinite retry loop in init_vp_index()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit 32ea0a33e3a0fb7c10c601b43e1b2f6c06a3f5fd ]

There is a retry loop in init_vp_index() where the CPUs from a certain
node are stripped out if they have already been in the allocated cpumask
or not in HK_TYPE_MANAGED_IRQ housekeeping cpumask. If there is no
CPU left, the allocated cpumask is ignored and the process is retried
again. However, if the HK_TYPE_MANAGED_IRQ housekeeping cpumask turns
out not to contain any CPU in that particular node, that will become an
infinite retry loop.  This particular problem was reported by sashiko
[1]. This should rarely happen, but we still need to guard against this.

Fix this infinite loop problem by also skipping NUMA node that has no
housekeeping CPU in the inner while loop of init_vp_index(). Also update
the early abort check to check for the absence of online housekeeping
CPUs instead of just the emptiness of the cpumask. As the outer for
loop will only be reached if the housekeeping cpumask has at least one
online CPU, a NUMA node with housekeeping CPUs will eventually be found.

Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/message/20260422030903.E1BFCC2BCB0%40smtp.kernel.org [1]
Fixes: 6640b5df1a38 ("Drivers: hv: vmbus: Don't assign VMbus channel interrupts to isolated CPUs")
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mhkelley@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c | 12 +++++++++---
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c b/drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c
index 3c6011a48dabe..914d479d78723 100644
--- a/drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c
+++ b/drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c
@@ -743,13 +743,14 @@ static void init_vp_index(struct vmbus_channel *channel)
 	u32 i, ncpu = num_online_cpus();
 	cpumask_var_t available_mask;
 	struct cpumask *allocated_mask;
+	const struct cpumask *node_mask;
 	const struct cpumask *hk_mask = housekeeping_cpumask(HK_TYPE_MANAGED_IRQ);
 	u32 target_cpu;
 	int numa_node;
 
 	if (!perf_chn ||
 	    !alloc_cpumask_var(&available_mask, GFP_KERNEL) ||
-	    cpumask_empty(hk_mask)) {
+	    !cpumask_intersects(hk_mask, cpu_online_mask)) {
 		/*
 		 * If the channel is not a performance critical
 		 * channel, bind it to VMBUS_CONNECT_CPU.
@@ -771,14 +772,19 @@ static void init_vp_index(struct vmbus_channel *channel)
 				next_numa_node_id = 0;
 				continue;
 			}
-			if (cpumask_empty(cpumask_of_node(numa_node)))
+			/*
+			 * Try next NUMA node if current NUMA node has no CPU
+			 * or doesn't contain any housekeeping CPU.
+			 */
+			node_mask = cpumask_of_node(numa_node);
+			if (!cpumask_intersects(node_mask, hk_mask))
 				continue;
 			break;
 		}
 		allocated_mask = &hv_context.hv_numa_map[numa_node];
 
 retry:
-		cpumask_xor(available_mask, allocated_mask, cpumask_of_node(numa_node));
+		cpumask_xor(available_mask, allocated_mask, node_mask);
 		cpumask_and(available_mask, available_mask, hk_mask);
 
 		if (cpumask_empty(available_mask)) {
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 008/168] Drivers: hv: Dont reset VMBus connection state on error/exit paths

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Kelley <mhkelley58@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit ec31dc39e835ccde0930daccece8c492d28282fc ]

In two places, current code forces vmbus_connection.conn_state to
DISCONNECTED prior to calling vmbus_disconnect(). But vmbus_disconnect()
calls vmbus_initiate_unload(), which unloads the VMBus connection
only if the conn_state is CONNECTED. Consequently, the connection
remains and the Hyper-V host might continue to send messages or post
VMBus interrupts.

The problem was introduced in commit 74347a99e73ae ("x86/Hyper-V:
Unload vmbus channel in hv panic callback"), in that
vmbus_initiate_unload() started checking the current connection
state before doing the unload. This commit removed some occurrences
where conn_state was forced to DISCONNECTED, but these two remained,
apparently due to an oversight at the time.

Fix this by not forcing conn_state to DISCONNECTED during VMBus exit,
or if a failure occurs when establishing the connection in the first
place. Whatever value conn_state has at the time is then read by
vmbus_initiate_unload() to determine if there is a connection to
be unloaded.

Reported-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-hyperv/20260805205806.B5AC31F000E9@smtp.kernel.org/
Fixes: 74347a99e73ae ("x86/Hyper-V: Unload vmbus channel in hv panic callback")
Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/hv/connection.c | 1 -
 drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c  | 1 -
 2 files changed, 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/hv/connection.c b/drivers/hv/connection.c
index 3cdba13b132f0..722c07ec05be4 100644
--- a/drivers/hv/connection.c
+++ b/drivers/hv/connection.c
@@ -340,7 +340,6 @@ int vmbus_connect(void)
 cleanup:
 	pr_err("Unable to connect to host\n");
 
-	vmbus_connection.conn_state = DISCONNECTED;
 	vmbus_disconnect();
 
 	kfree(msginfo);
diff --git a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
index 9df19a69feb69..44af1c455bbf9 100644
--- a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
+++ b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
@@ -2707,7 +2707,6 @@ static void __exit vmbus_exit(void)
 
 	hv_remove_kexec_handler();
 	hv_remove_crash_handler();
-	vmbus_connection.conn_state = DISCONNECTED;
 	hv_stimer_global_cleanup();
 	vmbus_disconnect();
 	if (vmbus_irq == -1) {
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 009/168] pinctrl: qcom: ipq5018: add missing pwm3 function on gpio13

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Gilberto Conde <gilbertorconde@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit c6c159fcdb4e9a678eda0831f971e4a3a488ec47 ]

GPIO13 supports the PWM3 function at mux select value 4, but the
pingroup table leaves that slot empty and gpio13 is not listed in
pwm3_groups. Selecting pwm3 on gpio13 is therefore rejected by the
pinmux core:

  ipq5018-tlmm: invalid group "gpio13" for function "pwm3"

The GL.iNet GL-X2000 drives its fan from PWM3 on this pin, and the
vendor firmware muxes it with select value 4:

  gpio13 : out low  func4 8mA no pull

Add pwm3 to the fourth function slot of gpio13 and list gpio13 in
pwm3_groups. With this the pin muxes as expected:

  pin 13 (GPIO_13): device 1941010.pwm function pwm3 group gpio13

Fixes: 725d1c891658 ("pinctrl: qcom: Add IPQ5018 pinctrl driver")
Signed-off-by: Gilberto Conde <gilbertorconde@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Dybcio <konrad.dybcio@oss.qualcomm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260921093419.2870168-1-gilbertorconde@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/pinctrl/qcom/pinctrl-ipq5018.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/pinctrl/qcom/pinctrl-ipq5018.c b/drivers/pinctrl/qcom/pinctrl-ipq5018.c
index 68f65b57003e9..18e68f7185bd5 100644
--- a/drivers/pinctrl/qcom/pinctrl-ipq5018.c
+++ b/drivers/pinctrl/qcom/pinctrl-ipq5018.c
@@ -565,7 +565,7 @@ static const char * const qdss_cti_trig_out_b1_groups[] = {
 };
 
 static const char * const pwm3_groups[] = {
-	"gpio45",
+	"gpio45", "gpio13",
 };
 
 static const char * const qdss_cti_trig_in_b1_groups[] = {
@@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ static const struct msm_pingroup ipq5018_groups[] = {
 	PINGROUP(10, blsp0_spi, blsp1_uart0, led0, gcc_plltest, qdss_tracedata_a, _, _, _, _),
 	PINGROUP(11, blsp0_spi, blsp1_uart0, _, gcc_tlmm, qdss_tracedata_a, _, _, _, _),
 	PINGROUP(12, blsp0_spi, blsp0_i2c, blsp1_uart0, _, gcc_plltest, qdss_tracedata_a, _, _, _),
-	PINGROUP(13, blsp0_spi, blsp0_i2c, blsp1_uart0, _, qdss_tracedata_a, _, _, _, _),
+	PINGROUP(13, blsp0_spi, blsp0_i2c, blsp1_uart0, pwm3, qdss_tracedata_a, _, _, _, _),
 	PINGROUP(14, pcie0_clk, _, _, cri_trng0, qdss_tracedata_a, _, _, _, _),
 	PINGROUP(15, _, _, cri_trng1, qdss_tracedata_a, _, _, _, _, _),
 	PINGROUP(16, pcie0_wake, _, _, cri_trng, qdss_tracedata_a, _, _, _, _),
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 010/168] power: supply: generic-adc-battery: Fix temperature IIO channel conversion

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Svyatoslav Ryhel <clamor95@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 6bca94e64255053ab2aa56f2588fda73d399b790 ]

Temperature IIO channel data is provided in milli-degrees, while
POWER_SUPPLY_PROP_TEMP is expected to be in deci-degrees. Adjust the
existing logic to reflect this conversion properly.

Fixes: 33088c0513818 ("power: supply: generic-adc-battery: add temperature support")
Signed-off-by: Svyatoslav Ryhel <clamor95@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260926142905.206215-2-clamor95@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/power/supply/generic-adc-battery.c | 9 +++++++--
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/power/supply/generic-adc-battery.c b/drivers/power/supply/generic-adc-battery.c
index 7bdc6b2636090..aebc824aa2ede 100644
--- a/drivers/power/supply/generic-adc-battery.c
+++ b/drivers/power/supply/generic-adc-battery.c
@@ -90,12 +90,17 @@ static int gab_read_channel(struct gab *adc_bat, enum gab_chan_type channel,
 	int ret;
 
 	ret = iio_read_channel_processed(adc_bat->channel[channel], result);
-	if (ret < 0)
+	if (ret < 0) {
 		dev_err(&adc_bat->psy->dev, "read channel error: %d\n", ret);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	if (channel == GAB_TEMP)
+		*result /= 100; /* Convert from milli- to deci-degree */
 	else
 		*result *= 1000;
 
-	return ret;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static int gab_get_property(struct power_supply *psy,
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 011/168] pinctrl: qcom: ipq5018: replace gcc_plltest with pwm2 on gpio12

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Adriel Santos <adriel@adriel.eu>

[ Upstream commit 709ba1c547eaf37da36ded2ecf3ea4e304cdfa9a ]

The pingroup table has gcc_plltest at function 5 of gpio12 and does not
offer pwm2 on that pin, so the pinmux core rejects a request for pwm2 on
gpio12 as an invalid group. On the hardware, function 5 of gpio12
carries the PWM2 output: the Xiaomi AX3000T v2 drives its blue status
LED from PWM2 on gpio12.

The vendor kernel shipped on that router (Linux 4.4, stock firmware
2.0.28) has pwm2 in this slot. Its pingroup table, as read from the
firmware image, lists these functions for gpio12:

  gpio, blsp0_spi, blsp0_i2c, blsp1_uart0, _, pwm2, qdss_tracedata_a,
  _, _, _

and has pwm3 at function 4 of gpio13, matching commit c6c159fcdb4e
("pinctrl: qcom: ipq5018: add missing pwm3 function on gpio13").

Measured on the board: with gpio12 set to each of the 16 function
values in turn, and PWM2 held at 0% and then at 100% duty, the pad
level read back from GPIO_IN follows PWM2 only at function 5. There it
does not follow PWM channels 0, 1 or 3, and the LED switches with PWM2.
Functions 4 and 7, which the table leaves empty, do not carry PWM2.

Put pwm2 in function 5 of gpio12 and list gpio12 in pwm2_groups. Drop
gpio12 from gcc_plltest_groups: none of its functions is gcc_plltest
any more, and selecting it would trigger the WARN_ON() in
msm_pinmux_set_mux().

Fixes: 725d1c891658 ("pinctrl: qcom: Add IPQ5018 pinctrl driver")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Adriel Santos <adriel@adriel.eu>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@oss.qualcomm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261002160958.908424-1-adriel@adriel.eu
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/pinctrl/qcom/pinctrl-ipq5018.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/pinctrl/qcom/pinctrl-ipq5018.c b/drivers/pinctrl/qcom/pinctrl-ipq5018.c
index 18e68f7185bd5..2bbc409924f8b 100644
--- a/drivers/pinctrl/qcom/pinctrl-ipq5018.c
+++ b/drivers/pinctrl/qcom/pinctrl-ipq5018.c
@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ static const char * const blsp1_uart0_groups[] = {
 };
 
 static const char * const gcc_plltest_groups[] = {
-	"gpio10", "gpio12",
+	"gpio10",
 };
 
 static const char * const gcc_tlmm_groups[] = {
@@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ static const char * const qdss_cti_trig_in_b0_groups[] = {
 };
 
 static const char * const pwm2_groups[] = {
-	"gpio44",
+	"gpio12", "gpio44",
 };
 
 static const char * const qdss_cti_trig_out_b1_groups[] = {
@@ -690,7 +690,7 @@ static const struct msm_pingroup ipq5018_groups[] = {
 	PINGROUP(9, sdc1_clk, qspi_clk, _, qdss_tracedata_a, _, _, _, _, _),
 	PINGROUP(10, blsp0_spi, blsp1_uart0, led0, gcc_plltest, qdss_tracedata_a, _, _, _, _),
 	PINGROUP(11, blsp0_spi, blsp1_uart0, _, gcc_tlmm, qdss_tracedata_a, _, _, _, _),
-	PINGROUP(12, blsp0_spi, blsp0_i2c, blsp1_uart0, _, gcc_plltest, qdss_tracedata_a, _, _, _),
+	PINGROUP(12, blsp0_spi, blsp0_i2c, blsp1_uart0, _, pwm2, qdss_tracedata_a, _, _, _),
 	PINGROUP(13, blsp0_spi, blsp0_i2c, blsp1_uart0, pwm3, qdss_tracedata_a, _, _, _, _),
 	PINGROUP(14, pcie0_clk, _, _, cri_trng0, qdss_tracedata_a, _, _, _, _),
 	PINGROUP(15, _, _, cri_trng1, qdss_tracedata_a, _, _, _, _, _),
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 012/168] vsock: treat TCP_CLOSING as once-established

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michal Luczaj <mhal@rbox.co>

[ Upstream commit 4f6ac74fa594a918d41255c941256e1d51592d3b ]

Handle the TCP_ESTABLISHED -> TCP_CLOSING transition on OP_RST, which can
race with the connect loop. Immediately break and return 0 on
ESTABLISHED/CLOSING. The return value of connect() should reflect what
happened up to the point the connection was established or failed. Events
that occur afterwards must not affect it. E.g. even if OP_RW has already
set sk_err, connect() should still return 0, not ENOBUFS because of it.
Adapt the inaccurate comment above signal_pending().

Resetting a socket that is still present in connected_table can lead to
memory corruption. The reporter noted lost transports for in-flight skbs,
and I have reproduced crashes caused by re-insertion into connected_table.

  list_add double add: new=, prev=, next=.
  kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:35!
  Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
  Workqueue: vsock-loopback vsock_loopback_work
  RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0x11f/0x130
  Call Trace:
   vsock_insert_connected.cold+0xe/0x13
   virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x10e9/0x1460
   vsock_loopback_work+0x305/0x480
   process_one_work+0xe4c/0x1560
   worker_thread+0x4f1/0xd60
   kthread+0x36e/0x470
   ret_from_fork+0x47b/0x6b0
   ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

This fix is supplementary to commit 002541ef650b ("vsock: Ignore
signal/timeout on connect() if already established"). Details under Link.

Fixes: d021c344051a ("VSOCK: Introduce VM Sockets")
Reported-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/anzT1fREOSyHT99k@v4bel/
Signed-off-by: Michal Luczaj <mhal@rbox.co>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261005-vsock-connect-reset-closing-v4-1-15d41cfda3ed@rbox.co
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c | 17 ++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c b/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c
index 6b7bdd6166c06..8be8d7c55034c 100644
--- a/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c
+++ b/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c
@@ -1565,23 +1565,22 @@ static int vsock_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
 		timeout = schedule_timeout(timeout);
 		lock_sock(sk);
 
-		/* Connection established. Whatever happens to socket once we
-		 * release it, that's not connect()'s concern. No need to go
+		/* Connection was established. Whatever happens to socket once
+		 * we release it, that's not connect()'s concern. No need to go
 		 * into signal and timeout handling. Call it a day.
 		 *
 		 * Note that allowing to "reset" an already established socket
 		 * here is racy and insecure.
 		 */
-		if (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED)
-			break;
+		if (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED ||
+		    sk->sk_state == TCP_CLOSING) {
+			err = 0;
+			goto out_wait;
+		}
 
 		/* If connection was _not_ established and a signal/timeout came
 		 * to be, we want the socket's state reset. User space may want
-		 * to retry.
-		 *
-		 * sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED implies that socket is not on
-		 * vsock_connected_table. We keep the binding and the transport
-		 * assigned.
+		 * to retry, so we keep the binding and the transport assigned.
 		 */
 		if (signal_pending(current) || timeout == 0) {
 			err = timeout == 0 ? -ETIMEDOUT : sock_intr_errno(timeout);
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 013/168] net/rds: dont let the rdma_cm destroy an id RDS still owns on route failure

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Allison Henderson <achender@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 98d446b7c013254a8a7b49720557676a3a851fde ]

rds_rdma_cm_event_handler_cmn() hands the return value of
rdma_resolve_route() straight back to the rdma_cm on
RDMA_CM_EVENT_ADDR_RESOLVED.  A synchronous failure there - -ENOMEM
from the route work allocation, an SA query that cannot be set up, a
RoCE route with no usable device - makes addr_handler() destroy the
id the event was delivered on.  That id is ic->i_cm_id, and nothing
clears the pointer: the connection sits in RDS_CONN_CONNECTING with a
freed id until its shutdown calls rdma_disconnect() and
rdma_destroy_id() on it.

The ROUTE_RESOLVED case already avoids this: rds_ib_cm_initiate_connect()
forces a zero return while ic->i_cm_id == cm_id, as the comment there
explains.  Do the same here - drop the connection and return 0 - so
the id stays RDS's to destroy from the shutdown, and the reconnect
gets a fresh one.

Fixes: 55b7ed0b582f ("RDS: Common RDMA transport code")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Allison Henderson <achender@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261003163408.250568-3-achender@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/rds/rdma_transport.c | 12 +++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/rds/rdma_transport.c b/net/rds/rdma_transport.c
index b15cf316b23a2..21738a5690917 100644
--- a/net/rds/rdma_transport.c
+++ b/net/rds/rdma_transport.c
@@ -89,9 +89,19 @@ static int rds_rdma_cm_event_handler_cmn(struct rdma_cm_id *cm_id,
 		if (conn) {
 			rdma_set_service_type(cm_id, conn->c_tos);
 			rdma_set_min_rnr_timer(cm_id, IB_RNR_TIMER_000_32);
-			/* XXX do we need to clean up if this fails? */
 			ret = rdma_resolve_route(cm_id,
 						 RDS_RDMA_RESOLVE_TIMEOUT_MS);
+			if (ret) {
+				/* A non-zero return has the rdma_cm destroy
+				 * the id, but it is still ic->i_cm_id, which
+				 * the connection's shutdown would then
+				 * disconnect and destroy again.  Drop the
+				 * connection and keep the id for that
+				 * shutdown.
+				 */
+				rds_conn_drop(conn);
+				ret = 0;
+			}
 		}
 		break;
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 014/168] ASoC: Intel: avs: Reset the stream unless it is already prepared

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sergey Tiraspolsky <stiraspo@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit f6be9f558a83fe30a03bd3adae461c821a0cef8c ]

Commit cfca1637bc2b ("ASoC: Intel: avs: Unprepare a stream when XRUN
occurs") resets the HDA stream when ->prepare() is called in the XRUN
state. User space does not always recover that way. PipeWire's ALSA
backend recovers from an underrun with snd_pcm_drop(), snd_pcm_prepare()
and a new start, so ->prepare() runs in the SETUP state,
hdac_stream->prepared is still set and the reset is skipped. Every
recovery attempt then fails the same way:

  spa.alsa: hw:avsmax98927,1p: snd_pcm_avail after recover: Broken pipe

On a Google Pixelbook (Kaby Lake, max98927 speakers) this happens after
an occasional underrun during normal playback and silences the speakers
for one to four minutes, until the PCM is closed. It can be provoked by
stopping PipeWire with SIGSTOP for 0.5 s during playback: in one run
that single underrun led to 1297 failed recoveries over two minutes,
until the sink was suspended. A plain alsa-lib program that recovers
with snd_pcm_drop() and snd_pcm_prepare() hits the same loop, while
snd_pcm_prepare() straight from XRUN recovers at once.

Skip the reset only when the stream is already PREPARED, the repeated
->prepare() case the check exists for, and reset it otherwise. With
this change both kinds of recovery succeed with a single restart.

Fixes: cfca1637bc2b ("ASoC: Intel: avs: Unprepare a stream when XRUN occurs")
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5-5
Signed-off-by: Sergey Tiraspolsky <stiraspo@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Cezary Rojewski <cezary.rojewski@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261010103753.16969-1-stiraspo@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 sound/soc/intel/avs/pcm.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/sound/soc/intel/avs/pcm.c b/sound/soc/intel/avs/pcm.c
index 12e31027d99c2..69bb01ae25765 100644
--- a/sound/soc/intel/avs/pcm.c
+++ b/sound/soc/intel/avs/pcm.c
@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ static int avs_dai_fe_prepare(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, struct snd_so
 	data = snd_soc_dai_get_dma_data(dai, substream);
 	host_stream = data->host_stream;
 
-	if (runtime->state == SNDRV_PCM_STATE_XRUN)
+	if (runtime->state != SNDRV_PCM_STATE_PREPARED)
 		hdac_stream(host_stream)->prepared = false;
 	if (hdac_stream(host_stream)->prepared)
 		return 0;
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 015/168] ASoC: stm32: spdifrx: fix synchronization state check

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Avi Weiss <thnkslprpt@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 0936bbd35a247665c64886135835faa3c3f4f29f ]

The interrupt handler uses a logical AND to check whether SPDIFRX
was in the SYNC state before clearing errors. Since both SYNC (1)
and ENABLE (3) are nonzero, this also treats ENABLE as SYNC (and
any other non-zero value that might be added).

The logical && basically just converts this to check for != 0.

So errors occurring while SPDIFRX is enabled cause the driver
to retry synch instead of disconnecting the PCM stream.

Fix is to change the logical && to equality (==) and only retry
when exactly in sync state.

Fixes: 0c93c291321f2 ("ASoC: stm32: spdifrx: retry synchronization in sync state")
Signed-off-by: Avi Weiss <thnkslprpt@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Olivier Moysan <olivier.moysan@foss.st.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261011035459.2289403-1-thnkslprpt@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 sound/soc/stm/stm32_spdifrx.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/sound/soc/stm/stm32_spdifrx.c b/sound/soc/stm/stm32_spdifrx.c
index 4e17909d21267..4c2ff09971635 100644
--- a/sound/soc/stm/stm32_spdifrx.c
+++ b/sound/soc/stm/stm32_spdifrx.c
@@ -728,7 +728,7 @@ static irqreturn_t stm32_spdifrx_isr(int irq, void *devid)
 
 	if (err) {
 		regmap_read(spdifrx->regmap, STM32_SPDIFRX_CR, &cr);
-		sync_state = FIELD_GET(SPDIFRX_CR_SPDIFEN_MASK, cr) &&
+		sync_state = FIELD_GET(SPDIFRX_CR_SPDIFEN_MASK, cr) ==
 			     SPDIFRX_SPDIFEN_SYNC;
 
 		/* SPDIFRX is in STATE_STOP. Disable SPDIFRX to clear errors */
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 016/168] ASoC: cs42l56: Put the Limiter Cushion control on the limiter register

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: HyeongJun An <sammiee5311@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 203436d2aeb7093290459e344e1912a418a6ebfd ]

The Limiter Cushion control writes bits 4:2 of the ALC Thresholds
register. Those bits are ALCMIN, which the ALC MIN control owns. The
datasheet puts CUSH at bits 4:2 of the Limit Thresholds Control
register, next to LMAX, which the Limiter MAX control already uses.

So setting the limiter cushion changes the ALC minimum threshold, and
the cushion itself cannot be set.

Use CS42L56_LIM_THRESHOLD_CTL.

Fixes: 272b5edd3b8f ("ASoC: Add support for CS42L56 CODEC")
Link: https://statics.cirrus.com/pubs/proDatasheet/CS42L56_F2.pdf
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5-5
Signed-off-by: HyeongJun An <sammiee5311@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261008130953.2446692-2-sammiee5311@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 sound/soc/codecs/cs42l56.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l56.c b/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l56.c
index 1714857594fbe..e04e174f449b8 100644
--- a/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l56.c
+++ b/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l56.c
@@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ static const struct snd_kcontrol_new cs42l56_snd_controls[] = {
 			0, 0x3f, 0, 0),
 	SOC_SINGLE_TLV("Limiter MAX", CS42L56_LIM_THRESHOLD_CTL,
 			5, 0x07, 1, alc_tlv),
-	SOC_SINGLE_TLV("Limiter Cushion", CS42L56_ALC_THRESHOLD,
+	SOC_SINGLE_TLV("Limiter Cushion", CS42L56_LIM_THRESHOLD_CTL,
 			2, 0x07, 1, alc_tlv),
 
 	SOC_SINGLE("NG Switch", CS42L56_NOISE_GATE_CTL, 6, 1, 1),
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 017/168] ASoC: cs42l52: Fix the NG Type Switch bit

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: HyeongJun An <sammiee5311@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 8b08b98796d2da103f2432550c14a7c687e72080 ]

The NG Type Switch enum selects between "Apply Specific" and "Apply
All", which is the NGALL bit. The datasheet puts NGALL at bit 7 of the
Noise Gate Control register. The enum uses bit 6, which is NG, the
noise gate enable owned by the NG Enable Switch. cs42l52.h names it
CS42L52_NG_ENABLE_SHIFT. cs42l56 has the same Noise Gate register and
puts its NG All Switch at bit 7.

So changing the noise gate type turns the noise gate on or off, and
NGALL cannot be set.

Use bit 7.

Fixes: dfe0f98b8d2e ("ASoC: Add support for CS42L52 Codec")
Link: https://statics.cirrus.com/pubs/proDatasheet/CS42L52_F2.pdf
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5-5
Signed-off-by: HyeongJun An <sammiee5311@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261008130953.2446692-3-sammiee5311@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 sound/soc/codecs/cs42l52.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l52.c b/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l52.c
index 4fc8a6ae8d92c..2c7698618970d 100644
--- a/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l52.c
+++ b/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l52.c
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ static const char * const cs42l52_ng_type_text[] = {
 };
 
 static SOC_ENUM_SINGLE_DECL(ng_type_enum,
-			    CS42L52_NOISE_GATE_CTL, 6,
+			    CS42L52_NOISE_GATE_CTL, 7,
 			    cs42l52_ng_type_text);
 
 static const char * const left_swap_text[] = {
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 018/168] ASoC: pcm3168a: Fix the DAC zero flag polarity bit

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: HyeongJun An <sammiee5311@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit b26edc925c1cfa0184cd270ed81d4833db045ce0 ]

The DAC Zero Flag Polarity enum uses PCM3168A_DAC_ATSPDA_SHIFT, which
is bit 6 of register 70. That bit is ATSPDA, the attenuation speed,
which the DAC Volume Rate Multiplier enum already owns. The datasheet
puts ZREV, the zero flag polarity, at bit 0. The header defines
PCM3168A_DAC_ZREV_SHIFT for it, but nothing uses it.

So changing the zero flag polarity changes the attenuation speed, and
ZREV cannot be set.

Use PCM3168A_DAC_ZREV_SHIFT.

Fixes: a9b17a638af5 ("ASoC: pcm3168a: Add driver for pcm3168a codec")
Link: https://www.ti.com/lit/ds/symlink/pcm3168a.pdf
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5-5
Signed-off-by: HyeongJun An <sammiee5311@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Cezary Rojewski <cezary.rojewski@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261008130953.2446692-4-sammiee5311@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 sound/soc/codecs/pcm3168a.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/pcm3168a.c b/sound/soc/codecs/pcm3168a.c
index e5ac1146588cc..983ca03e7a757 100644
--- a/sound/soc/codecs/pcm3168a.c
+++ b/sound/soc/codecs/pcm3168a.c
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ static SOC_ENUM_SINGLE_DECL(pcm3168a_dac_zf_func, PCM3168A_DAC_ATT_DEMP_ZF,
 static const char *const pcm3168a_pol[] = { "Active High", "Active Low" };
 
 static SOC_ENUM_SINGLE_DECL(pcm3168a_dac_zf_pol, PCM3168A_DAC_ATT_DEMP_ZF,
-		PCM3168A_DAC_ATSPDA_SHIFT, pcm3168a_pol);
+		PCM3168A_DAC_ZREV_SHIFT, pcm3168a_pol);
 
 static const char *const pcm3168a_con[] = { "Differential", "Single-Ended" };
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 019/168] ASoC: max98371: Fix the Speaker DHT Min Volume bits

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: HyeongJun An <sammiee5311@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit f7934340c56a84fc1b246ebf6b2e806d775f3b54 ]

Register 0x31 holds two 4-bit fields. The datasheet puts SPK_GAIN_MIN
at bits 7:4 and DHT_VROT_PNT at bits 3:0. The Speaker DHT Min Volume
and Speaker DHT Rotation Volume controls both use bits 3:0.

So setting the minimum speaker gain changes the DHT rotation point, and
SPK_GAIN_MIN cannot be set.

Move Speaker DHT Min Volume to bits 7:4.

Fixes: ca2cd6bc6663 ("ASoC: Add max98371 codec driver")
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5-5
Signed-off-by: HyeongJun An <sammiee5311@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261008130953.2446692-5-sammiee5311@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 sound/soc/codecs/max98371.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/max98371.c b/sound/soc/codecs/max98371.c
index f0e49179c38f6..d0e7efce80968 100644
--- a/sound/soc/codecs/max98371.c
+++ b/sound/soc/codecs/max98371.c
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ static const struct snd_kcontrol_new max98371_snd_controls[] = {
 			0, (1<<MAX98371_DHT_MAX_WIDTH)-1, 0,
 			max98371_dht_max_gain),
 	SOC_SINGLE_TLV("Speaker DHT Min Volume", MAX98371_DHT_GAIN,
-			0, (1<<MAX98371_DHT_GAIN_WIDTH)-1, 0,
+			4, (1<<MAX98371_DHT_GAIN_WIDTH)-1, 0,
 			max98371_dht_min_gain),
 	SOC_SINGLE_TLV("Speaker DHT Rotation Volume", MAX98371_DHT_GAIN,
 			0, (1<<MAX98371_DHT_ROT_WIDTH)-1, 0,
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 020/168] ASoC: wm8978: Fix the 128x oversampling switch bits

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: HyeongJun An <sammiee5311@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit d0567ca9a2faa33efbe5ae84ef7b86423a93bffd ]

The DAC and ADC 128x Oversampling Switches use bit 5 of R10 and R14.
Table 66 of the WM8978 datasheet puts DACOSR128 and ADCOSR128 at bit 3
of those registers.

In R14, bit 5 is inside HPFCUT[6:4], which the High Pass Cut Off
control owns. So turning on ADC oversampling changes the high pass
cut-off, and the oversampling bit cannot be set. In R10, bit 5 is
reserved, so the DAC switch has no effect.

Use bit 3 for both.

Fixes: 823dba519122 ("ASoC: Fix broken bitfield definitions in WM8978")
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5-5
Signed-off-by: HyeongJun An <sammiee5311@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261008130953.2446692-6-sammiee5311@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 sound/soc/codecs/wm8978.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/wm8978.c b/sound/soc/codecs/wm8978.c
index 718bfef302cc6..6042a2fb7329c 100644
--- a/sound/soc/codecs/wm8978.c
+++ b/sound/soc/codecs/wm8978.c
@@ -255,9 +255,9 @@ static const struct snd_kcontrol_new wm8978_snd_controls[] = {
 
 	/* DAC / ADC oversampling */
 	SOC_SINGLE("DAC 128x Oversampling Switch", WM8978_DAC_CONTROL,
-		   5, 1, 0),
+		   3, 1, 0),
 	SOC_SINGLE("ADC 128x Oversampling Switch", WM8978_ADC_CONTROL,
-		   5, 1, 0),
+		   3, 1, 0),
 };
 
 /* Mixer #1: Output (OUT1, OUT2) Mixer: mix AUX, Input mixer output and DAC */
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 021/168] ASoC: nau8822: Fix the 128x oversampling switch bits

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: HyeongJun An <sammiee5311@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 4db45fc1da3d62d0fa6e8f1e457ae92e8741ed07 ]

The DAC and ADC 128x Oversampling Switches use bit 5 of R10 and R14.
The NAU8822 datasheet register map puts DACOS and ADCOS at bit 3 of
those registers.

In R14, bit 5 is inside HPF[6:4], which the High Pass Cut Off control
owns. So turning on ADC oversampling changes the high pass cut-off, and
the oversampling bit cannot be set. In R10, bit 5 is reserved, so the
DAC switch has no effect.

Use bit 3 for both.

Fixes: 1e3cb6c321be ("ASoC: nau8822: new codec driver")
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5-5
Signed-off-by: HyeongJun An <sammiee5311@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261008130953.2446692-7-sammiee5311@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 sound/soc/codecs/nau8822.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/nau8822.c b/sound/soc/codecs/nau8822.c
index 7199d734c79f2..fbdc5db887b6e 100644
--- a/sound/soc/codecs/nau8822.c
+++ b/sound/soc/codecs/nau8822.c
@@ -379,9 +379,9 @@ static const struct snd_kcontrol_new nau8822_snd_controls[] = {
 		NAU8822_REG_RIGHT_ADC_BOOST_CONTROL, 0, 7, 0, boost_tlv),
 
 	SOC_SINGLE("DAC 128x Oversampling Switch",
-		NAU8822_REG_DAC_CONTROL, 5, 1, 0),
+		NAU8822_REG_DAC_CONTROL, 3, 1, 0),
 	SOC_SINGLE("ADC 128x Oversampling Switch",
-		NAU8822_REG_ADC_CONTROL, 5, 1, 0),
+		NAU8822_REG_ADC_CONTROL, 3, 1, 0),
 };
 
 /* LMAIN and RMAIN Mixer */
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 022/168] netlink: reset skb headers before unicast and multicast filtering

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>

[ Upstream commit 8bf659bd54e1f00e34cf5244b1d289c506fa47c0 ]

Socket filters can use SKF_NET_OFF and SKF_LL_OFF to read relative to
an skb's network and MAC headers. Netlink producers may reserve
headroom without resetting those headers, allowing a receiving socket's
filter to read data before the initialized message.

For example, IWPM HELLO replies are allocated with dev_alloc_skb(),
which reserves NET_SKB_PAD bytes. An unprivileged NETLINK_RDMA user can
attach a classic socket filter and disclose this headroom through the
length of the delivered reply. The resets in netlink_dump() do not help
because IWPM sends a separately allocated skb through netlink_unicast().

Reset both headers before running the receiver's filter in unicast and
broadcast delivery, as is already done for dump skbs. This also covers
other netlink producers that reserve headroom without changing their
allocation or message-building code.

Fixes: b1153f29ee07 ("netlink: make socket filters work on netlink")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261006224232.50724-1-kylebot@openai.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
index f3a8c8338d203..e539b0a632fad 100644
--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
@@ -1345,6 +1345,8 @@ int netlink_unicast(struct sock *ssk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	if (netlink_is_kernel(sk))
 		return netlink_unicast_kernel(sk, skb, ssk);
 
+	skb_reset_network_header(skb);
+	skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
 	if (sk_filter(sk, skb)) {
 		err = skb->len;
 		kfree_skb(skb);
@@ -1479,6 +1481,8 @@ static void do_one_broadcast(struct sock *sk,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
+	skb_reset_network_header(p->skb2);
+	skb_reset_mac_header(p->skb2);
 	if (sk_filter(sk, p->skb2)) {
 		kfree_skb(p->skb2);
 		p->skb2 = NULL;
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 023/168] spi: tegra114: assert CS GPIO for every transfer in a message

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Carlos Jones Jr <carlosjr.jones@analog.com>

[ Upstream commit 8980bc573ae2d2b9d86d76aeb86c76e1597070bf ]

The driver provides its own transfer_one_message() and therefore drives
the chip-select GPIO itself rather than through the SPI core. The GPIO is
asserted only in the is_first_of_msg path of
tegra_spi_setup_transfer_one(), but tegra_spi_transfer_end() deasserts it
whenever a transfer has cs_change set. For a multi-transfer message whose
earlier transfers request cs_change -- for example a register read that
sends the address in one transfer and clocks the data back in the next --
the CS GPIO is released after the first transfer and never re-asserted,
so the remaining transfers are clocked with chip-select inactive and the
peripheral never drives the bus.

This was observed with an ADIS16470 IMU (adis16475 driver), whose
register read is a two-transfer, cs_change-framed exchange: a logic
analyzer showed the data frame clocked with CS high, and the driver read
0 while the device drove 0x4056 on the wire.

Re-assert the CS GPIO for every transfer so that multi-transfer messages
keep chip-select active across the whole message. gpiod_set_value() is
idempotent and polarity-aware, so this is a no-op for the first transfer
and for messages that keep CS asserted throughout.

Fixes: 63c1440596ff ("spi: tegra114: add support for gpio based CS")
Signed-off-by: Carlos Jones Jr <carlosjr.jones@analog.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261002085540.1625-1-carlosjr.jones@analog.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/spi/spi-tegra114.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi-tegra114.c b/drivers/spi/spi-tegra114.c
index ba2c9feab1cdf..2b7fc3e0c244e 100644
--- a/drivers/spi/spi-tegra114.c
+++ b/drivers/spi/spi-tegra114.c
@@ -859,6 +859,13 @@ static u32 tegra_spi_setup_transfer_one(struct spi_device *spi,
 		command1 |= SPI_BIT_LENGTH(bits_per_word - 1);
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Re-assert the CS GPIO for every transfer: transfer_end() drops it
+	 * on cs_change, and the assert above only covers is_first_of_msg.
+	 */
+	if (spi_get_csgpiod(spi, 0))
+		gpiod_set_value(spi_get_csgpiod(spi, 0), 1);
+
 	return command1;
 }
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 024/168] nios2: fix __wsum type degradation in csum_fold()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit b963f2345fa20417401c51a69dedb6a58eea33a9 ]

csum_fold() shifts a bitwise __wsum type, which sparse reports as
"restricted __wsum degrades to integer". Sparse only checks the body of
a static inline once something instantiates it, so this went unnoticed
until a recent block layer change added the first csum_fold() caller to
a file built on this architecture.

Force cast to a __u32 for the shift, as the other architectures do.

Fixes: eea9507a69d6 ("nios2: Library functions")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202609222053.5gjiJjtb-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/nios2/include/asm/checksum.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/nios2/include/asm/checksum.h b/arch/nios2/include/asm/checksum.h
index 69004e07a1ba3..b6b415ae17a08 100644
--- a/arch/nios2/include/asm/checksum.h
+++ b/arch/nios2/include/asm/checksum.h
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static inline __sum16 csum_fold(__wsum sum)
 		"add	%0, %0, r8\n"
 		"nor	%0, %0, %0\n"
 		: "=r" (sum)
-		: "r" (sum << 16), "0" (sum)
+		: "r" ((__force u32)sum << 16), "0" (sum)
 		: "r8");
 	return (__force __sum16) sum;
 }
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 025/168] scsi: st: Save the visited block for the partition the drive is in

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Laurence Oberman <loberman@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit c9e9f024dd4f61f0f6636c9f2ed0830f87060e11 ]

set_location() saves the current tape location before switching
partitions, so that switch_partition() can return to it later. It reads
the location with READ POSITION but stores it in the st_partstat of
STp->partition, ignoring the partition the drive reports.

The two differ after a device reset. When the reset is recovered with
MTREW, MTSEEK or MTEOM, st_ioctl() sets STp->partition = 0 and calls
switch_partition() to return to STp->new_partition. A drive that was in
partition 1 is still there, so set_location() files the partition 1
position under partition 0. The next switch to partition 0 locates to
that block: if partition 0 holds less data, MTSETPART fails with EIO
(BLANK CHECK), otherwise the tape is silently positioned at the wrong
block.

IBM ULTRIUM-TD5 (LTO-5), LU reset in partition 1 at block 1025:

  st 12:0:0:0: [st0] Visited block 1025 for partition 0 saved.
  ...
  st 12:0:0:0: [st0] Setting block to 1025 and partition to 0.
  st 12:0:0:0: [st0] Error: 402, cmd: 2b 2 0 0 0 4
  st 12:0:0:0: [st0] Sense Key : Blank Check [current]
  st 12:0:0:0: [st0] Add. Sense: End-of-data detected

Store the location in the st_partstat of the partition reported by READ
POSITION. With the fix:

  st 12:0:0:0: [st0] Visited block 1025 for partition 1 saved.

This is a pre-existing issue. It was not caught when testing the recent
st reset series because the partition test was only run on scsi_debug:
on the LTO drive it was skipped, since can-partitions is off in the test
harness's stinit.conf, as is normal for LTO. scsi_debug hides the
problem because its emulated tape returns to the beginning of partition
0 on an LU reset. It was found while validating a backport of that
series to RHEL 9.8, when the partition tests were run on real hardware
with can-partitions enabled. The same failure then reproduced on
unmodified RHEL 9.8 and on upstream, and the fix makes the test pass on
v7.3-rc3 and RHEL 9.8 with an LTO-5.

The harness (https://gitlab.com/loberman/tapetest, test X03) now refuses
to silently skip the partition tests on hardware.

Fixes: 7081dc75df79 ("scsi: st: Restore some drive settings after reset")
Assisted-by: Claude
Signed-off-by: Laurence Oberman <loberman@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261006164250.773840-1-loberman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen (Oracle) <mkp@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/scsi/st.c | 14 ++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/scsi/st.c b/drivers/scsi/st.c
index f9ab45c4bb40d..defbc1507980a 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/st.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/st.c
@@ -3195,14 +3195,20 @@ static int set_location(struct scsi_tape *STp, unsigned int block, int partition
 	    partition >= ST_NBR_PARTITIONS)
 		return (-EINVAL);
 	if (partition != STp->partition) {
-		if (get_location(STp, &blk, &p, 1))
+		/*
+		 * Save the location for the partition the drive reports,
+		 * not for STp->partition: after a reset STp->partition may
+		 * not match the partition the drive is in.
+		 */
+		if (get_location(STp, &blk, &p, 1) ||
+		    p < 0 || p >= ST_NBR_PARTITIONS)
 			STps->last_block_valid = 0;
 		else {
-			STps->last_block_valid = 1;
-			STps->last_block_visited = blk;
+			STp->ps[p].last_block_valid = 1;
+			STp->ps[p].last_block_visited = blk;
 			DEBC_printk(STp, "Visited block %d for "
 				    "partition %d saved.\n",
-				    blk, STp->partition);
+				    blk, p);
 		}
 	}
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 026/168] scsi: target: iscsi: Fix race in discovery auth updates

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Linfeng Sun <linfeng.sun.dev@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit e15b81f602edbdee39c335546f25486a1747f3f0 ]

Separate configfs opens can concurrently update the discovery AuthMethod
parameter. Both callers may free the same value in
iscsi_update_param_value(), causing a double-free.

Protect the lookup and replacement with the discovery TPG access lock,
as used by the other TPG configfs parameter updates.

Fixes: e48354ce078c ("iscsi-target: Add iSCSI fabric support for target v4.1")
Signed-off-by: Linfeng Sun <linfeng.sun.dev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <michael.christie@oracle.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260811124843.6817-1-linfeng.sun.dev@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen (Oracle) <mkp@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_configfs.c | 26 ++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_configfs.c b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_configfs.c
index 1cff6052e8202..16d91195c08f8 100644
--- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_configfs.c
+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_configfs.c
@@ -1306,17 +1306,24 @@ static ssize_t iscsi_disc_enforce_discovery_auth_store(struct config_item *item,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	if (iscsit_get_tpg(discovery_tpg) < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	param = iscsi_find_param_from_key(AUTHMETHOD,
 				discovery_tpg->param_list);
-	if (!param)
-		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!param) {
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	if (op) {
 		/*
 		 * Reset the AuthMethod key to CHAP.
 		 */
-		if (iscsi_update_param_value(param, CHAP) < 0)
-			return -EINVAL;
+		if (iscsi_update_param_value(param, CHAP) < 0) {
+			err = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
 
 		discovery_tpg->tpg_attrib.authentication = 1;
 		iscsit_global->discovery_acl.node_auth.enforce_discovery_auth = 1;
@@ -1327,8 +1334,10 @@ static ssize_t iscsi_disc_enforce_discovery_auth_store(struct config_item *item,
 		/*
 		 * Reset the AuthMethod key to CHAP,None
 		 */
-		if (iscsi_update_param_value(param, "CHAP,None") < 0)
-			return -EINVAL;
+		if (iscsi_update_param_value(param, "CHAP,None") < 0) {
+			err = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
 
 		discovery_tpg->tpg_attrib.authentication = 0;
 		iscsit_global->discovery_acl.node_auth.enforce_discovery_auth = 0;
@@ -1337,7 +1346,10 @@ static ssize_t iscsi_disc_enforce_discovery_auth_store(struct config_item *item,
 			" Discovery TPG\n");
 	}
 
-	return count;
+	err = count;
+out:
+	iscsit_put_tpg(discovery_tpg);
+	return err;
 }
 
 CONFIGFS_ATTR(iscsi_disc_, enforce_discovery_auth);
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 027/168] ocfs2/dlm: Protect the recovery list during debugfs reads

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 4c435828932bf46f29860e4a0375bcae101b778a ]

Recovery participant records must remain alive while debug_state_print()
walks reco.node_data and formats their fields. The formatter holds
dlm->spinlock, but the recovery participant list is protected by
dlm_reco_state_lock. In particular, dlm_destroy_recovery_area() detaches
the list under dlm_reco_state_lock and frees the detached records after
releasing it. A concurrent debugfs open can therefore read freed memory.

Protect the participant traversal and field reads in debug_state_print()
with dlm_reco_state_lock, matching the existing list writers. This also
serializes the traversal against list_add_tail() during recovery-area
initialization. Make the existing lock available to the debug code
through dlmcommon.h; the lock remains internal to the OCFS2 DLM module.

Release dlm->spinlock after formatting the other domain state and before
acquiring dlm_reco_state_lock, so the debug reader does not nest the two
locks. Leave recovery list insertion, detachment and freeing unchanged.

KASAN report as below:

    BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in debug_state_open+0x1169/0x12d0
    Read of size 4 at addr ffff88810662ef80 by task dlm-state-stres/896

    CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 896 Comm: dlm-state-stres Not tainted 7.3.0-rc4-next-20260921-pmb-ocfs2-functional-v1+ #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
    Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
    Call Trace:
     <TASK>
     dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0
     print_report+0xce/0x630
     ? debug_state_open+0x1169/0x12d0
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     ? __virt_addr_valid+0x20e/0x420
     ? debug_state_open+0x1169/0x12d0
     kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
     ? debug_state_open+0x1169/0x12d0
     debug_state_open+0x1169/0x12d0
     ? __pfx_debug_state_open+0x10/0x10
     full_proxy_open_regular+0x193/0x310
     do_dentry_open+0x595/0x12d0
     ? __pfx_full_proxy_open_regular+0x10/0x10
     vfs_open_consume+0xd1/0x400
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     path_openat+0x18d0/0x2020
     ? __pfx_path_openat+0x10/0x10
     do_file_open+0x21e/0x470
     ? __pfx_do_file_open+0x10/0x10
     ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x23/0x40
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     ? alloc_fd+0x3a6/0x6b0
     do_sys_openat2+0xf4/0x1b0
     ? __pfx_do_sys_openat2+0x10/0x10
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     ? __fput+0x5b5/0xa60
     __x64_sys_openat+0x136/0x1e0
     ? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10
     do_syscall_64+0x114/0x620
     entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
    [Register dump omitted.]
     </TASK>

    Allocated by task 880:
     kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
     kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
     __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
     __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x28d/0x610
     dlm_remaster_locks+0x147/0x1d90
     dlm_do_recovery+0xde1/0x1580
     dlm_recovery_thread+0x109/0x300
     kthread+0x351/0x460
     ret_from_fork+0x659/0x940
     ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

    Freed by task 880:
     kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
     kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
     kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
     __kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80
     kfree+0x308/0x580
     dlm_destroy_recovery_area+0x285/0x460
     dlm_remaster_locks+0x17c4/0x1d90
     dlm_do_recovery+0xde1/0x1580
     dlm_recovery_thread+0x109/0x300
     kthread+0x351/0x460
     ret_from_fork+0x659/0x940
     ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

    The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88810662ef80
     which belongs to the cache kmalloc-32 of size 32
    The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
     freed 32-byte region [ffff88810662ef80, ffff88810662efa0)

    [Page and memory-state dumps omitted.]

Fixes: 007dce53a29c ("ocfs2/dlm: Dump the dlm state in a debugfs file")
Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/pm-ocfs2-objects-candidate-0049-v3-184e46c47f5283f06191@gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmcommon.h   | 2 ++
 fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdebug.c    | 5 ++++-
 fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmrecovery.c | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmcommon.h b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmcommon.h
index 20f790a47484a..58b28dfa8d34e 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmcommon.h
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmcommon.h
@@ -435,6 +435,8 @@ enum {
 	DLM_DEREF_LOCKRES_DONE		= 522,
 };
 
+extern spinlock_t dlm_reco_state_lock;
+
 struct dlm_reco_node_data
 {
 	int state;
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdebug.c b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdebug.c
index e62ed98df7de4..afaea6396b6f9 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdebug.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdebug.c
@@ -792,8 +792,11 @@ static int debug_state_print(struct dlm_ctxt *dlm, char *buf, int len)
 				 buf + out, len - out);
 	out += scnprintf(buf + out, len - out, "\n");
 
+	spin_unlock(&dlm->spinlock);
+
 	/* Recovery Node State: */
 	out += scnprintf(buf + out, len - out, "Recovery Node State:\n");
+	spin_lock(&dlm_reco_state_lock);
 	list_for_each_entry(node, &dlm->reco.node_data, list) {
 		switch (node->state) {
 		case DLM_RECO_NODE_DATA_INIT:
@@ -825,7 +828,7 @@ static int debug_state_print(struct dlm_ctxt *dlm, char *buf, int len)
 				node->node_num, state);
 	}
 
-	spin_unlock(&dlm->spinlock);
+	spin_unlock(&dlm_reco_state_lock);
 
 	return out;
 }
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmrecovery.c b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmrecovery.c
index 739da8bd7dbf0..591dd17ef4f5e 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmrecovery.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmrecovery.c
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ static int dlm_lockres_master_requery(struct dlm_ctxt *dlm,
 
 static u64 dlm_get_next_mig_cookie(void);
 
-static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(dlm_reco_state_lock);
+DEFINE_SPINLOCK(dlm_reco_state_lock);
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(dlm_mig_cookie_lock);
 static u64 dlm_mig_cookie = 1;
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 028/168] samples: pidfd: fix userprogs typo

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

[ Upstream commit f1365f97fb7498d805981102eee22d362ae643f2 ]

The Makefile adds pidfd-metadata to "usertprogs-always-y", which kbuild
does not know, so the sample has not been built since the conversion to
userprogs, even with CONFIG_SAMPLE_PIDFD=y.

Fix the variable name. pidfd-metadata.c builds without warnings with
gcc and clang for x86_64 and arm64.

Fixes: 60fb0b1239719 ("samples: pidfd: build sample program for target architecture")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261011223358.2327625-14-sashal@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 samples/pidfd/Makefile | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/samples/pidfd/Makefile b/samples/pidfd/Makefile
index 9754e2d81f70d..d82409f7061f3 100644
--- a/samples/pidfd/Makefile
+++ b/samples/pidfd/Makefile
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
-usertprogs-always-y += pidfd-metadata
+userprogs-always-y += pidfd-metadata
 
 userccflags += -I usr/include
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 029/168] pipe: preserve existing fasync readers on writer setup failure

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>

[ Upstream commit 40bb03d3ea6f6a915218508819ecc4d7a7fa260d ]

F_SETFL and FIOASYNC decide whether to invoke ->fasync() before
pipe_fasync() takes pipe->mutex. Two enables of one O_RDWR FIFO can
therefore both enter the callback.

fasync_helper() allocates before checking for an existing entry. If the
first enable installs both entries, a second enable can update the
reader entry and then fail the allocation for the writer entry. The
error path removes the pre-existing reader entry, clearing FASYNC while
the writer entry remains registered. __fput() then skips ->fasync(), so a
later pipe notification can dereference the freed file or its f_owner.
An unprivileged memory-pressure reproducer triggers a KASAN
slab-use-after-free in send_sigio() through this path.

Keep the reader helper's result and undo the registration only if this
call added it. The pipe mutex serializes changes to both lists, so a
failed new registration still removes its reader, while a failed
duplicate preserves the existing registrations and FASYNC. Successful
duplicate enables continue to update fa_fd as before.

Fixes: 76398425bb06 ("Move FASYNC bit handling to f_op->fasync()")
Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/pipe.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/pipe.c b/fs/pipe.c
index ba4376341ddd2..2ad7eba72b35a 100644
--- a/fs/pipe.c
+++ b/fs/pipe.c
@@ -751,9 +751,11 @@ pipe_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
 	if (filp->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
 		retval = fasync_helper(fd, filp, on, &pipe->fasync_readers);
 	if ((filp->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) && retval >= 0) {
+		int read_ret = retval;
+
 		retval = fasync_helper(fd, filp, on, &pipe->fasync_writers);
-		if (retval < 0 && (filp->f_mode & FMODE_READ))
-			/* this can happen only if on == T */
+		/* Undo only a reader entry added by this call. */
+		if (retval < 0 && read_ret > 0)
 			fasync_helper(-1, filp, 0, &pipe->fasync_readers);
 	}
 	__pipe_unlock(pipe);
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 030/168] tracing: probes: error if BTF is required but unavailable

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Martin Kaiser <martin@kaiser.cx>

[ Upstream commit 66c658033d842bb75f81f20aaa4a378fe47be1a1 ]

traceprobe_expand_meta_args expands probe arguments based on BTF info.

Return an error if we have arguments that need expanding but BTF is not
supported.

The params variable is now unused, it can be removed.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261014083838.31020-1-martin@kaiser.cx/

Fixes: d157d7694460 ("tracing/probes: Support BTF field access from $retval")
Signed-off-by: Martin Kaiser <martin@kaiser.cx>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/trace/trace_probe.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_probe.c b/kernel/trace/trace_probe.c
index a43d974fbccc7..d6bde7a03b57a 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_probe.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_probe.c
@@ -1663,7 +1663,6 @@ const char **traceprobe_expand_meta_args(int argc, const char *argv[],
 					 int *new_argc, char *buf, int bufsize,
 					 struct traceprobe_parse_context *ctx)
 {
-	const struct btf_param *params = NULL;
 	int i, j, n, used, ret, args_idx = -1;
 	const char **new_argv = NULL;
 
@@ -1681,7 +1680,7 @@ const char **traceprobe_expand_meta_args(int argc, const char *argv[],
 		if (args_idx != -1) {
 			/* $arg* requires BTF info */
 			trace_probe_log_err(0, NOSUP_BTFARG);
-			return (const char **)params;
+			return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
 		}
 		*new_argc = argc;
 		return NULL;
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 031/168] scsi: libsas: Fix SMP IO deadlock during HA resume

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Xingui Yang <yangxingui@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit 81e097a064b28b4a1f6ca1a8b433e659c1bd64c0 ]

smp_execute_task_sg() calls pm_runtime_get_sync() on the host before
issuing an SMP command. When that command is itself issued from the HA
resume path, the get_sync() deadlocks: it waits for the ongoing resume
(the device is RPM_RESUMING), while the resume is blocked in
sas_drain_work() waiting for that same SMP IO to complete.

The deadlock needs an expander-attached SATA disk. During
sas_resume_ha() -> sas_drain_work(), DISCE_RESUME -> sas_resume_sata()
-> ata_sas_port_resume() requests ATA_EH_RESET, and the hard reset for
such a disk is done via SMP PHY CONTROL (sas_ata_hard_reset() ->
sas_phy_reset() -> sas_smp_phy_control() ->
smp_execute_task_sg()). Direct-attached SATA resets through
lldd_control_phy() and SSP devices use TMFs, so neither hits this.

Replace the get_sync()/put_sync() pair with
pm_runtime_get_noresume()/pm_runtime_put(). smp_execute_task_sg() only
needs to hold off autosuspend while the SMP is in flight, and it must
not try to resume the host: a sync resume issued from the HA resume path
itself is what deadlocks, and by the time sas_resume_ha() runs, hw_init
has already reinitialized the hardware, so the device is accessible
without one.

The usage reference is still required. Discovery work normally runs
inside an event worker's PM reference, taken at sas_notify_port_event()
notify time and held until the handler has flushed the disco
queue. sas_rediscover_ex_phy() however requeues DISCE_REVALIDATE_DOMAIN
from within the revalidation worker itself, and flush_workqueue() does
not wait for work items queued during execution, so that chained
revalidation runs with no outer PM reference - without the
get_noresume(), its SMP could race autosuspend.

For the BSG path, sas_smp_handler() is the only caller which may find
the host autosuspended: expander SMP requests do not go through any SCSI
device request queue, so nothing else in that path holds the host
awake. Resume it there with pm_runtime_resume_and_get() and check the
result.

Fixes: 3dbbbf656b850 ("scsi: libsas: Fix HA resume deadlock and hisi_sas disk-wake race")
Signed-off-by: Xingui Yang <yangxingui@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: John Garry <john.garry@linux.dev>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260928040234.992912-1-yangxingui@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen (Oracle) <mkp@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/scsi/libsas/sas_expander.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/scsi/libsas/sas_expander.c b/drivers/scsi/libsas/sas_expander.c
index e97f4e01a865a..16cc1c14b9f45 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/libsas/sas_expander.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/libsas/sas_expander.c
@@ -40,7 +40,11 @@ static int smp_execute_task_sg(struct domain_device *dev,
 		to_sas_internal(dev->port->ha->shost->transportt);
 	struct sas_ha_struct *ha = dev->port->ha;
 
-	pm_runtime_get_sync(ha->dev);
+	/*
+	 * Non-blocking: a sync resume here would deadlock against
+	 * sas_drain_work() during HA resume.
+	 */
+	pm_runtime_get_noresume(ha->dev);
 	mutex_lock(&dev->ex_dev.cmd_mutex);
 	for (retry = 0; retry < 3; retry++) {
 		if (test_bit(SAS_DEV_GONE, &dev->state)) {
@@ -113,7 +117,7 @@ static int smp_execute_task_sg(struct domain_device *dev,
 		}
 	}
 	mutex_unlock(&dev->ex_dev.cmd_mutex);
-	pm_runtime_put_sync(ha->dev);
+	pm_runtime_put(ha->dev);
 
 	BUG_ON(retry == 3 && task != NULL);
 	sas_free_task(task);
@@ -2142,6 +2146,11 @@ void sas_smp_handler(struct bsg_job *job, struct Scsi_Host *shost,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
+	/* The host may have autosuspended, resume it here. */
+	ret = pm_runtime_resume_and_get(dev->port->ha->dev);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
 	ret = smp_execute_task_sg(dev, job->request_payload.sg_list,
 			job->reply_payload.sg_list);
 	if (ret >= 0) {
@@ -2149,6 +2158,7 @@ void sas_smp_handler(struct bsg_job *job, struct Scsi_Host *shost,
 		rcvlen = job->reply_payload.payload_len - ret;
 		ret = 0;
 	}
+	pm_runtime_put(dev->port->ha->dev);
 
 out:
 	bsg_job_done(job, ret, rcvlen);
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 032/168] netlink: avoid hashing the network namespace pointer

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>

[ Upstream commit f88bb3606e4bd11ee035b682cddc2999e604609a ]

The netlink rhashtable key includes a raw struct net pointer and a
user-controlled port ID. Both /proc/net/netlink and socket diagnostics
expose the table's bucket order. By binding and rebinding chosen
NETLINK_USERSOCK port IDs, an unprivileged reader can distinguish equal
buckets and recover the low bits of the Jenkins hash. Its 32-bit seed
and the limited set of kernel-image slides can then be searched offline
to recover the address of init_net.

Use the namespace's unique, non-address net_cookie in the comparison
key instead. It is assigned before the per-net initializers run and
remains unchanged for the namespace's lifetime. The lookup key and
object hash are still built by netlink_compare_arg_init(), keeping
lookup, insertion, removal and rehashing consistent while preserving
namespace separation. Neither public table walker needs to change.

Reading the socket's namespace cookie in netlink_compare() is safe
under RCU, including during namespace teardown. netlink_release()
removes the socket from the hash table and defers its final put with
call_rcu(). cleanup_net() runs the per-net exit methods and waits for
outstanding RCU callbacks with rcu_barrier() before freeing namespace
storage.

Unlike ns.ns_id, net_cookie is also available and initialized during
setup_net() in older stable kernels, making the change straightforward
to backport to v5.15 and later.

Fixes: c428ecd1a21f ("netlink: Move namespace into hash key")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261008011359.63727-2-kylebot@openai.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
index e539b0a632fad..a7d3673ca72fc 100644
--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ netlink_unlock_table(void)
 
 struct netlink_compare_arg
 {
-	possible_net_t pnet;
+	u64 net_cookie;
 	u32 portid;
 };
 
@@ -478,14 +478,14 @@ static inline int netlink_compare(struct rhashtable_compare_arg *arg,
 	const struct netlink_sock *nlk = ptr;
 
 	return nlk->portid != x->portid ||
-	       !net_eq(sock_net(&nlk->sk), read_pnet(&x->pnet));
+	       sock_net(&nlk->sk)->net_cookie != x->net_cookie;
 }
 
 static void netlink_compare_arg_init(struct netlink_compare_arg *arg,
 				     struct net *net, u32 portid)
 {
 	memset(arg, 0, sizeof(*arg));
-	write_pnet(&arg->pnet, net);
+	arg->net_cookie = net->net_cookie;
 	arg->portid = portid;
 }
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 033/168] net: bcmgenet: unshare the skb before writing the control block

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Nicolai Buchwitz <nb@tipi-net.de>

[ Upstream commit 89771ce4f8f67dcffae561b2ccac95c0f6e3aa01 ]

bcmgenet stores first_cb, last_cb and bytes_sent in the skb control
block and reads them back on completion to free the skb and credit BQL.
ether_setup() leaves IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set, so the stack can resubmit
a shared skb that is still in the ring. The next transmit overwrites
last_cb, so the earlier slots complete without crediting their bytes
and BQL stalls the queue until the watchdog resets it.

Unshare the skb before writing the control block.

Reproduce with pktgen in clone_skb mode, which hands the driver the same
skb while earlier copies are still in the ring:

  modprobe pktgen
  pg=/proc/net/pktgen
  echo "add_device eth0" > $pg/kpktgend_0
  echo "dst_mac AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF" > $pg/eth0
  echo "dst 192.0.2.1" > $pg/eth0
  echo "clone_skb 8" > $pg/eth0
  echo "count 0" > $pg/eth0
  echo start > $pg/pgctrl &
  sleep 5
  echo stop > $pg/pgctrl
  wait
  cat /sys/class/net/eth0/queues/tx-0/byte_queue_limits/inflight

inflight stays nonzero on the now idle queue. clone_skb 0 leaves it at
zero.

Fixes: f48bed16a756 ("net: bcmgenet: Free skb after last Tx frag")
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Buchwitz <nb@tipi-net.de>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli@broadcom.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261009-nb-genet-shared-skb-net-v1-1-c6d0a841977d@tipi-net.de
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmgenet.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmgenet.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmgenet.c
index affac9887f160..37f42e8787a0e 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmgenet.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmgenet.c
@@ -2104,6 +2104,16 @@ static netdev_tx_t bcmgenet_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
 		goto out;
 	}
 
+	/* We store Tx state in the control block, so the skb must not be
+	 * shared, but ether_setup() leaves IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set.
+	 */
+	skb = skb_share_check(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!skb) {
+		BCMGENET_STATS64_INC((&ring->stats64), dropped);
+		ret = NETDEV_TX_OK;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
 	/* Retain how many bytes will be sent on the wire, without TSB inserted
 	 * by transmit checksum offload
 	 */
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 034/168] net/ipv6: Introduce payload_len helpers

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alice Mikityanska <alice@isovalent.com>

[ Upstream commit b2936b4fd56294e49d6c8e9152ea6c4982757c7d ]

The next commits will transition away from using the hop-by-hop
extension header to encode packet length for BIG TCP. Add wrappers
around ip6->payload_len that return the actual value if it's non-zero,
and calculate it from skb->len if payload_len is set to zero (and a
symmetrical setter).

The new helpers are used wherever the surrounding code supports the
hop-by-hop jumbo header for BIG TCP IPv6, or the corresponding IPv4 code
uses skb_ip_totlen (e.g., in include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_ipv6.h).

No behavioral change in this commit.

Signed-off-by: Alice Mikityanska <alice@isovalent.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260205133925.526371-2-alice.kernel@fastmail.im
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 8070ed578b6b ("calipso: keep BIG TCP payload_len in calipso_skbuff_setattr()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 include/linux/ipv6.h                       | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/net/ipv6.h                         |  2 --
 include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_ipv6.h     |  4 ++--
 net/bridge/br_netfilter_ipv6.c             |  2 +-
 net/bridge/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bridge.c |  4 ++--
 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c                       |  2 +-
 net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c                     |  7 +++----
 net/ipv6/output_core.c                     |  7 +------
 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c            |  2 +-
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_ovs.c           |  2 +-
 net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c              |  2 +-
 net/sched/sch_cake.c                       |  2 +-
 12 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/ipv6.h b/include/linux/ipv6.h
index 9cc278b5e4f42..915548699da86 100644
--- a/include/linux/ipv6.h
+++ b/include/linux/ipv6.h
@@ -117,6 +117,28 @@ static inline unsigned int ipv6_transport_len(const struct sk_buff *skb)
 	       skb_network_header_len(skb);
 }
 
+static inline unsigned int
+ipv6_payload_len(const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct ipv6hdr *ip6)
+{
+	u32 len = ntohs(ip6->payload_len);
+
+	return (len || !skb_is_gso(skb) || !skb_is_gso_tcp(skb)) ?
+		len :
+		skb->len - skb_network_offset(skb) - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int skb_ipv6_payload_len(const struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	return ipv6_payload_len(skb, ipv6_hdr(skb));
+}
+
+#define IPV6_MAXPLEN		65535
+
+static inline void ipv6_set_payload_len(struct ipv6hdr *ip6, unsigned int len)
+{
+	ip6->payload_len = len <= IPV6_MAXPLEN ? htons(len) : 0;
+}
+
 /* 
    This structure contains results of exthdrs parsing
    as offsets from skb->nh.
diff --git a/include/net/ipv6.h b/include/net/ipv6.h
index 9d72128ea9022..60d95434a203c 100644
--- a/include/net/ipv6.h
+++ b/include/net/ipv6.h
@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@ struct ip_tunnel_info;
 
 #define SIN6_LEN_RFC2133	24
 
-#define IPV6_MAXPLEN		65535
-
 /*
  *	NextHeader field of IPv6 header
  */
diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_ipv6.h b/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_ipv6.h
index a0633eeaec977..c53ac00bb974d 100644
--- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_ipv6.h
+++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_ipv6.h
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ static inline int __nft_set_pktinfo_ipv6_validate(struct nft_pktinfo *pkt)
 	if (ip6h->version != 6)
 		return -1;
 
-	pkt_len = ntohs(ip6h->payload_len);
+	pkt_len = ipv6_payload_len(pkt->skb, ip6h);
 	skb_len = pkt->skb->len - skb_network_offset(pkt->skb);
 	if (pkt_len + sizeof(*ip6h) > skb_len)
 		return -1;
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ static inline int nft_set_pktinfo_ipv6_ingress(struct nft_pktinfo *pkt)
 	if (ip6h->version != 6)
 		goto inhdr_error;
 
-	pkt_len = ntohs(ip6h->payload_len);
+	pkt_len = ipv6_payload_len(pkt->skb, ip6h);
 	if (pkt_len + sizeof(*ip6h) > pkt->skb->len) {
 		idev = __in6_dev_get(nft_in(pkt));
 		__IP6_INC_STATS(nft_net(pkt), idev, IPSTATS_MIB_INTRUNCATEDPKTS);
diff --git a/net/bridge/br_netfilter_ipv6.c b/net/bridge/br_netfilter_ipv6.c
index ad268bd19d5b0..5f21fab5c05ab 100644
--- a/net/bridge/br_netfilter_ipv6.c
+++ b/net/bridge/br_netfilter_ipv6.c
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ int br_validate_ipv6(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (hdr->version != 6)
 		goto inhdr_error;
 
-	pkt_len = ntohs(hdr->payload_len);
+	pkt_len = ipv6_payload_len(skb, hdr);
 	if (hdr->nexthdr == NEXTHDR_HOP && nf_ip6_check_hbh_len(skb, &pkt_len))
 		goto drop;
 
diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bridge.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bridge.c
index 3b75d5b216171..381638ee9ac5f 100644
--- a/net/bridge/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bridge.c
+++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bridge.c
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ static int nf_ct_br_ipv6_check(const struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (hdr->version != 6)
 		return -1;
 
-	len = ntohs(hdr->payload_len) + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + nhoff;
+	len = ipv6_payload_len(skb, hdr) + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + nhoff;
 	if (skb->len < len)
 		return -1;
 
@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ static unsigned int nf_ct_bridge_pre(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
 		if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)))
 			return NF_ACCEPT;
 
-		len = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + ntohs(ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len);
+		len = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + skb_ipv6_payload_len(skb);
 		if (pskb_trim_rcsum(skb, len))
 			return NF_ACCEPT;
 
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c
index 9f8f17b3934f6..c5ae346e29cf3 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *ip6_rcv_core(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
 	skb->transport_header = skb->network_header + sizeof(*hdr);
 	IP6CB(skb)->nhoff = offsetof(struct ipv6hdr, nexthdr);
 
-	pkt_len = ntohs(hdr->payload_len);
+	pkt_len = ipv6_payload_len(skb, hdr);
 
 	/* pkt_len may be zero if Jumbo payload option is present */
 	if (pkt_len || hdr->nexthdr != NEXTHDR_HOP) {
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c
index 84b17eeaa57cc..a4e09b1305b23 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c
@@ -387,12 +387,11 @@ INDIRECT_CALLABLE_SCOPE int ipv6_gro_complete(struct sk_buff *skb, int nhoff)
 		hop_jumbo->jumbo_payload_len = htonl(payload_len + hoplen);
 
 		iph->nexthdr = NEXTHDR_HOP;
-		iph->payload_len = 0;
-	} else {
-		iph = (struct ipv6hdr *)(skb->data + nhoff);
-		iph->payload_len = htons(payload_len);
 	}
 
+	iph = (struct ipv6hdr *)(skb->data + nhoff);
+	ipv6_set_payload_len(iph, payload_len);
+
 	nhoff += sizeof(*iph) + ipv6_exthdrs_len(iph, &ops);
 	if (WARN_ON(!ops || !ops->callbacks.gro_complete))
 		goto out;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/output_core.c b/net/ipv6/output_core.c
index b5205311f372b..49c48be2713f2 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/output_core.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/output_core.c
@@ -123,12 +123,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip6_dst_hoplimit);
 
 int __ip6_local_out(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	int len;
-
-	len = skb->len - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
-	if (len > IPV6_MAXPLEN)
-		len = 0;
-	ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len = htons(len);
+	ipv6_set_payload_len(ipv6_hdr(skb), skb->len - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr));
 	IP6CB(skb)->nhoff = offsetof(struct ipv6hdr, nexthdr);
 
 	/* if egress device is enslaved to an L3 master device pass the
diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c
index 863d48624c6aa..cdb6fb98e267a 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c
@@ -985,7 +985,7 @@ ip_vs_prepare_tunneled_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, int skb_af,
 		*next_protocol = IPPROTO_IPV6;
 		if (payload_len)
 			*payload_len =
-				ntohs(old_ipv6h->payload_len) +
+				ipv6_payload_len(skb, old_ipv6h) +
 				sizeof(*old_ipv6h);
 		old_dsfield = ipv6_get_dsfield(old_ipv6h);
 		*ttl = old_ipv6h->hop_limit;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_ovs.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_ovs.c
index 068e9489e1c27..a6988eeb15797 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_ovs.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_ovs.c
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ int nf_ct_skb_network_trim(struct sk_buff *skb, int family)
 		len = skb_ip_totlen(skb);
 		break;
 	case NFPROTO_IPV6:
-		len = ntohs(ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len);
+		len = skb_ipv6_payload_len(skb);
 		if (ipv6_hdr(skb)->nexthdr == NEXTHDR_HOP) {
 			int err = nf_ip6_check_hbh_len(skb, &len);
 
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c b/net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c
index de51b15cf53d9..e2c109d5f069c 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c
@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ dump_ipv6_packet(struct net *net, struct nf_log_buf *m,
 
 	/* Max length: 44 "LEN=65535 TC=255 HOPLIMIT=255 FLOWLBL=FFFFF " */
 	nf_log_buf_add(m, "LEN=%zu TC=%u HOPLIMIT=%u FLOWLBL=%u ",
-		       ntohs(ih->payload_len) + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr),
+		       ipv6_payload_len(skb, ih) + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr),
 		       (ntohl(*(__be32 *)ih) & 0x0ff00000) >> 20,
 		       ih->hop_limit,
 		       (ntohl(*(__be32 *)ih) & 0x000fffff));
diff --git a/net/sched/sch_cake.c b/net/sched/sch_cake.c
index a25b45ab6fb0e..3837ceb445fcf 100644
--- a/net/sched/sch_cake.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_cake.c
@@ -1280,7 +1280,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *cake_ack_filter(struct cake_sched_data *q,
 			    ipv6_addr_cmp(&ipv6h_check->daddr, &ipv6h->daddr))
 				continue;
 
-			seglen = ntohs(ipv6h_check->payload_len);
+			seglen = ipv6_payload_len(skb, ipv6h_check);
 		} else {
 			continue;
 		}
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 035/168] calipso: keep BIG TCP payload_len in calipso_skbuff_setattr()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Joas Antonio dos Santos <joasantonio108@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 8070ed578b6b9134e045627fb745c887a806d46e ]

calipso_skbuff_setattr() adjusts payload_len by the length of the
option it inserts or resizes:

	payload = ntohs(ip6_hdr->payload_len);
	ip6_hdr->payload_len = htons(payload + len_delta);

GRO can build BIG TCP packets larger than IPV6_MAXPLEN, and stores
payload_len == 0 for them; ipv6_payload_len() then falls back to
skb->len.  For such a packet forwarded to a destination mapped to
CALIPSO, the code above writes len_delta (or 65536 + len_delta when
shrinking) into payload_len, and ipv6_payload_len() no longer falls
back to skb->len.  nf_tables, conntrack and sch_cake rely on it.

The same arithmetic also wraps when a packet grows past IPV6_MAXPLEN,
and a BIG TCP packet that shrinks below IPV6_MAXPLEN should get its
real length back.

Set payload_len from the skb length with ipv6_set_payload_len(), which
stores 0 above IPV6_MAXPLEN and the real length otherwise, as
ipv6_gro_complete() does.  The network header was just reset to
skb->data, so skb->len - sizeof(*ip6_hdr) is the payload length.

Tested on one kernel (arm64, QEMU) with SELinux permissive, a minimal
mdp-generated policy (network_peer_controls=1), "netlabelctl calipso
add pass doi:16" and a NetLabel mapping of fd00:2::/64 to CALIPSO
DOI 16.  calipso_skbuff_setattr() was called through
netlbl_skbuff_setattr() from a test-only debugfs hook (not part of
this patch) adding a level-only label; payload_len after the call:

  case                         before fix   after fix   real length
  1000, unlabeled                    1016        1016          1016
  70000 GSO, payload_len 0             16           0         70016
  65530 GSO, grows past MAXPLEN        10           0         65546
  65540 GSO with a 24 byte hop
  header, shrinks below MAXPLEN     65528       65532         65532
  1000 with a 24 byte hop header      992         992           992

(0 means ipv6_payload_len() returns the real length.)  On the forward
path, with a client injecting unlabeled UDP through a router to a
server, the router adds the CALIPSO option and the server delivers all
datagrams (Udp6InDatagrams 5, Ip6InTruncatedPkts 0) with this patch.

Fixes: 81fbc812132c ("ipv6/gro: insert temporary HBH/jumbo header")
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Wang Zhan <wang.zhan@smartx.com>
Signed-off-by: Joas Antonio dos Santos <joasantonio108@gmail.com>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5-5
Reviewed-by: Wang Zhan <wang.zhan@smartx.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/179156155963.36253.400481753322266658@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/ipv6/calipso.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv6/calipso.c b/net/ipv6/calipso.c
index 72079ef2959b9..f23bccb0ee5a2 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/calipso.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/calipso.c
@@ -1322,7 +1322,7 @@ static int calipso_skbuff_setattr(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	struct ipv6hdr *ip6_hdr;
 	struct ipv6_opt_hdr *hop;
 	unsigned char buf[CALIPSO_MAX_BUFFER];
-	int len_delta, new_end, pad, payload;
+	int len_delta, new_end, pad;
 	unsigned int start, end;
 
 	ip6_hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb);
@@ -1361,8 +1361,8 @@ static int calipso_skbuff_setattr(struct sk_buff *skb,
 			sizeof(*ip6_hdr) + start);
 		skb_reset_network_header(skb);
 		ip6_hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb);
-		payload = ntohs(ip6_hdr->payload_len);
-		ip6_hdr->payload_len = htons(payload + len_delta);
+		/* 0 above IPV6_MAXPLEN (BIG TCP), the real length otherwise */
+		ipv6_set_payload_len(ip6_hdr, skb->len - sizeof(*ip6_hdr));
 	}
 
 	hop = (struct ipv6_opt_hdr *)(ip6_hdr + 1);
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 036/168] gpio: mxc: use lock guards for the generic GPIO chip lock

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@linaro.org>

[ Upstream commit ba441322c7aac4735d78fc6781e497a01fb8eac7 ]

Simplify the code by using lock guards for the bgpio_lock.

Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250702-gpio-mmio-rework-v2-2-6b77aab684d8@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@linaro.org>
Stable-dep-of: b7719c575dec ("gpio: mxc: fix both_edges bit operations")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/gpio/gpio-mxc.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpio-mxc.c b/drivers/gpio/gpio-mxc.c
index a8ab78ae7fa30..4b469ec089e4f 100644
--- a/drivers/gpio/gpio-mxc.c
+++ b/drivers/gpio/gpio-mxc.c
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 // Authors: Daniel Mack, Juergen Beisert.
 // Copyright (C) 2004-2010 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
 
+#include <linux/cleanup.h>
 #include <linux/clk.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
@@ -161,7 +162,6 @@ static int gpio_set_irq_type(struct irq_data *d, u32 type)
 {
 	struct irq_chip_generic *gc = irq_data_get_irq_chip_data(d);
 	struct mxc_gpio_port *port = gc->private;
-	unsigned long flags;
 	u32 bit, val;
 	u32 gpio_idx = d->hwirq;
 	int edge;
@@ -200,41 +200,38 @@ static int gpio_set_irq_type(struct irq_data *d, u32 type)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&port->gc.bgpio_lock, flags);
+	scoped_guard(raw_spinlock_irqsave, &port->gc.bgpio_lock) {
+		if (GPIO_EDGE_SEL >= 0) {
+			val = readl(port->base + GPIO_EDGE_SEL);
+			if (edge == GPIO_INT_BOTH_EDGES)
+				writel(val | (1 << gpio_idx),
+				       port->base + GPIO_EDGE_SEL);
+			else
+				writel(val & ~(1 << gpio_idx),
+				       port->base + GPIO_EDGE_SEL);
+		}
 
-	if (GPIO_EDGE_SEL >= 0) {
-		val = readl(port->base + GPIO_EDGE_SEL);
-		if (edge == GPIO_INT_BOTH_EDGES)
-			writel(val | (1 << gpio_idx),
-				port->base + GPIO_EDGE_SEL);
-		else
-			writel(val & ~(1 << gpio_idx),
-				port->base + GPIO_EDGE_SEL);
-	}
+		if (edge != GPIO_INT_BOTH_EDGES) {
+			reg += GPIO_ICR1 + ((gpio_idx & 0x10) >> 2); /* lower or upper register */
+			bit = gpio_idx & 0xf;
+			val = readl(reg) & ~(0x3 << (bit << 1));
+			writel(val | (edge << (bit << 1)), reg);
+		}
 
-	if (edge != GPIO_INT_BOTH_EDGES) {
-		reg += GPIO_ICR1 + ((gpio_idx & 0x10) >> 2); /* lower or upper register */
-		bit = gpio_idx & 0xf;
-		val = readl(reg) & ~(0x3 << (bit << 1));
-		writel(val | (edge << (bit << 1)), reg);
+		writel(1 << gpio_idx, port->base + GPIO_ISR);
+		port->pad_type[gpio_idx] = type;
 	}
 
-	writel(1 << gpio_idx, port->base + GPIO_ISR);
-	port->pad_type[gpio_idx] = type;
-
-	raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&port->gc.bgpio_lock, flags);
-
 	return port->gc.direction_input(&port->gc, gpio_idx);
 }
 
 static void mxc_flip_edge(struct mxc_gpio_port *port, u32 gpio)
 {
 	void __iomem *reg = port->base;
-	unsigned long flags;
 	u32 bit, val;
 	int edge;
 
-	raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&port->gc.bgpio_lock, flags);
+	guard(raw_spinlock_irqsave)(&port->gc.bgpio_lock);
 
 	reg += GPIO_ICR1 + ((gpio & 0x10) >> 2); /* lower or upper register */
 	bit = gpio & 0xf;
@@ -250,12 +247,9 @@ static void mxc_flip_edge(struct mxc_gpio_port *port, u32 gpio)
 	} else {
 		pr_err("mxc: invalid configuration for GPIO %d: %x\n",
 		       gpio, edge);
-		goto unlock;
+		return;
 	}
 	writel(val | (edge << (bit << 1)), reg);
-
-unlock:
-	raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&port->gc.bgpio_lock, flags);
 }
 
 /* handle 32 interrupts in one status register */
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 037/168] gpio: mxc: fix both_edges bit operations

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>

[ Upstream commit b7719c575dec69146f6d537fd616b27083c0cf45 ]

gpio_set_irq_type() can be called concurrently for different pins on
the same port.  The IRQ core serializes per irq descriptor, but
different pins have different descriptors, so on SMP systems two
concurrent gpio_set_irq_type() calls for pins on the same port run
without mutual exclusion.

The read-modify-write of port->both_edges is performed outside the
port-wide scoped_guard(gpio_generic_lock_irqsave) section, so
concurrent updates for different pins can overwrite each other,
causing missed interrupts or stuck IRQ lines on dual-edge triggered
pins.

The original uniprocessor MXC SoCs were not affected; the race
became reachable on multi-core i.MX7 and i.MX8 SoCs that reuse this
driver.

Convert both_edges from u32 to unsigned long and use set_bit(),
clear_bit(), and test_bit() to make the modifications atomic.

Fixes: 910862ec092c ("mxc: emulate GPIO interrupt on both-edges")
Reviewed-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linusw@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261013-gpio-mxc-cleanup-v7-2-c4d769587d3e@nxp.com
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/gpio/gpio-mxc.c | 9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpio-mxc.c b/drivers/gpio/gpio-mxc.c
index 4b469ec089e4f..79b4e62fd3ba9 100644
--- a/drivers/gpio/gpio-mxc.c
+++ b/drivers/gpio/gpio-mxc.c
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 // Authors: Daniel Mack, Juergen Beisert.
 // Copyright (C) 2004-2010 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
 
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
 #include <linux/cleanup.h>
 #include <linux/clk.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
@@ -67,7 +68,7 @@ struct mxc_gpio_port {
 	struct irq_domain *domain;
 	struct gpio_chip gc;
 	struct device *dev;
-	u32 both_edges;
+	unsigned long both_edges;
 	struct mxc_gpio_reg_saved gpio_saved_reg;
 	bool power_off;
 	u32 wakeup_pads;
@@ -167,7 +168,7 @@ static int gpio_set_irq_type(struct irq_data *d, u32 type)
 	int edge;
 	void __iomem *reg = port->base;
 
-	port->both_edges &= ~(1 << gpio_idx);
+	clear_bit(gpio_idx, &port->both_edges);
 	switch (type) {
 	case IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_RISING:
 		edge = GPIO_INT_RISE_EDGE;
@@ -187,7 +188,7 @@ static int gpio_set_irq_type(struct irq_data *d, u32 type)
 				edge = GPIO_INT_HIGH_LEV;
 				pr_debug("mxc: set GPIO %d to high trigger\n", gpio_idx);
 			}
-			port->both_edges |= 1 << gpio_idx;
+			set_bit(gpio_idx, &port->both_edges);
 		}
 		break;
 	case IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_LOW:
@@ -258,7 +259,7 @@ static void mxc_gpio_irq_handler(struct mxc_gpio_port *port, u32 irq_stat)
 	while (irq_stat != 0) {
 		int irqoffset = fls(irq_stat) - 1;
 
-		if (port->both_edges & (1 << irqoffset))
+		if (test_bit(irqoffset, &port->both_edges))
 			mxc_flip_edge(port, irqoffset);
 
 		generic_handle_domain_irq(port->domain, irqoffset);
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 038/168] gpio: mxc: use BIT() macro

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alexander Stein <alexander.stein@ew.tq-group.com>

[ Upstream commit 9de94681ee48770ec7e2062451a572b557bf9298 ]

Replace the open-code with the BIT() macro.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Stein <alexander.stein@ew.tq-group.com>
Reviewed-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li@nxp.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260526063504.25916-2-alexander.stein@ew.tq-group.com
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>
Stable-dep-of: 170aeff46fb5 ("gpio: mxc: fix wakeup_pads bit operations")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/gpio/gpio-mxc.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpio-mxc.c b/drivers/gpio/gpio-mxc.c
index 79b4e62fd3ba9..382645c3a92f4 100644
--- a/drivers/gpio/gpio-mxc.c
+++ b/drivers/gpio/gpio-mxc.c
@@ -330,13 +330,13 @@ static int gpio_set_wake_irq(struct irq_data *d, u32 enable)
 			ret = enable_irq_wake(port->irq_high);
 		else
 			ret = enable_irq_wake(port->irq);
-		port->wakeup_pads |= (1 << gpio_idx);
+		port->wakeup_pads |= BIT(gpio_idx);
 	} else {
 		if (port->irq_high && (gpio_idx >= 16))
 			ret = disable_irq_wake(port->irq_high);
 		else
 			ret = disable_irq_wake(port->irq);
-		port->wakeup_pads &= ~(1 << gpio_idx);
+		port->wakeup_pads &= ~BIT(gpio_idx);
 	}
 
 	return ret;
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 039/168] gpio: mxc: fix wakeup_pads bit operations

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>

[ Upstream commit 170aeff46fb54f41545c85a72aec525aebc79d44 ]

gpio_set_wake_irq() can be called concurrently for different pins on
the same port. The writer-vs-writer race is the concern: two concurrent
gpio_set_wake_irq() calls for different pins on the same port both do
a non-atomic read-modify-write on the same wakeup_pads word. The old
|= and &= compile to separate load/modify/store instructions that can
interleave, losing one CPU's update.

assign_bit() uses an atomic RMW instruction, so concurrent writers to
different bits in the same word are safe.

The reader side (for_each_set_bit in noirq_suspend, wakeup_pads > 0)
runs in noirq context where no concurrent writer can execute, so
reader atomicity is not needed.

wakeup_pads is a u32, while assign_bit() operates on unsigned long
pointers. On 64-bit platforms, this causes an 8-byte read-modify-write
on a 4-byte field, corrupting the adjacent is_pad_wakeup. So change
wakeup_pads to unsigned long and reorder to avoid wasting words.

And fix the enable/disable path unconditionally sets/clears the
wakeup_pads bit even when enable_irq_wake()/disable_irq_wake() fails.
Only update the bit on success.

Fixes: f60c9eac54af ("gpio: mxc: enable pad wakeup on i.MX8x platforms")
Assisted-by: LLM
Reviewed-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261013-gpio-mxc-cleanup-v7-3-c4d769587d3e@nxp.com
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/gpio/gpio-mxc.c | 10 ++++++----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpio-mxc.c b/drivers/gpio/gpio-mxc.c
index 382645c3a92f4..5feac844c70bb 100644
--- a/drivers/gpio/gpio-mxc.c
+++ b/drivers/gpio/gpio-mxc.c
@@ -71,8 +71,8 @@ struct mxc_gpio_port {
 	unsigned long both_edges;
 	struct mxc_gpio_reg_saved gpio_saved_reg;
 	bool power_off;
-	u32 wakeup_pads;
 	bool is_pad_wakeup;
+	unsigned long wakeup_pads;
 	u32 pad_type[32];
 	const struct mxc_gpio_hwdata *hwdata;
 };
@@ -330,16 +330,18 @@ static int gpio_set_wake_irq(struct irq_data *d, u32 enable)
 			ret = enable_irq_wake(port->irq_high);
 		else
 			ret = enable_irq_wake(port->irq);
-		port->wakeup_pads |= BIT(gpio_idx);
 	} else {
 		if (port->irq_high && (gpio_idx >= 16))
 			ret = disable_irq_wake(port->irq_high);
 		else
 			ret = disable_irq_wake(port->irq);
-		port->wakeup_pads &= ~BIT(gpio_idx);
 	}
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 
-	return ret;
+	assign_bit(gpio_idx, &port->wakeup_pads, enable);
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static int mxc_gpio_init_gc(struct mxc_gpio_port *port, int irq_base)
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 040/168] perf: Fix perf_pmu_migrate_context() leaving events behind

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Haris Okanovic <harisokn@amazon.com>

[ Upstream commit e76b36b4be7160eaa14b416681e548b125702395 ]

__perf_pmu_remove() walks the group leaders of a CPU and PMU with
perf_event_groups_for_cpu_pmu(), removing each one as it goes.
perf_remove_from_context() takes the leader out of the groups rbtree,
after which rb_next() on that node returns NULL, prematurely ending the
walk. Other groups stay behind in the source context.

On CPU hotplug, they are then torn down with the dying CPU. They keep
running until teardown, while the PMU's interrupt and migrated events
are on a new CPU, which drivers rely on never happening.

Walk ctx->event_list instead and pick out the PMU's events by their
pmu_ctx.

Fixes: bd2756811766 ("perf: Rewrite core context handling")
Signed-off-by: Haris Okanovic <harisokn@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261013185603.1347265-2-harisokn@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/events/core.c | 20 +++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index a226f908490f0..c891243ddef9b 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -13099,23 +13099,18 @@ perf_event_create_kernel_counter(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int cpu,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(perf_event_create_kernel_counter);
 
-static void __perf_pmu_remove(struct perf_event_context *ctx,
-			      int cpu, struct pmu *pmu,
-			      struct perf_event_groups *groups,
+static void __perf_pmu_remove(struct perf_event_context *ctx, struct pmu *pmu,
 			      struct list_head *events)
 {
-	struct perf_event *event, *sibling;
+	struct perf_event *event, *tmp;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(event, tmp, &ctx->event_list, event_entry) {
+		if (event->pmu_ctx->pmu != pmu)
+			continue;
 
-	perf_event_groups_for_cpu_pmu(event, groups, cpu, pmu) {
 		perf_remove_from_context(event, 0);
 		put_pmu_ctx(event->pmu_ctx);
 		list_add(&event->migrate_entry, events);
-
-		for_each_sibling_event(sibling, event) {
-			perf_remove_from_context(sibling, 0);
-			put_pmu_ctx(sibling->pmu_ctx);
-			list_add(&sibling->migrate_entry, events);
-		}
 	}
 }
 
@@ -13191,8 +13186,7 @@ void perf_pmu_migrate_context(struct pmu *pmu, int src_cpu, int dst_cpu)
 	 */
 	mutex_lock_double(&src_ctx->mutex, &dst_ctx->mutex);
 
-	__perf_pmu_remove(src_ctx, src_cpu, pmu, &src_ctx->pinned_groups, &events);
-	__perf_pmu_remove(src_ctx, src_cpu, pmu, &src_ctx->flexible_groups, &events);
+	__perf_pmu_remove(src_ctx, pmu, &events);
 
 	if (!list_empty(&events)) {
 		/*
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 041/168] autofs: ignore notification errors from a replaced pipe

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sung Byeongchan <tjdqudcks0424@naver.com>

commit 65676cd4203c0e41a94caf54080a7f0a95434bda upstream.

autofs_notify_daemon() takes a reference to the current notification
pipe under wq_mutex, then drops the mutex before writing the request. The
write can block while the daemon enters catatonic mode and installs a
replacement pipe.

If the old pipe's reader is then closed, the delayed write returns -EPIPE
and the generic error path enters catatonic mode again. That transition
acts on the current superblock state, closes the replacement pipe, and
releases the new daemon generation's wait queues.

Only enter catatonic mode when the pipe which failed is still the current
pipe. Factor the already-locked transition so the identity check and state
change are atomic with respect to another replacement.

This was reproduced on v7.3-rc5-337-gff47652a4b66c in a local QEMU guest.
An unprivileged UID 65534 lookup filled the old packet pipe before a
normal CATATONIC/SETPIPEFD restart. On the unmodified kernel, the new pipe
received HUP and both a pending victim lookup and a later lookup failed
with ENOENT in two out of two fresh-mount runs.

With this change, the new pipe remained active, received an intact
304-byte request, and both victim lookups completed in two out of two
runs. Normal lookup and restart-without-a-blocked-writer controls passed.
No KASAN, oops, refcount, or lock diagnostic was observed. A source
reproducer and complete local logs are available privately on request.

The demonstrated impact is limited to denial of a shared autofs service
during a legitimate daemon restart. No memory corruption, information leak,
privilege escalation, or code execution primitive was observed.

Fixes: 8d7b48e0bc5fa ("autofs4: add miscellaneous device for ioctls")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sung Byeongchan <tjdqudcks0424@naver.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261007173542.593624-1-tjdqudcks0424@naver.com
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/autofs/waitq.c |   25 +++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/autofs/waitq.c
+++ b/fs/autofs/waitq.c
@@ -12,15 +12,13 @@
  */
 static autofs_wqt_t autofs_next_wait_queue = 1;
 
-void autofs_catatonic_mode(struct autofs_sb_info *sbi)
+static void autofs_catatonic_mode_locked(struct autofs_sb_info *sbi)
 {
 	struct autofs_wait_queue *wq, *nwq;
 
-	mutex_lock(&sbi->wq_mutex);
-	if (sbi->flags & AUTOFS_SBI_CATATONIC) {
-		mutex_unlock(&sbi->wq_mutex);
+	lockdep_assert_held(&sbi->wq_mutex);
+	if (sbi->flags & AUTOFS_SBI_CATATONIC)
 		return;
-	}
 
 	pr_debug("entering catatonic mode\n");
 
@@ -40,6 +38,21 @@ void autofs_catatonic_mode(struct autofs
 	fput(sbi->pipe);	/* Close the pipe */
 	sbi->pipe = NULL;
 	sbi->pipefd = -1;
+}
+
+void autofs_catatonic_mode(struct autofs_sb_info *sbi)
+{
+	mutex_lock(&sbi->wq_mutex);
+	autofs_catatonic_mode_locked(sbi);
+	mutex_unlock(&sbi->wq_mutex);
+}
+
+static void autofs_catatonic_mode_for_pipe(struct autofs_sb_info *sbi,
+					   struct file *pipe)
+{
+	mutex_lock(&sbi->wq_mutex);
+	if (sbi->pipe == pipe)
+		autofs_catatonic_mode_locked(sbi);
 	mutex_unlock(&sbi->wq_mutex);
 }
 
@@ -170,7 +183,7 @@ static void autofs_notify_daemon(struct
 		autofs_wait_release(sbi, wq->wait_queue_token, ret);
 		break;
 	default:
-		autofs_catatonic_mode(sbi);
+		autofs_catatonic_mode_for_pipe(sbi, pipe);
 		break;
 	}
 	fput(pipe);

[PATCH 6.6 042/168] unicode: free the map after a grace period

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>

commit a96c5299bd7305eb984377681eb3222a57376405 upstream.

generic_ci_d_hash() and generic_ci_d_compare() read sb->s_encoding and
dereference the unicode map while a pathwalk in rcu mode holds nothing
but rcu_read_lock(). The filesystems that use them, ext4, f2fs and
tmpfs, drop the map with utf8_unload() from ->put_super(), which runs
when the last reference to the mount goes away. A lookup that is still
inside such a filesystem at that point reads a freed map.

With a pathwalk held up in utf8_casefold_hash() while the last reference
to a casefolded tmpfs goes away:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in utf8nlookup+0x74c/0x950
  Read of size 8 at addr ff110001030fe658 by task walker/98
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   utf8nlookup+0x74c/0x950
   utf8byte+0x160/0x1560
   utf8_casefold_hash+0x167/0x230
   generic_ci_d_hash+0xdd/0x1c0
   link_path_walk+0x11ad/0x1d30
   path_lookupat+0x63/0xb00
   filename_lookup+0x1f1/0x5b0
   vfs_statx+0xd7/0x3b0
  [...]
  Allocated by task 94:
   __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x249/0x560
   utf8_load+0x4e/0x570
   shmem_parse_opt_casefold.isra.0+0x92/0x270
  [...]
  Freed by task 97:
   kfree+0x1db/0x5b0
   shmem_put_super+0x72/0x170
   generic_shutdown_super+0x14c/0x530
   kill_anon_super+0x3a/0x60
   deactivate_locked_super+0x9c/0xf0
   cleanup_mnt+0x9f/0x130

So far that has been hard to hit. umount(2) waits for a grace period
in namespace_unlock() before it drops the mount, so only a mount whose
last reference goes away elsewhere, like the close of a file or a chdir
out of a lazily unmounted directory, can race a walker. So it is
reachable.

Delay the free until a grace period has passed. The map and the data
table it holds a reference to then outlive any pathwalk that found the
superblock before the mount went away. The reference on the data table
module is dropped from the rcu callback as well. utf8-core is built in
whenever CONFIG_UNICODE is set, so there is no module exit that would
have to wait for the callbacks.

Overlayfs points the s_encoding of an overlay at the map of its first
layer without taking a reference of its own. That stays correct. The
layer is held by the overlay, so its map is dropped only after the
overlay is gone.

Fixes: b886ee3e778e ("ext4: Support case-insensitive file name lookups")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261009-work-fixes-rcu-v1-6-7446d2d335e6@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/unicode/utf8-core.c  |   21 +++++++++++++++++----
 include/linux/unicode.h |    1 +
 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/unicode/utf8-core.c
+++ b/fs/unicode/utf8-core.c
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
 #include <linux/parser.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/stringhash.h>
@@ -205,12 +206,24 @@ out_free_um:
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(utf8_load);
 
+static void utf8_unload_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+	struct unicode_map *um = container_of(head, struct unicode_map, rcu);
+
+	symbol_put(utf8_data_table);
+	kfree(um);
+}
+
+/*
+ * A pathwalk in rcu mode may still be in ->d_hash() or ->d_compare() of a
+ * filesystem that is being torn down and read the map through its
+ * superblock, so the map and the tables it points to have to outlive the
+ * grace period.
+ */
 void utf8_unload(struct unicode_map *um)
 {
-	if (um) {
-		symbol_put(utf8_data_table);
-		kfree(um);
-	}
+	if (um)
+		call_rcu(&um->rcu, utf8_unload_rcu);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(utf8_unload);
 
--- a/include/linux/unicode.h
+++ b/include/linux/unicode.h
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ struct unicode_map {
 	unsigned int version;
 	const struct utf8data *ntab[UTF8_NMAX];
 	const struct utf8data_table *tables;
+	struct rcu_head rcu;
 };
 
 int utf8_validate(const struct unicode_map *um, const struct qstr *str);

[PATCH 6.6 043/168] KVM: nVMX: Reset MMU back to the root MMU if loading L2 state fails for !VM-Entry

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Amirmohammad Eftekhar <amirmohammadeftekhar@gmail.com>

commit c8f4cfe1cf93bce924e27f2abead7a4c4a487505 upstream.

Reset the vCPU's MMU pointer back to the root MMU if loading L2 state fails
in the "not from VM-Entry" case, i.e. when emulating RSM or handling
KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE.  Failure to unwind the MMU pointer results in KVM
trying to run L1 with a nested MMU, and is especially problematic if the
vCPU manages to free its nested state before the VM crashes.  Constructing
the root for a nested EPT MMU goes through vmcs12, which is dynamically
allocated/freed when nVMX is enabled/disabled.  And so if the nested state
is freed with the MMU still pointing at the nested MMU, KVM will hit a NULL
pointer deref when attempting to get L1=>L2 EPTP.

  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000078
  #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
  PGD 114a2d067 P4D 111743067 PUD 11141f067 PMD 0
  Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
  CPU: 20 UID: 1000 PID: 1272 Comm: nested_tdp_faul Not tainted 7.3.0-rc4-8c89f11d1a99b-sink-vm #1914 PREEMPTLAZY
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  RIP: 0010:nested_ept_get_eptp+0xb/0x10 [kvm_intel]
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   kvm_mmu_load+0xcd/0x870 [kvm]
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x18f5/0x1f80 [kvm]
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2c7/0x970 [kvm]
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x90/0xd0
   do_syscall_64+0x9c/0x4d0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
  RIP: 0033:0x47491b
   </TASK>
  Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
  CR2: 0000000000000078
  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
  RIP: 0010:nested_ept_get_eptp+0xb/0x10 [kvm_intel]

Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Fixes: 72e9cbdb4338 ("KVM: nVMX: fix SMI injection in guest mode")
Fixes: 8fcc4b5923af ("kvm: nVMX: Introduce KVM_CAP_NESTED_STATE")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Amirmohammad Eftekhar <amirmohammadeftekhar@gmail.com>
[sean: write changelog]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261001214356.3825100-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
@@ -3568,8 +3568,10 @@ vmentry_fail_vmexit_guest_mode:
 vmentry_fail_vmexit:
 	vmx_switch_vmcs(vcpu, &vmx->vmcs01);
 
-	if (!from_vmentry)
+	if (!from_vmentry) {
+		nested_ept_uninit_mmu_context(vcpu);
 		return NVMX_VMENTRY_VMEXIT;
+	}
 
 	kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, &vmx->nested.apic_access_page_map, false);
 	kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, &vmx->nested.virtual_apic_map, true);

[PATCH 6.6 044/168] fsnotify: prevent mark additions during connector teardown

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>

commit 36ebddca56b9d8993d6dc984fdecc748ee1f5e06 upstream.

fsnotify_destroy_marks() keeps a reference to its current mark while it
drops conn->lock to destroy the mark. This stabilizes the forward-walk
cursor, but does not prevent a new mark from being inserted before it.
For example, an inotify watch re-added after IN_IGNORED sorts before the
old, detached mark for the same group. The walk can miss the replacement
and then detach the entire connector from the object.

The replacement is still on its group's marks_list and, for inotify, in
the watch IDR. The group mutex no longer protects the connector's object
from disappearing. An unprivileged fdinfo read racing the final detach
can consequently call igrab(NULL):

  BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in igrab+0x24/0x100
  Write of size 4 at addr 0000000000000148
  Call Trace:
   igrab+0x24/0x100
   inotify_show_fdinfo+0x1dc/0x5e0
   seq_show+0x397/0x690

Set a DESTROYING flag under conn->lock before starting the walk, and
reject new marks on that connector with -ENOENT. The existing add-mark
error paths undo the temporary group-list entry and the backend's watch
allocation. Do not wait for teardown while holding the group mutex,
which the destroyer needs. Once the old connector is detached, an add
can install a fresh connector as before.

This closes the insertion race for all object types using the common
connector teardown, without changing the mark reference or SRCU lifetime
rules.

Fixes: 6b3f05d24d35 ("fsnotify: Detach mark from object list when last reference is dropped")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/notify/mark.c                 |   11 +++++++++++
 include/linux/fsnotify_backend.h |    1 +
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/notify/mark.c
+++ b/fs/notify/mark.c
@@ -719,6 +719,11 @@ restart:
 		goto out_err;
 	}
 
+	if (conn->flags & FSNOTIFY_CONN_FLAG_DESTROYING) {
+		err = -ENOENT;
+		goto out_err;
+	}
+
 	/* is mark the first mark? */
 	if (hlist_empty(&conn->list)) {
 		hlist_add_head_rcu(&mark->obj_list, &conn->list);
@@ -902,6 +907,12 @@ void fsnotify_destroy_marks(fsnotify_con
 	if (!conn)
 		return;
 	/*
+	 * New marks could be inserted before our cursor and survive the final
+	 * detachment of the connector from the object. Prevent additions to
+	 * this connector before dropping its lock.
+	 */
+	conn->flags |= FSNOTIFY_CONN_FLAG_DESTROYING;
+	/*
 	 * We have to be careful since we can race with e.g.
 	 * fsnotify_clear_marks_by_group() and once we drop the conn->lock, the
 	 * list can get modified. However we are holding mark reference and
--- a/include/linux/fsnotify_backend.h
+++ b/include/linux/fsnotify_backend.h
@@ -474,6 +474,7 @@ struct fsnotify_mark_connector {
 	unsigned short type;	/* Type of object [lock] */
 #define FSNOTIFY_CONN_FLAG_HAS_FSID	0x01
 #define FSNOTIFY_CONN_FLAG_HAS_IREF	0x02
+#define FSNOTIFY_CONN_FLAG_DESTROYING	0x04
 	unsigned short flags;	/* flags [lock] */
 	__kernel_fsid_t fsid;	/* fsid of filesystem containing object */
 	union {

[PATCH 6.6 045/168] eventfs: Free the eventfs_inode after an rcu grace period too

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>

commit 2cd88c498ecff8e22bf4c397b8eb226db70ac343 upstream.

tracefs_d_revalidate() reads ->is_freed of the eventfs_inode that
dentry->d_fsdata points to, and ->d_revalidate() is called in rcu
pathwalk mode with nothing but rcu_read_lock() held. The dentry itself
stays around for such a walker, but tracefs_d_release() drops its
reference to the eventfs_inode when the dentry is killed, and
release_ei() then frees it after a grace period of eventfs_srcu. An
SRCU grace period doesn't wait for rcu_read_lock() sections, so the
walker can read an eventfs_inode that is already gone.

With a pathwalk held up in tracefs_d_revalidate() while the dentry goes
away:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tracefs_d_revalidate+0x76/0x90
  Read of size 1 at addr ff1100010152d8d0 by task walker/97
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   tracefs_d_revalidate+0x76/0x90
   lookup_fast+0x320/0x640
   path_lookupat+0x160/0xb00
   filename_lookup+0x1f1/0x5b0
   vfs_statx+0xd7/0x3b0
   vfs_fstatat+0x4d/0x90
   __do_sys_newfstatat+0xa0/0x100
   do_syscall_64+0x10e/0x5e0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
  [...]
  Allocated by task 1:
   __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x249/0x560
   eventfs_create_dir+0x7a/0x590
   event_create_dir+0x2fb/0xcf0
   trace_add_event_call+0xbf/0x150
  [...]
  Freed by task 11:
   kfree+0x1db/0x5b0
   srcu_invoke_callbacks+0x3a3/0x620
   process_one_work+0x937/0x1810
   worker_thread+0x4f1/0xd60

Before commit 8e556432477e ("eventfs: Use SRCU for freeing
eventfs_inodes") release_ei() used call_rcu(), which covered the walker,
while eventfs_iterate() needs the SRCU grace period. Wait for both and
chain call_rcu() from the SRCU callback.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 8e556432477e ("eventfs: Use SRCU for freeing eventfs_inodes")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261009-work-fixes-rcu-v1-4-7446d2d335e6@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/tracefs/event_inode.c |   10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/tracefs/event_inode.c
+++ b/fs/tracefs/event_inode.c
@@ -92,6 +92,14 @@ static void free_ei_rcu(struct rcu_head
 	}
 }
 
+/* read under eventfs_srcu and, by tracefs_d_revalidate(), in rcu pathwalk */
+static void free_ei_srcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
+{
+	struct eventfs_inode *ei = container_of(rcu, struct eventfs_inode, rcu);
+
+	call_rcu(&ei->rcu, free_ei_rcu);
+}
+
 /*
  * eventfs_inode reference count management.
  *
@@ -113,7 +121,7 @@ static void release_ei(struct kref *ref)
 			entry->release(entry->name, ei->data);
 	}
 
-	call_srcu(&eventfs_srcu, &ei->rcu, free_ei_rcu);
+	call_srcu(&eventfs_srcu, &ei->rcu, free_ei_srcu);
 }
 
 static inline void put_ei(struct eventfs_inode *ei)

[PATCH 6.6 046/168] net/sched: fix use-after-free in __tcf_action_put()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jérémy Jean <Jeremy.Jean@oss.cyber.gouv.fr>

commit 7b16eb911091aae237a8673da94e4dfb9cd21d54 upstream.

__tcf_action_put() decrements the reference count before decrementing the
binding count. Another thread can free the action between these operations,
causing the binding-count update to access freed memory. KASAN reports it
as:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __tcf_action_put+0x327/0x340
  Write of size 4 at addr ff11000000d46420 by task tc-put-pause/64

Hold the action IDR mutex across both counter updates and IDR removal,
keeping cleanup outside the lock.

Fixes: 16af6067392c ("net: sched: implement reference counted action release")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Jérémy Jean <Jeremy.Jean@oss.cyber.gouv.fr>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261008181348.527035-2-Jeremy.Jean@oss.cyber.gouv.fr
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/sched/act_api.c |   11 +++++------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/net/sched/act_api.c
+++ b/net/sched/act_api.c
@@ -372,9 +372,10 @@ static int __tcf_action_put(struct tc_ac
 {
 	struct tcf_idrinfo *idrinfo = p->idrinfo;
 
-	if (refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock(&p->tcfa_refcnt, &idrinfo->lock)) {
-		if (bind)
-			atomic_dec(&p->tcfa_bindcnt);
+	mutex_lock(&idrinfo->lock);
+	if (bind)
+		atomic_dec(&p->tcfa_bindcnt);
+	if (refcount_dec_and_test(&p->tcfa_refcnt)) {
 		idr_remove(&idrinfo->action_idr, p->tcfa_index);
 		mutex_unlock(&idrinfo->lock);
 
@@ -382,9 +383,7 @@ static int __tcf_action_put(struct tc_ac
 		return 1;
 	}
 
-	if (bind)
-		atomic_dec(&p->tcfa_bindcnt);
-
+	mutex_unlock(&idrinfo->lock);
 	return 0;
 }
 

[PATCH 6.6 047/168] net: rds: fix uninitialized trans dereference in CM event handler

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Aohan Mei <henrymei@tencent.com>

commit 492ba6ac1b1ffb8a06ff52db0825c1af2cdb28c8 upstream.

rds_rdma_cm_event_handler_cmn() assigns trans only when the RDMA
device is an InfiniBand CA (RDMA_NODE_IB_CA).  On any other device
type, e.g. an iWARP RNIC such as siw, trans stays uninitialized, but
the event switch dereferences it: unconditionally in the
RDMA_CM_EVENT_CONNECT_REQUEST case via trans->cm_handle_connect(),
and (with a connection context) in the ROUTE_RESOLVED and
ESTABLISHED cases.

An RDS listener on an iWARP device therefore crashes the kernel as
soon as a connect request arrives: with CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO
the wild load becomes a NULL dereference at offset 0xa0
(&trans->cm_handle_connect) in the iw_cm_wq workqueue.

GCC masks the bug in default builds by folding the uninitialized
load into &rds_ib_transport; Clang-built kernels take the real
uninitialized path and oops.

The active side can land on a non-IB device too: the id that
rds_ib_conn_path_connect() creates is not restricted to a node type,
so rdma_resolve_addr() binds it to whichever device serves the local
address, and an iWARP RNIC on the same netdev qualifies.  The crash
there is different: resolving a route on an iWARP id never fills in
cm_id->route.path_rec, and the ROUTE_RESOLVED case writes
path_rec[0].sl before it calls into the transport.

The iWARP transport was dropped long ago and IB is the only
transport left, so make that explicit: initialize trans to
&rds_ib_transport at declaration, drop the conditional assignment,
reject a connect request that arrives on a non-IB device, and drop a
connection whose address resolved to one instead of resolving a
route on it.  The rejection is limited to RDMA_CM_EVENT_CONNECT_REQUEST
on purpose: a non-zero return from the handler makes rdma_cm destroy
the id the event was delivered on, which is right for the request's
freshly created id but would free a connection id that RDS still owns
for any other event.  On the active side the id stays ic->i_cm_id and
the connection's shutdown destroys it, so that case returns 0.

Fixes: dcdede0406d3 ("RDS: Drop stale iWARP RDMA transport")
Reported-by: TencentOS Corvus AI <corvus@tencent.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20260824111701.2979194-1-ljp1205831794@gmail.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20260825021223.3483044-1-ljp1205831794@gmail.com/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: CodeBuddy:Kimi-K3
Signed-off-by: Aohan Mei <henrymei@tencent.com>
[achender: reject only on RDMA_CM_EVENT_CONNECT_REQUEST instead of
 bailing out for every event on a non-IB device, so that rdma_cm does
 not destroy connection ids RDS still tracks; drop a connection whose
 address resolved to a non-IB device before a route is resolved on it;
 changelog adjusted]
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Allison Henderson <achender@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261003163408.250568-2-achender@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/rds/rdma_transport.c |   26 ++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/net/rds/rdma_transport.c
+++ b/net/rds/rdma_transport.c
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ static int rds_rdma_cm_event_handler_cmn
 {
 	/* this can be null in the listening path */
 	struct rds_connection *conn = cm_id->context;
-	struct rds_transport *trans;
+	struct rds_transport *trans = &rds_ib_transport;
 	int ret = 0;
 	int *err;
 	u8 len;
@@ -60,9 +60,6 @@ static int rds_rdma_cm_event_handler_cmn
 	rdsdebug("conn %p id %p handling event %u (%s)\n", conn, cm_id,
 		 event->event, rdma_event_msg(event->event));
 
-	if (cm_id->device->node_type == RDMA_NODE_IB_CA)
-		trans = &rds_ib_transport;
-
 	/* Prevent shutdown from tearing down the connection
 	 * while we're executing. */
 	if (conn) {
@@ -82,11 +79,32 @@ static int rds_rdma_cm_event_handler_cmn
 
 	switch (event->event) {
 	case RDMA_CM_EVENT_CONNECT_REQUEST:
+		/* Only the IB transport is supported, but RDS listens on
+		 * every RDMA device: reject a request that arrived on any
+		 * other kind.  A non-zero return has rdma_cm destroy the
+		 * request's id, which is what we want here and only here.
+		 */
+		if (cm_id->device->node_type != RDMA_NODE_IB_CA) {
+			ret = 1;
+			break;
+		}
 		ret = trans->cm_handle_connect(cm_id, event, isv6);
 		break;
 
 	case RDMA_CM_EVENT_ADDR_RESOLVED:
 		if (conn) {
+			/* The address resolved to a device RDS has no
+			 * transport for.  Do not go on to resolve a route:
+			 * an iWARP route leaves cm_id->route.path_rec
+			 * unset, which the ROUTE_RESOLVED case below
+			 * dereferences.  Drop the connection instead; the
+			 * id is still ic->i_cm_id, so return 0 and let the
+			 * shutdown destroy it.
+			 */
+			if (cm_id->device->node_type != RDMA_NODE_IB_CA) {
+				rds_conn_drop(conn);
+				break;
+			}
 			rdma_set_service_type(cm_id, conn->c_tos);
 			rdma_set_min_rnr_timer(cm_id, IB_RNR_TIMER_000_32);
 			ret = rdma_resolve_route(cm_id,

[PATCH 6.6 048/168] pinctrl: amd: Clear S4 wake bits when firmware has _AEI

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>

commit 1cca81a683da7f0ef2fbaf34442376044cbbad22 upstream.

Commit ffe8a0c6b552 ("pinctrl-amd: Don't clear S4 wake bits at probe")
preserves firmware-programmed S4 wake sources because some PCIe devices
rely on them for Wake-on-LAN. The system that motivated that change does
not expose ACPI GPIO events through _AEI.

On a Chuwi CoreBook Plus, firmware exposes _AEI but also leaves the S4/S5
wake bit set for GPIO 24. This causes the machine to power back on
immediately after shutdown even though Wake-on-LAN is not enabled.

GPIO register dumps show that the only relevant difference is bit 15 on
GPIO 24. Clearing that bit makes the machine remain off. GPIO 24 is not
itself listed in _AEI, so _AEI is not a per-pin indication of which pins
the OS manages; it is a platform level signal of which wake model the
firmware follows.

Use that signal to decide what to clear. Continue clearing S0i3/S3 bits on
every system. Clear S4 bits when firmware exposes _AEI, indicating that the
platform hands GPIO events to the OS, but preserve S4 bits when _AEI is
absent so that firmware-programmed sources such as PCIe PME that bypass the
GPIO IRQ wake API keep working.

A platform that exposes _AEI for some pins while routing a wake capable
device through a raw GPIO not listed in _AEI would lose that wake source
unless firmware re-arms it during the sleep transition. No such system has
been reported.

Fixes: ffe8a0c6b552 ("pinctrl-amd: Don't clear S4 wake bits at probe")
Reported-by: Olzhas Marat <marat.olzhas@gmail.com>
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=222041
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Olzhas Marat <marat.olzhas@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Shyam Sundar S K <Shyam-sundar.S-k@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linusw@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-amd.c |    9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-amd.c
+++ b/drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-amd.c
@@ -871,6 +871,15 @@ static void amd_gpio_irq_init(struct amd
 
 	mask = BIT(WAKE_CNTRL_OFF_S0I3) | BIT(WAKE_CNTRL_OFF_S3);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
+	/*
+	 * Platforms without _AEI leave GPIO wake sources to firmware, so
+	 * preserve their S4 wake bits.
+	 */
+	if (acpi_has_method(ACPI_HANDLE(&gpio_dev->pdev->dev), "_AEI"))
+		mask |= BIT(WAKE_CNTRL_OFF_S4);
+#endif
+
 	for (i = 0; i < desc->npins; i++) {
 		int pin = desc->pins[i].number;
 		const struct pin_desc *pd = pin_desc_get(gpio_dev->pctrl, pin);

[PATCH 6.6 049/168] sctp: revalidate output stream after association connect wait

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Daehyeon Ko <4ncienth@gmail.com>

commit b7ad72414c673ce1fa1f463e807cd4f34f8be9bf upstream.

When message interleaving is enabled, the first send waits for association
establishment before building its data chunks.  The wait drops the socket
lock, and handshake processing can reduce the output stream count to the
peer-advertised inbound stream count.  sctp_stream_init() then frees the
extension of every removed stream.

The sender resumes with the stream that it checked before the wait.  If the
peer removed that stream, sctp_outq_tail() later dereferences its NULL
extension.  Fatal-oops policies then panic the host.

KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x38-0x3f]
RIP: sctp_outq_tail+0x49e/0xaa0
Call Trace:
 sctp_primitive_SEND
 sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc
 sctp_sendmsg

A range check alone is insufficient.  Stream reconfiguration can grow the
output count again while the lock is released without recreating extensions
freed by the earlier shrink.  The stream can then be in range while its
extension remains NULL.  The send-buffer wait has the same issue.

Factor the range and extension checks into a helper and repeat both after
each send-path wait that drops the socket lock.  Once the lock is
reacquired, the validation remains stable through data creation and
queueing.

If validation fails after the connect wait, the auto-created association is
already established.  Return ESRCH so the existing caller path keeps it
under state-machine ownership instead of freeing it directly, which would
leave protocol, counter and socket state inconsistent.

Fixes: 668c9beb9020 ("sctp: implement assign_number for sctp_stream_interleave")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Daehyeon Ko <4ncienth@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261007035739.3472432-1-4ncienth@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/sctp/socket.c |   33 +++++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -1785,6 +1785,18 @@ static int sctp_sendmsg_check_sflags(str
 	return 1;
 }
 
+static int sctp_sendmsg_check_stream(struct sctp_association *asoc,
+				     struct sctp_sndrcvinfo *sinfo)
+{
+	if (unlikely(sinfo->sinfo_stream >= asoc->stream.outcnt))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (unlikely(!SCTP_SO(&asoc->stream, sinfo->sinfo_stream)->ext))
+		return sctp_stream_init_ext(&asoc->stream, sinfo->sinfo_stream);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc(struct sctp_association *asoc,
 				struct msghdr *msg, size_t msg_len,
 				struct sctp_transport *transport,
@@ -1799,16 +1811,9 @@ static int sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc(struct s
 	long timeo;
 	int err;
 
-	if (sinfo->sinfo_stream >= asoc->stream.outcnt) {
-		err = -EINVAL;
+	err = sctp_sendmsg_check_stream(asoc, sinfo);
+	if (err)
 		goto err;
-	}
-
-	if (unlikely(!SCTP_SO(&asoc->stream, sinfo->sinfo_stream)->ext)) {
-		err = sctp_stream_init_ext(&asoc->stream, sinfo->sinfo_stream);
-		if (err)
-			goto err;
-	}
 
 	if (sp->disable_fragments && msg_len > asoc->frag_point) {
 		err = -EMSGSIZE;
@@ -1829,10 +1834,9 @@ static int sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc(struct s
 		err = sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(asoc, transport, &timeo, msg_len);
 		if (err)
 			goto err;
-		if (unlikely(sinfo->sinfo_stream >= asoc->stream.outcnt)) {
-			err = -EINVAL;
+		err = sctp_sendmsg_check_stream(asoc, sinfo);
+		if (err)
 			goto err;
-		}
 	}
 
 	if (sctp_state(asoc, CLOSED)) {
@@ -1847,6 +1851,11 @@ static int sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc(struct s
 				err = -ESRCH;
 				goto err;
 			}
+			err = sctp_sendmsg_check_stream(asoc, sinfo);
+			if (err) {
+				err = -ESRCH;
+				goto err;
+			}
 		} else {
 			wait_connect = true;
 		}

[PATCH 6.6 050/168] tools: gpio: fix building from the top level with O=

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 52336337f1a01ad803c7f3ddb23f40222e9ad58d upstream.

"make O=<dir> tools/gpio" fails:

  Makefile:27: /tools/build/Makefile.include: No such file or directory

tools/Makefile clears srctree, and the gpio Makefile only works it out
again when building_out_of_srctree is not set, which the top-level
Makefile sets for O= builds.

Also work out srctree when it is empty, as tools/bpf/Makefile does
since commit a89b2cbf71d64 ("tools, bpf: Fix build for 'make -s
tools/bpf O=<dir>'").

Fixes: 4a6a6f5c4aeed ("tools: gpio: Use !building_out_of_srctree to determine srctree")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261011223358.2327625-5-sashal@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 tools/gpio/Makefile |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

--- a/tools/gpio/Makefile
+++ b/tools/gpio/Makefile
@@ -7,7 +7,13 @@ bindir ?= /usr/bin
 # isn't set and when invoked from selftests build, where srctree
 # is set to ".". building_out_of_srctree is undefined for in srctree
 # builds
+ifeq ($(srctree),)
+update_srctree := 1
+endif
 ifndef building_out_of_srctree
+update_srctree := 1
+endif
+ifeq ($(update_srctree),1)
 srctree := $(patsubst %/,%,$(dir $(CURDIR)))
 srctree := $(patsubst %/,%,$(dir $(srctree)))
 endif

[PATCH 6.6 051/168] tracing/histograms: Reject non-stacktrace fields for synthetic stacktrace fields

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>

commit a244c241593b5b38a08f0df2cb43c26574efbdcb upstream.

In check_synth_field(), when a synthetic event field is a stacktrace
(field->is_stack) and the histogram field is not a "long[" stacktrace
array, validation falls through to the generic size and signedness
comparison.

Because parse_synth_field() sets a stacktrace field's type to
"__data_loc unsigned long[]", its size is sizeof(u64) and
synth_field_signed() marks it as signed.  Consequently, any 8-byte
signed scalar histogram field passes the fallback check, and its scalar
value is subsequently dereferenced as a kernel stacktrace pointer in
get_field_size() and trace_stack().

Furthermore, checking strstr(hist_field->type, "long[") is insufficient
because tracepoint fields defined with __bitmask() or __rel_bitmask()
also have type "__data_loc unsigned long[]" or "__rel_loc unsigned
long[]", whilst create_hist_field() treats them as 4-byte scalar values
without HIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE.

Propagate HIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE to variable references and field
variables (whilst excluding variable aliases from per-element
stacktrace capture), and reject any mismatch between
HIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE and field->is_stack in check_synth_field().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 00cf3d672a9d ("tracing: Allow synthetic events to pass around stacktraces")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261013112449.1006088-1-lee@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c |   15 +++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c
@@ -2098,7 +2098,8 @@ static int init_var_ref(struct hist_fiel
 	ref_field->size = var_field->size;
 	ref_field->is_signed = var_field->is_signed;
 	ref_field->flags |= var_field->flags &
-		(HIST_FIELD_FL_TIMESTAMP | HIST_FIELD_FL_TIMESTAMP_USECS);
+		(HIST_FIELD_FL_TIMESTAMP | HIST_FIELD_FL_TIMESTAMP_USECS |
+		 HIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE);
 
 	if (system) {
 		ref_field->system = kstrdup(system, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -3286,6 +3287,7 @@ static struct field_var *create_field_va
 		ret =  -ENOMEM;
 		goto err;
 	}
+	var->flags |= val->flags & HIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE;
 
 	field_var->var = var;
 	field_var->val = val;
@@ -3904,7 +3906,10 @@ static int check_synth_field(struct synt
 	    && field->is_dynamic)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (strstr(hist_field->type, "long[") && field->is_stack)
+	if (!!(hist_field->flags & HIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE) != field->is_stack)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (field->is_stack)
 		return 0;
 
 	if (strcmp(field->type, hist_field->type) != 0) {
@@ -4443,7 +4448,8 @@ static int create_var_field(struct hist_
 	if (!ret && hist_data->fields[val_idx]->flags & HIST_FIELD_FL_EXECNAME)
 		update_var_execname(hist_data->fields[val_idx]);
 
-	if (!ret && hist_data->fields[val_idx]->flags &
+	if (!ret && !(hist_data->fields[val_idx]->flags & HIST_FIELD_FL_ALIAS) &&
+	    hist_data->fields[val_idx]->flags &
 	    (HIST_FIELD_FL_STRING | HIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE))
 		hist_data->fields[val_idx]->var_str_idx = hist_data->n_var_str++;
 
@@ -5185,7 +5191,8 @@ static void hist_trigger_elt_update(stru
 		if (hist_field->flags & HIST_FIELD_FL_VAR) {
 			var_idx = hist_field->var.idx;
 
-			if (hist_field->flags &
+			if (!(hist_field->flags & HIST_FIELD_FL_ALIAS) &&
+			    hist_field->flags &
 			    (HIST_FIELD_FL_STRING | HIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE)) {
 				unsigned int str_start, var_str_idx, idx;
 				char *str, *val_str;

[PATCH 6.6 052/168] i2c: qcom-cci: Fix HALT_ACK reset request being dropped

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Loic Poulain <loic.poulain@oss.qualcomm.com>

commit 195f3d74b5de98969dc4fad956393bb00787efd1 upstream.

A HALT_ACK interrupt indicates that the corresponding I2C master has
entered the halted state and must be reset before further operation.

The M0 and M1 HALT_ACK status bits may be asserted simultaneously in a
single interrupt. However, the interrupt handler currently overwrites
the reset mask when processing each HALT_ACK condition, causing the
first reset request to be lost if both events are reported together.

Accumulate reset requests instead of overwriting them so that both
masters are properly reset when M0 and M1 HALT_ACK events occur in the
same interrupt.

Fixes: e517526195de4 ("i2c: Add Qualcomm CCI I2C driver")
Signed-off-by: Loic Poulain <loic.poulain@oss.qualcomm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.8+
Reviewed-by: Konrad Dybcio <konrad.dybcio@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261012-cci-fixes-v1-1-8cd4eb1fc5f9@oss.qualcomm.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-qcom-cci.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-qcom-cci.c
+++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-qcom-cci.c
@@ -168,12 +168,12 @@ static irqreturn_t cci_isr(int irq, void
 	}
 
 	if (unlikely(val & CCI_IRQ_STATUS_0_I2C_M0_Q0Q1_HALT_ACK)) {
-		reset = CCI_RESET_CMD_M0_MASK;
+		reset |= CCI_RESET_CMD_M0_MASK;
 		ret = IRQ_HANDLED;
 	}
 
 	if (unlikely(val & CCI_IRQ_STATUS_0_I2C_M1_Q0Q1_HALT_ACK)) {
-		reset = CCI_RESET_CMD_M1_MASK;
+		reset |= CCI_RESET_CMD_M1_MASK;
 		ret = IRQ_HANDLED;
 	}
 

[PATCH 6.6 053/168] perf: Update cgroup time when rotating multiplexed events

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Antoine Huret <antoine.huret@bull.com>

commit e4c7c401c6b9174c0c893084fdaa6a84bd2520d7 upstream.

Since commit bd2756811766 ("perf: Rewrite core context handling"),
perf_rotate_context() only updates the context time before scheduling
out the flexible events. It no longer updates the cgroup time, which
ctx_sched_out() used to do.

Cgroup events take their times from the per-cpu cgroup clock, so
between two cgroup switches the rotations see a frozen clock. The
events rotated out lose the running time they accumulated, and the next
update, usually a read, credits the whole interval to the events that
happen to be on the PMU at that moment.

As a result, the time_running of multiplexed cgroup events is wrong,
and so are their scaled counts, as long as no other cgroup runs on the
CPU, e.g. a busy job alone on its CPUs. Counting cycles over one second
of a busy loop in a cgroup gives from half to several times the max
frequency of the CPU.

Update the cgroup time before rotating the CPU context, as was done
before the rewrite.

Fixes: bd2756811766 ("perf: Rewrite core context handling")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/PR3PR07MB69223331EED5BEBE150375B7849C2@PR3PR07MB6922.eurprd07.prod.outlook.com/
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5-5
Signed-off-by: Antoine Huret <antoine.huret@bull.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261015-perf-cgroup-rotation-time-v1-1-93e177dfee5d@bull.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/events/core.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -4363,6 +4363,7 @@ static bool perf_rotate_context(struct p
 
 	if (cpu_event) {
 		update_context_time(&cpuctx->ctx);
+		update_cgrp_time_from_cpuctx(cpuctx, false);
 		__pmu_ctx_sched_out(cpu_epc, EVENT_FLEXIBLE);
 		rotate_ctx(&cpuctx->ctx, cpu_event);
 		__pmu_ctx_sched_in(&cpuctx->ctx, pmu);

[PATCH 6.6 054/168] scsi: xen/scsifront: Check for a NULL shadow entry on a backend response

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yehyeong Lee <yhlee@isslab.korea.ac.kr>

commit 8c8222c255772713eb36cde695777a1fce224917 upstream.

scsifront_do_response() validates the rqid in a backend response against
VSCSIIF_MAX_REQS before using it to index info->shadow[], but then
dereferences the entry to test ->inflight without checking that the slot
is populated.  Shadow slots are NULL before a command is submitted (the
host private area is zeroed at allocation) and are reset to NULL in
_scsifront_put_rqid() once a request completes, so an in-range rqid that
does not correspond to an outstanding request makes the frontend
dereference a NULL pointer.

A malicious or buggy backend can thus crash the guest by returning a
response whose rqid is in range but not in flight -- for example a
spurious response before any command has been issued, or a duplicate of
one already completed.  The ring has only VSCSIIF_MAX_REQS (16) slots,
so before the first command every in-range rqid selects a NULL slot.

Reject a response whose shadow slot is not populated.

Fixes: 6d1c2f48f3fc ("xen/scsifront: harden driver against malicious backend")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Yehyeong Lee <yhlee@isslab.korea.ac.kr>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261005123555.253995-1-yhlee@isslab.korea.ac.kr
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen (Oracle) <mkp@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/scsi/xen-scsifront.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/drivers/scsi/xen-scsifront.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/xen-scsifront.c
@@ -367,6 +367,7 @@ static void scsifront_do_response(struct
 	struct vscsifrnt_shadow *shadow;
 
 	if (ring_rsp->rqid >= VSCSIIF_MAX_REQS ||
+	    !info->shadow[ring_rsp->rqid] ||
 	    !info->shadow[ring_rsp->rqid]->inflight) {
 		scsifront_set_error(info, "illegal rqid returned by backend!");
 		return;

[PATCH 6.6 055/168] scsi: libiscsi: Reject a negative task index from parse_pdu_itt

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yehyeong Lee <yhlee@isslab.korea.ac.kr>

commit 8ee2a09a1dbb257c9e828ad2497f8e4832dfb142 upstream.

A transport that implements parse_pdu_itt hands libiscsi an index taken
from the PDU, and both lookups bound it from above only:

      if (i >= session->cmds_max)

i and cmds_max are both int, so a negative index passes and
session->cmds[i] is read from before the array.

be2iscsi produces one. beiscsi_parse_pdu() assigns the raw tag,

      *index = (int)itt;

and beiscsi_complete_pdu() forwards an unsolicited NOP-In from the
hardware async ring without replacing its ITT, so the value is the
target's. It also reports the session's own age rather than the one in
the tag, which leaves the age comparison in iscsi_verify_itt() with
nothing to reject.

Bound the index from below in both lookups.

Fixes: bfead3b2cb46 ("[SCSI] be2iscsi: Adding msix and mcc_rings V3")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <michael.christie@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Yehyeong Lee <yhlee@isslab.korea.ac.kr>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261007015842.634893-2-yhlee@isslab.korea.ac.kr
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen (Oracle) <mkp@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/scsi/libiscsi.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/scsi/libiscsi.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/libiscsi.c
@@ -1191,7 +1191,7 @@ struct iscsi_task *iscsi_itt_to_task(str
 		session->tt->parse_pdu_itt(conn, itt, &i, NULL);
 	else
 		i = get_itt(itt);
-	if (i >= session->cmds_max)
+	if (i < 0 || i >= session->cmds_max)
 		return NULL;
 
 	return session->cmds[i];
@@ -1384,7 +1384,7 @@ int iscsi_verify_itt(struct iscsi_conn *
 		return ISCSI_ERR_BAD_ITT;
 	}
 
-	if (i >= session->cmds_max) {
+	if (i < 0 || i >= session->cmds_max) {
 		iscsi_conn_printk(KERN_ERR, conn,
 				  "received invalid itt index %u (max cmds "
 				   "%u.\n", i, session->cmds_max);

[PATCH 6.6 056/168] scsi: libiscsi: Validate the ITT reflected in a Reject PDU

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yehyeong Lee <yhlee@isslab.korea.ac.kr>

commit c5958c770b2a0ee492414e26b07da9164a0d1f5d upstream.

A Reject PDU carries a copy of the header it rejects, and
iscsi_handle_reject() takes the ITT out of that copy to find the task to
clean up:

      memcpy(&rejected_pdu, data, sizeof(struct iscsi_hdr));
      ...
      task = iscsi_itt_to_task(conn, rejected_pdu.itt);

That value is whatever the target put there. iscsi_itt_to_task() bounds
the index against cmds_max and checks nothing else, so any task in the
pool can be named, and iscsi_nop_out_rsp() then completes it.

An index that has never been used gives a NULL task->conn: the pool is
zeroed at session setup and conn is assigned only when a task is
allocated. If the task was used and returned, iscsi_complete_task() hits
its WARN_ON_ONCE(task->state == ISCSI_TASK_FREE) and the refcount
underflows. An in-flight SCSI command is completed as successful - a 1
MiB read returned 1048576 with none of its buffer written and no
warning.

Validate the reflected ITT the way iscsi_itt_to_ctask() validates a
command ITT, and require the task to be in flight and not a SCSI
command.

[    6.248477] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000c: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
[    6.249357] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000060-0x0000000000000067]
[    6.249951] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 7.2.0-rc5-ISCSI1-gf5098b6bae76 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
[    6.250718] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[    6.251616] RIP: 0010:iscsi_nop_out_rsp.constprop.0+0x46/0x160
[    6.252043] Code: c1 ea 03 48 83 ec 08 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 f5 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 6b 58 48 8d 7d 60 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 c0 00 00 00 48 8b 45 60 48 39 c3 74 50 48 b8 00
[    6.252813] RSP: 0018:ffff88806c907b80 EFLAGS: 00010206
[    6.253042] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88800607e000 RCX: ffffffff8d571a25
[    6.253345] RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: ffff88806c907c38 RDI: 0000000000000060
[    6.253642] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff235a504
[    6.253947] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 7463656e6e6f6320 R12: 0000000000000000
[    6.254251] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88806c907c38 R15: 0000000000000000
[    6.254549] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880d95bc000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[    6.254887] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[    6.255140] CR2: 00007fc393e8ffc0 CR3: 0000000005252006 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[    6.255439] PKRU: 55555554
[    6.255564] Call Trace:
[    6.255674]  <IRQ>
[    6.255768]  __iscsi_complete_pdu+0x18bf/0x22a0
[    6.256733]  iscsi_complete_pdu+0x54/0xa0
[    6.256905]  iscsi_tcp_data_recv_done+0xf4/0x250
[    6.257103]  iscsi_tcp_recv_skb+0x31e/0xec0
[    6.257680]  iscsi_sw_tcp_recv+0x12f/0x390
[    6.258061]  __tcp_read_sock+0x1ab/0x810
[    6.258853]  iscsi_sw_tcp_data_ready+0x18b/0x510
[    6.259808]  tcp_data_queue+0x1f13/0x4cd0
[    6.260567]  tcp_rcv_established+0x8a5/0x3a00
[    6.261931]  tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x449/0x960
[    6.262269]  tcp_v4_rcv+0x2245/0x3bc0

Fixes: 8afa1439fcff ("[SCSI] libiscsi: handle immediate command rejections")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <michael.christie@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Yehyeong Lee <yhlee@isslab.korea.ac.kr>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261007015842.634893-3-yhlee@isslab.korea.ac.kr
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen (Oracle) <mkp@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/scsi/libiscsi.c |    8 +++++---
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/scsi/libiscsi.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/libiscsi.c
@@ -1142,13 +1142,15 @@ static int iscsi_handle_reject(struct is
 			spin_unlock(&conn->session->frwd_lock);
 			spin_lock(&conn->session->back_lock);
 		} else {
-			struct iscsi_task *task;
+			struct iscsi_task *task = NULL;
 			/*
 			 * Our nop as ping got dropped. We know the target
 			 * and transport are ok so just clean up
 			 */
-			task = iscsi_itt_to_task(conn, rejected_pdu.itt);
-			if (!task) {
+			if (!iscsi_verify_itt(conn, rejected_pdu.itt))
+				task = iscsi_itt_to_task(conn, rejected_pdu.itt);
+			if (!task || task->state == ISCSI_TASK_FREE ||
+			    task->sc) {
 				iscsi_conn_printk(KERN_ERR, conn,
 						 "Invalid pdu reject. Could "
 						 "not lookup rejected task.\n");

[PATCH 6.6 057/168] scsi: libiscsi: Validate the task named by a management response

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yehyeong Lee <yhlee@isslab.korea.ac.kr>

commit 11bffcd9cb346732eab2914ef44fe777a3f0b585 upstream.

__iscsi_complete_pdu() fetches the task for five response types from one
place and checks only that the index resolved:

      case ISCSI_OP_LOGOUT_RSP:
      case ISCSI_OP_LOGIN_RSP:
      case ISCSI_OP_TEXT_RSP:
      case ISCSI_OP_SCSI_TMFUNC_RSP:
      case ISCSI_OP_NOOP_IN:
              task = iscsi_itt_to_task(conn, hdr->itt);
              if (!task)
                      return ISCSI_ERR_BAD_ITT;

iscsi_itt_to_task() bounds the index against cmds_max and looks at
nothing else, so a target can name any slot in the pool, including one
that has never been used. task->conn is then NULL, and both
iscsi_nop_out_rsp() and iscsi_complete_task() dereference it. One
unsolicited NOP-In is enough; a Text Response carrying the same ITT
crashes in iscsi_complete_task() instead.

Require the task to be in flight and not a SCSI command, the way
iscsi_itt_to_ctask() does for the command opcodes.

[    6.298634] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000c: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
[    6.298642] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000060-0x0000000000000067]
[    6.298652] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 111 Comm: iscsistart Not tainted 7.2.0-rc5-ISCSI1-gf5098b6bae76 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
[    6.298654] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[    6.298656] RIP: 0010:iscsi_nop_out_rsp.constprop.0+0x46/0x160
[    6.298691] Code: c1 ea 03 48 83 ec 08 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 f5 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 6b 58 48 8d 7d 60 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 c0 00 00 00 48 8b 45 60 48 39 c3 74 50 48 b8 00
[    6.298698] RSP: 0018:ffff88806c907be8 EFLAGS: 00010206
[    6.298701] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff888006116800 RCX: 0000000000000020
[    6.298702] RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: ffff88800525d578 RDI: 0000000000000060
[    6.298703] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[    6.298706] R10: 0000000000000020 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
[    6.298706] R13: 000000000000002e R14: ffff8880056eb440 R15: ffff888006116800
[    6.298707] FS:  00007fc02d1c2740(0000) GS:ffff8880b29bc000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[    6.298710] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[    6.298711] CR2: 000055fe3b56ddf8 CR3: 00000000053b9004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[    6.298712] PKRU: 55555554
[    6.298713] Call Trace:
[    6.298714]  <IRQ>
[    6.298714]  __iscsi_complete_pdu+0x13a8/0x22a0
[    6.298758]  iscsi_complete_pdu+0x54/0xa0
[    6.298759]  iscsi_tcp_hdr_recv_done+0x870/0x2c80
[    6.298778]  iscsi_tcp_recv_skb+0x31e/0xec0
[    6.298800]  iscsi_sw_tcp_recv+0x12f/0x390
[    6.298804]  __tcp_read_sock+0x1ab/0x810
[    6.298812]  iscsi_sw_tcp_data_ready+0x18b/0x510
[    6.298814]  tcp_rcv_established+0x1f56/0x3a00
[    6.298842]  tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x449/0x960
[    6.298847]  tcp_v4_rcv+0x2245/0x3bc0

Fixes: 7996a778ff8c ("[SCSI] iscsi: add libiscsi")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <michael.christie@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Yehyeong Lee <yhlee@isslab.korea.ac.kr>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261007015842.634893-4-yhlee@isslab.korea.ac.kr
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen (Oracle) <mkp@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/scsi/libiscsi.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/scsi/libiscsi.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/libiscsi.c
@@ -1286,7 +1286,7 @@ int __iscsi_complete_pdu(struct iscsi_co
 	case ISCSI_OP_SCSI_TMFUNC_RSP:
 	case ISCSI_OP_NOOP_IN:
 		task = iscsi_itt_to_task(conn, hdr->itt);
-		if (!task)
+		if (!task || task->state == ISCSI_TASK_FREE || task->sc)
 			return ISCSI_ERR_BAD_ITT;
 		break;
 	default:

[PATCH 6.6 058/168] drm/amdgpu/sdma3: Work around POLL_REGMEM / FENCE hang

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Timur Kristóf <timur.kristof@gmail.com>

commit 752480ad62964edf0254e151110d3e53a7cb37de upstream.

SDMA can randomly hang on Polaris 10. Hard to reproduce,
but has been occurring sporadically in the Mesa CI
on the RADV Polaris 10 job even when Mesa isn't using
the SDMA engine.

When Mesa actually uses the SDMA on Polaris, the hang
becomes more frequent and the reproduction rate goes up
significantly in the CI system.

We don't know why the hangs occur, but it seems
that inserting a single NOP packet before each
POLL_REGMEM and FENCE packet works around it.
At the moment it's unclear which GPUs are affected,
so let's apply this to SDMA 3.x for now.

Note that this issue is not documented or acknowledged by AMD.

Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Timur Kristóf <timur.kristof@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
(cherry picked from commit c343a27ed90823d08de125f7c447d96d056b75d9)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/sdma_v3_0.c |   25 +++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/sdma_v3_0.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/sdma_v3_0.c
@@ -454,6 +454,9 @@ static void sdma_v3_0_ring_emit_hdp_flus
 	else
 		ref_and_mask = REG_SET_FIELD(ref_and_mask, GPU_HDP_FLUSH_DONE, SDMA1, 1);
 
+	/* Hang workaround */
+	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, SDMA_PKT_NOP_HEADER_OP(SDMA_OP_NOP));
+
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, SDMA_PKT_HEADER_OP(SDMA_OP_POLL_REGMEM) |
 			  SDMA_PKT_POLL_REGMEM_HEADER_HDP_FLUSH(1) |
 			  SDMA_PKT_POLL_REGMEM_HEADER_FUNC(3)); /* == */
@@ -481,6 +484,10 @@ static void sdma_v3_0_ring_emit_fence(st
 				      unsigned flags)
 {
 	bool write64bit = flags & AMDGPU_FENCE_FLAG_64BIT;
+
+	/* Hang workaround */
+	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, SDMA_PKT_NOP_HEADER_OP(SDMA_OP_NOP));
+
 	/* write the fence */
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, SDMA_PKT_HEADER_OP(SDMA_OP_FENCE));
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, lower_32_bits(addr));
@@ -489,7 +496,11 @@ static void sdma_v3_0_ring_emit_fence(st
 
 	/* optionally write high bits as well */
 	if (write64bit) {
+		/* Hang workaround */
+		amdgpu_ring_write(ring, SDMA_PKT_NOP_HEADER_OP(SDMA_OP_NOP));
+
 		addr += 4;
+
 		amdgpu_ring_write(ring, SDMA_PKT_HEADER_OP(SDMA_OP_FENCE));
 		amdgpu_ring_write(ring, lower_32_bits(addr));
 		amdgpu_ring_write(ring, upper_32_bits(addr));
@@ -1035,6 +1046,9 @@ static void sdma_v3_0_ring_emit_pipeline
 	uint32_t seq = ring->fence_drv.sync_seq;
 	uint64_t addr = ring->fence_drv.gpu_addr;
 
+	/* Hang workaround */
+	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, SDMA_PKT_NOP_HEADER_OP(SDMA_OP_NOP));
+
 	/* wait for idle */
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, SDMA_PKT_HEADER_OP(SDMA_OP_POLL_REGMEM) |
 			  SDMA_PKT_POLL_REGMEM_HEADER_HDP_FLUSH(0) |
@@ -1063,6 +1077,9 @@ static void sdma_v3_0_ring_emit_vm_flush
 {
 	amdgpu_gmc_emit_flush_gpu_tlb(ring, vmid, pd_addr);
 
+	/* Hang workaround */
+	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, SDMA_PKT_NOP_HEADER_OP(SDMA_OP_NOP));
+
 	/* wait for flush */
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, SDMA_PKT_HEADER_OP(SDMA_OP_POLL_REGMEM) |
 			  SDMA_PKT_POLL_REGMEM_HEADER_HDP_FLUSH(0) |
@@ -1571,11 +1588,11 @@ static const struct amdgpu_ring_funcs sd
 	.get_wptr = sdma_v3_0_ring_get_wptr,
 	.set_wptr = sdma_v3_0_ring_set_wptr,
 	.emit_frame_size =
-		6 + /* sdma_v3_0_ring_emit_hdp_flush */
+		6 + 1 + /* sdma_v3_0_ring_emit_hdp_flush */
 		3 + /* hdp invalidate */
-		6 + /* sdma_v3_0_ring_emit_pipeline_sync */
-		VI_FLUSH_GPU_TLB_NUM_WREG * 3 + 6 + /* sdma_v3_0_ring_emit_vm_flush */
-		10 + 10 + 10, /* sdma_v3_0_ring_emit_fence x3 for user fence, vm fence */
+		6 + 1 + /* sdma_v3_0_ring_emit_pipeline_sync */
+		VI_FLUSH_GPU_TLB_NUM_WREG * 3 + 6 + 1 + /* sdma_v3_0_ring_emit_vm_flush */
+		(10 + 1) * 3, /* sdma_v3_0_ring_emit_fence x3 for user fence, vm fence */
 	.emit_ib_size = 7 + 6, /* sdma_v3_0_ring_emit_ib */
 	.emit_ib = sdma_v3_0_ring_emit_ib,
 	.emit_fence = sdma_v3_0_ring_emit_fence,

[PATCH 6.6 059/168] drm/amdgpu: dont drop the runtime PM reference twice in amdgpu_gpr

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jesse Zhang <Jesse.Zhang@amd.com>

commit de9f6bcdb44f0e410031002e2f103826ea6b6259 upstream.

amdgpu_debugfs_gpr_read() drops its runtime PM reference right after
reading the wave registers. When copying them to userspace fails, it
jumps to the err label, which drops the reference a second time. A read
into a bad buffer on Navi31 either steals a reference somebody else
holds (power/runtime_usage goes from 1 to 0) or underflows the count:

  amdgpu 0000:03:00.0: Runtime PM usage count underflow!

The registers are already in the kernel buffer at that point, so finish
the hardware access first and copy the buffer with a single
copy_to_user() instead of the put_user() loop with its own error path.

Fixes: 9eee152aab56 ("drm/amdgpu/debugfs: fix ref count leak when pm_runtime_get_sync fails")
Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Jesse Zhang <Jesse.Zhang@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
(cherry picked from commit 31035bbd74f7c3e10c163db875b8e67f8b50ee6a)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_debugfs.c |   21 +++------------------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_debugfs.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_debugfs.c
@@ -1157,7 +1157,6 @@ static ssize_t amdgpu_debugfs_gpr_read(s
 {
 	struct amdgpu_device *adev = f->f_inode->i_private;
 	int r;
-	ssize_t result = 0;
 	uint32_t offset, se, sh, cu, wave, simd, thread, bank, *data;
 
 	if (size > 4096 || size & 3 || *pos & 3)
@@ -1202,25 +1201,11 @@ static ssize_t amdgpu_debugfs_gpr_read(s
 
 	pm_runtime_mark_last_busy(adev_to_drm(adev)->dev);
 	pm_runtime_put_autosuspend(adev_to_drm(adev)->dev);
+	amdgpu_virt_disable_access_debugfs(adev);
 
-	while (size) {
-		uint32_t value;
-
-		value = data[result >> 2];
-		r = put_user(value, (uint32_t *)buf);
-		if (r) {
-			amdgpu_virt_disable_access_debugfs(adev);
-			goto err;
-		}
-
-		result += 4;
-		buf += 4;
-		size -= 4;
-	}
-
+	r = copy_to_user(buf, data, size) ? -EFAULT : size;
 	kfree(data);
-	amdgpu_virt_disable_access_debugfs(adev);
-	return result;
+	return r;
 
 err:
 	pm_runtime_put_autosuspend(adev_to_drm(adev)->dev);

[PATCH 6.6 060/168] tracing: Fix the shift out of bounds in the log2 histogram modifier

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Donggeun Yoo <donggeunyoo.kernel@gmail.com>

commit 647c2f97fcb94bc642cefe6db004999974563f06 upstream.

The .log2 key modifier files a value under its base-2 order:

  # echo 'hist:keys=bytes_req.log2' > events/kmem/kmalloc/trigger

hist_field_log2() computes that as ilog2(roundup_pow_of_two(val)). The
out-of-line form of roundup_pow_of_two() is

	return 1UL << fls_long(n - 1);

which shifts by 64 on a 64-bit kernel both when n is 0, where n - 1
wraps to ULONG_MAX, and when n is above 2^63. Both are ordinary keys,
because the field fetch hands every value over as a u64: a syscall
argument of 0 reaches the first, and one above 2^63 reaches the second.

Keying sys_enter_lseek on offset.log2 and passing 0, 1, 2, 3, 1000,
2^63+1 and U64_MAX gives

  { offset: ~ 2^1  } hitcount:          1
  { offset: ~ 2^10 } hitcount:          1
  { offset: ~ 2^2  } hitcount:          1
  { offset: ~ 2^0  } hitcount:          4

Keys above 2^63 land in the lowest bucket. With CONFIG_UBSAN_SHIFT=y
the shift is also reported:

  UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in include/linux/log2.h:57:13
  shift exponent 64 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int'
   __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0xdd/0x1cb
   hist_fn_call.cold+0x8b/0xd9
   event_hist_trigger+0x1cc/0x790
   ftrace_syscall_enter+0x197/0x360
   do_syscall_64+0x402/0x4b0

Use order_base_2(), which is ilog2(n - 1) + 1 for n > 1 and 0 below
that. It returns what the old expression returned on every input the
old one was defined for. Where it was not, 0 stays in bucket 0, which
is where x86_64 had been putting it, and the keys above 2^63 move into
bucket 64.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260916002735.808520-1-donggeunyoo.kernel@gmail.com
Fixes: 4b94f5b7b4a5 ("tracing: Add hist trigger 'log2' modifier")
Signed-off-by: Donggeun Yoo <donggeunyoo.kernel@gmail.com>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-fable-5
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ static u64 hist_field_log2(struct hist_f
 
 	u64 val = hist_fn_call(operand, elt, buffer, rbe, event);
 
-	return (u64) ilog2(roundup_pow_of_two(val));
+	return order_base_2(val);
 }
 
 static u64 hist_field_bucket(struct hist_field *hist_field,

[PATCH 6.6 061/168] tracing: Check operator stack capacity before pushing

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Taeyang Lee <0wn@theori.io>

commit c47a7b11bcb3d45e29723afcf6336866476b1d08 upstream.

predicate_parse() uses the first operator stack entry before processing
any opening parentheses. A push then increments top before writing.
The existing check still permits that write when top already points to
the last allocated entry, which can access beyond the operator stack.

Reject the push when top reaches the last allocated entry.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 39f7c41c908b ("tracing/filters: Enable filtering a cpumask field by another cpumask")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/atELO9L0I9kg5CpC@Taeyangs-MacBook-Pro.local
Signed-off-by: Taeyang Lee <0wn@theori.io>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c
@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ predicate_parse(const char *str, int nr_
 
 		switch (*next) {
 		case '(':					/* #2 */
-			if (top - op_stack > nr_parens) {
+			if (top - op_stack >= nr_parens - 1) {
 				ret = -EINVAL;
 				goto out_free;
 			}

[PATCH 6.6 062/168] tracing: Do not initialize tracefs work if tracing is disabled

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Amit Machhiwal <amachhiw@linux.ibm.com>

commit b3b974008388ab59e44d764ba7a63c988fec2524 upstream.

If trace buffer allocation fails during early boot (e.g.  in
early_trace_init() -> allocate_trace_buffers()), tracing_disabled is
left set to 1 and the global trace array events list remains
uninitialized.

Later during boot, tracer_init_tracefs() (invoked via fs_initcall)
queues tracerfs_init_work asynchronously without checking if tracing was
disabled.  When tracer_init_tracefs_work_func() runs, it calls
event_trace_init() and init_tracer_tracefs(&global_trace, NULL)
unconditionally.  This leads to __find_event_file() dereferencing an
uninitialized tr->events list, causing an early boot NULL pointer
dereference Oops:

  BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000010
  Faulting instruction address: 0xc000000000485be0
  Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 7 [#1]
  ...
  NIP [c000000000485be0] __find_event_file+0x70/0x3c0
  LR  [c000000000448874] init_tracer_tracefs+0x274/0xc80
  Call Trace:
   init_tracer_tracefs+0x274/0xc80
   tracer_init_tracefs_work_func+0x50/0x320
   process_one_work+0x1e8/0x5c0
   worker_thread+0x1dc/0x3d0
   kthread+0x194/0x1b0
   start_kernel_thread+0x14/0x18

Check tracing_disabled at the beginning of tracer_init_tracefs_work_func()
and return immediately if tracing is disabled or failed to initialize,
preventing the crash.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 6621a7004684 ("tracing: make tracer_init_tracefs initcall asynchronous")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261009163557.88467-2-amachhiw@linux.ibm.com
Reported-by: Michal Suchánek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/arYskzbiaNzBR9MD@kunlun.suse.cz/
Signed-off-by: Amit Machhiwal <amachhiw@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Michal Suchánek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/trace/trace.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

--- a/kernel/trace/trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c
@@ -10040,6 +10040,12 @@ static struct notifier_block trace_modul
 
 static __init void tracer_init_tracefs_work_func(struct work_struct *work)
 {
+	/*
+	 * Do not attempt to initialize tracefs if tracing was disabled or
+	 * failed to allocate
+	 */
+	if (tracing_disabled)
+		return;
 
 	event_trace_init();
 

[PATCH 6.6 063/168] tracing: Fix hist trigger timestamps for buffered events

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tengda Wu <wutengda@huaweicloud.com>

commit 9414ca3b99e5a7f1f3bf51c2a01b383e1b355dd0 upstream.

Syzkaller triggered a WARN_ON_ONCE(!nest) warning:

  WARNING: kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:821 at ring_buffer_event_time_stamp
  Call trace:
    ring_buffer_event_time_stamp
    hist_field_timestamp
    hist_fn_call
    event_hist_trigger
    event_triggers_call
    __event_trigger_test_discard
    trace_event_buffer_commit
    do_trace_event_raw_event_sched_switch
    trace_event_raw_event_sched_switch

The warning is probabilistically reproducible and is related to syzkaller
executing the following commands:

  echo 'prev_pid == 999999' > events/sched/sched_switch/filter
  echo 'hist:keys=common_timestamp' > events/sched/sched_switch/trigger

The specific triggering process is as follows:

CPU 0                                           CPU 1
(context switching)                             (echo 'hist:keys=common_timestamp' > \
                                                        events/sched/sched_switch/trigger)
do_trace_event_raw_event_##call
  trace_event_buffer_lock_reserve
    if (!tr->no_filter_buffering_ref &&
        trace_file->flags & EVENT_FILE_FL_FILTERED)
        return entry;  // return directly
                                                event_hist_trigger_parse
                                                  hist_register_trigger
                                                    tracing_set_filter_buffering(file->tr, true);
                                                      tr->no_filter_buffering_ref++;
    __trace_buffer_lock_reserve
      rb_start_commit
        local_inc(&cpu_buffer->committing);  // skipped and not executed
  trace_event_buffer_commit
    __event_trigger_test_discard
      event_triggers_call
        event_hist_trigger
          hist_fn_call
            hist_field_timestamp
              ring_buffer_event_time_stamp
                nest = local_read(&cpu_buffer->committing);
                WARN_ON_ONCE(!nest)  // trigger warning

The root cause is that when an event file has a filter attached and the
hist trigger has not yet been attached, trace_event_buffer_lock_reserve()
writes the event into the per-CPU trace_buffered_event temp buffer instead
of reserving it in the ring buffer, so cpu_buffer->committing is not
incremented. When the event is later processed at commit time by a hist
trigger, hist_field_timestamp() -> ring_buffer_event_time_stamp() sees a
zero committing count, triggering WARN_ON_ONCE(!nest).

tracing_event_time_stamp() was added by commit d8279bfc5e959 ("tracing:
Add tracing_event_time_stamp() API") for exactly this case: if the event
is the per-CPU trace_buffered_event, it returns the current ring buffer
timestamp. But it never gained a caller. Use it in hist_field_timestamp(),
so that a hist trigger that races onto a buffered event records the
current time, which is only marginally later than when the event was
recorded, instead of warning and recording a bogus timestamp.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260929104015.1689921-1-wutengda@huaweicloud.com
Fixes: b94bc80df648 ("tracing: Use a no_filter_buffering_ref to stop using the filter buffer")
Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu <wutengda@huaweicloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c
@@ -866,7 +866,7 @@ static u64 hist_field_timestamp(struct h
 	struct hist_trigger_data *hist_data = hist_field->hist_data;
 	struct trace_array *tr = hist_data->event_file->tr;
 
-	u64 ts = ring_buffer_event_time_stamp(buffer, rbe);
+	u64 ts = tracing_event_time_stamp(buffer, rbe);
 
 	if (hist_data->attrs->ts_in_usecs && trace_clock_in_ns(tr))
 		ts = ns2usecs(ts);

[PATCH 6.6 064/168] wifi: p54: validate firmware record lengths

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Heyang Tan <thy15333007817@163.com>

commit db7b86bd97b380ece8fa39cfdd7502a9fd35e56f upstream.

The p54 firmware parser accesses component ID and component version
records without checking that their lengths cover the fields being read.
A malformed record can therefore make the parser read past the record.

Validate the component ID and component version record lengths before
accessing their data. The descriptor record is also checked against the
shortest descriptor length found in the supported firmware images.

Reject descriptor values that underflow the RX offset or produce an empty
RX range before updating the driver state.

Assisted-by: LLM Codex
Signed-off-by: Heyang Tan <thy15333007817@163.com>
Tested-by: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260918083349.891-1-thy15333007817@163.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/fwio.c |   42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/fwio.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/fwio.c
@@ -52,6 +52,13 @@ int p54_parse_firmware(struct ieee80211_
 		u32 code = le32_to_cpu(bootrec->code);
 		switch (code) {
 		case BR_CODE_COMPONENT_ID:
+			if (len < sizeof(struct bootrec_comp_id) /
+				sizeof(*bootrec->data)) {
+				wiphy_err(priv->hw->wiphy,
+					  "firmware component ID is too short\n");
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+
 			priv->fw_interface = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)
 					     bootrec->data);
 			switch (priv->fw_interface) {
@@ -72,16 +79,41 @@ int p54_parse_firmware(struct ieee80211_
 			}
 			break;
 		case BR_CODE_COMPONENT_VERSION:
+			if (len < DIV_ROUND_UP(sizeof(struct bootrec_comp_ver),
+					       sizeof(*bootrec->data))) {
+				wiphy_err(priv->hw->wiphy,
+					  "firmware component version is too short\n");
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+
 			/* 24 bytes should be enough for all firmwares */
-			if (strnlen((unsigned char *) bootrec->data, 24) < 24)
-				fw_version = (unsigned char *) bootrec->data;
+			if (strnlen((unsigned char *)bootrec->data,
+				    sizeof(struct bootrec_comp_ver)) <
+				    sizeof(struct bootrec_comp_ver))
+				fw_version = (unsigned char *)bootrec->data;
 			break;
 		case BR_CODE_DESCR: {
 			struct bootrec_desc *desc =
 				(struct bootrec_desc *)bootrec->data;
-			priv->rx_start = le32_to_cpu(desc->rx_start);
-			/* FIXME add sanity checking */
-			priv->rx_end = le32_to_cpu(desc->rx_end) - 0x3500;
+			u32 rx_start, rx_end;
+
+			/* 0xa is the shortest descriptor in supported firmware. */
+			if (len < 0xa) {
+				wiphy_err(priv->hw->wiphy,
+					  "firmware descriptor is too short\n");
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+
+			rx_start = le32_to_cpu(desc->rx_start);
+			rx_end = le32_to_cpu(desc->rx_end);
+			if (rx_end < 0x3500 || rx_end - 0x3500 <= rx_start) {
+				wiphy_err(priv->hw->wiphy,
+					  "firmware descriptor has invalid RX range\n");
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+
+			priv->rx_start = rx_start;
+			priv->rx_end = rx_end - 0x3500;
 			priv->headroom = desc->headroom;
 			priv->tailroom = desc->tailroom;
 			priv->privacy_caps = desc->privacy_caps;

[PATCH 6.6 065/168] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION)

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs) <blbllhy@gmail.com>

commit 5271b79b7ad68dcb222e893773f92bdabf7750f3 upstream.

do_tcp_getsockopt() reads icsk->icsk_ca_ops->name without holding
rcu_read_lock(). Since commit 0baf26b0fcd7 ("bpf: tcp: Support
tcp_congestion_ops in bpf"), icsk_ca_ops can point to dynamically
allocated BPF struct_ops memory that may be freed concurrently via
setsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION), leading to a use-after-free.

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _copy_to_user+0x37/0x60
  Read of size 16 at addr ffff888013505260 by task exploit/149
   _copy_to_user+0x37/0x60
   do_tcp_getsockopt+0x158a/0x2460 (net/ipv4/tcp.c:4585)
   tcp_getsockopt+0x91/0xf0
   __sys_getsockopt+0xf7/0x170

Fix this by holding rcu_read_lock() around the ca_ops->name access,
using READ_ONCE() to load icsk_ca_ops, and copying the name to a
stack buffer before releasing the lock. Also annotate the relevant
icsk_ca_ops stores with WRITE_ONCE() to fix the accompanying KCSAN
data-race issue.

Fixes: 0baf26b0fcd7 ("bpf: tcp: Support tcp_congestion_ops in bpf")
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Xiang Mei (Microsoft) <xmei5@asu.edu>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260821182449.79785-2-blbllhy@gmail.com/
Cc: AutonomousCodeSecurity@microsoft.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs) <blbllhy@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/d3f97f1acbf0010898148be6e6406e4b8b4a5c84.1787870710.git.blbllhy@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv4/tcp.c           |   14 +++++++++++---
 net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c      |    4 ++--
 net/ipv4/tcp_dctcp.c     |    2 +-
 net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c |    2 +-
 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c    |    2 +-
 5 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
@@ -4104,16 +4104,24 @@ int do_tcp_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, i
 		val = !inet_csk_in_pingpong_mode(sk);
 		break;
 
-	case TCP_CONGESTION:
+	case TCP_CONGESTION: {
+		char ca_name[TCP_CA_NAME_MAX] = {};
+
 		if (copy_from_sockptr(&len, optlen, sizeof(int)))
 			return -EFAULT;
 		len = min_t(unsigned int, len, TCP_CA_NAME_MAX);
 		if (copy_to_sockptr(optlen, &len, sizeof(int)))
 			return -EFAULT;
-		if (copy_to_sockptr(optval, icsk->icsk_ca_ops->name, len))
+
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		memcpy(ca_name, READ_ONCE(icsk->icsk_ca_ops)->name,
+		       sizeof(ca_name));
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+
+		if (copy_to_sockptr(optval, ca_name, len))
 			return -EFAULT;
 		return 0;
-
+	}
 	case TCP_ULP:
 		if (copy_from_sockptr(&len, optlen, sizeof(int)))
 			return -EFAULT;
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ void tcp_assign_congestion_control(struc
 	ca = rcu_dereference(net->ipv4.tcp_congestion_control);
 	if (unlikely(!bpf_try_module_get(ca, ca->owner)))
 		ca = &tcp_reno;
-	icsk->icsk_ca_ops = ca;
+	WRITE_ONCE(icsk->icsk_ca_ops, ca);
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	memset(icsk->icsk_ca_priv, 0, sizeof(icsk->icsk_ca_priv));
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ static void tcp_reinit_congestion_contro
 	struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
 
 	tcp_cleanup_congestion_control(sk);
-	icsk->icsk_ca_ops = ca;
+	WRITE_ONCE(icsk->icsk_ca_ops, ca);
 	icsk->icsk_ca_setsockopt = 1;
 	memset(icsk->icsk_ca_priv, 0, sizeof(icsk->icsk_ca_priv));
 
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_dctcp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_dctcp.c
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ __bpf_kfunc static void dctcp_init(struc
 	/* No ECN support? Fall back to Reno. Also need to clear
 	 * ECT from sk since it is set during 3WHS for DCTCP.
 	 */
-	inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ca_ops = &dctcp_reno;
+	WRITE_ONCE(inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ca_ops, &dctcp_reno);
 	INET_ECN_dontxmit(sk);
 }
 
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c
@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ void tcp_ca_openreq_child(struct sock *s
 		ca = tcp_ca_find_key(ca_key);
 		if (likely(ca && bpf_try_module_get(ca, ca->owner))) {
 			icsk->icsk_ca_dst_locked = tcp_ca_dst_locked(dst);
-			icsk->icsk_ca_ops = ca;
+			WRITE_ONCE(icsk->icsk_ca_ops, ca);
 			ca_got_dst = true;
 		}
 		rcu_read_unlock();
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
@@ -3782,7 +3782,7 @@ static void tcp_ca_dst_init(struct sock
 	if (likely(ca && bpf_try_module_get(ca, ca->owner))) {
 		bpf_module_put(icsk->icsk_ca_ops, icsk->icsk_ca_ops->owner);
 		icsk->icsk_ca_dst_locked = tcp_ca_dst_locked(dst);
-		icsk->icsk_ca_ops = ca;
+		WRITE_ONCE(icsk->icsk_ca_ops, ca);
 	}
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 }

[PATCH 6.6 066/168] tcp: fix use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt(TCP_CC_INFO)

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs) <blbllhy@gmail.com>

commit 385e474086c2e7e29e2dded690be40dc273e20ee upstream.

do_tcp_getsockopt() reads icsk->icsk_ca_ops and dereferences the
get_info function pointer without rcu_read_lock(). With BPF struct_ops
congestion control, ca_ops can point to dynamically allocated memory
that is freed concurrently, resulting in a use-after-free when the
kernel dereferences or calls through the stale pointer.

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in do_tcp_getsockopt+0x2037/0x23e0
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff888013701258 by task exploit/149
   do_tcp_getsockopt+0x2037/0x23e0 (net/ipv4/tcp.c:4564)
   tcp_getsockopt+0x91/0xf0
   __sys_getsockopt+0xf7/0x170

Fix this by wrapping the ca_ops load and get_info call within
rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock(), and using READ_ONCE() to load
the icsk_ca_ops pointer.

Fixes: 0baf26b0fcd7 ("bpf: tcp: Support tcp_congestion_ops in bpf")
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: AutonomousCodeSecurity@microsoft.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs) <blbllhy@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/65fd3816ed5d541d9edd4bf4fcf97104a2cf907a.1787870710.git.blbllhy@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv4/tcp.c       |    4 +++-
 net/ipv4/tcp_dctcp.c |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
@@ -4089,9 +4089,11 @@ int do_tcp_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, i
 		if (copy_from_sockptr(&len, optlen, sizeof(int)))
 			return -EFAULT;
 
-		ca_ops = icsk->icsk_ca_ops;
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		ca_ops = READ_ONCE(icsk->icsk_ca_ops);
 		if (ca_ops && ca_ops->get_info)
 			sz = ca_ops->get_info(sk, ~0U, &attr, &info);
+		rcu_read_unlock();
 
 		len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sz);
 		if (copy_to_sockptr(optlen, &len, sizeof(int)))
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_dctcp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_dctcp.c
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ static size_t dctcp_get_info(struct sock
 	if (ext & (1 << (INET_DIAG_DCTCPINFO - 1)) ||
 	    ext & (1 << (INET_DIAG_VEGASINFO - 1))) {
 		memset(&info->dctcp, 0, sizeof(info->dctcp));
-		if (inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ca_ops != &dctcp_reno) {
+		if (READ_ONCE(inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ca_ops) != &dctcp_reno) {
 			info->dctcp.dctcp_enabled = 1;
 			info->dctcp.dctcp_ce_state = (u16) ca->ce_state;
 			info->dctcp.dctcp_alpha = ca->dctcp_alpha;

[PATCH 6.6 067/168] cgroup: fix spurious SIGKILL of CLONE_INTO_CGROUP children

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Etienne Perot <eperot@google.com>

commit 8e359920216689b3b79e0fe8961a77fe312a511f upstream.

Since commit b69bb476dee9 ("cgroup: fix race between fork and
cgroup.kill"), the fork path snapshots the kill_seq of the child's
future cgroup into kargs->kill_seq, and cgroup_post_fork() SIGKILLs
the child if that cgroup's kill_seq has changed in the meantime, to
catch forks racing with a cgroup.kill sweep.

For CLONE_INTO_CGROUP, however, the snapshot in cgroup_css_set_fork()
is taken before the target cgroup has been resolved: kargs->cgrp is
always NULL at this point (it is only set at the end of the function).
So the "if (kargs->cgrp)" branch is dead code and the snapshot always
records the kill_seq of the parent's cgroup. cgroup_post_fork() then
compares it with the kill_seq of the target cgroup, so the child gets
SIGKILLed whenever the two cgroups have been killed a different number
of times.

As a result, once cgroup.kill has been written to a cgroup, every
child subsequently cloned into it with clone3(CLONE_INTO_CGROUP) is
killed on the spot, for as long as the cgroup exists: kill_seq is not
exposed to userspace and never resets.

Re-snapshot kill_seq from the target cgroup once it has been resolved,
and drop the dead branch at the early snapshot site.

This does not reopen the race fixed by b69bb476dee9. For
CLONE_INTO_CGROUP, everything from the snapshot to the check in
cgroup_post_fork() runs with cgroup_mutex held, and kill_seq is
only ever incremented under cgroup_mutex.

tj: Updated the comment above kill_seq to reflect the new serialization
rules as suggested by Shakeel Butt.

Fixes: b69bb476dee9 ("cgroup: fix race between fork and cgroup.kill")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeel.butt@linux.dev>
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Etienne Perot <eperot@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 include/linux/cgroup-defs.h |    5 ++++-
 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c      |    6 ++----
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/cgroup-defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/cgroup-defs.h
@@ -435,7 +435,10 @@ struct cgroup {
 
 	int nr_threaded_children;	/* # of live threaded child cgroups */
 
-	/* sequence number for cgroup.kill, serialized by css_set_lock. */
+	/*
+	 * Sequence number for cgroup.kill. Incremented with both cgroup_mutex
+	 * and css_set_lock held. Readers hold either one.
+	 */
 	unsigned int kill_seq;
 
 	struct kernfs_node *kn;		/* cgroup kernfs entry */
--- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c
+++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c
@@ -6449,10 +6449,7 @@ static int cgroup_css_set_fork(struct ke
 	spin_lock_irq(&css_set_lock);
 	cset = task_css_set(current);
 	get_css_set(cset);
-	if (kargs->cgrp)
-		kargs->kill_seq = kargs->cgrp->kill_seq;
-	else
-		kargs->kill_seq = cset->dfl_cgrp->kill_seq;
+	kargs->kill_seq = cset->dfl_cgrp->kill_seq;
 	spin_unlock_irq(&css_set_lock);
 
 	if (!(kargs->flags & CLONE_INTO_CGROUP)) {
@@ -6517,6 +6514,7 @@ static int cgroup_css_set_fork(struct ke
 	put_css_set(cset);
 	fput(f);
 	kargs->cgrp = dst_cgrp;
+	kargs->kill_seq = dst_cgrp->kill_seq;
 	return ret;
 
 err:

[PATCH 6.6 068/168] dm cache: fix demotion stats in passthrough mode

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ming-Hung Tsai <mtsai@redhat.com>

commit 2ccb8878c149443c6acf628b438c9c942c20abb2 upstream.

The demotion counter is incremented per incoming write bio before the
invalidation begins, causing the demotion count to exceed the actual
number of cached blocks when multiple bios target the same cached
block. Additionally, the counter is incremented unconditionally
regardless of invalidation failure.

Reproduce steps:

1. Create a cache device consisting of 512 cache entries

modprobe brd rd_size=262144
dmsetup create cmeta --table "0 8192 linear /dev/ram0 0"
dmsetup create cdata --table "0 65536 linear /dev/ram0 8192"
dmsetup create corig --table "0 65536 linear /dev/ram0 262144"
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/mapper/cmeta bs=4k count=1 oflag=direct
dmsetup create cache --table "0 65536 cache /dev/mapper/cmeta \
/dev/mapper/cdata /dev/mapper/corig 128 2 metadata2 writethrough smq 0"

2. Populate the cache, and record the number of cached blocks

fio --name=populate --filename=/dev/mapper/cache --rw=randwrite --bs=4k \
--direct=1 --ioengine=libaio --iodepth=32 --io_size=2048m
nr_cached=$(dmsetup status cache | awk '{split($7, a, "/"); print a[1]}')

3. Reload the cache into passthrough mode

dmsetup suspend cache
dmsetup reload cache --table "0 65536 cache /dev/mapper/cmeta \
/dev/mapper/cdata /dev/mapper/corig 128 2 metadata2 passthrough smq 0"
dmsetup resume cache

4. Write to the passthrough cache with multiple jobs to trigger
   multiple bios hitting the same cached block.

fio --filename=/dev/mapper/cache --name=test --rw=write --bs=4k \
--direct=1 --ioengine=libaio --iodepth=32 --numjobs=4

5. Check if demoted matches cached block count. These numbers should
   match but may differ due to overcounting per bio.

nr_demoted=$(dmsetup status cache | awk '{print $12}')
echo "$nr_cached, $nr_demoted"

Fix by moving the demotion counter increment into invalidate_complete(),
gated on the success flag.

Reported-by: Ben Marzinski <bmarzins@redhat.com>
Fixes: b29d4986d0da ("dm cache: significant rework to leverage dm-bio-prison-v2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ming-Hung Tsai <mtsai@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Marzinski <bmarzins@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/md/dm-cache-target.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/md/dm-cache-target.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-cache-target.c
@@ -1463,6 +1463,9 @@ static void invalidate_complete(struct d
 	struct bio_list bios;
 	struct cache *cache = mg->cache;
 
+	if (success)
+		atomic_inc(&cache->stats.demotion);
+
 	bio_list_init(&bios);
 	if (mg->cell) {
 		if (dm_cell_unlock_v2(cache->prison, mg->cell, &bios))
@@ -1734,7 +1737,6 @@ static int map_bio(struct cache *cache,
 		if (passthrough_mode(cache)) {
 			if (bio_data_dir(bio) == WRITE) {
 				bio_drop_shared_lock(cache, bio);
-				atomic_inc(&cache->stats.demotion);
 				invalidate_start(cache, cblock, block, bio);
 				return DM_MAPIO_SUBMITTED;
 			} else

[PATCH 6.6 069/168] dm cache: fix issue with background work locking

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Benjamin Marzinski <bmarzins@redhat.com>

commit bc9781c0247de107876f32929f1637db93a42b34 upstream.

dm cache used a rw_semaphore for background_work_lock. Write locks on
rw_semaphores have strict owner semantics, but there was no guarantee
that the process that locked background_work_lock was the same process
that unlocked it. This can be easily seen using a kernel compiled with
CONFIG_DEBUG_RWSEMS. Given a dm cache device <cache>, run: 'dmsetup
suspend <cache> && dmsetup resume <cache>'. This will trigger a kernel
warning:

DEBUG_RWSEMS_WARN_ON((rwsem_owner(sem) != current) && !rwsem_test_oflags(sem, RWSEM_NONSPINNABLE))

triggered by cache_resume(). To fix this, switch from a rw_semaphore to
a spinlock and a wait queue. dm cache already has a wait queue and
associated counter, migration_wait and nr_allocated_migrations, that was
getting woken up when background work was getting completed, but wasn't
actually used by anything. This is replaced by the background_work queue
and counter.

Fixes: b29d4986d0da ("dm cache: significant rework to leverage dm-bio-prison-v2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Marzinski <bmarzins@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Sakai <msakai@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ming-Hung Tsai <mtsai@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/md/dm-cache-target.c |   55 +++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/md/dm-cache-target.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-cache-target.c
@@ -340,8 +340,6 @@ struct cache {
 	struct list_head invalidation_requests;
 
 	sector_t migration_threshold;
-	wait_queue_head_t migration_wait;
-	atomic_t nr_allocated_migrations;
 
 	/*
 	 * The number of in flight migrations that are performing
@@ -397,7 +395,11 @@ struct cache {
 	bool loaded_mappings:1;
 	bool loaded_discards:1;
 
-	struct rw_semaphore background_work_lock;
+	/* background work management */
+	bool background_work_allowed;
+	unsigned background_work_nr;
+	spinlock_t background_work_lock;
+	wait_queue_head_t background_work_wait;
 
 	struct batcher committer;
 	struct work_struct commit_ws;
@@ -488,19 +490,13 @@ static struct dm_cache_migration *alloc_
 	memset(mg, 0, sizeof(*mg));
 
 	mg->cache = cache;
-	atomic_inc(&cache->nr_allocated_migrations);
 
 	return mg;
 }
 
 static void free_migration(struct dm_cache_migration *mg)
 {
-	struct cache *cache = mg->cache;
-
-	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&cache->nr_allocated_migrations))
-		wake_up(&cache->migration_wait);
-
-	mempool_free(mg, &cache->migration_pool);
+	mempool_free(mg, &mg->cache->migration_pool);
 }
 
 /*----------------------------------------------------------------*/
@@ -1031,34 +1027,39 @@ static void calc_discard_block_range(str
 
 static void prevent_background_work(struct cache *cache)
 {
-	lockdep_off();
-	down_write(&cache->background_work_lock);
-	lockdep_on();
+	spin_lock_irq(&cache->background_work_lock);
+	cache->background_work_allowed = false;
+	wait_event_lock_irq(cache->background_work_wait,
+			    cache->background_work_nr == 0,
+			    cache->background_work_lock);
+	spin_unlock_irq(&cache->background_work_lock);
 }
 
 static void allow_background_work(struct cache *cache)
 {
-	lockdep_off();
-	up_write(&cache->background_work_lock);
-	lockdep_on();
+	spin_lock_irq(&cache->background_work_lock);
+	cache->background_work_allowed = true;
+	spin_unlock_irq(&cache->background_work_lock);
 }
 
 static bool background_work_begin(struct cache *cache)
 {
 	bool r;
 
-	lockdep_off();
-	r = down_read_trylock(&cache->background_work_lock);
-	lockdep_on();
-
+	spin_lock_irq(&cache->background_work_lock);
+	r = cache->background_work_allowed;
+	if (r)
+		cache->background_work_nr++;
+	spin_unlock_irq(&cache->background_work_lock);
 	return r;
 }
 
 static void background_work_end(struct cache *cache)
 {
-	lockdep_off();
-	up_read(&cache->background_work_lock);
-	lockdep_on();
+	spin_lock_irq(&cache->background_work_lock);
+	if (--cache->background_work_nr == 0)
+		wake_up(&cache->background_work_wait);
+	spin_unlock_irq(&cache->background_work_lock);
 }
 
 /*----------------------------------------------------------------*/
@@ -2519,9 +2520,7 @@ static int cache_create(struct cache_arg
 
 	spin_lock_init(&cache->lock);
 	bio_list_init(&cache->deferred_bios);
-	atomic_set(&cache->nr_allocated_migrations, 0);
 	atomic_set(&cache->nr_io_migrations, 0);
-	init_waitqueue_head(&cache->migration_wait);
 
 	r = -ENOMEM;
 	atomic_set(&cache->nr_dirty, 0);
@@ -2603,8 +2602,10 @@ static int cache_create(struct cache_arg
 		     issue_op, cache, cache->wq);
 	dm_iot_init(&cache->tracker);
 
-	init_rwsem(&cache->background_work_lock);
-	prevent_background_work(cache);
+	init_waitqueue_head(&cache->background_work_wait);
+	spin_lock_init(&cache->background_work_lock);
+	cache->background_work_allowed = false;
+	cache->background_work_nr = 0;
 
 	*result = cache;
 	return 0;

[PATCH 6.6 070/168] dm-crypt: fix a tiny race condition in crypt_dec_pending

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ben Cressey <ben@cressey.dev>

commit 148845aa1921d95ef5dc851c76e6a284f6657df6 upstream.

crypt_dec_pending reads io->error before calling atomic_dec_and_test.
Another context, for example crypt_endio called from an interrupt, may
set io->error and drop its reference between the read and the
decrement. crypt_dec_pending then drops the last reference and completes
the bio with the stale status - so a read that failed and was never
decrypted, or a write that failed, is reported as successful.

The read was placed before the decrement by commit b35f8caa0890 ("dm
crypt: wait for endio to complete before destruction"), because that
commit freed dm_crypt_io before calling bio_endio. This is no longer the
case, dm_crypt_io lives in the per-bio data now.

Read io->error after atomic_dec_and_test instead. atomic_dec_and_test is
fully ordered, so no additional barrier is needed.

Fixes: b35f8caa0890 ("dm crypt: wait for endio to complete before destruction")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jose Fernandez (Anthropic) <jose.fernandez@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Ben Cressey <ben@cressey.dev>
Assisted-by: Claude:unspecified
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -1794,7 +1794,6 @@ static void crypt_dec_pending(struct dm_
 {
 	struct crypt_config *cc = io->cc;
 	struct bio *base_bio = io->base_bio;
-	blk_status_t error = io->error;
 
 	if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&io->io_pending))
 		return;
@@ -1816,7 +1815,7 @@ static void crypt_dec_pending(struct dm_
 	else
 		kfree(io->integrity_metadata);
 
-	base_bio->bi_status = error;
+	base_bio->bi_status = io->error;
 
 	bio_endio(base_bio);
 }

[PATCH 6.6 071/168] dm-ebs: fix incorrect device offset check in ebs_ctr()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Genjian Zhang <zhanggenjian@kylinos.cn>

commit 7ac81e2d2240f2c57bd073b0733e0b2abca38e82 upstream.

<offset> is a backing-device sector offset; ti->len is the virtual
target length. Comparing them rejects valid tables, e.g.:

  dmsetup create ebs0 --table "0 1048576 ebs /dev/sda 2097152 1 8"
  -> ebs: Invalid device offset sector (-EINVAL)

Drop the check. Bounds against the backing device are already
enforced later by device_area_is_invalid() via ebs_iterate_devices().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d3c7b35c20d6 ("dm: add emulated block size target")
Signed-off-by: Genjian Zhang <zhanggenjian@kylinos.cn>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/md/dm-ebs-target.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/md/dm-ebs-target.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-ebs-target.c
@@ -265,8 +265,7 @@ static int ebs_ctr(struct dm_target *ti,
 
 	r = -EINVAL;
 	if (sscanf(argv[1], "%llu%c", &tmp, &dummy) != 1 ||
-	    tmp != (sector_t)tmp ||
-	    (sector_t)tmp >= ti->len) {
+	    tmp != (sector_t)tmp) {
 		ti->error = "Invalid device offset sector";
 		goto bad;
 	}

[PATCH 6.6 072/168] net/iucv: fix the recvmsg window update

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>

commit fa5acd038ea657ad5033713d6916214cbd349151 upstream.

iucv_sock_recvmsg() sends the HiperSockets-only AF_IUCV_FLAG_WIN without
testing the transport, so on a classic z/VM socket iucv_send_ctrl() sizes
the skb through a NULL iucv->hs_dev. SO_MSGLIMIT accepts 1, so msglimit / 2
is zero and one recvmsg() on its own socket is enough for an unprivileged
process to take a spurious disconnect.

It also calls iucv_send_ctrl() under spin_lock_bh(&message_q.lock), which
allocates GFP_KERNEL inside a section the code treats as atomic. Sending
outside that lock lets two recvmsg() reach afiucv_hs_send() at once, where
msg_recv is sampled for the advertised window and subtracted after
dev_queue_xmit() -- and sendmsg reaches that counter under lock_sock()
while recvmsg holds no socket lock, so both can subtract the same value,
the counter goes negative and the credit reaches the peer twice.

Test the transport, claim the credit with atomic_xchg() after the last
error exit and hand it back if the transmit fails, and send once the lock
is dropped.

Fixes: 3881ac441f64 ("af_iucv: add HiperSockets transport")
Fixes: 238965b71b96 ("net/af_iucv: build proper skbs for HiperTransport")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Aswin Karuvally <aswin@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Reviewed-by: Alexandra Winter <wintera@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260828-b4-disp-33fac0ed-v3-1-e6d061880ee0@proton.me
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/iucv/af_iucv.c |   42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

--- a/net/iucv/af_iucv.c
+++ b/net/iucv/af_iucv.c
@@ -207,12 +207,6 @@ static int afiucv_hs_send(struct iucv_me
 	phs_hdr->flags = flags;
 	if (flags == AF_IUCV_FLAG_SYN)
 		phs_hdr->window = iucv->msglimit;
-	else if ((flags == AF_IUCV_FLAG_WIN) || !flags) {
-		confirm_recv = atomic_read(&iucv->msg_recv);
-		phs_hdr->window = confirm_recv;
-		if (confirm_recv)
-			phs_hdr->flags = phs_hdr->flags | AF_IUCV_FLAG_WIN;
-	}
 	memcpy(phs_hdr->destUserID, iucv->dst_user_id, 8);
 	memcpy(phs_hdr->destAppName, iucv->dst_name, 8);
 	memcpy(phs_hdr->srcUserID, iucv->src_user_id, 8);
@@ -247,13 +241,22 @@ static int afiucv_hs_send(struct iucv_me
 	}
 	skb->protocol = cpu_to_be16(ETH_P_AF_IUCV);
 
+	/* Claim the receive credit here, not while building the header: every
+	 * way this frame can be dropped has now been ruled out, so the window
+	 * is zeroed only for as long as the transmit itself takes.
+	 */
+	if (flags == AF_IUCV_FLAG_WIN || !flags) {
+		confirm_recv = atomic_xchg(&iucv->msg_recv, 0);
+		phs_hdr->window = confirm_recv;
+		if (confirm_recv)
+			phs_hdr->flags = phs_hdr->flags | AF_IUCV_FLAG_WIN;
+	}
+
 	atomic_inc(&iucv->skbs_in_xmit);
 	err = dev_queue_xmit(skb);
 	if (net_xmit_eval(err)) {
 		atomic_dec(&iucv->skbs_in_xmit);
-	} else {
-		atomic_sub(confirm_recv, &iucv->msg_recv);
-		WARN_ON(atomic_read(&iucv->msg_recv) < 0);
+		atomic_add(confirm_recv, &iucv->msg_recv);
 	}
 	return net_xmit_eval(err);
 
@@ -1239,6 +1242,7 @@ static int iucv_sock_recvmsg(struct sock
 	struct iucv_sock *iucv = iucv_sk(sk);
 	unsigned int copied, rlen;
 	struct sk_buff *skb, *rskb, *cskb;
+	bool send_win = false;
 	int err = 0;
 	u32 offset;
 
@@ -1329,16 +1333,20 @@ static int iucv_sock_recvmsg(struct sock
 		if (skb_queue_empty(&iucv->backlog_skb_q)) {
 			if (!list_empty(&iucv->message_q.list))
 				iucv_process_message_q(sk);
-			if (atomic_read(&iucv->msg_recv) >=
-							iucv->msglimit / 2) {
-				err = iucv_send_ctrl(sk, AF_IUCV_FLAG_WIN);
-				if (err) {
-					sk->sk_state = IUCV_DISCONN;
-					sk->sk_state_change(sk);
-				}
-			}
+			if (iucv->transport == AF_IUCV_TRANS_HIPER &&
+			    atomic_read(&iucv->msg_recv) >=
+							iucv->msglimit / 2)
+				send_win = true;
 		}
 		spin_unlock_bh(&iucv->message_q.lock);
+
+		if (send_win) {
+			err = iucv_send_ctrl(sk, AF_IUCV_FLAG_WIN);
+			if (err) {
+				sk->sk_state = IUCV_DISCONN;
+				sk->sk_state_change(sk);
+			}
+		}
 	}
 
 done:

[PATCH 6.6 073/168] xfs: fix capability check in xfs

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>

commit e2f62a9744ebad3bcb6347a648e615026e9efeff upstream.

An user reported a bug where he managed to evade group's quota
by changing a file's gid to a different group id the same user
belonged to, even though quotas were enforced on both gids and the
file's size was big enough to exceed the quota's hardlimit.

Commit eba0549bc7d1 replaced a capable() call by a
has_capability_noaudit() to prevent unnecessary selinux audit messages.
Turns out that both calls have slightly different semantics even though
their documentation seems similar. Where in a nutshell:

capable() - Tests the task's effective credentials
has_ns_capability_noaudit() - Tests the task's real credentials

This most of the time has no practical difference but in some cases like
changing attrs (specifically group id in this case) through a NFS client
this will allow the quota code to use XFS_QMOPT_FORCE_RES, effectively
bypassing quota accounting checks.

Using instead ns_capable_noaudit() should fix this issue and prevent
selinux audit messages.

This also fix the remaining calls to has_capability_noaudit()

Fixes: eba0549bc7d1 ("xfs: don't generate selinux audit messages for capability testing")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.18
Reported-by: Dr. Thomas Orgis <thomas.orgis@uni-hamburg.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <sergeh@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/xfs/xfs_fsmap.c |    2 +-
 fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c |    2 +-
 fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c  |    2 +-
 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_fsmap.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_fsmap.c
@@ -902,7 +902,7 @@ xfs_getfsmap(
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	use_rmap = xfs_has_rmapbt(mp) &&
-		   has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+		   ns_capable_noaudit(&init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
 	head->fmh_entries = 0;
 
 	/* Set up our device handlers. */
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
@@ -1218,7 +1218,7 @@ xfs_ioctl_setattr_get_trans(
 		goto out_error;
 
 	error = xfs_trans_alloc_ichange(ip, NULL, NULL, pdqp,
-			has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_FOWNER), &tp);
+			ns_capable_noaudit(&init_user_ns, CAP_FOWNER), &tp);
 	if (error)
 		goto out_error;
 
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c
@@ -712,7 +712,7 @@ xfs_setattr_nonsize(
 	}
 
 	error = xfs_trans_alloc_ichange(ip, udqp, gdqp, NULL,
-			has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_FOWNER), &tp);
+			ns_capable_noaudit(&init_user_ns, CAP_FOWNER), &tp);
 	if (error)
 		goto out_dqrele;
 

[PATCH 6.6 074/168] tipc: protect node reset trace dump with node lock

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Chengfeng Ye <nicoyip.dev@gmail.com>

commit dddf197f29ba5e47a476dde82bf542ca2e0d5e5e upstream.

The tipc_node_reset_links trace event asks tipc_node_dump() to walk the
node's link entries. Unlike the other node events that request link data,
this event runs without the node lock.

This permits bearer teardown to free a link while the trace callback is
dumping it:

  CPU 0                                CPU 1
  trace_tipc_node_reset_links()
    tipc_node_dump()
      l = n->links[0].link
                                       tipc_node_write_lock()
                                       kfree(l)
                                       n->links[0].link = NULL
                                       tipc_node_write_unlock()
      tipc_link_dump(l)

tipc_link_dump() then dereferences the stale pointer. KASAN reported:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tipc_link_dump
  Read of size 4 by task poc/115
  Call Trace:
   tipc_link_dump+0x10cb/0x16b0
   tipc_node_dump+0x4bb/0x740
   trace_event_raw_event_tipc_node_class+0x258/0x360
   tipc_node_reset_links+0x14d/0x1a0
   tipc_rcv+0x13f5/0x3030
   tipc_udp_recv+0x4e3/0x670
  Allocated by task 0:
   tipc_link_create+0x1e1/0x1020
   tipc_node_check_dest+0x7d2/0x11a0
   tipc_disc_rcv+0xdbf/0x1430
  Freed by task 89:
   kfree+0x131/0x3c0
   tipc_node_link_down+0x267/0x4b0
   tipc_node_delete_links+0xec/0x160
   bearer_disable+0x107/0x260

Take the node write lock around the trace event. This serializes the
dump against tipc_node_link_down(delete=true), which frees the link
under the same write lock.

Fixes: eb18a510b5cd ("tipc: add trace_events for tipc node")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chengfeng Ye <nicoyip.dev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tung Nguyen <tung.quang.nguyen@est.tech>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260825190141.242219-1-nicoyip.dev@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/tipc/node.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/net/tipc/node.c
+++ b/net/tipc/node.c
@@ -1335,7 +1335,9 @@ static void tipc_node_reset_links(struct
 
 	pr_warn("Resetting all links to %x\n", n->addr);
 
+	tipc_node_write_lock(n);
 	trace_tipc_node_reset_links(n, true, " ");
+	tipc_node_write_unlock_fast(n);
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BEARERS; i++) {
 		tipc_node_link_down(n, i, false);
 	}

[PATCH 6.6 075/168] sctp: validate chunk length in the inqueue parser

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Charles Vosburgh <theminershive@gmail.com>

commit 6cfc1b90cb86f4aabc69fb8e30128e07e2cdfa3a upstream.

SCTP chunks always include a four-byte generic header, but
sctp_inq_pop() currently accepts shorter declared lengths. A zero-length
chunk leaves chunk_end at the current header.

When ASCONF is covered by the association's SCTP-AUTH policy,
sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() can continue before the state machine performs its
normal chunk-length check. sctp_inq_pop() then returns the same malformed
chunk repeatedly and the receive softirq can lock up.

A remote SCTP peer can trigger this after establishing an association on
a kernel built with CONFIG_IP_SCTP and configured with
net.sctp.addip_enable=1 and net.sctp.auth_enable=1. The reproducer did
not require application credentials, a shared SCTP AUTH key, or
net.sctp.addip_noauth_enable=1.

On commit f967455fb2a5 ("seg6: reset IP6CB after IPv6 decapsulation"),
one zero-length ASCONF caused repeated
watchdog soft-lockup reports in a two-vCPU KVM guest. All 3 pre-trigger
health probes succeeded, while 36 of 37 post-trigger probes failed. With
this change, all 37 post-trigger probes succeeded and no equivalent
soft-lockup signature appeared.

Reject chunks shorter than the generic SCTP header at the shared inqueue
parser boundary. Mark the packet for discard before either caller can
continue processing it, while preserving the four-byte generic minimum.
Declared-length 1 through 4 controls and kernel-generated ASCONF traffic
remained healthy. The patched sctp_hello selftest passed for IPv4 and
IPv6.

The complete private reproducer and validation evidence are available
directly to maintainers on request.

Fixes: bbd0d59809f9 ("[SCTP]: Implement the receive and verification of AUTH chunk")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Charles Vosburgh <theminershive@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260827-sctp-zero-chunk-inqueue-v2-1-2e7669c6a6cb@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/sctp/inqueue.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/net/sctp/inqueue.c
+++ b/net/sctp/inqueue.c
@@ -212,8 +212,10 @@ new_skb:
 	chunk->chunk_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(ch->length));
 	skb_pull(chunk->skb, sizeof(*ch));
 	chunk->subh.v = NULL; /* Subheader is no longer valid.  */
-
-	if (chunk->chunk_end + sizeof(*ch) <= skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb)) {
+	if (unlikely(ntohs(ch->length) < sizeof(*ch))) {
+		chunk->pdiscard = 1;
+	} else if (chunk->chunk_end + sizeof(*ch) <=
+		   skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb)) {
 		/* This is not a singleton */
 		chunk->singleton = 0;
 	} else if (chunk->chunk_end > skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb)) {

[PATCH 6.6 076/168] page_pool: keep frag_offset aligned for odd-sized requests

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Florian Schauer <florian@schauer.to>

commit dc0df5a0c62ccea1d0e08d39a4dc9064de81d411 upstream.

page_pool_alloc_frag_netmem() rounds the requested fragment size with

	size = ALIGN(size, dma_get_cache_alignment());

dma_get_cache_alignment() returns 1 unless the architecture defines
ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN, which DMA-coherent architectures such as x86 do not.
There the ALIGN() is a no-op and pool->frag_offset advances by the raw,
unrounded size.

A single caller asking for an odd size then leaves frag_offset misaligned
for every fragment carved out of that page afterwards.  The pool is shared,
so the damage is not confined to the caller that caused it.

The per-cpu system_page_pool used by generic XDP hits this.
skb_pp_cow_data() allocates its fragments with the raw packet length:

	size = min_t(u32, len, PAGE_SIZE);
	truesize = size;
	page = page_pool_dev_alloc(pool, &page_off, &truesize);

leaving frag_offset odd for whatever is carved out of that page next.  Its
own head allocation is already aligned -- SKB_HEAD_ALIGN(size) plus the
XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM its callers pass -- so it is a later user of the shared
pool that pays: page_pool_dev_alloc_va() returns a misaligned buffer,
napi_build_skb() installs it as skb->head, and skb_shinfo(skb) ==
skb->head + skb->end is misaligned with it.

skb_shinfo()->dataref is a 4-byte atomic_t at offset 0x20, so the
atomic_inc() in __skb_clone() straddles a cache line.  On x86 with split
lock detection -- fatal for kernel split locks by default -- this panics
the machine:

  Oops: Split lock detected
  RIP: 0010:skb_clone+0x154/0x1e0
  Call Trace:
   <IRQ>
   raw_local_deliver+0x1ed/0x2c0
   ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x54/0x1c0
   ip_local_deliver_finish+0x85/0x100
   ip_local_deliver+0x67/0x100
   __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x85/0xa0
   process_backlog+0x87/0x130

Reproduced by attaching any generic-mode XDP program to loopback and
opening a RAW IPPROTO_UDP socket, which makes raw_local_deliver() clone
every locally delivered UDP packet; ordinary DNS traffic then triggers it,
roughly once per 2500 clones.  Observed on 6.12.101 and 7.1.8.

Tracing page_pool_alloc_frag_netmem() over one such run shows the
amplification -- two odd-sized requests, nine misaligned offsets:

  requested size & 7:   0: 17035    5: 1    7: 1
  frag_offset & 7:      0: 17028    3: 1    4: 1    5: 1    6: 1    7: 5

and skb_pp_cow_data() returning heads that were aligned on entry:

  head 0xffff8f4c86aeac00 -> 0xffff8f4c53a9a9c4 (&7=4)
  head 0xffff8f4d6a8a42c0 -> 0xffff8f4c4f7b7a45 (&7=5)

Round the fragment size up to at least the alignment struct skb_shared_info
requires, so fragments are always suitably aligned for the objects callers
build on them.  Architectures needing a larger DMA alignment keep it.

This also makes the remainder computed in page_pool_alloc_netmem(),

	*size = max_size - *offset;

aligned, since max_size is a power of two -- which fixes the matching
misalignment of skb->end.

Verified with a controlled A/B under QEMU/KVM: same tree, same config,
same compiler, same rootfs and identical traffic, differing only by this
patch.  A SEC("xdp.frags") XDP_PASS program on lo plus UDP datagrams
larger than max_head_size drives skb_pp_cow_data()'s fragment loop, which
passes raw packet lengths to the pool.  Measured at the return of
skb_pp_cow_data():

                          unpatched   patched
  skb_pp_cow_data calls       40800     40800
  misaligned skb->head         1120         0
  dataref at line offset >60     80         0

The last row counts the accesses that actually fault:
skb_shinfo()->dataref sits at head+end+0x20 and is a 4-byte atomic, so
`lock incl` splits a 64-byte cache line only when that address lands at
offset 61..63.  All 80 occurrences were at offset 61; the panic reported
above was at offset 62.  Eliminating the misalignment removes every one
of them.

Same class of bug as commit 3bed3cc4156e ("net: Do not allocate page
fragments that are not skb aligned"), which fixed the older
netdev_alloc_frag()/napi_alloc_frag() allocators.

Fixes: 53e0961da1c7 ("page_pool: add frag page recycling support in page pool")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Florian Schauer <florian@schauer.to>
Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260828060822.2628276-1-florian@schauer.to
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/core/page_pool.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/core/page_pool.c
+++ b/net/core/page_pool.c
@@ -751,7 +751,8 @@ struct page *page_pool_alloc_frag(struct
 		    size > max_size))
 		return NULL;
 
-	size = ALIGN(size, dma_get_cache_alignment());
+	size = ALIGN(size, max_t(unsigned int, dma_get_cache_alignment(),
+				 __alignof__(struct skb_shared_info)));
 	*offset = pool->frag_offset;
 
 	if (page && *offset + size > max_size) {

[PATCH 6.6 077/168] s390/ctcm: Prevent XID null dereference

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Aswin Karuvally <aswin@linux.ibm.com>

commit b264d8422779d69febce914efc47a92a85cc382c upstream.

The mpc_validate_xid() function sets grp->saved_xid2->xid2_flag2 to 0x40
to signal XID validation error. If peer XID is NULL or r/w channel
pairing mismatch happens, grp->saved_xid2 is never initialized. An
attempt to set the flag in such case leads to NULL dereference.

Fix this by using the always available priv->xid->xid2_flag2 instead of
grp->saved_xid2->xid2_flag2 for validation errors.

Fixes: 293d984f0e36 ("ctcm: infrastructure for replaced ctc driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Aswin Karuvally <aswin@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260827063408.2168914-1-aswin@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/s390/net/ctcm_mpc.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/s390/net/ctcm_mpc.c
+++ b/drivers/s390/net/ctcm_mpc.c
@@ -826,7 +826,7 @@ static void mpc_action_go_ready(fsm_inst
 
 	fsm_deltimer(&grp->timer);
 
-	if (grp->saved_xid2->xid2_flag2 == 0x40) {
+	if (priv->xid->xid2_flag2 == 0x40) {
 		priv->xid->xid2_flag2 = 0x00;
 		if (grp->estconnfunc) {
 			grp->estconnfunc(grp->port_num, 1,
@@ -1636,7 +1636,6 @@ done:
 			"The XID used in the MPC protocol is not valid, "
 			"rc = %d\n", rc);
 		priv->xid->xid2_flag2 = 0x40;
-		grp->saved_xid2->xid2_flag2 = 0x40;
 	}
 
 	return rc;

[PATCH 6.6 078/168] s390/pci: Fix leak of uninitialized kernel data in SCLP report

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle@linux.ibm.com>

commit 8ac60ae2a307a50b599bf5d300b448d638f3ba29 upstream.

While report_error_write() checks that the provided buffer is at least
as large as the header struct, but not that it is large enough to
contain the report with the length claimed by report->length. If
user-space provides a short buffer, meaning a larger report->length than
the actually written payload, up to around 4K of kernel data from past
the kmalloc(len + 1) sized buffer allocated in kernfs_fop_write_iter()
will leak into the SCLP report.

However, as the entity processing the SCLP is privileged and able to
access at least the page including the report, this does not leak data
that entity could not access but it is still an out of bounds read and
a malformed error report that should be rejected.

Fixes: 368704a65be8 ("s390/pci: add report_error attribute")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Block <bblock@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/s390/pci/pci_sysfs.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/s390/pci/pci_sysfs.c
+++ b/arch/s390/pci/pci_sysfs.c
@@ -146,6 +146,9 @@ static ssize_t report_error_write(struct
 	if (off || (count < sizeof(*report)))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (count < (report->length + sizeof(*report)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	ret = sclp_pci_report(report, zdev->fh, zdev->fid);
 
 	return ret ? ret : count;

[PATCH 6.6 079/168] ipv4: avoid divide by zero in fib_rebalance

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zihan Xi <zihanx@nebusec.ai>

commit 5046d2880fec7d49ebed2fd2866747ee1d06ad71 upstream.

fib_rebalance() computes the total eligible nexthop weight in one pass
and programs upper bounds in a second pass. A concurrent change to
ignore_routes_with_linkdown can make the first pass return zero while
the second pass sees an eligible nexthop, resulting in division by zero.

If the first pass reports a zero total, set each nexthop upper bound to
-1 and skip the division. This matches the IPv6 fix in commit
d2c26c2911dd ("ipv6: avoid divide by zero in rt6_multipath_rebalance")
and preserves the lock-free rebalance path.

Fixes: 0e884c78ee19 ("ipv4: L3 hash-based multipath")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Vega <vega@nebusec.ai>
Signed-off-by: Zihan Xi <zihanx@nebusec.ai>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260827182514.4667-2-zihanx@nebusec.ai
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c
@@ -857,7 +857,7 @@ static void fib_rebalance(struct fib_inf
 	change_nexthops(fi) {
 		int upper_bound;
 
-		if (nexthop_nh->fib_nh_flags & RTNH_F_DEAD) {
+		if (!total || nexthop_nh->fib_nh_flags & RTNH_F_DEAD) {
 			upper_bound = -1;
 		} else if (ip_ignore_linkdown(nexthop_nh->fib_nh_dev) &&
 			   nexthop_nh->fib_nh_flags & RTNH_F_LINKDOWN) {

[PATCH 6.6 080/168] drm/amdgpu: Fix VCE 3 ring align_mask

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Rosca <david.rosca@amd.com>

[ Upstream commit 2ee9836545e690c9e66ec203445d7705959fd7a8 ]

The largest frame is 20 dwords, so 0xf mask is too small.
This was always wrong, but we were lucky with the VCE_CMD_END
commands inserted after fence and vm_flush.

Fixes: 8897ea8c761b ("drm/amdgpu: Implement insert_end for VCE 3")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: David Rosca <david.rosca@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vce_v3_0.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vce_v3_0.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vce_v3_0.c
index 1b5afa08f52b9..18df0735ef777 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vce_v3_0.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vce_v3_0.c
@@ -959,7 +959,7 @@ static const struct amdgpu_ring_funcs vce_v3_0_ring_phys_funcs = {
 
 static const struct amdgpu_ring_funcs vce_v3_0_ring_vm_funcs = {
 	.type = AMDGPU_RING_TYPE_VCE,
-	.align_mask = 0xf,
+	.align_mask = 0x1f,
 	.nop = VCE_CMD_NO_OP,
 	.support_64bit_ptrs = false,
 	.no_user_fence = true,
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 081/168] mm/huge_memory: initialise workingset state before folio split

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Matt Fleming <mfleming@cloudflare.com>

[ Upstream commit aca1f2d5de17e138bc6c4859126b77e516b82541 ]

xas_try_split() adds __GFP_ACCOUNT for page-cache xa_nodes, but
__folio_split() leaves the xa_state's xa_lru unset.  That lets a live,
memcg-charged xa_node exist without being linked into the mapping's
shadow_nodes list_lru; when reclaim later walks the list_lru it trips
VM_WARN_ON(!css_is_dying()).

Use mapping_set_update() to install both the workingset update callback
and the shadow_nodes list_lru on the xa_state.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260725101419.3938406-1-matt@readmodwrite.com
Fixes: 58729c04cf10 ("mm/huge_memory: add buddy allocator like (non-uniform) folio_split()")
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <mfleming@cloudflare.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+c5b060ce82921a2fd500@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c5b060ce82921a2fd500
Reviewed-by: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) <david@kernel.org>
Cc: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Barry Song <baohua@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: Dev Jain <dev.jain@arm.com>
Cc: Kairui Song <ryncsn@gmail.com>
Cc: Lance Yang <lance.yang@linux.dev>
Cc: Liam Howlett <liam@infradead.org>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <ljs@kernel.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Nico Pache <npache@redhat.com>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeel.butt@linux.dev>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 mm/huge_memory.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c
index 28502c539cabb..4aa032e96fa60 100644
--- a/mm/huge_memory.c
+++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
@@ -2746,6 +2746,8 @@ int split_huge_page_to_list(struct page *page, struct list_head *list)
 			goto out;
 		}
 
+		mapping_set_update(&xas, mapping);
+
 		xas_split_alloc(&xas, folio, folio_order(folio), gfp);
 		if (xas_error(&xas)) {
 			ret = xas_error(&xas);
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 082/168] KVM: x86/mmu: Preserve nested TDP shadow page tables if they are used as roots

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 7a2c70e777a00c32ebafd376a6fe31ebb91c5b20 ]

kvm_mmu_zap_oldest_mmu_pages() excludes a shadow page whose root_count
is non-zero from top-level reclaim, because such a page cannot be
freed. The path in mmu_page_zap_pte() that recursively zaps a parentless
nested TDP child has no such check. As a result, a shadow page can
be zapped even if the page itself can't be freed; as the comment in
kvm_mmu_zap_oldest_mmu_pages() notes, zapping it will just force vCPUs
to rebuild the page.

As in top-level reclaim, do not recursively prepare zapping of a
nested TDP child whose root_count is non-zero.

Fixes: 2de4085cccea ("KVM: x86/MMU: Recursively zap nested TDP SPs when zapping last/only parent")
Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[sean: resolve minor conflict due to lack of lockless aging in 6.12]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index b243cb405808a..5bff73562cbd1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -2508,7 +2508,9 @@ static int mmu_page_zap_pte(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
 			 * avoids retaining a large number of stale nested SPs.
 			 */
 			if (tdp_enabled && invalid_list &&
-			    child->role.guest_mode && !child->parent_ptes.val)
+			    child->role.guest_mode &&
+			    !child->root_count &&
+			    !child->parent_ptes.val)
 				return kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(kvm, child,
 								invalid_list);
 		}
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 083/168] mm, madvise: fix potential workingset node list_lru leaks

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kairui Song <kasong@tencent.com>

[ Upstream commit 62e72d2cf702a5e2fb53d9c46ed900d9384e4a06 ]

Since commit 5abc1e37afa0 ("mm: list_lru: allocate list_lru_one only when
needed"), all list_lru users need to allocate the items using the new
infrastructure that provides list_lru info for slab allocation, ensuring
that the corresponding memcg list_lru is allocated before use.

For workingset shadow nodes (which are xa_node), users are converted to
use the new infrastructure by commit 9bbdc0f32409 ("xarray: use
kmem_cache_alloc_lru to allocate xa_node").  The xas->xa_lru will be set
correctly for filemap users.  However, there is a missing case: xa_node
allocations caused by madvise(..., MADV_COLLAPSE).

madvise(..., MADV_COLLAPSE) will also read in the absent parts of file
map, and there will be xa_nodes allocated for the caller's memcg (assuming
it's not rootcg).  However, these allocations won't trigger memcg list_lru
allocation because the proper xas info was not set.

If nothing else has allocated other xa_nodes for that memcg to trigger
list_lru creation, and memory pressure starts to evict file pages,
workingset_update_node will try to add these xa_nodes to their
corresponding memcg list_lru, and it does not exist (NULL).  So they will
be added to rootcg's list_lru instead.

This shouldn't be a significant issue in practice, but it is indeed
unexpected behavior, and these xa_nodes will not be reclaimed effectively.
And may lead to incorrect counting of the list_lru->nr_items counter.

This problem wasn't exposed until recent commit 28e98022b31ef
("mm/list_lru: simplify reparenting and initial allocation") added a
sanity check: only dying memcg could have a NULL list_lru when
list_lru_{add,del} is called.  This problem triggered this WARNING.

So make madvise(..., MADV_COLLAPSE) also call xas_set_lru() to pass the
list_lru which we may want to insert xa_node into later.  And move
mapping_set_update to mm/internal.h, and turn into a macro to avoid
including extra headers in mm/internal.h.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241222122936.67501-1-ryncsn@gmail.com
Fixes: 9bbdc0f32409 ("xarray: use kmem_cache_alloc_lru to allocate xa_node")
Reported-by: syzbot+38a0cbd267eff2d286ff@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/675d01e9.050a0220.37aaf.00be.GAE@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Kairui Song <kasong@tencent.com>
Cc: Chengming Zhou <chengming.zhou@linux.dev>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeel.butt@linux.dev>
Cc: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 mm/khugepaged.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/mm/khugepaged.c b/mm/khugepaged.c
index ead6b0001524b..42330aeb76386 100644
--- a/mm/khugepaged.c
+++ b/mm/khugepaged.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/page_table_check.h>
 #include <linux/swapops.h>
 #include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
+#include <linux/dax.h>
 #include <linux/ksm.h>
 
 #include <asm/tlb.h>
@@ -1800,6 +1801,8 @@ static int collapse_file(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
 	if (result != SCAN_SUCCEED)
 		goto out;
 
+	mapping_set_update(&xas, mapping);
+
 	__folio_set_locked(new_folio);
 	if (is_shmem)
 		__folio_set_swapbacked(new_folio);
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 084/168] net: bridge: mcast: dont truncate the port group walk on teardown

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jun Yang <littleddfu@gmail.com>

commit 5a3f7a683aee56e1f15c9d53041f3236767eaae7 upstream.

__br_multicast_disable_port_ctx() and br_multicast_del_port() walk
port->mglist with hlist_for_each_entry_safe(). However,
br_multicast_find_del_pg() can also delete other entries from the same
list through br_multicast_fwd_src_remove() or __fwd_del_star_excl().

If such an entry is the iterator's saved next node, hlist_del_init()
clears its ->next and terminates the walk early. The reproducer triggers
this in both teardown walks, leaving port groups in the bridge mdb with
a dangling ->key.port after del_nbp() frees the port:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __mdb_fill_info+0x1191/0x1320
   __mdb_fill_info+0x1191/0x1320
   br_mdb_dump+0x594/0xe40
   rtnl_mdb_dump+0x1cf/0x5d0

Use hlist_del_init_rcu() to unlink the group while preserving ->next.
br_multicast_del_pg() and the teardown walks run under
br->multicast_lock. The GC worker must acquire the same lock before
detaching the group for destruction, so the node remains alive while
the walk uses the preserved pointer.

Preserving ->next means a walk can now reach a group that an earlier
iteration already deleted as a side effect. That group is off mp->ports,
so br_multicast_find_del_pg() would fall through its port scan and hit
the trailing WARN_ON(1). Skip such groups at the top of that helper: a
port group is put on port->mglist when it is created and only unlinked
when it is deleted, so hlist_unhashed() identifies exactly this case.

Fixes: b08123684bd5 ("net: bridge: mcast: install S,G entries automatically based on reports")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Reported-by: TencentOS Corvus AI <corvus@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Yang <junvyyang@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260831111330.199543-1-junvyyang@tencent.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/bridge/br_multicast.c |   13 ++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/bridge/br_multicast.c
+++ b/net/bridge/br_multicast.c
@@ -812,7 +812,11 @@ static void __br_multicast_del_pg(struct
 	struct hlist_node *tmp;
 
 	rcu_assign_pointer(*pp, pg->next);
-	hlist_del_init(&pg->mglist);
+	/* Keep ->next (held under multicast_lock, freed later by the GC work):
+	 * a port->mglist teardown walk may have latched this node as its next,
+	 * and deleting other groups of the same port must not truncate it.
+	 */
+	hlist_del_init_rcu(&pg->mglist);
 	br_multicast_eht_clean_sets(pg);
 	hlist_for_each_entry_safe(ent, tmp, &pg->src_list, node)
 		br_multicast_del_group_src(ent, false);
@@ -847,6 +851,13 @@ static void br_multicast_find_del_pg(str
 	struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *mp;
 	struct net_bridge_port_group *p;
 
+	/* A teardown walk over port->mglist can reach a group that an earlier
+	 * iteration already deleted as a side effect. It is off mp->ports by
+	 * now, so skip it instead of falling through to the WARN_ON() below.
+	 */
+	if (hlist_unhashed(&pg->mglist))
+		return;
+
 	mp = br_mdb_ip_get(br, &pg->key.addr);
 	if (WARN_ON(!mp))
 		return;

[PATCH 6.6 085/168] ksmbd: fill in FileSysIdentifier in FS_POSIX_INFORMATION

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Aleksandr Khromov <haa@amicon.ru>

commit db2267b27c054a6c2151ff7fbb67927e784f31d6 upstream.

smb2_get_info_filesystem() reports 56 bytes for FS_POSIX_INFORMATION,
that is the whole of FILE_SYSTEM_POSIX_INFO, but never assigns
FileSysIdentifier.  Those eight bytes go to the client as they are found
in the response buffer.

The buffer is zeroed on allocation, so a standalone request leaks
nothing.  A compound request can leak: the offset of the next response
is advanced by the length pinned for the previous one, so a reply that
was written into the buffer and then dropped in favour of the short
error response of smb2_set_err_rsp() stays there, and the next reply is
laid over it with only the header cleared.

Report the file system id statfs() returned, which is what the field is
for.  FileSysIdentifier is __le64 and f_fsid is a pair of ints, so
assemble the value first, val[0] as the low half, and convert it on the
way out.

Fixes: e2f34481b24d ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Khromov <haa@amicon.ru>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
@@ -5761,6 +5761,9 @@ static int smb2_get_info_filesystem(stru
 			info->UserBlocksAvail = cpu_to_le64(stfs.f_bavail);
 			info->TotalFileNodes = cpu_to_le64(stfs.f_files);
 			info->FreeFileNodes = cpu_to_le64(stfs.f_ffree);
+			info->FileSysIdentifier =
+				cpu_to_le64((u64)(u32)stfs.f_fsid.val[1] << 32 |
+					    (u32)stfs.f_fsid.val[0]);
 			rsp->OutputBufferLength = cpu_to_le32(56);
 			fixed_len = 56;
 		}

[PATCH 6.6 086/168] ksmbd: initialize FileSystemControlFlags in FS_CONTROL_INFORMATION

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Aleksandr Khromov <haa@amicon.ru>

commit c0cd3fc6824122014da2b3b0cb7ddeaa2946ec8e upstream.

smb2_get_info_filesystem() reports 48 bytes for FS_CONTROL_INFORMATION,
that is the whole of struct smb2_fs_control_info, but never assigns
FileSystemControlFlags.  Those four bytes go to the client as they are
found in the response buffer.

The buffer is zeroed on allocation, so a standalone request leaks
nothing.  A compound request can leak: the offset of the next response
is advanced by the length pinned for the previous one, so a reply that
was written into the buffer and then dropped in favour of the short
error response of smb2_set_err_rsp() stays there, and the next reply is
laid over it with only the header cleared.

ksmbd does not implement quota tracking, so report no control flags.

Fixes: e2f34481b24d ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Khromov <haa@amicon.ru>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
@@ -5739,6 +5739,7 @@ static int smb2_get_info_filesystem(stru
 		info->FreeSpaceStopFiltering = 0;
 		info->DefaultQuotaThreshold = cpu_to_le64(SMB2_NO_FID);
 		info->DefaultQuotaLimit = cpu_to_le64(SMB2_NO_FID);
+		info->FileSystemControlFlags = 0;
 		info->Padding = 0;
 		rsp->OutputBufferLength = cpu_to_le32(48);
 		fixed_len = 48;

[PATCH 6.6 087/168] ksmbd: zero the FS_OBJECT_ID_INFORMATION buffer before filling it in

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Aleksandr Khromov <haa@amicon.ru>

commit 399aa12450a61a5c73dc77e73f069ece9687c95d upstream.

smb2_get_info_filesystem() reports 64 bytes for FS_OBJECT_ID_INFORMATION,
that is the whole of struct object_id_info, but writes only 46 of them:

 - objid[] is 16 bytes, and when the volume UUID is not available only
   sizeof(stfs.f_fsid) (8) bytes are copied into it;
 - extended_info.version_string[] is STRING_LENGTH (28) bytes, and only
   strlen("1.1.0") (5) bytes are copied into it.

The response buffer is zeroed on allocation (kvzalloc() in
smb2_allocate_rsp_buf()), so for a standalone request the remaining 31
bytes are zero.  In a compound request they need not be.  The offset of
the next response is advanced by the length pinned for the previous one,
so if a preceding command wrote its reply into the buffer and then
failed, smb2_set_err_rsp() pins only the short error response and the
next reply lands inside the area that has already been written.  Only
the header is cleared there:

	memset((char *)rsp_hdr, 0, sizeof(struct smb2_hdr) + 2);

The client then receives up to 31 bytes of a response it was not meant
to see, including one that failed with an access denied error.

Clear the structure before filling it in.  As a side effect
version_string is now NUL terminated.

Fixes: e2f34481b24d ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3")
Suggested-by: ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong@chenxiaosong.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Khromov <haa@amicon.ru>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
@@ -5685,6 +5685,7 @@ static int smb2_get_info_filesystem(stru
 		struct object_id_info *info;
 
 		info = (struct object_id_info *)(rsp->Buffer);
+		memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info));
 
 		if (path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_uuid_len == 16)
 			memcpy(info->objid, path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_uuid.b,

[PATCH 6.6 088/168] net/sched: cls_flower: validate mask pointer after nla_next()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Aohan Mei <henrymei@tencent.com>

commit fee10655709c5c597e8e9f722f3035d9ea31ff3a upstream.

fl_set_enc_opt() iterates the key's nested tunnel-option attributes
with nla_for_each_attr() while advancing a single mask pointer via
nla_next() at the bottom of each loop, so the mask cursor is driven
by the number of key attributes rather than by the mask's own
attributes.  The nla_ok() added by commit c96adff956191 ("cls_flower:
call nla_ok() before nla_next()") only validates the mask pointer
that was just consumed; the pointer produced by nla_next() is used by
the next iteration (fl_set_geneve_opt() and siblings) without any
validation.

The mask's nested attributes are validated with NL_VALIDATE_LIBERAL,
which merely warns on trailing bytes that do not form a complete
attribute.  A mask carrying one valid attribute plus 1-3 residue
bytes (or a non-aligned attribute length making msk_depth negative)
therefore reaches the next iteration with msk_depth != 0, so neither
the !msk_depth check in fl_set_enc_opt() nor the !depth check in the
per-type helpers fires.  nla_type() then reads past the mask payload
and nla_parse_nested_deprecated() iterates with an nla_len taken
from those bytes, reading well beyond the mask attribute (KASAN:
slab-out-of-bounds read in __nla_validate_parse from fl_change()).

Validate the advanced mask pointer as well: when the mask is not
legitimately exhausted (msk_depth != 0) and the new pointer fails
nla_ok(), reject the filter with -EINVAL.  An exactly exhausted mask
still skips the check, preserving exact-match behaviour for the
remaining key attributes.

Fixes: c96adff95619 ("cls_flower: call nla_ok() before nla_next()")
Reported-by: TencentOS Corvus AI <corvus@tencent.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Aohan Mei <henrymei@tencent.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260826025123.62758-1-ljp1205831794@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/sched/cls_flower.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

--- a/net/sched/cls_flower.c
+++ b/net/sched/cls_flower.c
@@ -1589,6 +1589,11 @@ static int fl_set_enc_opt(struct nlattr
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 		nla_opt_msk = nla_next(nla_opt_msk, &msk_depth);
+
+		if (msk_depth && !nla_ok(nla_opt_msk, msk_depth)) {
+			NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "A mask attribute is invalid");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
 	}
 
 	return 0;

[PATCH 6.6 089/168] smb: client: fix heap overflow in cifs_do_set_acl()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Frank Sorenson <sorenson@redhat.com>

commit 1dac61e2c29d1a71784604b48cf3b1234a65ec29 upstream.

cifs_set_acl() validates ACL size using posix_acl_xattr_size():

        4 + (count * 8)  // 4-byte header + 8 bytes per ACE

cifs_do_set_acl() then calls posix_acl_to_cifs() to write the CIFS
wire format into the same buffer:

        6 + (count * 10)  // 6-byte header + 10 bytes per ACE

An ACL that passes the xattr-based check in cifs_set_acl() can
overflow the heap when posix_acl_to_cifs() writes the larger CIFS
format.

Validate the CIFS format size against the remaining buffer space and
USHRT_MAX before converting--data_count is __u16, so sizes above
USHRT_MAX truncate the on-wire packet length, causing the server to
apply a partial ACL.  Replace MaxDataCount = 1000 with
min(CIFSMaxBufSize, USHRT_MAX).

Fixes: dc1af4c4b4721 ("cifs: implement set acl method")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Frank Sorenson <sorenson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <pc@manguebit.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/smb/client/cifssmb.c |   13 +++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/smb/client/cifssmb.c
+++ b/fs/smb/client/cifssmb.c
@@ -3152,6 +3152,7 @@ int cifs_do_set_acl(const unsigned int x
 	int rc = 0;
 	int bytes_returned = 0;
 	__u16 params, byte_count, data_count, param_offset, offset;
+	size_t cifs_acl_size, bytes_available;
 
 	cifs_dbg(FYI, "In SetPosixACL (Unix) for path %s\n", fileName);
 setAclRetry:
@@ -3170,8 +3171,7 @@ setAclRetry:
 	}
 	params = 6 + name_len;
 	pSMB->MaxParameterCount = cpu_to_le16(2);
-	/* BB find max SMB size from sess */
-	pSMB->MaxDataCount = cpu_to_le16(1000);
+	pSMB->MaxDataCount = cpu_to_le16(min_t(unsigned int, CIFSMaxBufSize, USHRT_MAX));
 	pSMB->MaxSetupCount = 0;
 	pSMB->Reserved = 0;
 	pSMB->Flags = 0;
@@ -3183,6 +3183,15 @@ setAclRetry:
 	parm_data = ((char *)pSMB) + sizeof(pSMB->hdr.smb_buf_length) + offset;
 	pSMB->ParameterOffset = cpu_to_le16(param_offset);
 
+	/* make sure we can fit the larger cifs_posix_aces in the buffer */
+	cifs_acl_size = sizeof(struct cifs_posix_acl) +
+		       (acl->a_count * sizeof(struct cifs_posix_ace));
+	bytes_available = (CIFSMaxBufSize + MAX_HEADER_SIZE(tcon->ses->server)) - offset;
+	if (cifs_acl_size > bytes_available || cifs_acl_size > USHRT_MAX) {
+		rc = -E2BIG;
+		goto setACLerrorExit;
+	}
+
 	/* convert to on the wire format for POSIX ACL */
 	data_count = posix_acl_to_cifs(parm_data, acl, acl_type);
 

[PATCH 6.6 090/168] smb: client: fix multiuser mount with krb5

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paulo Alcantara <pc@manguebit.org>

commit 69499395867332364ed4ac8b546537eb3bab6ebb upstream.

Customer reported that they could no longer mount their SMB shares
with multiuser mount option and krb5.  Turned out that the client
wasn't duplicating username option when creating multiuser
connections, therefore failing to retrieve credentials as
cifs.upcall(8) couldn't find them in keytab.

Fix this by duplicating username option (if set) from original fs
context before creating multiuser connections with krb5.

Reproducer:

  ```
  $ ktutil
  ktutil:  add_entry -password -p testuser -k 1 -e aes256-cts
  Password for testuser@ZELDA.TEST:
  ktutil:  write_kt /etc/krb5.keytab
  ktutil:  quit
  $ klist -ke
  Keytab name: FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab
  KVNO Principal
   ---- ----------------------------------------------------------------
     1 testuser@ZELDA.TEST (aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96)
  $ mount.cifs //w22-root2/scratch /mnt/1 -o \
      	uid=1000,sec=krb5,username=testuser@ZELDA.TEST,multiuser
  mount error(13): Permission denied
  Refer to the mount.cifs(8) manual page (e.g. man mount.cifs) and
  kernel log messages (dmesg)
  ```

Reported-by: Jacob Shivers <jshivers@redhat.com>
Fixes: 12b4c5d98cd7 ("smb: client: fix krb5 mount with username option")
Cc: Ronnie Sahlberg <ronniesahlberg@gmail.com>
Cc: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Cc: Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com>
Cc: Bharath SM <bharathsm@microsoft.com>
Cc: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <pc@manguebit.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/smb/client/connect.c |   21 ++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/smb/client/connect.c
+++ b/fs/smb/client/connect.c
@@ -4147,14 +4147,25 @@ cifs_setup_session(const unsigned int xi
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static int
-cifs_set_vol_auth(struct smb3_fs_context *ctx, struct cifs_ses *ses)
+static int set_fs_context_auth(struct smb3_fs_context *ctx,
+			       struct cifs_ses *ses)
 {
 	ctx->sectype = ses->sectype;
 
-	/* krb5 is special, since we don't need username or pw */
-	if (ctx->sectype == Kerberos)
+	/*
+	 * krb5 is special as we might need to pass username (passwordless) down
+	 * to cifs.upcall(8) for keytab.
+	 */
+	if (ctx->sectype == Kerberos) {
+		if (ses->user_name && ses->user_name[0]) {
+			ctx->username = kstrndup(ses->user_name,
+						 CIFS_MAX_USERNAME_LEN,
+						 GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!ctx->username)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+		}
 		return 0;
+	}
 
 	return cifs_set_cifscreds(ctx, ses);
 }
@@ -4193,7 +4204,7 @@ cifs_construct_tcon(struct cifs_sb_info
 	ctx->witness = master_tcon->use_witness;
 	ctx->dfs_root_ses = master_tcon->ses->dfs_root_ses;
 
-	rc = cifs_set_vol_auth(ctx, master_tcon->ses);
+	rc = set_fs_context_auth(ctx, master_tcon->ses);
 	if (rc) {
 		tcon = ERR_PTR(rc);
 		goto out;

[PATCH 6.6 091/168] scsi: st: Fix use-after-free race between st_remove() and st_open()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Laurence Oberman <loberman@redhat.com>

commit 71caf7f84bd62a4bf91cc95abd2de690afb8d15f upstream.

st_remove() drops the probe reference on the scsi_tape with kref_put()
and only afterwards removes its index from st_index_idr. If that was the
last reference, scsi_tape_release() frees the structure while it is
still published in the idr.

scsi_tape_get(), called from st_open(), looks up the tape in
st_index_idr and takes a reference under st_ref_mutex and
st_index_lock. remove_cdevs() does not wait for opens that are already
past chrdev_open(), so an open that is blocked on st_ref_mutex while
st_remove() holds it can take the mutex as soon as st_remove() drops it,
find the freed tpnt in the idr and call kref_get() on it:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in st_open
  Write of size 4 ...
   st_open (drivers/scsi/st.c:254 drivers/scsi/st.c:1291)
   chrdev_open
  ...
  Freed by task ...:
   kfree
   st_remove (drivers/scsi/st.c:4512)

Remove the index from the idr before dropping the reference, all under
st_ref_mutex. A concurrent scsi_tape_get() now either runs first and
holds a valid reference that keeps the tape alive, or runs afterwards
and finds nothing, so st_open() fails with -ENXIO.

This restores the ordering st_remove() had before the conversion to
st_index_idr, where the tape was unpublished from scsi_tapes[] before
the final kref_put().

Fixes: 6c648d95a6af ("[SCSI] st: get rid of scsi_tapes array")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Dingisoul <dingiso.kernel@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-scsi/20261007211520.1428497-1-dingiso.kernel@gmail.com/
Tested-by: Dingisoul <dingiso.kernel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Laurence Oberman <loberman@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261013202548.249628-1-loberman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen (Oracle) <mkp@kernel.org>
[ loberman: st_remove() still returns int in 6.6; context adjusted ]
Signed-off-by: Laurence Oberman <loberman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/scsi/st.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/scsi/st.c b/drivers/scsi/st.c
index defbc1507980a..e302e366fa278 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/st.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/st.c
@@ -4449,11 +4449,11 @@ static int st_remove(struct device *dev)
 	remove_cdevs(tpnt);
 
 	mutex_lock(&st_ref_mutex);
-	kref_put(&tpnt->kref, scsi_tape_release);
-	mutex_unlock(&st_ref_mutex);
 	spin_lock(&st_index_lock);
 	idr_remove(&st_index_idr, index);
 	spin_unlock(&st_index_lock);
+	kref_put(&tpnt->kref, scsi_tape_release);
+	mutex_unlock(&st_ref_mutex);
 	return 0;
 }
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 092/168] perf: Track the perf mlock gift separately

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) <ljs@kernel.org>

commit 78436f3882fb8d848c823bf8cf754988202c5ca5 upstream.

The locked_vm field in struct user_struct was originally introduced by
commit 789f90fcf6b0 ("perf_counter: per user mlock gift") to provide an
mlock-like budget for perf measured against mm->pinned_vm (since 2011).

perf grants each user a 'gift' of perf_event_mlock_kb * online CPUs of
buffer pages which is charged to user->locked_vm without any RLIMIT_MEMLOCK
check.

Only pages beyond the gift are checked against RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, per-mm, via
mm->pinned_vm, which makes it different from the standard mlock() check,
which is per-mm and made against RLIMIT_MEMLOCK.

However, since this was introduced, a number of other components have
utilised this field where a shared resource needed to be limited against
RLIMIT_MEMLOCK.

The other users are currently MSG_ZEROCOPY, io_uring, AF_XDP, iommufd,
s390 KVM zPCI and most recently, secretmem in commit 97d34aa65c29
("mm/secretmem: properly account locked pages").

This field is shared between all of these, but because the gift is not
checked against RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, user->locked_vm alone can exceed it - 16
CPUs * 516 KiB is already more than the default 8 MiB - after which every
other user of the field fails unconditionally.

This was reported by a user who saw secretmem failing while running a
simultaneous perf record.

Resolve the issue by simply giving perf its own field separate from the
rest.

BPF used user->locked_vm up until commit 80ee81e0403c ("bpf: Eliminate
rlimit-based memory accounting infra for bpf maps") which landed in 5.11.

Thus also eliminate the now-defunct ifdef for CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL for
user->locked_vm.

This issue exists between all of the components which use user->locked_vm
and perf, however secretmem is the first user who has caused a report over
many years and has been backported, so target the fix at that.

Fixes: 97d34aa65c29 ("mm/secretmem: properly account locked pages")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/20261002175651.811343-1-ameer.hamza@truenas.com
Reported-by: Ameer Hamza <ameer.hamza@truenas.com>
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) <ljs@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[ ljs - Applied to open-coded accounting in perf_mmap()/perf_mmap_close(). ]
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) <ljs@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 include/linux/sched/user.h |  8 +++++---
 kernel/events/core.c       | 12 ++++++------
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/sched/user.h b/include/linux/sched/user.h
index 8d7e5521f7cdd..ec262b605437c 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched/user.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched/user.h
@@ -23,11 +23,13 @@ struct user_struct {
 	struct hlist_node uidhash_node;
 	kuid_t uid;
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS) || defined(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) || \
-	defined(CONFIG_NET) || defined(CONFIG_IO_URING) || \
+#if defined(CONFIG_NET) || defined(CONFIG_IO_URING) || \
 	defined(CONFIG_VFIO_PCI_ZDEV_KVM) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IOMMUFD) || \
 	defined(CONFIG_SECRETMEM)
-	atomic_long_t locked_vm;
+	atomic_long_t locked_vm;	/* pinned pages charged to RLIMIT_MEMLOCK */
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
+	atomic_long_t perf_mlock;	/* perf buffer pages within perf_event_mlock_kb */
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE
 	atomic_t nr_watches;	/* The number of watches this user currently has */
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index a6c78d8ee1cf9..70b8d75d7c78e 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -6408,7 +6408,7 @@ static void perf_mmap_close(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 		perf_pmu_output_stop(event);
 
 		/* now it's safe to free the pages */
-		atomic_long_sub(rb->aux_nr_pages - rb->aux_mmap_locked, &mmap_user->locked_vm);
+		atomic_long_sub(rb->aux_nr_pages - rb->aux_mmap_locked, &mmap_user->perf_mlock);
 		atomic64_sub(rb->aux_mmap_locked, &vma->vm_mm->pinned_vm);
 
 		/* this has to be the last one */
@@ -6483,7 +6483,7 @@ static void perf_mmap_close(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 	 */
 
 	atomic_long_sub((size >> PAGE_SHIFT) + 1 - mmap_locked,
-			&mmap_user->locked_vm);
+			&mmap_user->perf_mlock);
 	atomic64_sub(mmap_locked, &vma->vm_mm->pinned_vm);
 	free_uid(mmap_user);
 
@@ -6643,11 +6643,11 @@ static int perf_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 	 */
 	user_lock_limit *= num_online_cpus();
 
-	user_locked = atomic_long_read(&user->locked_vm);
+	user_locked = atomic_long_read(&user->perf_mlock);
 
 	/*
 	 * sysctl_perf_event_mlock may have changed, so that
-	 *     user->locked_vm > user_lock_limit
+	 *     user->perf_mlock > user_lock_limit
 	 */
 	if (user_locked > user_lock_limit)
 		user_locked = user_lock_limit;
@@ -6655,7 +6655,7 @@ static int perf_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 
 	if (user_locked > user_lock_limit) {
 		/*
-		 * charge locked_vm until it hits user_lock_limit;
+		 * charge perf_mlock until it hits user_lock_limit;
 		 * charge the rest from pinned_vm
 		 */
 		extra = user_locked - user_lock_limit;
@@ -6707,7 +6707,7 @@ static int perf_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 
 unlock:
 	if (!ret) {
-		atomic_long_add(user_extra, &user->locked_vm);
+		atomic_long_add(user_extra, &user->perf_mlock);
 		atomic64_add(extra, &vma->vm_mm->pinned_vm);
 
 		atomic_inc(&event->mmap_count);
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 093/168] eventfs: fix SRCU read lock leak in eventfs_iterate()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>

Commit 25d27d5fa864 ("eventfs: Use children field for rcu head and add
memory barriers") added an early bail out to the ei->children loop:

	smp_rmb();
	if (ei->is_freed)
		return -EINVAL;

Upstream wraps eventfs_iterate() in guard(srcu)(&eventfs_srcu), so that
return still drops the read lock. The 6.6.y backport instead brackets the
function with srcu_read_lock() and a shared "out" label that calls
srcu_read_unlock(), so this path returns while still holding eventfs_srcu
for reading.

The unbalanced reader prevents the grace period from ever completing, so
the call_srcu() callback queued by free_ei() never runs and the
eventfs_inode is leaked. Every readdir that races with removal adds
another reader.

Set ret and jump to "out" like the other bail out paths in this function
do.

Fixes: 25d27d5fa864 ("eventfs: Use children field for rcu head and add memory barriers")
Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/tracefs/event_inode.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/tracefs/event_inode.c b/fs/tracefs/event_inode.c
index 880a4d667472b..ca55828e7446d 100644
--- a/fs/tracefs/event_inode.c
+++ b/fs/tracefs/event_inode.c
@@ -748,8 +748,10 @@ static int eventfs_iterate(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
 		 * Matches the smp_wmb() in free_ei()
 		 */
 		smp_rmb();
-		if (ei->is_freed)
-			return -EINVAL;
+		if (ei->is_freed) {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
 
 		if (c > 0) {
 			c--;
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 094/168] kernel/watch_queue: Use pipe_buf() to retrieve the pipe buffer

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>

[ Upstream commit 547476063e123e73fc3aea8432104ab092ffea84 ]

Use pipe_buf() helper to retrieve the pipe buffer in
post_one_notification() replacing the open-coded the logic.

Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250307052919.34542-3-kprateek.nayak@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 5e531d62f1f8 ("watch_queue: Fix note pool publication race in watch_queue_set_size()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/watch_queue.c | 7 +++----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/watch_queue.c b/kernel/watch_queue.c
index 17254597accd4..0840603c91e37 100644
--- a/kernel/watch_queue.c
+++ b/kernel/watch_queue.c
@@ -101,12 +101,11 @@ static bool post_one_notification(struct watch_queue *wqueue,
 	struct pipe_inode_info *pipe = wqueue->pipe;
 	struct pipe_buffer *buf;
 	struct page *page;
-	unsigned int head, tail, mask, note, offset, len;
+	unsigned int head, tail, note, offset, len;
 	bool done = false;
 
 	spin_lock_irq(&pipe->rd_wait.lock);
 
-	mask = pipe->ring_size - 1;
 	head = pipe->head;
 	tail = pipe->tail;
 	if (pipe_full(head, tail, pipe->ring_size))
@@ -124,7 +123,7 @@ static bool post_one_notification(struct watch_queue *wqueue,
 	memcpy(p + offset, n, len);
 	kunmap_atomic(p);
 
-	buf = &pipe->bufs[head & mask];
+	buf = pipe_buf(pipe, head);
 	buf->page = page;
 	buf->private = (unsigned long)wqueue;
 	buf->ops = &watch_queue_pipe_buf_ops;
@@ -147,7 +146,7 @@ static bool post_one_notification(struct watch_queue *wqueue,
 	return done;
 
 lost:
-	buf = &pipe->bufs[(head - 1) & mask];
+	buf = pipe_buf(pipe, head - 1);
 	buf->flags |= PIPE_BUF_FLAG_LOSS;
 	goto out;
 }
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 095/168] watch_queue: Fix note pool publication race in watch_queue_set_size()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Cen Zhang (Microsoft) <cenzhang@linux.microsoft.com>

[ Upstream commit 5e531d62f1f8834faf7a4eed0d41105cf6570a8f ]

There is a race between watch_queue_set_size() and post_one_notification().
watch_queue_set_size() publishes wqueue->notes, notes_bitmap, nr_pages and
nr_notes with plain stores, and post_one_notification() reads them with
plain loads under a different lock, so nothing orders the four stores
against the poster's loads: depending on the build, notes can be stored
last (gcc 14 on x86-64 does this).  Since keyctl_watch_key() lets a watch
attach to a queue before it is sized, post_one_notification() can already
be running on another CPU at that moment: it reads nr_notes > 0, passes
its bounds check, and then reads notes while it is still NULL,
dereferencing notes[0].

An unprivileged user triggers this reliably by watching one of its own
keys through a notification pipe and racing ioctl(IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_SIZE)
on that pipe against keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM) on the key from another CPU,
triggering:

  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
  RIP: 0010:post_one_notification.isra.0+0xa2/0x1e0
  Call Trace:
   __post_watch_notification+0x148/0x180
   keyctl_setperm_key+0x119/0x130
   do_syscall_64+0x108/0x4c0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt

Fix this by publishing nr_notes last with smp_store_release(), and by
reading it once with smp_load_acquire() in post_one_notification() before
the bitmap and the page array are touched.  A poster that observes a
non-zero nr_notes then also observes the pool behind it; one that observes
zero drops the notification as before.

Fixes: c73be61cede5 ("pipe: Add general notification queue support")
Reported-by: Dae R. Jeong <threeearcat@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZT-S8Q7tyutcvu_q@dragonet/
Reported-by: AutonomousCodeSecurity@microsoft.com
Suggested-by: Dae R. Jeong <threeearcat@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang (Microsoft) <cenzhang@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261009224715.46121-1-cenzhang@linux.microsoft.com
Reviewed-by: Bradley Morgan <brads@mainlining.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/watch_queue.c | 11 +++++++----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/watch_queue.c b/kernel/watch_queue.c
index 0840603c91e37..d5a76a5efd204 100644
--- a/kernel/watch_queue.c
+++ b/kernel/watch_queue.c
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static bool post_one_notification(struct watch_queue *wqueue,
 	struct pipe_inode_info *pipe = wqueue->pipe;
 	struct pipe_buffer *buf;
 	struct page *page;
-	unsigned int head, tail, note, offset, len;
+	unsigned int head, tail, note, offset, len, nr_notes;
 	bool done = false;
 
 	spin_lock_irq(&pipe->rd_wait.lock);
@@ -111,8 +111,10 @@ static bool post_one_notification(struct watch_queue *wqueue,
 	if (pipe_full(head, tail, pipe->ring_size))
 		goto lost;
 
-	note = find_first_bit(wqueue->notes_bitmap, wqueue->nr_notes);
-	if (note >= wqueue->nr_notes)
+	/* Pairs with the smp_store_release() in watch_queue_set_size(). */
+	nr_notes = smp_load_acquire(&wqueue->nr_notes);
+	note = find_first_bit(wqueue->notes_bitmap, nr_notes);
+	if (note >= nr_notes)
 		goto lost;
 
 	page = wqueue->notes[note / WATCH_QUEUE_NOTES_PER_PAGE];
@@ -297,7 +299,8 @@ long watch_queue_set_size(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned int nr_notes)
 	wqueue->notes = pages;
 	wqueue->notes_bitmap = bitmap;
 	wqueue->nr_pages = nr_pages;
-	wqueue->nr_notes = nr_notes;
+	/* Pairs with the smp_load_acquire() in post_one_notification(). */
+	smp_store_release(&wqueue->nr_notes, nr_notes);
 	return 0;
 
 error_p:
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 096/168] ntfs3: free the sbi after a grace period

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit c01b091b06412d3b1b53d8c2925f6de586c8a2fc ]

If the "nocase" mount option ntfs3 uses custom hash and dentry compare
functions. Both access ntfs3 superblock private information in rcu
pathwalk. ntfs_put_super() and ntfs3_kill_sb() drop the info without any
rcu delay. A lookup that's still inside the filesystem when the last
reference to the mount is dropped causes a UAF. With a pathwalk held up
in ntfs_d_hash() while the last reference to the mount goes away:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ntfs_nls_to_utf16+0x752/0x940
  Read of size 8 at addr ff1100010453c850 by task walker/99
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   ntfs_nls_to_utf16+0x752/0x940
   ntfs_d_hash+0x22b/0x500
   link_path_walk+0x11ad/0x1d30
   path_lookupat+0x63/0xb00
   filename_lookup+0x1f1/0x5b0
   vfs_statx+0xd7/0x3b0
  [...]
  Allocated by task 95:
   __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x249/0x560
   ntfs_init_fs_context+0x2db/0x5a0
   alloc_fs_context+0x52e/0xc70
  [...]
  Freed by task 98:
   kfree+0x1db/0x5b0
   deactivate_locked_super+0x9c/0xf0
   cleanup_mnt+0x9f/0x130
   task_work_run+0x131/0x250

The bug is currently masked by the grace period in namespace_unlock()
for umount(2). Keep the necessary information until the filesystem
private info is freed and free it with an rcu delay.

ntfs3_free_sbi() now runs from an rcu callback and drops the upcase
table via ntfs_put_shared(). So switch s_shared_lock over to
spin_lock_bh(). Otherwise the callback can deadlock against a task
holding the lock on the same cpu.

Fixes: a3a956c78efa ("fs/ntfs3: Add option "nocase"")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261009-work-fixes-rcu-v1-7-7446d2d335e6@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
[ sashal: Omitted removal of mount-option cleanup already absent from ntfs_put_super(). ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/ntfs3/ntfs_fs.h |  1 +
 fs/ntfs3/super.c   | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/ntfs_fs.h b/fs/ntfs3/ntfs_fs.h
index 5e7536ad0b94c..8850ee2b75b11 100644
--- a/fs/ntfs3/ntfs_fs.h
+++ b/fs/ntfs3/ntfs_fs.h
@@ -209,6 +209,7 @@ struct ntfs_index {
 /* Ntfs file system in-core superblock data. */
 struct ntfs_sb_info {
 	struct super_block *sb;
+	struct rcu_head rcu;
 
 	u32 discard_granularity;
 	u64 discard_granularity_mask_inv; // ~(discard_granularity_mask_inv-1)
diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/super.c b/fs/ntfs3/super.c
index 15b1f2027b4ed..3b7731b188302 100644
--- a/fs/ntfs3/super.c
+++ b/fs/ntfs3/super.c
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ void *ntfs_set_shared(void *ptr, u32 bytes)
 	void *ret = NULL;
 	int i, j = -1;
 
-	spin_lock(&s_shared_lock);
+	spin_lock_bh(&s_shared_lock);
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(s_shared); i++) {
 		if (!s_shared[i].cnt) {
 			j = i;
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ void *ntfs_set_shared(void *ptr, u32 bytes)
 		s_shared[j].cnt = 1;
 		ret = ptr;
 	}
-	spin_unlock(&s_shared_lock);
+	spin_unlock_bh(&s_shared_lock);
 
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ void *ntfs_put_shared(void *ptr)
 	void *ret = ptr;
 	int i;
 
-	spin_lock(&s_shared_lock);
+	spin_lock_bh(&s_shared_lock);
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(s_shared); i++) {
 		if (s_shared[i].cnt && s_shared[i].ptr == ptr) {
 			if (--s_shared[i].cnt)
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ void *ntfs_put_shared(void *ptr)
 			break;
 		}
 	}
-	spin_unlock(&s_shared_lock);
+	spin_unlock_bh(&s_shared_lock);
 
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -624,6 +624,8 @@ static noinline void ntfs3_put_sbi(struct ntfs_sb_info *sbi)
 
 static void ntfs3_free_sbi(struct ntfs_sb_info *sbi)
 {
+	if (sbi->options)
+		put_mount_options(sbi->options);
 	kfree(sbi->new_rec);
 	kvfree(ntfs_put_shared(sbi->upcase));
 	kvfree(sbi->def_table);
@@ -635,6 +637,11 @@ static void ntfs3_free_sbi(struct ntfs_sb_info *sbi)
 	kfree(sbi);
 }
 
+static void ntfs3_free_sbi_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+	ntfs3_free_sbi(container_of(head, struct ntfs_sb_info, rcu));
+}
+
 static void ntfs_put_super(struct super_block *sb)
 {
 	struct ntfs_sb_info *sbi = sb->s_fs_info;
@@ -651,6 +658,12 @@ static void ntfs_put_super(struct super_block *sb)
 
 	/* Mark rw ntfs as clear, if possible. */
 	ntfs_set_state(sbi, NTFS_DIRTY_CLEAR);
+
+	/*
+	 * The mount options stay until the sbi is freed: ->d_hash() and
+	 * ->d_compare() of a pathwalk in rcu mode read the nls table through
+	 * them.
+	 */
 	ntfs3_put_sbi(sbi);
 }
 
@@ -1807,9 +1820,11 @@ static void ntfs3_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
 
 	kill_block_super(sb);
 
-	if (sbi->options)
-		put_mount_options(sbi->options);
-	ntfs3_free_sbi(sbi);
+	/*
+	 * A pathwalk in rcu mode may still be in ->d_hash() or ->d_compare()
+	 * and read the upcase table and the nls table through the sbi.
+	 */
+	call_rcu(&sbi->rcu, ntfs3_free_sbi_rcu);
 }
 
 // clang-format off
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 097/168] ext4: free the sbi after a grace period

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit c17b44266a1f9fcb49b894d4611d1254bf1aa313 ]

ext4_get_link() follows a symlink that keeps its target in a data block
in rcu pathwalk mode with ext4_getblk(EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CACHED_NOWAIT).
That reads s_mount_state in the ASSERT() of ext4_getblk() and again in
ext4_es_lookup_extent(), and the lookup bumps the extent status hit or
miss counter, all through sb->s_fs_info.

ext4_put_super() destroys those counters, clears sb->s_fs_info and frees
the sbi without waiting for a grace period. A pathwalk that is still in
ext4_get_link() when the last reference to the mount goes away then
dereferences a NULL s_fs_info, the freed sbi or the destroyed percpu
counters.

With a pathwalk held up in ext4_get_link() while the last reference
goes away:

  KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000a8-0x00000000000000af]
  RIP: 0010:ext4_getblk+0xf0/0x640
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   ext4_get_link+0x26c/0x410
   pick_link+0xf96/0x1780
   step_into_slowpath+0x9b8/0x1250
   path_lookupat+0x484/0xb00
   filename_lookup+0x1f1/0x5b0
   vfs_statx+0xd7/0x3b0
   vfs_fstatat+0x4d/0x90
   __do_sys_newfstatat+0xa0/0x100
   do_syscall_64+0x10e/0x5e0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

So far that has been hard to hit. umount(2) waits for a grace period in
namespace_unlock() before it drops the mount, so only a mount whose last
reference goes away elsewhere, like the close of a file or a chdir out of
a lazily unmounted directory, can race a walker.

Keep sb->s_fs_info and free the sbi together with the extent status
counters after a grace period. Split the counters out of
ext4_es_unregister_shrinker() for that. The shrinker still gets wasted
in ext4_put_super(), the counters go with the sbi.

Fixes: 6493792d3299 ("ext4: convert symlink external data block mapping to bdev")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261009-work-fixes-rcu-v1-1-7446d2d335e6@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
[ sashal: Replaced shrinker_free() with unregister_shrinker() for the embedded shrinker. ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/ext4/ext4.h           |  2 ++
 fs/ext4/extents_status.c |  7 ++++++-
 fs/ext4/extents_status.h |  1 +
 fs/ext4/super.c          | 13 +++++++++++--
 4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/ext4/ext4.h b/fs/ext4/ext4.h
index 5654a1cd2b4af..58746c5130ac6 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h
+++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h
@@ -1669,6 +1669,8 @@ struct ext4_sb_info {
 	struct list_head s_es_list;	/* List of inodes with reclaimable extents */
 	long s_es_nr_inode;
 	struct ext4_es_stats s_es_stats;
+	/* ext4_get_link() reads the sbi in rcu pathwalk */
+	struct rcu_head s_rcu;
 	struct mb_cache *s_ea_block_cache;
 	struct mb_cache *s_ea_inode_cache;
 	spinlock_t s_es_lock ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp;
diff --git a/fs/ext4/extents_status.c b/fs/ext4/extents_status.c
index d9d5cfb9c951a..cd5160e72d5ae 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/extents_status.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/extents_status.c
@@ -1749,12 +1749,17 @@ int ext4_es_register_shrinker(struct ext4_sb_info *sbi)
 }
 
 void ext4_es_unregister_shrinker(struct ext4_sb_info *sbi)
+{
+	unregister_shrinker(&sbi->s_es_shrinker);
+}
+
+/* ext4_get_link() bumps the hit and miss counters in rcu pathwalk */
+void ext4_es_destroy_stats(struct ext4_sb_info *sbi)
 {
 	percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_es_stats.es_stats_cache_hits);
 	percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_es_stats.es_stats_cache_misses);
 	percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_es_stats.es_stats_all_cnt);
 	percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_es_stats.es_stats_shk_cnt);
-	unregister_shrinker(&sbi->s_es_shrinker);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/fs/ext4/extents_status.h b/fs/ext4/extents_status.h
index d9847a4a25dba..b2c6579b2c9dd 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/extents_status.h
+++ b/fs/ext4/extents_status.h
@@ -241,6 +241,7 @@ static inline void ext4_es_store_pblock_status(struct extent_status *es,
 
 extern int ext4_es_register_shrinker(struct ext4_sb_info *sbi);
 extern void ext4_es_unregister_shrinker(struct ext4_sb_info *sbi);
+extern void ext4_es_destroy_stats(struct ext4_sb_info *sbi);
 
 extern int ext4_seq_es_shrinker_info_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v);
 
diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c
index 349e2b087769d..94d40e03ff2f0 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/super.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/super.c
@@ -1289,6 +1289,14 @@ static void ext4_flex_groups_free(struct ext4_sb_info *sbi)
 	}
 }
 
+static void ext4_put_sbi_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+	struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = container_of(head, struct ext4_sb_info, s_rcu);
+
+	ext4_es_destroy_stats(sbi);
+	kfree(sbi);
+}
+
 static void ext4_put_super(struct super_block *sb)
 {
 	struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
@@ -1378,7 +1386,6 @@ static void ext4_put_super(struct super_block *sb)
 	ext4_stop_mmpd(sbi);
 
 	brelse(sbi->s_sbh);
-	sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
 	/*
 	 * Now that we are completely done shutting down the
 	 * superblock, we need to actually destroy the kobject.
@@ -1393,7 +1400,8 @@ static void ext4_put_super(struct super_block *sb)
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UNICODE)
 	utf8_unload(sb->s_encoding);
 #endif
-	kfree(sbi);
+	/* ext4_get_link() reads the sbi and the counters in rcu pathwalk */
+	call_rcu(&sbi->s_rcu, ext4_put_sbi_rcu);
 }
 
 static struct kmem_cache *ext4_inode_cachep;
@@ -5688,6 +5696,7 @@ failed_mount8: __maybe_unused
 	}
 failed_mount3a:
 	ext4_es_unregister_shrinker(sbi);
+	ext4_es_destroy_stats(sbi);
 failed_mount3:
 	/* flush s_sb_upd_work before sbi destroy */
 	flush_work(&sbi->s_sb_upd_work);
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 098/168] scsi: bsg: Pass reply_len to bsg_setup_queue() to fit UFS ARPMB replies

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Stanley Jhu <stanleyjhu@google.com>

[ Upstream commit ec6b083915e8146e147314a5f4f1285d07b57bfc ]

bsg-lib allocates a 96-byte (SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE) reply buffer per
job, but struct ufs_rpmb_reply is 104 bytes: a 40-byte struct
ufs_bsg_reply followed by a 64-byte EHS. When an Advanced RPMB command
returns an EHS, ufshcd_advanced_rpmb_req_handler() copies it right after
the 40-byte header and writes 8 bytes past the end of the buffer.

Let each BSG transport pass its reply buffer size to bsg_setup_queue()
and have ufs_bsg request sizeof(struct ufs_rpmb_reply), so the full
reply reaches user space. Other transports keep SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE.

Fixes: 6ff265fc5ef6 ("scsi: ufs: core: bsg: Add advanced RPMB support in ufs_bsg")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stanley Jhu <stanleyjhu@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261013132708.1669415-1-stanleyjhu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen (Oracle) <mkp@kernel.org>
[ sashal: Adapted bsg_setup_queue() and its callers to the existing interface without a queue-limits parameter. ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 block/bsg-lib.c                     | 13 ++++++++++---
 drivers/scsi/mpi3mr/mpi3mr_app.c    |  2 +-
 drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_fc.c    |  5 +++--
 drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_iscsi.c |  3 ++-
 drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_sas.c   |  6 ++++--
 drivers/ufs/core/ufs_bsg.c          |  3 ++-
 include/linux/bsg-lib.h             |  3 ++-
 7 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/block/bsg-lib.c b/block/bsg-lib.c
index b3acdbdb6e7ea..5df816a0a58ee 100644
--- a/block/bsg-lib.c
+++ b/block/bsg-lib.c
@@ -23,11 +23,14 @@ struct bsg_set {
 	struct bsg_device	*bd;
 	bsg_job_fn		*job_fn;
 	bsg_timeout_fn		*timeout_fn;
+	unsigned int		reply_len;
 };
 
 static int bsg_transport_sg_io_fn(struct request_queue *q, struct sg_io_v4 *hdr,
 		bool open_for_write, unsigned int timeout)
 {
+	struct bsg_set *bset =
+		container_of(q->tag_set, struct bsg_set, tag_set);
 	struct bsg_job *job;
 	struct request *rq;
 	struct bio *bio;
@@ -50,7 +53,7 @@ static int bsg_transport_sg_io_fn(struct request_queue *q, struct sg_io_v4 *hdr,
 	reply = job->reply;
 	memset(job, 0, sizeof(*job));
 	job->reply = reply;
-	job->reply_len = SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE;
+	job->reply_len = bset->reply_len;
 	job->dd_data = job + 1;
 
 	job->request_len = hdr->request_len;
@@ -301,9 +304,10 @@ static blk_status_t bsg_queue_rq(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx,
 static int bsg_init_rq(struct blk_mq_tag_set *set, struct request *req,
 		       unsigned int hctx_idx, unsigned int numa_node)
 {
+	struct bsg_set *bset = container_of(set, struct bsg_set, tag_set);
 	struct bsg_job *job = blk_mq_rq_to_pdu(req);
 
-	job->reply = kzalloc(SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+	job->reply = kzalloc(bset->reply_len, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!job->reply)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	return 0;
@@ -357,9 +361,11 @@ static const struct blk_mq_ops bsg_mq_ops = {
  * @job_fn: bsg job handler
  * @timeout: timeout handler function pointer
  * @dd_job_size: size of LLD data needed for each job
+ * @reply_len: size of the reply buffer needed for each job
  */
 struct request_queue *bsg_setup_queue(struct device *dev, const char *name,
-		bsg_job_fn *job_fn, bsg_timeout_fn *timeout, int dd_job_size)
+		bsg_job_fn *job_fn, bsg_timeout_fn *timeout, int dd_job_size,
+		unsigned int reply_len)
 {
 	struct bsg_set *bset;
 	struct blk_mq_tag_set *set;
@@ -372,6 +378,7 @@ struct request_queue *bsg_setup_queue(struct device *dev, const char *name,
 
 	bset->job_fn = job_fn;
 	bset->timeout_fn = timeout;
+	bset->reply_len = reply_len;
 
 	set = &bset->tag_set;
 	set->ops = &bsg_mq_ops;
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/mpi3mr/mpi3mr_app.c b/drivers/scsi/mpi3mr/mpi3mr_app.c
index 27fcffa94713b..fdec01d4bcee3 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/mpi3mr/mpi3mr_app.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/mpi3mr/mpi3mr_app.c
@@ -1551,7 +1551,7 @@ void mpi3mr_bsg_init(struct mpi3mr_ioc *mrioc)
 	}
 
 	q = bsg_setup_queue(bsg_dev, dev_name(bsg_dev),
-			mpi3mr_bsg_request, NULL, 0);
+			mpi3mr_bsg_request, NULL, 0, SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE);
 	if (IS_ERR(q)) {
 		ioc_err(mrioc, "%s: bsg registration failed\n",
 		    dev_name(bsg_dev));
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_fc.c b/drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_fc.c
index fd827e30556b1..8d53a6717da81 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_fc.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_fc.c
@@ -4293,7 +4293,7 @@ fc_bsg_hostadd(struct Scsi_Host *shost, struct fc_host_attrs *fc_host)
 		 "fc_host%d", shost->host_no);
 
 	q = bsg_setup_queue(dev, bsg_name, fc_bsg_dispatch, fc_bsg_job_timeout,
-				i->f->dd_bsg_size);
+				i->f->dd_bsg_size, SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE);
 	if (IS_ERR(q)) {
 		dev_err(dev,
 			"fc_host%d: bsg interface failed to initialize - setup queue\n",
@@ -4324,7 +4324,8 @@ fc_bsg_rportadd(struct Scsi_Host *shost, struct fc_rport *rport)
 		return -ENOTSUPP;
 
 	q = bsg_setup_queue(dev, dev_name(dev), fc_bsg_dispatch_prep,
-				fc_bsg_job_timeout, i->f->dd_bsg_size);
+				fc_bsg_job_timeout, i->f->dd_bsg_size,
+				SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE);
 	if (IS_ERR(q)) {
 		dev_err(dev, "failed to setup bsg queue\n");
 		return PTR_ERR(q);
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_iscsi.c b/drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_iscsi.c
index 22bec2453bac9..7cc99d213ce22 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_iscsi.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_iscsi.c
@@ -1542,7 +1542,8 @@ iscsi_bsg_host_add(struct Scsi_Host *shost, struct iscsi_cls_host *ihost)
 		return -ENOTSUPP;
 
 	snprintf(bsg_name, sizeof(bsg_name), "iscsi_host%d", shost->host_no);
-	q = bsg_setup_queue(dev, bsg_name, iscsi_bsg_host_dispatch, NULL, 0);
+	q = bsg_setup_queue(dev, bsg_name, iscsi_bsg_host_dispatch, NULL, 0,
+			SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE);
 	if (IS_ERR(q)) {
 		shost_printk(KERN_ERR, shost, "bsg interface failed to "
 			     "initialize - no request queue\n");
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_sas.c b/drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_sas.c
index ce69240accb28..edb9b853c938b 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_sas.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_sas.c
@@ -199,7 +199,8 @@ static int sas_bsg_initialize(struct Scsi_Host *shost, struct sas_rphy *rphy)
 
 	if (rphy) {
 		q = bsg_setup_queue(&rphy->dev, dev_name(&rphy->dev),
-				sas_smp_dispatch, NULL, 0);
+				sas_smp_dispatch, NULL, 0,
+				SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE);
 		if (IS_ERR(q))
 			return PTR_ERR(q);
 		rphy->q = q;
@@ -208,7 +209,8 @@ static int sas_bsg_initialize(struct Scsi_Host *shost, struct sas_rphy *rphy)
 
 		snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "sas_host%d", shost->host_no);
 		q = bsg_setup_queue(&shost->shost_gendev, name,
-				sas_smp_dispatch, NULL, 0);
+				sas_smp_dispatch, NULL, 0,
+				SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE);
 		if (IS_ERR(q))
 			return PTR_ERR(q);
 		to_sas_host_attrs(shost)->q = q;
diff --git a/drivers/ufs/core/ufs_bsg.c b/drivers/ufs/core/ufs_bsg.c
index 0043d69077b64..df31f89b9666f 100644
--- a/drivers/ufs/core/ufs_bsg.c
+++ b/drivers/ufs/core/ufs_bsg.c
@@ -256,7 +256,8 @@ int ufs_bsg_probe(struct ufs_hba *hba)
 	if (ret)
 		goto out;
 
-	q = bsg_setup_queue(bsg_dev, dev_name(bsg_dev), ufs_bsg_request, NULL, 0);
+	q = bsg_setup_queue(bsg_dev, dev_name(bsg_dev), ufs_bsg_request, NULL, 0,
+			sizeof(struct ufs_rpmb_reply));
 	if (IS_ERR(q)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(q);
 		device_del(bsg_dev);
diff --git a/include/linux/bsg-lib.h b/include/linux/bsg-lib.h
index 9e97ced2896df..1c6b057c6412c 100644
--- a/include/linux/bsg-lib.h
+++ b/include/linux/bsg-lib.h
@@ -65,7 +65,8 @@ struct bsg_job {
 void bsg_job_done(struct bsg_job *job, int result,
 		  unsigned int reply_payload_rcv_len);
 struct request_queue *bsg_setup_queue(struct device *dev, const char *name,
-		bsg_job_fn *job_fn, bsg_timeout_fn *timeout, int dd_job_size);
+		bsg_job_fn *job_fn, bsg_timeout_fn *timeout, int dd_job_size,
+		unsigned int reply_len);
 void bsg_remove_queue(struct request_queue *q);
 void bsg_job_put(struct bsg_job *job);
 int __must_check bsg_job_get(struct bsg_job *job);
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 099/168] drm/exec: dont immediately add prelocked obj to array of locked objs

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian König <ckoenig.leichtzumerken@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 26401a4999f1596a515b2e704e7066ac09306488 ]

When a contention is detected the drm_exec object grabs a reference to
the contended object, unlocks all other objects and pre-locks the
contended one before anything else.

The problem is that it is possible that this pre-locked object was about
to be destroyed and drm_exec is now holding the last reference to it.

So we never actually see this pre-locked object again to be explicitly
locked and so also never reserve a slot for a dma_fence object on it.

Should the driver now use drm_exec_for_each_locked_object() to add a new
fence to all locked objects we eventually see a warning or even a
BUG_ON() to prevent random memory corruption.

Fix this by keeping the prelocked object out of the array of locked objs
until it was explicitly mentioned by the driver again.

If the prelocked object is never mentioned again by the driver
just unlock and drop the reference at the end of the locking loop.

Signed-off-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reported-by: Vitaly Prosyak <vitaly.prosyak@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Prosyak <vitaly.prosyak@amd.com>
Tested-by: Vitaly Prosyak <vitaly.prosyak@amd.com>
Fixes: 09593216bff1 ("drm: execution context for GEM buffers v7")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.6+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20261007124657.9664-1-christian.koenig@amd.com
[ sashal: Adapted iterator documentation to preserve the existing explicit index parameter. ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_exec.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 include/drm/drm_exec.h     |  9 ++---
 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_exec.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_exec.c
index d22d487a8356b..4947447598ef5 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_exec.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_exec.c
@@ -50,6 +50,16 @@
 /* Dummy value used to initially enter the retry loop */
 #define DRM_EXEC_DUMMY ((void *)~0)
 
+/* Unlock and put the prelocked obj */
+static void drm_exec_drop_prelocked(struct drm_exec *exec)
+{
+	if (exec->prelocked) {
+		dma_resv_unlock(exec->prelocked->resv);
+		drm_gem_object_put(exec->prelocked);
+		exec->prelocked = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
 /* Unlock all objects and drop references */
 static void drm_exec_unlock_all(struct drm_exec *exec)
 {
@@ -61,8 +71,7 @@ static void drm_exec_unlock_all(struct drm_exec *exec)
 		drm_gem_object_put(obj);
 	}
 
-	drm_gem_object_put(exec->prelocked);
-	exec->prelocked = NULL;
+	drm_exec_drop_prelocked(exec);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -114,6 +123,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(drm_exec_fini);
 bool drm_exec_cleanup(struct drm_exec *exec)
 {
 	if (likely(!exec->contended)) {
+
+		/*
+		 * The contended and prelocked object might never be passed to
+		 * drm_exec_lock_obj() again. This can happen when the object
+		 * is about to be cleaned up and we now hold the last reference
+		 * to it. Make sure that we don't unnecessarily keep it around.
+		 */
+		drm_exec_drop_prelocked(exec);
 		ww_acquire_done(&exec->ticket);
 		return false;
 	}
@@ -172,16 +189,16 @@ static int drm_exec_lock_contended(struct drm_exec *exec)
 		dma_resv_lock_slow(obj->resv, &exec->ticket);
 	}
 
-	ret = drm_exec_obj_locked(exec, obj);
-	if (unlikely(ret))
-		goto error_unlock;
+	/*
+	 * It is perfectly possible that we see another contention before the
+	 * first one is fully handled.
+	 */
+	drm_exec_drop_prelocked(exec);
 
+	/* We move the reference from contended to prelocked here */
 	exec->prelocked = obj;
 	return 0;
 
-error_unlock:
-	dma_resv_unlock(obj->resv);
-
 error_dropref:
 	drm_gem_object_put(obj);
 	return ret;
@@ -209,35 +226,31 @@ int drm_exec_lock_obj(struct drm_exec *exec, struct drm_gem_object *obj)
 	if (exec->prelocked == obj) {
 		drm_gem_object_put(exec->prelocked);
 		exec->prelocked = NULL;
-		return 0;
-	}
+	} else {
+		if (exec->flags & DRM_EXEC_INTERRUPTIBLE_WAIT)
+			ret = dma_resv_lock_interruptible(obj->resv,
+							  &exec->ticket);
+		else
+			ret = dma_resv_lock(obj->resv, &exec->ticket);
+
+		if (unlikely(ret == -EDEADLK)) {
+			drm_gem_object_get(obj);
+			exec->contended = obj;
+			return -EDEADLK;
+		}
 
-	if (exec->flags & DRM_EXEC_INTERRUPTIBLE_WAIT)
-		ret = dma_resv_lock_interruptible(obj->resv, &exec->ticket);
-	else
-		ret = dma_resv_lock(obj->resv, &exec->ticket);
+		if (unlikely(ret == -EALREADY) &&
+		    exec->flags & DRM_EXEC_IGNORE_DUPLICATES)
+			return 0;
 
-	if (unlikely(ret == -EDEADLK)) {
-		drm_gem_object_get(obj);
-		exec->contended = obj;
-		return -EDEADLK;
+		if (unlikely(ret))
+			return ret;
 	}
 
-	if (unlikely(ret == -EALREADY) &&
-	    exec->flags & DRM_EXEC_IGNORE_DUPLICATES)
-		return 0;
-
-	if (unlikely(ret))
-		return ret;
-
 	ret = drm_exec_obj_locked(exec, obj);
 	if (ret)
-		goto error_unlock;
-
-	return 0;
+		dma_resv_unlock(obj->resv);
 
-error_unlock:
-	dma_resv_unlock(obj->resv);
 	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(drm_exec_lock_obj);
diff --git a/include/drm/drm_exec.h b/include/drm/drm_exec.h
index b5bf0b6da791c..fe2f21f4f066f 100644
--- a/include/drm/drm_exec.h
+++ b/include/drm/drm_exec.h
@@ -71,7 +71,8 @@ drm_exec_obj(struct drm_exec *exec, unsigned long index)
  * @index: unsigned long index for the iteration
  * @obj: the current GEM object
  *
- * Iterate over all the locked GEM objects inside the drm_exec object.
+ * Iterate over all the explicitly locked GEM objects inside the drm_exec
+ * container, except for the contended and implicit prelocked one.
  */
 #define drm_exec_for_each_locked_object(exec, index, obj)		\
 	for ((index) = 0; ((obj) = drm_exec_obj(exec, index)); ++(index))
@@ -83,9 +84,9 @@ drm_exec_obj(struct drm_exec *exec, unsigned long index)
  * @index: unsigned long index for the iteration
  * @obj: the current GEM object
  *
- * Iterate over all the locked GEM objects inside the drm_exec object in
- * reverse locking order. Note that @index may go below zero and wrap,
- * but that will be caught by drm_exec_obj(), returning a NULL object.
+ * Iterate over all the explicitly locked GEM objects inside the drm_exec
+ * container in reverse locking order. Note that @index may go below zero and wrap
+ * around, but that will be caught by drm_exec_obj(), returning a NULL object.
  */
 #define drm_exec_for_each_locked_object_reverse(exec, index, obj)	\
 	for ((index) = (exec)->num_objects - 1;				\
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 100/168] exit: move core of do_wait() into helper

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

[ Upstream commit 06a101ca45b296fe951692620b0bc49abf90c368 ]

Rather than have a maze of gotos, put the actual logic in __do_wait()
and have do_wait() loop deal with waitqueue setup/teardown and whether
to call __do_wait() again.

No functional changes intended in this patch.

Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Stable-dep-of: 81933038f5e2 ("pid_namespace: make zap_pid_ns_processes() freezable")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/exit.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
index 55a8aa868298f..07a17f0916107 100644
--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -1590,16 +1590,10 @@ static int do_wait_pid(struct wait_opts *wo)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static long do_wait(struct wait_opts *wo)
+static long __do_wait(struct wait_opts *wo)
 {
-	int retval;
-
-	trace_sched_process_wait(wo->wo_pid);
+	long retval;
 
-	init_waitqueue_func_entry(&wo->child_wait, child_wait_callback);
-	wo->child_wait.private = current;
-	add_wait_queue(&current->signal->wait_chldexit, &wo->child_wait);
-repeat:
 	/*
 	 * If there is nothing that can match our criteria, just get out.
 	 * We will clear ->notask_error to zero if we see any child that
@@ -1611,24 +1605,23 @@ static long do_wait(struct wait_opts *wo)
 	   (!wo->wo_pid || !pid_has_task(wo->wo_pid, wo->wo_type)))
 		goto notask;
 
-	set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
 	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
 
 	if (wo->wo_type == PIDTYPE_PID) {
 		retval = do_wait_pid(wo);
 		if (retval)
-			goto end;
+			return retval;
 	} else {
 		struct task_struct *tsk = current;
 
 		do {
 			retval = do_wait_thread(wo, tsk);
 			if (retval)
-				goto end;
+				return retval;
 
 			retval = ptrace_do_wait(wo, tsk);
 			if (retval)
-				goto end;
+				return retval;
 
 			if (wo->wo_flags & __WNOTHREAD)
 				break;
@@ -1638,14 +1631,32 @@ static long do_wait(struct wait_opts *wo)
 
 notask:
 	retval = wo->notask_error;
-	if (!retval && !(wo->wo_flags & WNOHANG)) {
-		retval = -ERESTARTSYS;
-		if (!signal_pending(current)) {
-			schedule();
-			goto repeat;
-		}
-	}
-end:
+	if (!retval && !(wo->wo_flags & WNOHANG))
+		return -ERESTARTSYS;
+
+	return retval;
+}
+
+static long do_wait(struct wait_opts *wo)
+{
+	int retval;
+
+	trace_sched_process_wait(wo->wo_pid);
+
+	init_waitqueue_func_entry(&wo->child_wait, child_wait_callback);
+	wo->child_wait.private = current;
+	add_wait_queue(&current->signal->wait_chldexit, &wo->child_wait);
+
+	do {
+		set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
+		retval = __do_wait(wo);
+		if (retval != -ERESTARTSYS)
+			break;
+		if (signal_pending(current))
+			break;
+		schedule();
+	} while (1);
+
 	__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
 	remove_wait_queue(&current->signal->wait_chldexit, &wo->child_wait);
 	return retval;
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 101/168] pid_namespace: make zap_pid_ns_processes() freezable

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Aviv Vaknin <vaknins33@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 81933038f5e273d17ed22792f906889393b204c5 ]

When the init of a pid namespace exits, zap_pid_ns_processes() waits
until all other pids in the namespace are freed. A tracer outside the
namespace that does not reap its traced zombies keeps those pids
allocated, so this wait has no upper bound, and while it lasts every
suspend attempt fails:

  Freezing user space processes failed after 20.006 seconds (2 tasks refusing to freeze, wq_busy=0):

Neither wait is freezable. The first loop sleeps in do_wait(), which
returns -ERESTARTSYS on the freezer's fake signal; the loop then clears
TIF_SIGPENDING and waits again without ever freezing. The final loop
sleeps in TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, and since nothing clears TIF_SIGPENDING
there, schedule() returns immediately after the first freeze attempt
and the task spins until the wait ends.

Sleep in TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE | TASK_FREEZABLE in do_wait(), so that the
freezer can freeze tasks waiting there directly, and in TASK_IDLE |
TASK_FREEZABLE in the final loop, like coredump_task_exit() does.

This was hit with Chromium-based browsers: crashpad ptrace-attaches the
threads of a crashed renderer, which is a pid namespace init, and does
not reap those killed during the dump.

Fixes: 3eb07c8c8adb ("pid namespaces: destroy pid namespace on init's death")
Fixes: b9a985db9896 ("pid_ns: Sleep in TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE in zap_pid_ns_processes")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Aviv Vaknin <vaknins33@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261002202820.3433318-1-vaknins33@gmail.com
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bradley Morgan <brads@mainlining.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/exit.c          | 2 +-
 kernel/pid_namespace.c | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
index 07a17f0916107..e2dae48578d96 100644
--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -1648,7 +1648,7 @@ static long do_wait(struct wait_opts *wo)
 	add_wait_queue(&current->signal->wait_chldexit, &wo->child_wait);
 
 	do {
-		set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
+		set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE | TASK_FREEZABLE);
 		retval = __do_wait(wo);
 		if (retval != -ERESTARTSYS)
 			break;
diff --git a/kernel/pid_namespace.c b/kernel/pid_namespace.c
index e9b2bb260ee6c..eea15232f6690 100644
--- a/kernel/pid_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/pid_namespace.c
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ void zap_pid_ns_processes(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns)
 	 * free_pid() will awaken this task.
 	 */
 	for (;;) {
-		set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
+		set_current_state(TASK_IDLE | TASK_FREEZABLE);
 		if (pid_ns->pid_allocated == init_pids)
 			break;
 		/*
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 102/168] ASoC: SOF: ipc4-topology: Fix shift-out-of-bounds for aggregated ALH capture

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Peter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com>

[ Upstream commit 746de48c3a250f0c264105dcbfcdf0c5001e970b ]

When ch_count is smaller than blob->alh_cfg.device_count (e.g. a mono
capture stream, such as a SmartMic, aggregated across multiple SDW
links), step = ch_count / blob->alh_cfg.device_count truncates to 0.
The subsequent GENMASK(step - 1, 0) then underflows step - 1 (u32) to
UINT_MAX, causing GENMASK()'s internal shift to use an out-of-bounds
exponent:

  UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in sound/soc/sof/ipc4-topology.c:2363:13
  shift exponent 18446744069414584384 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int'

Treat ch_count < device_count the same way as the existing "channels
equal to output reference channels" case: apply the same ch_mask to
every aggregated device instead of trying to split channels that
can't be evenly divided.

Fixes: 0390a102cc18 ("ASoC: SOF: ipc4-topology: use different channel mask for each sdw amp feedback")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Bard Liao <yung-chuan.liao@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261008090130.15135-1-peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
[ sashal: used a standalone guard because the playback-specific conditional is absent ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 sound/soc/sof/ipc4-topology.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/sound/soc/sof/ipc4-topology.c b/sound/soc/sof/ipc4-topology.c
index 8911c075251ca..8e16ec8038382 100644
--- a/sound/soc/sof/ipc4-topology.c
+++ b/sound/soc/sof/ipc4-topology.c
@@ -1690,8 +1690,20 @@ sof_ipc4_prepare_copier_module(struct snd_sof_widget *swidget,
 				ch_map >>= 4;
 			}
 
-			step = ch_count / blob->alh_cfg.device_count;
-			mask =  GENMASK(step - 1, 0);
+			if (ch_count < blob->alh_cfg.device_count) {
+				/*
+				 * When there are fewer channels than aggregated devices
+				 * (e.g. a mono capture stream split across multiple links),
+				 * set step = 0 to ensure all the ch_mask is applied to all
+				 * alh mappings.
+				 */
+				mask = ch_mask;
+				step = 0;
+			} else {
+				step = ch_count / blob->alh_cfg.device_count;
+				mask =  GENMASK(step - 1, 0);
+			}
+
 			/*
 			 * Set each gtw_cfg.node_id to blob->alh_cfg.mapping[]
 			 * for all widgets with the same stream name
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 103/168] tracing: Keep the predicate limit separate from program capacity

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Taeyang Lee <0wn@theori.io>

[ Upstream commit 803aa6fc2dbea25ab9d3ed19eca1c96d0ab17445 ]

predicate_parse() adds two to nr_preds to reserve the terminal TRUE
and FALSE entries. It also uses that increased value as the limit for
parsed predicates. If the initial count is smaller than the number
actually parsed, the program can fill the allocation and subsequent
accesses can go past its end.

Keep nr_preds as the predicate limit and use a separate value for the
allocation size. This leaves space for both terminal entries and a
zeroed entry when parsing stops at the limit.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 39f7c41c908b ("tracing/filters: Enable filtering a cpumask field by another cpumask")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/atELCd1XjKVhrkFL@Taeyangs-MacBook-Pro.local
Signed-off-by: Taeyang Lee <0wn@theori.io>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
[ sashal: Adapted kzalloc_objs() allocation to kcalloc(). ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c | 7 +++----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c
index ada02ae893c20..cd89fbf2fb208 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c
@@ -482,18 +482,17 @@ predicate_parse(const char *str, int nr_parens, int nr_preds,
 	int len;
 	int N = 0;
 	int i;
-
-	nr_preds += 2; /* For TRUE and FALSE */
+	int nr_preds_alloc = nr_preds + 2; /* For TRUE and FALSE */
 
 	op_stack = kmalloc_array(nr_parens, sizeof(*op_stack), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!op_stack)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-	prog_stack = kcalloc(nr_preds, sizeof(*prog_stack), GFP_KERNEL);
+	prog_stack = kcalloc(nr_preds_alloc, sizeof(*prog_stack), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!prog_stack) {
 		parse_error(pe, -ENOMEM, 0);
 		goto out_free;
 	}
-	inverts = kmalloc_array(nr_preds, sizeof(*inverts), GFP_KERNEL);
+	inverts = kmalloc_array(nr_preds_alloc, sizeof(*inverts), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!inverts) {
 		parse_error(pe, -ENOMEM, 0);
 		goto out_free;
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 104/168] dm-integrity: require stable writes for internal hash modes

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Chen Cheng <chencheng@fnnas.com>

[ Upstream commit b2fd92f016e9d692fd3c8c08d0ee014e9212279d ]

dm-integrity direct, bitmap and inline internal-hash modes compute
integrity tags from the pages carried by the write bio.  The lower data
write also uses those pages, so the tag and the data write depend on the
same memory contents staying unchanged while writeback is in flight.

Without stable writes, a buffered writer can modify a writeback folio
after dm-integrity has submitted the data bio and before the lower device
has consumed the data.  After a crash, this can leave data from the later
contents with a tag calculated from the earlier contents, causing
permanent checksum failures on read.

Set BLK_FEAT_STABLE_WRITES for internal-hash D, B and I modes so
filesystems wait for writeback folios to become stable before modifying
them again.  Journal mode is left unchanged because it copies data into
the journal before computing and persisting the tag.

Tested using dm-delay over a virtio-blk test disk, dm-integrity
internal_hash:crc32c and no-journal ext4.  The D and B reproducers both
failed with checksum errors before this change and completed with
READ_RC=0 and zero mismatches after it.

Fixes: 7eada909bfd7 ("dm: add integrity target")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Sun Yangkai <sunyangkai@fygo.io>
Link: https://github.com/chencheng-fnnas/reproducer/blob/main/dm-integrity-writeback-race.py
Signed-off-by: Chen Cheng <chencheng@fnnas.com>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
[ sashal: adapted BLK_FEAT_STABLE_WRITES to QUEUE_FLAG_STABLE_WRITES using a new needs_stable_writes target bit. ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/md/dm-integrity.c     | 3 +++
 drivers/md/dm-table.c         | 2 +-
 include/linux/device-mapper.h | 5 +++++
 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c b/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c
index aa6f3e71c4fa2..d66eb4e36811a 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c
@@ -3515,6 +3515,9 @@ static void dm_integrity_io_hints(struct dm_target *ti, struct queue_limits *lim
 		limits->io_min = ic->sectors_per_block << SECTOR_SHIFT;
 		limits->dma_alignment = limits->logical_block_size - 1;
 	}
+
+	if (ic->internal_hash && (ic->mode == 'D' || ic->mode == 'B'))
+		ti->needs_stable_writes = true;
 }
 
 static void calculate_journal_section_size(struct dm_integrity_c *ic)
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-table.c b/drivers/md/dm-table.c
index ed0a5e91968df..6d4ce9790a564 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-table.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-table.c
@@ -1944,7 +1944,7 @@ static int device_requires_stable_pages(struct dm_target *ti,
 					struct dm_dev *dev, sector_t start,
 					sector_t len, void *data)
 {
-	return bdev_stable_writes(dev->bdev);
+	return ti->needs_stable_writes || bdev_stable_writes(dev->bdev);
 }
 
 int dm_table_set_restrictions(struct dm_table *t, struct request_queue *q,
diff --git a/include/linux/device-mapper.h b/include/linux/device-mapper.h
index 69d0435c7ebb0..f61daeeecee69 100644
--- a/include/linux/device-mapper.h
+++ b/include/linux/device-mapper.h
@@ -356,6 +356,11 @@ struct dm_target {
 	 */
 	bool discards_supported:1;
 
+	/*
+	 * Set if this target requires stable data during writeback.
+	 */
+	bool needs_stable_writes:1;
+
 	/*
 	 * Set if this target requires that discards be split on
 	 * 'max_discard_sectors' boundaries.
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 105/168] io_uring/cancel: dont spin on local work the task cant run

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs) <cenzhang@linux.microsoft.com>

[ Upstream commit fddcf4c5321b3ea5f72166c3fd36a9d1c34f80c7 ]

io_uring_cancel_generic() refuses to sleep while any ring on the exiting
task's tctx has local work pending. It assumes the task is that ring's
submitter and that the next io_uring_try_cancel_requests() pass will run
the work. This does not hold for a ring that was still
IORING_SETUP_R_DISABLED when the task got its tctx node from
io_uring_create() or io_ringfd_register(). The submitter is set later by
IORING_REGISTER_ENABLE_RINGS, possibly from another task, and only the
submitter may run local work on an IORING_SETUP_DEFER_TASKRUN ring. To
the exiting task the work stays pending forever, the loop never reaches
schedule(), and the task trips the WARN_ON_ONCE() once and then spins in
do_exit().

An unprivileged user can set this up at will by creating a disabled
ring, having a child enable it and stop, posting to the ring with
IORING_OP_MSG_RING and exiting with a request in flight that only the
child can complete. The exiting thread burns a CPU until the child runs
or dies, and with panic_on_warn set the WARN panics the kernel.

Fix by skipping the sleep only when io_allowed_defer_tw_run() allows the
task to run the work. This is reasonable since work it cannot run cannot
complete any of its requests either, so nothing is lost by sleeping.
Drop the WARN_ON_ONCE() since handing a disabled ring to another thread
is a supported scenario, not a bug state.

Fixes: 360cd42c4e95 ("io_uring: optimise io_req_local_work_add")
Reported-by: AutonomousCodeSecurity@microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs) <cenzhang@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261008191602.45101-1-cenzhang@linux.microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
[ sashal: replaced io_local_work_pending() with a direct !llist_empty() check on work_llist ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 io_uring/io_uring.c | 7 +++----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/io_uring/io_uring.c b/io_uring/io_uring.c
index d4973d0d4e434..e74f49546961f 100644
--- a/io_uring/io_uring.c
+++ b/io_uring/io_uring.c
@@ -3491,12 +3491,11 @@ __cold void io_uring_cancel_generic(bool cancel_all, struct io_sq_data *sqd)
 		prepare_to_wait(&tctx->wait, &wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
 		io_run_task_work();
 		io_uring_drop_tctx_refs(current);
+		/* only skip the sleep for local work this task may run */
 		xa_for_each(&tctx->xa, index, node) {
-			if (!llist_empty(&node->ctx->work_llist)) {
-				WARN_ON_ONCE(node->ctx->submitter_task &&
-					     node->ctx->submitter_task != current);
+			if (!llist_empty(&node->ctx->work_llist) &&
+			    io_allowed_defer_tw_run(node->ctx))
 				goto end_wait;
-			}
 		}
 		/*
 		 * If we've seen completions, retry without waiting. This
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 106/168] vsock/virtio: validate packet source for connected sockets

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Daehyeon Ko <4ncienth@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit dee44f41f206becb41c492899c1996cfd7f82a1b ]

virtio_transport_recv_pkt() looks up sockets first by the full source and
destination tuple, then by destination only in the bound table. The
fallback is needed for listening and connecting sockets, but sockets remain
in the bound table after connect(), so it can also return a non-listening
socket.

The fallback does not validate the source address. In TCP_SYN_SENT, a
RESPONSE from an unrelated source can transition the victim socket to
TCP_ESTABLISHED while its stored remote address remains unchanged.
Subsequent RW packets from that source are delivered through the same
destination-only fallback.

This was reproduced with capability-empty processes under different UIDs.
The attacker discovered the target tuple through unprivileged AF_VSOCK
sock_diag and caused the victim socket to read 16 attacker-chosen bytes;
the intended peer-side socket read 0 of those 16 bytes.

Add vsock_check_source() to validate the transport, source port and source
CID against the peer stored in a non-listening socket. The local transport
is the CID exception because its packets are generated internally with
VMADDR_CID_LOCAL as their source, including connections using CID aliases.

Use the helper after lock_sock() in the virtio receive path.

Fixes: 06a8fc78367d ("VSOCK: Introduce virtio_vsock_common.ko")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20260813121236.2328599-1-4ncienth@gmail.com/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bobby Eshleman <bobbyeshleman@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: Daehyeon Ko <4ncienth@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260826003929.966160-2-4ncienth@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
[ sashal: adjusted context for vsock lookup and reset helpers without network namespace arguments ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 include/net/af_vsock.h                  |  3 +++
 net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c                | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c |  3 ++-
 3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/net/af_vsock.h b/include/net/af_vsock.h
index 1820b87b8b7ff..d00f017948ed7 100644
--- a/include/net/af_vsock.h
+++ b/include/net/af_vsock.h
@@ -210,6 +210,9 @@ void vsock_remove_connected(struct vsock_sock *vsk);
 struct sock *vsock_find_bound_socket(struct sockaddr_vm *addr);
 struct sock *vsock_find_connected_socket(struct sockaddr_vm *src,
 					 struct sockaddr_vm *dst);
+bool vsock_check_source(const struct vsock_sock *vsk,
+			const struct vsock_transport *transport,
+			const struct sockaddr_vm *src);
 void vsock_remove_sock(struct vsock_sock *vsk);
 void vsock_for_each_connected_socket(struct vsock_transport *transport,
 				     void (*fn)(struct sock *sk));
diff --git a/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c b/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c
index 8be8d7c55034c..9d6dce5311990 100644
--- a/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c
+++ b/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c
@@ -334,6 +334,38 @@ struct sock *vsock_find_connected_socket(struct sockaddr_vm *src,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vsock_find_connected_socket);
 
+/**
+ * vsock_check_source - validate a packet source against a socket peer
+ * @vsk: socket receiving the packet
+ * @transport: transport receiving the packet
+ * @src: source address from the packet
+ *
+ * Return: true if the packet arrived on the socket's assigned transport and
+ * its source matches the stored peer. Loopback packets are generated
+ * internally and always use the local CID as their source, including
+ * connections using a valid CID alias.
+ *
+ * The caller must hold the socket lock and must not call this for listening
+ * sockets, which accept packets from any source and have no assigned
+ * transport.
+ */
+bool vsock_check_source(const struct vsock_sock *vsk,
+			const struct vsock_transport *transport,
+			const struct sockaddr_vm *src)
+{
+	if (vsk->transport != transport)
+		return false;
+
+	if (src->svm_port != vsk->remote_addr.svm_port)
+		return false;
+
+	if (src->svm_cid == vsk->remote_addr.svm_cid)
+		return true;
+
+	return transport->get_local_cid() == VMADDR_CID_LOCAL;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vsock_check_source);
+
 void vsock_remove_sock(struct vsock_sock *vsk)
 {
 	/* Transport reassignment must not remove the binding. */
diff --git a/net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c b/net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c
index 16431ef52799d..e6e04cbb7a4be 100644
--- a/net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c
+++ b/net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c
@@ -1470,7 +1470,8 @@ void virtio_transport_recv_pkt(struct virtio_transport *t,
 	 * lock_sock (note: listener sockets are not assigned to any transport)
 	 */
 	if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE) ||
-	    (sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN && vsk->transport != &t->transport)) {
+	    (sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN &&
+	     !vsock_check_source(vsk, &t->transport, &src))) {
 		(void)virtio_transport_reset_no_sock(t, skb);
 		release_sock(sk);
 		sock_put(sk);
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 107/168] ipv4: udp: Create exceptions before socket matching

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>

[ Upstream commit 4c3499f79f8c7e8561266bcc220a18538cec0458 ]

Currently, when ICMP Fragmentation Needed and Redirect Message packets
are locally delivered and quote a UDP packet, a FIB nexthop exception
(FNHE) is only created if the kernel can match the UDP packet to an
existing socket.

This behavior allows off-path attackers to conduct a side-channel attack
on the FNHE cache in order to discover the ephemeral port used by a
connected UDP socket.

Commit 6457378fe796 ("ipv4: use siphash instead of Jenkins in
fnhe_hashfun()") and commit 67d6d681e15b ("ipv4: make exception cache
less predictible") tried to mitigate such attacks by making it harder
for attackers to discover hash collisions in the FNHE cache and by
randomizing the number of exceptions a hash bucket can hold,
respectively. Unfortunately, both of the mitigations can be bypassed.

Instead, mitigate such attacks by always creating a FNHE, even before
trying to find a matching socket. Do that by calling ipv4_update_pmtu()
and ipv4_redirect(), the helpers used when the quoted packet did not
originate from a socket.

This means that guesses (right or wrong) from an off-path attacker will
always result in a FNHE being created or updated in the cache that the
attacker can observe.

Pass an oif of 0, in a similar fashion to icmp_err(). This is also the
oif used by the socket path for sockets that are not bound to a device.

Note that this does not allow attackers to create FNHEs that they could
not create before, as both helpers can already be reached with little to
no validation. For example, by sending an ICMP error that quotes an ICMP
Echo Reply or one that quotes a UDP source port that matches a wildcard
socket.

Also note that in the good case (matched socket) the above scheme comes
at the cost of an extra route lookup, as the no socket helpers perform
their own lookup before the one performed by ipv4_sk_update_pmtu() /
ipv4_sk_redirect(). When the two resolve to different nexthops, it also
results in two exceptions being created for the same destination IP. One
in the FNHE cache of the nexthop resolved by the no socket helpers and
another in the FNHE cache of the nexthop used by the socket.

Fixes: 4895c771c7f0 ("ipv4: Add FIB nexthop exceptions.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Noam Caspi <noam.caspi@mail.huji.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260828192344.2596928-3-idosch@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
[ sashal: inlined udp_err_update_exception() into the existing udp_err() wrapper ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/ipv4/udp.c | 11 ++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp.c b/net/ipv4/udp.c
index 86a1b2c9e71fe..8ceaeef5c184c 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/udp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c
@@ -870,7 +870,16 @@ int __udp4_lib_err(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 info, struct udp_table *udptable)
 
 int udp_err(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 info)
 {
-	return __udp4_lib_err(skb, info, dev_net(skb->dev)->ipv4.udp_table);
+	const int type = icmp_hdr(skb)->type;
+	const int code = icmp_hdr(skb)->code;
+	struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
+
+	if (type == ICMP_DEST_UNREACH && code == ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED)
+		ipv4_update_pmtu(skb, net, info, 0, IPPROTO_UDP);
+	else if (type == ICMP_REDIRECT)
+		ipv4_redirect(skb, net, 0, IPPROTO_UDP);
+
+	return __udp4_lib_err(skb, info, net->ipv4.udp_table);
 }
 
 /*
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 108/168] gtp: disable BH before calling udp_tunnel_xmit_skb()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Carlier <devnexen@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 5638504a2aa9e1b9d72af9060df1a160cce2d379 ]

gtp_genl_send_echo_req() runs as a generic netlink doit handler in
process context with BH not disabled. It calls udp_tunnel_xmit_skb(),
which eventually invokes iptunnel_xmit() — that uses __this_cpu_inc/dec
on softnet_data.xmit.recursion to track the tunnel xmit recursion level.

Without local_bh_disable(), the task may migrate between
dev_xmit_recursion_inc() and dev_xmit_recursion_dec(), breaking the
per-CPU counter pairing. The result is stale or negative recursion
levels that can later produce false-positive
SKB_DROP_REASON_RECURSION_LIMIT drops on either CPU.

The other udp_tunnel_xmit_skb() call sites in gtp.c are unaffected:
the data path runs under ndo_start_xmit and the echo response handlers
run from the UDP encap rx softirq, both with BH already disabled.

Fix it by disabling BH around the udp_tunnel_xmit_skb() call, mirroring
commit 2cd7e6971fc2 ("sctp: disable BH before calling
udp_tunnel_xmit_skb()").

Fixes: 6f1a9140ecda ("net: add xmit recursion limit to tunnel xmit functions")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David Carlier <devnexen@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260417055408.4667-1-devnexen@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
[ Ting-Han: this tree does not have commit e3411e326fa4 ("net: ipv4: Add a
  flags argument to iptunnel_xmit(), udp_tunnel_xmit_skb()") or commit
  1bec9d0c0046 ("ipv4: Convert ->flowi4_tos to dscp_t."), so the
  udp_tunnel_xmit_skb() call differs in context; the change is the same ]
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Ting-Han Hou <ue081723@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/gtp.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/gtp.c b/drivers/net/gtp.c
index f0ee46d3c873e..39515aba86e68 100644
--- a/drivers/net/gtp.c
+++ b/drivers/net/gtp.c
@@ -1827,6 +1827,7 @@ static int gtp_genl_send_echo_req(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 		return -ENODEV;
 	}
 
+	local_bh_disable();
 	udp_tunnel_xmit_skb(rt, sk, skb_to_send,
 			    fl4.saddr, fl4.daddr,
 			    fl4.flowi4_tos,
@@ -1836,6 +1837,7 @@ static int gtp_genl_send_echo_req(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 			    !net_eq(sock_net(sk),
 				    dev_net(gtp->dev)),
 			    false);
+	local_bh_enable();
 	return 0;
 }
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 109/168] i2c: viai2c-wmt: Fix clock leak in wmt_i2c_probe()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wentao Liang <vulab@iscas.ac.cn>

[ Upstream commit aaabefc79b0ff0018e8e3832169bbe359d0551fc ]

In wmt_i2c_probe(), i2c->clk is acquired using of_clk_get(). If any
subsequent operation fails or when the module is unloaded, the clock
reference count is never decremented via clk_put(), leading to a
resource leak.

Switch to devm_clk_get() so that the clock is automatically managed
and released.

Fixes: 560746eb79d3 ("i2c: vt8500: Add support for I2C bus on Wondermedia SoCs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang <vulab@iscas.ac.cn>
Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260916070631.1965713-1-vulab@iscas.ac.cn
[ sashal: adapted the change to the unrefactored driver using i2c_dev instead of i2c. ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-wmt.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-wmt.c b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-wmt.c
index 76118abc6e104..8682143e15acc 100644
--- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-wmt.c
+++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-wmt.c
@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ static int wmt_i2c_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	i2c_dev->clk = of_clk_get(np, 0);
+	i2c_dev->clk = devm_clk_get(&pdev->dev, NULL);
 	if (IS_ERR(i2c_dev->clk)) {
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "unable to request clock\n");
 		return PTR_ERR(i2c_dev->clk);
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 110/168] futex: Fix mm reuse handling for FUT_OFF_MMSHARED

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 3267512ad1c2cc0c7768c5b014dc2cceb398a801 ]

A FUT_OFF_MMSHARED futex is a shared futex that refers to an MM.
It is possible for a process to wait on a shared futex with a different MM
because a FUT_OFF_INODE waiter can be requeued onto a FUT_OFF_MMSHARED
futex by another process.
This can cause FUT_OFF_MMSHARED waiters on a freed MM to consume
wakeups intended for a newly allocated MM at the same address.

Fix it by keying FUT_OFF_MMSHARED using a unique 64-bit per-MM ID.
Leave private futexes as before to avoid influencing the performance of the
hotpath.

(Multi-threaded processes typically implicitly use FUT_OFF_MMSHARED by
setting clear_child_tid such that it points into anonymous memory, which
causes mm_release() in a multi-threaded mm to perform FUTEX_WAKE.)

Fixes: 222993395ed3 ("futex: Remove pointless mmgrap() + mmdrop()")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAG48ez0dLBpc3QtbAhMMVNHwHL94iHh2G+h-=BVFR4dDuzZr1g@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260929-futex-mmshared-fix-v1-1-262b1ffeb3d0@google.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[ sashal: adapted futex ID handling to direct mm_struct storage initialized by mm_init() because the dedicated per-MM futex infrastructure is absent. ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 include/linux/futex.h    | 14 ++++++++----
 include/linux/mm_types.h |  3 +++
 kernel/fork.c            |  3 +++
 kernel/futex/core.c      | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 4 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/futex.h b/include/linux/futex.h
index b70df27d7e85c..09f757f14d01f 100644
--- a/include/linux/futex.h
+++ b/include/linux/futex.h
@@ -23,26 +23,30 @@ struct task_struct;
  *  01 : Shared futex (PTHREAD_PROCESS_SHARED)
  *	mapped on a file (reference on the underlying inode)
  *  10 : Shared futex (PTHREAD_PROCESS_SHARED)
- *       (but private mapping on an mm, and reference taken on it)
+ *       (but private mapping on an mm)
 */
 
-#define FUT_OFF_INODE    1 /* We set bit 0 if key has a reference on inode */
-#define FUT_OFF_MMSHARED 2 /* We set bit 1 if key has a reference on mm */
+#define FUT_OFF_INODE    1 /* We set bit 0 if shared key identifies an inode */
+#define FUT_OFF_MMSHARED 2 /* We set bit 1 if shared key identifies an mm */
 
 union futex_key {
+	/* For FUT_OFF_INODE */
 	struct {
 		u64 i_seq;
 		unsigned long pgoff;
 		unsigned int offset;
 	} shared;
+
+	/* For FUT_OFF_MMSHARED or private */
 	struct {
 		union {
-			struct mm_struct *mm;
-			u64 __tmp;
+			struct mm_struct *mm; /* for private */
+			u64 mm_seq; /* for FUT_OFF_MMSHARED */
 		};
 		unsigned long address;
 		unsigned int offset;
 	} private;
+
 	struct {
 		u64 ptr;
 		unsigned long word;
diff --git a/include/linux/mm_types.h b/include/linux/mm_types.h
index ce3370823f9c7..91c10d8b00c02 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm_types.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm_types.h
@@ -849,6 +849,9 @@ struct mm_struct {
 		 */
 		int mm_lock_seq;
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX
+		atomic64_t futex_unique_id;
+#endif
 
 
 		unsigned long hiwater_rss; /* High-watermark of RSS usage */
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 73e8a6b430a05..396a1d4b05e59 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -1299,6 +1299,9 @@ static struct mm_struct *mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p,
 #endif
 	mm_init_uprobes_state(mm);
 	hugetlb_count_init(mm);
+#ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX
+	atomic64_set(&mm->futex_unique_id, 0);
+#endif
 
 	if (current->mm) {
 		mm->flags = mmf_init_flags(current->mm->flags);
diff --git a/kernel/futex/core.c b/kernel/futex/core.c
index 660d7061740b8..8fb54800ce0ad 100644
--- a/kernel/futex/core.c
+++ b/kernel/futex/core.c
@@ -151,39 +151,27 @@ futex_setup_timer(ktime_t *time, struct hrtimer_sleeper *timeout,
 }
 
 /*
- * Generate a machine wide unique identifier for this inode.
+ * Generate a machine wide unique identifier for this object (inode or mm).
  *
  * This relies on u64 not wrapping in the life-time of the machine; which with
  * 1ns resolution means almost 585 years.
- *
- * This further relies on the fact that a well formed program will not unmap
- * the file while it has a (shared) futex waiting on it. This mapping will have
- * a file reference which pins the mount and inode.
- *
- * If for some reason an inode gets evicted and read back in again, it will get
- * a new sequence number and will _NOT_ match, even though it is the exact same
- * file.
- *
- * It is important that futex_match() will never have a false-positive, esp.
- * for PI futexes that can mess up the state. The above argues that false-negatives
- * are only possible for malformed programs.
  */
-static u64 get_inode_sequence_number(struct inode *inode)
+static u64 get_object_id(atomic64_t *object_seq)
 {
-	static atomic64_t i_seq;
+	static atomic64_t last_assigned_seq;
 	u64 old;
 
-	/* Does the inode already have a sequence number? */
-	old = atomic64_read(&inode->i_sequence);
+	/* Does the object already have a sequence number? */
+	old = atomic64_read(object_seq);
 	if (likely(old))
 		return old;
 
 	for (;;) {
-		u64 new = atomic64_add_return(1, &i_seq);
+		u64 new = atomic64_add_return(1, &last_assigned_seq);
 		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!new))
 			continue;
 
-		old = atomic64_cmpxchg_relaxed(&inode->i_sequence, 0, new);
+		old = atomic64_cmpxchg_relaxed(object_seq, 0, new);
 		if (old)
 			return old;
 		return new;
@@ -206,7 +194,7 @@ static u64 get_inode_sequence_number(struct inode *inode)
  *
  *   ( inode->i_sequence, page->index, offset_within_page )
  *
- * [ also see get_inode_sequence_number() ]
+ * [ also see get_object_id() ]
  *
  * For private mappings (or when !@fshared), the key is:
  *
@@ -358,8 +346,8 @@ int get_futex_key(u32 __user *uaddr, bool fshared, union futex_key *key,
 			goto out;
 		}
 
-		key->both.offset |= FUT_OFF_MMSHARED; /* ref taken on mm */
-		key->private.mm = mm;
+		key->both.offset |= FUT_OFF_MMSHARED;
+		key->private.mm_seq = get_object_id(&mm->futex_unique_id);
 		key->private.address = address;
 
 	} else {
@@ -394,7 +382,22 @@ int get_futex_key(u32 __user *uaddr, bool fshared, union futex_key *key,
 		}
 
 		key->both.offset |= FUT_OFF_INODE; /* inode-based key */
-		key->shared.i_seq = get_inode_sequence_number(inode);
+		/*
+		 * This relies on the fact that a well formed program will not
+		 * unmap the file while it has a (shared) futex waiting on it.
+		 * This mapping will have a file reference which pins the mount
+		 * and inode.
+		 *
+		 * If for some reason an inode gets evicted and read back in
+		 * again, it will get a new sequence number and will _NOT_ match,
+		 * even though it is the exact same file.
+		 *
+		 * It is important that futex_match() will never have a
+		 * false-positive, esp. for PI futexes that can mess up the state.
+		 * The above argues that false-negatives are only possible for
+		 * malformed programs.
+		 */
+		key->shared.i_seq = get_object_id(&inode->i_sequence);
 		key->shared.pgoff = page_to_pgoff(tail);
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 	}
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 111/168] drm/i915/dmc: Harden DMC firmware payload parsing

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dibin Moolakadan Subrahmanian <dibin.moolakadan.subrahmanian@intel.com>

[ Upstream commit 8bb1858db453cd4250e3b633f5d2d09206024ca6 ]

Validate the conversion of the DMC firmware size from dwords to bytes
using check_mul_overflow() before calculating the firmware payload size.

Reject zero-length payloads and zero MMIO counts in the DMC firmware
header so malformed firmware is caught early. Also set dmc_fw_size only
after the payload allocation succeeds.

Fixes: eb805623d8b1 ("drm/i915/skl: Add support to load SKL CSR firmware.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude-Code:Sonnet-5
Signed-off-by: Dibin Moolakadan Subrahmanian <dibin.moolakadan.subrahmanian@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mitul Golani<mitulkumar.ajitkumar.golani@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ankit Nautiyal <ankit.k.nautiyal@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260922133535.3180973-5-dibin.moolakadan.subrahmanian@intel.com
(cherry picked from commit efde6601a1f1daedfe3dcc2816c934ddb44e3eef)
Signed-off-by: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>
[ sashal: Changed drm_err() calls to use &i915->drm instead of display->drm. ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dmc.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dmc.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dmc.c
index 8751973b5730f..8d42ae60d8625 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dmc.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_dmc.c
@@ -770,7 +770,7 @@ static u32 parse_dmc_fw_header(struct intel_dmc *dmc,
 	}
 
 	/* Cache the dmc header info. */
-	if (mmio_count > mmio_count_max) {
+	if (!mmio_count || mmio_count > mmio_count_max) {
 		drm_err(&i915->drm, "DMC firmware has wrong mmio count %u\n", mmio_count);
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -785,13 +785,21 @@ static u32 parse_dmc_fw_header(struct intel_dmc *dmc,
 		dmc_info->mmioaddr[i] = _MMIO(mmioaddr[i]);
 		dmc_info->mmiodata[i] = mmiodata[i];
 	}
-	dmc_info->mmio_count = mmio_count;
-	dmc_info->start_mmioaddr = start_mmioaddr;
 
 	rem_size -= header_len_bytes;
 
 	/* fw_size is in dwords, so multiplied by 4 to convert into bytes. */
-	payload_size = dmc_header->fw_size * 4;
+	if (check_mul_overflow(dmc_header->fw_size, 4u, &payload_size)) {
+		drm_err(&i915->drm, "DMC fw_size too large (%u dwords)\n",
+			dmc_header->fw_size);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (!payload_size) {
+		drm_err(&i915->drm, "DMC firmware has empty payload\n");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	if (rem_size < payload_size)
 		goto error_truncated;
 
@@ -799,12 +807,15 @@ static u32 parse_dmc_fw_header(struct intel_dmc *dmc,
 		drm_err(&i915->drm, "DMC FW too big (%u bytes)\n", payload_size);
 		return 0;
 	}
-	dmc_info->dmc_fw_size = dmc_header->fw_size;
 
 	dmc_info->payload = kmalloc(payload_size, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!dmc_info->payload)
 		return 0;
 
+	dmc_info->mmio_count = mmio_count;
+	dmc_info->start_mmioaddr = start_mmioaddr;
+	dmc_info->dmc_fw_size = dmc_header->fw_size;
+
 	payload = (u8 *)(dmc_header) + header_len_bytes;
 	memcpy(dmc_info->payload, payload, payload_size);
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 112/168] drm/amdgpu: free the userptr ranges when a CS fails after parser_bos

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jesse Zhang <Jesse.Zhang@amd.com>

[ Upstream commit 1b4da805a0ba354a549ce07459c871c17dd94fe0 ]

amdgpu_cs_parser_bos() allocates an HMM range for every userptr entry of
the BO list and looks up the user pages. Those ranges are only freed when
amdgpu_cs_parser_bos() itself fails or when amdgpu_cs_submit() checks
them under the notifier lock. If amdgpu_cs_patch_jobs(),
amdgpu_cs_vm_handling(), amdgpu_cs_sync_rings() or the early part of
amdgpu_cs_submit() fails, nothing frees them: neither
amdgpu_cs_parser_fini() nor amdgpu_bo_list_free() touch e->range.

Each such CS then leaks the range, its hmm_pfns array (8 bytes per page
of the userptr BO) and the BO reference the range holds. An IB on a ring
that patches the CS in place (e.g. VCN) with an unmapped va_start fails
in amdgpu_cs_patch_ibs() and takes this path.

Free the ranges on those error paths. Ranges amdgpu_cs_submit() already
dropped are NULL, so freeing them again is a no-op.

Fixes: fec8fdb54e8f ("drm/amdgpu: fix userptr HMM range handling v2")
Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Jesse Zhang <Jesse.Zhang@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
(cherry picked from commit c52a9542ed7cfd527feb938bd0accada2ac8d267)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[ sashal: adapted cleanup to the existing error_backoff path using amdgpu_ttm_tt_get_user_pages_done() ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_cs.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_cs.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_cs.c
index df7a5775d361e..6709041c4b94a 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_cs.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_cs.c
@@ -1440,6 +1440,7 @@ static void amdgpu_cs_parser_fini(struct amdgpu_cs_parser *parser)
 int amdgpu_cs_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data, struct drm_file *filp)
 {
 	struct amdgpu_device *adev = drm_to_adev(dev);
+	struct amdgpu_bo_list_entry *e;
 	struct amdgpu_cs_parser parser;
 	int r;
 
@@ -1495,6 +1496,11 @@ int amdgpu_cs_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data, struct drm_file *filp)
 	return 0;
 
 error_backoff:
+	/* amdgpu_cs_submit() only drops the ranges once it got that far. */
+	amdgpu_bo_list_for_each_userptr_entry(e, parser.bo_list) {
+		amdgpu_ttm_tt_get_user_pages_done(e->bo->tbo.ttm, e->range);
+		e->range = NULL;
+	}
 	mutex_unlock(&parser.bo_list->bo_list_mutex);
 
 error_fini:
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 113/168] dm-integrity: fix infinite loop on discard with large tag size

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ben Cressey <ben@cressey.dev>

[ Upstream commit 18d80c77b4c7dd20699e81cedfbbff4e9d198f28 ]

When integrity_metadata handles a discard, it fills a buffer with
DISCARD_FILLER and writes it over the tags, max_blocks blocks at a
time. If the kmalloc fails, the buffer is the on-stack array
checksums_onstack and max_size is set to HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE. So if the
tag size is larger than HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE, max_blocks is zero, bi_size
is never decremented and the loop never terminates.

Fix this by using sizeof(checksums_onstack) as max_size. The array has
MAX_TAG_SIZE bytes since commit b93b6643e9b5 ("dm integrity: fix a
crash with unusually large tag size"), so max_blocks is at least 1.

Fixes: 84597a44a9d8 ("dm integrity: add optional discard support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jose Fernandez (Anthropic) <jose.fernandez@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Ben Cressey <ben@cressey.dev>
Assisted-by: Claude:unspecified
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
[ sashal: Adjusted context for the absence of keyed-discard support. ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/md/dm-integrity.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c b/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c
index d66eb4e36811a..a10143b51c984 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c
@@ -1814,7 +1814,7 @@ static void integrity_metadata(struct work_struct *w)
 
 		if (unlikely(dio->op == REQ_OP_DISCARD)) {
 			unsigned int bi_size = dio->bio_details.bi_iter.bi_size;
-			unsigned int max_size = likely(checksums != checksums_onstack) ? PAGE_SIZE : HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE;
+			unsigned int max_size = likely(checksums != checksums_onstack) ? PAGE_SIZE : sizeof(checksums_onstack);
 			unsigned int max_blocks = max_size / ic->tag_size;
 
 			memset(checksums, DISCARD_FILLER, max_size);
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 114/168] cifs: add revalidation on FSCTL failure in smb2_duplicate_extents()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Frank Sorenson <sorenson@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit 53676a5e28231186c9f56d87b7998b640699bc15 ]

smb2_duplicate_extents() has no handling for
FSCTL_DUPLICATE_EXTENTS_TO_FILE failure: when the FSCTL fails, local
inode metadata may be stale from the pre-extension or from concurrent
remote writes, but is never refreshed.

Force revalidation on FSCTL failure and use i_size_read() for the
pre-extension check.

Fixes: cfc63fc8126a ("smb3: fix cached file size problems in duplicate extents (reflink)")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Frank Sorenson <sorenson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <pc@manguebit.org>
[ sashal: Made the failure check standalone because the existing code lacks the SMB2_query_info() success branch. ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c
index 4da027ee4b99b..21a2b265ae7c4 100644
--- a/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c
+++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c
@@ -2070,7 +2070,7 @@ smb2_duplicate_extents(const unsigned int xid,
 		src_off, dest_off, len);
 
 	inode = d_inode(trgtfile->dentry);
-	if (inode->i_size < dest_off + len) {
+	if (i_size_read(inode) < dest_off + len) {
 		rc = smb2_set_file_size(xid, tcon, trgtfile, dest_off + len, false);
 		if (rc)
 			goto duplicate_extents_out;
@@ -2095,6 +2095,11 @@ smb2_duplicate_extents(const unsigned int xid,
 	if (ret_data_len > 0)
 		cifs_dbg(FYI, "Non-zero response length in duplicate extents\n");
 
+	if (rc) {
+		CIFS_I(inode)->time = 0; /* force reval */
+		cifs_invalidate_cache(inode, 0);
+	}
+
 duplicate_extents_out:
 	return rc;
 }
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 115/168] xfs: dont hold buffer locks across sync transaction commit in xfs_sync_sb_buf

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yun Zhou <yun.zhou@windriver.com>

[ Upstream commit 41a28c865d1d5843f8cb9e0af17a8f4d9e2961ff ]

xfs_sync_sb_buf() holds sb/rtsb buffer locks across a synchronous
xfs_trans_commit(), which flushes the CIL push workqueue internally.
If shutdown occurs during the CIL push, xfs_buf_item_unpin() needs to
lock these buffers to fail them, causing a deadlock:

  setlabel:          holds buf lock -> flush_workqueue(xfs-cil)
  CIL push worker:   xfs_buf_item_unpin -> xfs_buf_lock(same buf)

Remove the xfs_trans_bhold() calls so that commit releases the buffer
locks normally.  After the sync commit, re-acquire the buffers via
mp->m_sb_bp / mp->m_rtsb_bp for the on-disk writeback.

Fixes: f7664b31975b ("xfs: implement online get/set fs label")
Reported-by: syzbot+837bcd54843dd6262f2f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=837bcd54843dd6262f2f
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Yun Zhou <yun.zhou@windriver.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
[ sashal: Omitted realtime superblock changes because the existing code lacks realtime superblock support. ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c | 17 +++++++----------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c
index f4656d17121eb..279e174fba8ac 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c
@@ -1150,26 +1150,23 @@ xfs_sync_sb_buf(
 	struct xfs_mount	*mp)
 {
 	struct xfs_trans	*tp;
-	struct xfs_buf		*bp;
 	int			error;
 
 	error = xfs_trans_alloc(mp, &M_RES(mp)->tr_sb, 0, 0, 0, &tp);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
-	bp = xfs_trans_getsb(tp);
 	xfs_log_sb(tp);
-	xfs_trans_bhold(tp, bp);
 	xfs_trans_set_sync(tp);
 	error = xfs_trans_commit(tp);
 	if (error)
-		goto out;
-	/*
-	 * write out the sb buffer to get the changes to disk
-	 */
-	error = xfs_bwrite(bp);
-out:
-	xfs_buf_relse(bp);
+		return error;
+
+	/* Re-acquire and write the sb to disk. */
+	xfs_buf_lock(mp->m_sb_bp);
+	error = xfs_bwrite(mp->m_sb_bp);
+	xfs_buf_unlock(mp->m_sb_bp);
+
 	return error;
 }
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 116/168] net: bonding: update the slave array for broadcast mode

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tonghao Zhang <tonghao@bamaicloud.com>

[ Upstream commit e0caeb24f538c3c9c94f471882ceeb43d9dc2739 ]

This patch fixes ce7a381697cb ("net: bonding: add broadcast_neighbor option for 802.3ad").
Before this commit, on the broadcast mode, all devices were traversed using the
bond_for_each_slave_rcu. This patch supports traversing devices by using all_slaves.
Therefore, we need to update the slave array when enslave or release slave.

Fixes: ce7a381697cb ("net: bonding: add broadcast_neighbor option for 802.3ad")
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Andrew Lunn <andrew+netdev@lunn.ch>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/a97e6e1e-81bc-4a79-8352-9e4794b0d2ca@kernel.org/
Signed-off-by: Tonghao Zhang <tonghao@bamaicloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Acked-by: Jay Vosburgh <jv@jvosburgh.net>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251016125136.16568-1-tonghao@bamaicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c | 7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
index e799791daa457..69cf5b970a114 100644
--- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
@@ -2314,7 +2314,9 @@ int bond_enslave(struct net_device *bond_dev, struct net_device *slave_dev,
 			bpf_prog_inc(bond->xdp_prog);
 	}
 
-	if (bond_mode_can_use_xmit_hash(bond))
+	/* broadcast mode uses the all_slaves to loop through slaves. */
+	if (bond_mode_can_use_xmit_hash(bond) ||
+	    BOND_MODE(bond) == BOND_MODE_BROADCAST)
 		bond_update_slave_arr(bond, NULL);
 
 	bond_xdp_set_features(bond_dev);
@@ -2457,7 +2459,8 @@ static int __bond_release_one(struct net_device *bond_dev,
 
 	bond_upper_dev_unlink(bond, slave);
 
-	if (bond_mode_can_use_xmit_hash(bond))
+	if (bond_mode_can_use_xmit_hash(bond) ||
+	    BOND_MODE(bond) == BOND_MODE_BROADCAST)
 		bond_update_slave_arr(bond, slave);
 
 	slave_info(bond_dev, slave_dev, "Releasing %s interface\n",
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 117/168] bonding: do not set usable_slaves for broadcast mode

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 45fc134bcfadde456639c1b1e206e6918d69a553 ]

After commit e0caeb24f538 ("net: bonding: update the slave array for broadcast mode"),
broadcast mode will also set all_slaves and usable_slaves during
bond_enslave(). But if we also set updelay, during enslave, the
slave init state will be BOND_LINK_BACK. And later
bond_update_slave_arr() will alloc usable_slaves but add nothing.
This will cause bond_miimon_inspect() to have ignore_updelay
always true. So the updelay will be always ignored. e.g.

[    6.498368] bond0: (slave veth2): link status definitely down, disabling slave
[    7.536371] bond0: (slave veth2): link status up, enabling it in 0 ms
[    7.536402] bond0: (slave veth2): link status definitely up, 10000 Mbps full duplex

To fix it, we can either always call bond_update_slave_arr() on every
place when link changes. Or, let's just not set usable_slaves for
broadcast mode.

Fixes: e0caeb24f538 ("net: bonding: update the slave array for broadcast mode")
Reported-by: Liang Li <liali@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260304-b4-bond_updelay-v1-1-f72eb2e454d0@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c | 13 +++++++++----
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
index 69cf5b970a114..e480c692513f0 100644
--- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
@@ -5112,13 +5112,18 @@ static void bond_set_slave_arr(struct bonding *bond,
 {
 	struct bond_up_slave *usable, *all;
 
-	usable = rtnl_dereference(bond->usable_slaves);
-	rcu_assign_pointer(bond->usable_slaves, usable_slaves);
-	kfree_rcu(usable, rcu);
-
 	all = rtnl_dereference(bond->all_slaves);
 	rcu_assign_pointer(bond->all_slaves, all_slaves);
 	kfree_rcu(all, rcu);
+
+	if (BOND_MODE(bond) == BOND_MODE_BROADCAST) {
+		kfree_rcu(usable_slaves, rcu);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	usable = rtnl_dereference(bond->usable_slaves);
+	rcu_assign_pointer(bond->usable_slaves, usable_slaves);
+	kfree_rcu(usable, rcu);
 }
 
 static void bond_reset_slave_arr(struct bonding *bond)
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 118/168] Revert "srcu: Use irq_work to start GP in tiny SRCU"

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

This reverts commit 20b98d9ffb09763048a7c84b47403eb0f177272c.

Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/49da816c-8082-46f1-bb12-f0d6187bb06a@roeck-us.net
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 include/linux/srcutiny.h |  4 ----
 kernel/rcu/srcutiny.c    | 19 +------------------
 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 22 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/srcutiny.h b/include/linux/srcutiny.h
index bad5fd0f1ddb6..447133171d95f 100644
--- a/include/linux/srcutiny.h
+++ b/include/linux/srcutiny.h
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@
 #ifndef _LINUX_SRCU_TINY_H
 #define _LINUX_SRCU_TINY_H
 
-#include <linux/irq_work_types.h>
 #include <linux/swait.h>
 
 struct srcu_struct {
@@ -25,21 +24,18 @@ struct srcu_struct {
 	struct rcu_head *srcu_cb_head;	/* Pending callbacks: Head. */
 	struct rcu_head **srcu_cb_tail;	/* Pending callbacks: Tail. */
 	struct work_struct srcu_work;	/* For driving grace periods. */
-	struct irq_work srcu_irq_work;	/* Defer schedule_work() to irq work. */
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC
 	struct lockdep_map dep_map;
 #endif /* #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC */
 };
 
 void srcu_drive_gp(struct work_struct *wp);
-void srcu_tiny_irq_work(struct irq_work *irq_work);
 
 #define __SRCU_STRUCT_INIT(name, __ignored, ___ignored)			\
 {									\
 	.srcu_wq = __SWAIT_QUEUE_HEAD_INITIALIZER(name.srcu_wq),	\
 	.srcu_cb_tail = &name.srcu_cb_head,				\
 	.srcu_work = __WORK_INITIALIZER(name.srcu_work, srcu_drive_gp),	\
-	.srcu_irq_work = { .func = srcu_tiny_irq_work },		\
 	__SRCU_DEP_MAP_INIT(name)					\
 }
 
diff --git a/kernel/rcu/srcutiny.c b/kernel/rcu/srcutiny.c
index 24aa302b3269a..c38e5933a5d69 100644
--- a/kernel/rcu/srcutiny.c
+++ b/kernel/rcu/srcutiny.c
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@
  */
 
 #include <linux/export.h>
-#include <linux/irq_work.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
 #include <linux/preempt.h>
 #include <linux/rcupdate_wait.h>
@@ -38,7 +37,6 @@ static int init_srcu_struct_fields(struct srcu_struct *ssp)
 	ssp->srcu_idx_max = 0;
 	INIT_WORK(&ssp->srcu_work, srcu_drive_gp);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ssp->srcu_work.entry);
-	init_irq_work(&ssp->srcu_irq_work, srcu_tiny_irq_work);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -82,7 +80,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(init_srcu_struct);
 void cleanup_srcu_struct(struct srcu_struct *ssp)
 {
 	WARN_ON(ssp->srcu_lock_nesting[0] || ssp->srcu_lock_nesting[1]);
-	irq_work_sync(&ssp->srcu_irq_work);
 	flush_work(&ssp->srcu_work);
 	WARN_ON(ssp->srcu_gp_running);
 	WARN_ON(ssp->srcu_gp_waiting);
@@ -159,20 +156,6 @@ void srcu_drive_gp(struct work_struct *wp)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(srcu_drive_gp);
 
-/*
- * Use an irq_work to defer schedule_work() to avoid acquiring the workqueue
- * pool->lock while the caller might hold scheduler locks, causing lockdep
- * splats due to workqueue_init() doing a wakeup.
- */
-void srcu_tiny_irq_work(struct irq_work *irq_work)
-{
-	struct srcu_struct *ssp;
-
-	ssp = container_of(irq_work, struct srcu_struct, srcu_irq_work);
-	schedule_work(&ssp->srcu_work);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(srcu_tiny_irq_work);
-
 static void srcu_gp_start_if_needed(struct srcu_struct *ssp)
 {
 	unsigned long cookie;
@@ -183,7 +166,7 @@ static void srcu_gp_start_if_needed(struct srcu_struct *ssp)
 	WRITE_ONCE(ssp->srcu_idx_max, cookie);
 	if (!READ_ONCE(ssp->srcu_gp_running)) {
 		if (likely(srcu_init_done))
-			irq_work_queue(&ssp->srcu_irq_work);
+			schedule_work(&ssp->srcu_work);
 		else if (list_empty(&ssp->srcu_work.entry))
 			list_add(&ssp->srcu_work.entry, &srcu_boot_list);
 	}
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 119/168] net_sched: codel: fix stale state for empty flows in fq_codel

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jonas Köppeler <j.koeppeler@tu-berlin.de>

[ Upstream commit 815980fe6dbb01ad4007e8b260a45617f598b76d ]

When codel_dequeue() finds an empty queue, it resets vars->dropping
but does not reset vars->first_above_time.  The reference CoDel
algorithm (Nichols & Jacobson, ACM Queue 2012) resets both:

  dodeque_result codel_queue_t::dodeque(time_t now) {
      ...
      if (r.p == NULL) {
          first_above_time = 0;   // <-- Linux omits this
      }
      ...
  }

Note that codel_should_drop() does reset first_above_time when called
with a NULL skb, but codel_dequeue() returns early before ever calling
codel_should_drop() in the empty-queue case.  The post-drop code paths
do reach codel_should_drop(NULL) and correctly reset the timer, so a
dropped packet breaks the cycle -- but the next delivered packet
re-arms first_above_time and the cycle repeats.

For sparse flows such as ICMP ping (one packet every 200ms-1s), the
first packet arms first_above_time, the flow goes empty, and the
second packet arrives after the interval has elapsed and gets dropped.
The pattern repeats, producing sustained loss on flows that are not
actually congested.

Test: veth pair, fq_codel, BQL disabled, 30000 iptables rules in the
consumer namespace (NAPI-64 cycle ~14ms, well above fq_codel's 5ms
target), ping at 5 pps under UDP flood:

  Before fix:  26% ping packet loss
  After fix:    0% ping packet loss

Fix by resetting first_above_time to zero in the empty-queue path
of codel_dequeue(), matching the reference algorithm.

Fixes: 76e3cc126bb2 ("codel: Controlled Delay AQM")
Fixes: d068ca2ae2e6 ("codel: split into multiple files")
Co-developed-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonas Köppeler <j.koeppeler@tu-berlin.de>
Reported-by: Chris Arges <carges@cloudflare.com>
Tested-by: Jonas Köppeler <j.koeppeler@tu-berlin.de>
Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260318134826.1281205-7-hawk@kernel.org/
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260323174920.253526-1-hawk@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 include/net/codel_impl.h | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/include/net/codel_impl.h b/include/net/codel_impl.h
index 78a27ac730700..b2c359c6dd1b8 100644
--- a/include/net/codel_impl.h
+++ b/include/net/codel_impl.h
@@ -158,6 +158,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *codel_dequeue(void *ctx,
 	bool drop;
 
 	if (!skb) {
+		vars->first_above_time = 0;
 		vars->dropping = false;
 		return skb;
 	}
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 120/168] Bluetooth: L2CAP: refuse __l2cap_chan_add if chan already has conn

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Pauli Virtanen <pav@iki.fi>

[ Upstream commit 86b55991d3cd690e73c5ef8d20b75ae4905b357a ]

l2cap_chan may be linked to l2cap_conn at most once. This is assumed in
several places, eg l2cap_chan_del cleanup.

There is a TOCTOU race where the invariant is violated:

    [Task 1]                          [Task 2]
    l2cap_chan_connect                l2cap_sock_bind
      l2cap_chan_lock                   lock_sock
      l2cap_state_change                if (sk->sk_state != BT_OPEN)
        chan->state = BT_CONNECT
        l2cap_sock_state_change_cb      chan->state = BT_BOUND
                                        sk->sk_state = BT_BOUND
          lock_sock <------------------ release_sock
          sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECT

l2cap_sock_connect() does not check sk->sk_state, so since chan->state
is now BT_BOUND, subsequent connect() ends up with second
__l2cap_chan_add.

Explicitly document and check the invariant in __l2cap_chan_add with
WARN_ON_ONCE. The only callsite where it could be hit is
l2cap_chan_connect, so add pre-check there to avoid relying on
chan->state. chan->state read/write is not properly guarded currently so
there can be other TOCTOUC problems.

Add l2cap_lock_chan in l2cap_sock_bind() to guard chan->state write.

Fixes: b66774b48dd9 ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix UAF in channel timeout by holding conn ref")
Assisted-by: deepseek-4-flash # finding the race condition
Signed-off-by: Pauli Virtanen <pav@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 7 ++++++-
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 2 ++
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
index c2bd2b25a809c..94fddc456ac57 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
@@ -625,6 +625,10 @@ void __l2cap_chan_add(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 	BT_DBG("conn %p, psm 0x%2.2x, dcid 0x%4.4x", conn,
 	       __le16_to_cpu(chan->psm), chan->dcid);
 
+	/* Caller must ensure l2cap_chan is linked to l2cap_conn only once */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(chan->conn || test_bit(FLAG_DEL, &chan->flags)))
+		return;
+
 	conn->disc_reason = HCI_ERROR_REMOTE_USER_TERM;
 
 	chan->conn = l2cap_conn_get(conn);
@@ -7332,7 +7336,8 @@ int l2cap_chan_connect(struct l2cap_chan *chan, __le16 psm, u16 cid,
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (cid && __l2cap_get_chan_by_dcid(conn, cid)) {
+	if ((cid && __l2cap_get_chan_by_dcid(conn, cid)) || chan->conn ||
+	    test_bit(FLAG_DEL, &chan->flags)) {
 		hci_conn_drop(hcon);
 		err = -EBUSY;
 		goto chan_unlock;
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
index c0da2b1168a1f..7d2e59e97c2c1 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ static int l2cap_sock_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, int alen)
 			return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
 	lock_sock(sk);
 
 	if (sk->sk_state != BT_OPEN) {
@@ -176,6 +177,7 @@ static int l2cap_sock_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, int alen)
 
 done:
 	release_sock(sk);
+	l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
 	return err;
 }
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.6 121/168] tracing: Reject incomplete event filter expressions

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>

commit 1fdc4164e488916402badddbb1f51e9380dabb91 upstream.

A non-empty expression normally finishes in predicate_parse()'s inner
loop, which resolves the pending logical operators before jumping to
finalization. If the input ends after an operator, possibly followed by
unary '!' tokens, the outer loop instead falls through with unresolved
operator state.

For example, "common_pid == 1 || common_pid == 2 &&" leaves
prog[0].target equal to -1. The second pass then reads prog[-1] before
the forward-jump check can reject it. Depending on adjacent slab
contents, it can also copy an out-of-bounds word into a branch target
that passes the forward-only check. A self-targeted perf tracepoint
counting event can reach this path through PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_FILTER.

Reject the outer-loop fallthrough when a predicate has already been
parsed. This ensures that non-empty expressions only reach finalization
after the inner loop has resolved their operators. Keep the existing
no-filter error for input that has no predicates. Add a regression test
for trailing logical operators and unary negations.

Fixes: 80765597bc587 ("tracing: Rewrite filter logic to be simpler and faster")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261023174620.91969-1-kylebot@openai.com
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6-astra
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Tested-by: JongHyuk Kim(MalHyuk) <malhyuk97@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c                                      |    6 ++
 tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/filter/event-filter-incomplete.tc |   24 ++++++++++
 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/filter/event-filter-incomplete.tc

--- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c
@@ -595,6 +595,12 @@ predicate_parse(const char *str, int nr_
 			top--;					/* #12 */
 		}
 	}
+	/* Only the inner loop can complete a non-empty expression. */
+	if (N) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		parse_error(pe, FILT_ERR_INVALID_FILTER, ptr - str);
+		goto out_free;
+	}
  out:
 	if (top != op_stack) {
 		/* Too many '(' */
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/filter/event-filter-incomplete.tc
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+# description: event filter - reject incomplete logical expressions
+# requires: events/sched/sched_switch/filter
+# flags: instance
+
+filter=events/sched/sched_switch/filter
+
+for base in \
+    'common_pid == 1' \
+    'common_pid == 1 || common_pid == 2' \
+    'common_pid == 1 && common_pid == 2' \
+    '!(common_pid == 1 || common_pid == 2)'
+do
+    printf '%s' "$base" > "$filter"
+    for tail in '&&' '||' '&& !' '|| !' '&& !! ' '|| !! '; do
+        if printf '%s' "$base $tail" > "$filter" 2>/dev/null; then
+            echo "Accepted incomplete filter: $base $tail"
+            exit_fail
+        fi
+    done
+done
+
+echo 0 > "$filter"

[PATCH 6.6 122/168] tracing: Save the event file instead of the compatible histogram

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Donggeun Yoo <donggeunyoo.kernel@gmail.com>

commit d5c42664fc094899af9aae5300b27fe8fdb658ef upstream.

create_field_var_hist() creates a histogram on the matched event to
supply a field variable, and records it on the target so it can be torn
down later:

	hist_data = find_compatible_hist(target_hist_data, file);
	...
	/* Save the compatible histogram information */
	var_hist->hist_data = hist_data;

hist_data is not the histogram it creates. It is one that was already
there, whose keys the new one copies. The saved pointer has a single
user, unregister_field_var_hists(), which runs when the target is
removed:

	file = hist_data->field_var_hists[i]->hist_data->event_file;

find_compatible_hist() matches on keys alone, so it can pick one with no
variables of its own. check_var_refs() then returns false and the user
can remove it while the target still points at it:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in event_hist_trigger_free+0x2b2/0x320
 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880093b90e0 by task init/1

 Freed by task 1:
  kfree+0x154/0x420
  event_hist_trigger_free+0x1d5/0x320
  event_hist_trigger_parse+0x35f3/0x69e0
  trigger_process_regex+0x1a6/0x250

Save the event file instead. It is all the dereference ever wanted, and
it does not go away when the user removes a trigger.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260914110753.221E61F000FF@smtp.kernel.org/
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260914234754.3676905-1-donggeunyoo.kernel@gmail.com
Fixes: 02205a6752f2 ("tracing: Add support for 'field variables'")
Signed-off-by: Donggeun Yoo <donggeunyoo.kernel@gmail.com>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-fable-5
Acked-by: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c
@@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ struct field_var {
 };
 
 struct field_var_hist {
-	struct hist_trigger_data	*hist_data;
+	struct trace_event_file		*file;
 	char				*cmd;
 };
 
@@ -3077,8 +3077,8 @@ create_field_var_hist(struct hist_trigge
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 	}
 
-	/* Save the compatible histogram information */
-	var_hist->hist_data = hist_data;
+	/* Needed to remove the histogram when the target goes away */
+	var_hist->file = file;
 
 	/* Create the new histogram with our variable */
 	ret = event_hist_trigger_parse(&trigger_hist_cmd, file,
@@ -6300,7 +6300,7 @@ static void unregister_field_var_hists(s
 	int ret;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < hist_data->n_field_var_hists; i++) {
-		file = hist_data->field_var_hists[i]->hist_data->event_file;
+		file = hist_data->field_var_hists[i]->file;
 		cmd = hist_data->field_var_hists[i]->cmd;
 		ret = event_hist_trigger_parse(&trigger_hist_cmd, file,
 					       "!hist", "hist", cmd);

[PATCH 6.6 123/168] tracing: Unregister field variable histograms when the command fails

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Donggeun Yoo <donggeunyoo.kernel@gmail.com>

commit 91c14d6c13096091c56304120aaa26e479130b8b upstream.

An action that names a field on another event needs that field as a
variable, so create_field_var_hist() registers a second hist trigger on
that event to provide it, and records it in
target_hist_data->field_var_hists[].

If a later part of the same command fails, create_actions() returns an
error and event_hist_trigger_parse() jumps to out_free. The write fails
with -EINVAL and sched_switch gets no trigger, but:

  # echo 'hist:keys=pid:ts0=common_timestamp.usecs' >> \
      events/sched/sched_waking/trigger
  # echo 'my_synth u64 lat; int a; int b' >> synthetic_events
  # echo 'hist:keys=next_pid:wakeup_lat=common_timestamp.usecs-$ts0:\
      onmatch(sched.sched_waking).my_synth($wakeup_lat,prio,nosuchfld)'\
      >> events/sched/sched_switch/trigger
  # cat events/sched/sched_waking/trigger
  hist:keys=pid:vals=hitcount:ts0=common_timestamp.usecs:sort=hitcount:size=2048:clock=global [active]
  hist:keys=pid:vals=hitcount:synthetic_prio=prio:sort=hitcount:size=2048 [active]

The second histogram is the one created for 'prio'. It is still active and
still counting.

out_free reaches destroy_field_var_hists(), which frees the
field_var_hists[] entries, but never unregister_field_var_hists(), which is
what removes the triggers and runs only from event_hist_trigger_free(). The
entry is freed and the trigger is left with nothing tracking it.

Unregister the field variable histograms in out_free as well, and record
each one as soon as its trigger is registered rather than after the lookup
that follows it, so no exit can leave a registered trigger untracked. The
entry then belongs to field_var_hists[] and is released by
destroy_field_var_hists(), so freeing it on that exit would be a double
free.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260914104036.1768529-1-donggeunyoo.kernel@gmail.com
Fixes: 02205a6752f2 ("tracing: Add support for 'field variables'")
Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260913204302.DB2551F000FF@smtp.kernel.org/
Signed-off-by: Donggeun Yoo <donggeunyoo.kernel@gmail.com>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-fable-5
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c |   12 ++++++------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c
@@ -3093,20 +3093,18 @@ create_field_var_hist(struct hist_trigge
 
 	kfree(cmd);
 
+	n = target_hist_data->n_field_var_hists;
+	target_hist_data->field_var_hists[n] = var_hist;
+	target_hist_data->n_field_var_hists++;
+
 	/* If we can't find the variable, something went wrong */
 	event_var = find_synthetic_field_var(target_hist_data, subsys_name,
 					     event_name, field_name);
 	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(event_var)) {
-		kfree(var_hist->cmd);
-		kfree(var_hist);
 		hist_err(tr, HIST_ERR_SYNTH_VAR_NOT_FOUND, errpos(field_name));
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 	}
 
-	n = target_hist_data->n_field_var_hists;
-	target_hist_data->field_var_hists[n] = var_hist;
-	target_hist_data->n_field_var_hists++;
-
 	return event_var;
 }
 
@@ -6919,6 +6917,8 @@ static int event_hist_trigger_parse(stru
 
 	trigger_data_free(trigger_data);
 
+	unregister_field_var_hists(hist_data);
+
 	destroy_hist_data(hist_data);
 	goto out;
 }

[PATCH 6.6 124/168] tracing: Fix 64-bit and signed histogram fields on 32-bit kernels

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Donggeun Yoo <donggeunyoo.kernel@gmail.com>

commit 443d23176812803d0fa182b8d05ef066a7b8271f upstream.

DEFINE_HIST_FIELD_FN() reads a trace event field and widens it to the u64
the histogram uses as a key or a value:

	type *addr = (type *)(event + hist_field->field->offset);

	return (u64)(unsigned long)*addr;

unsigned long is 32 bits on a 32-bit kernel, so the intermediate cast
discards the upper half of a 64-bit field, and widens a signed field by
zero extension from 32 bits rather than sign extension from its own
width. Five of the eight instantiations are wrong there: s64, u64, s32,
s16 and s8.

The cast came in with commit 79e577cbce4c ("tracing: Support string type
key properly"), which also added hist_field_dynstring() and
hist_field_pstring(). Those convert a char * to u64 and do warn without
an unsigned long in between on 32-bit. DEFINE_HIST_FIELD_FN() converts an
integer and never a pointer, so it gains nothing from the cast and only
loses information.

Drop the intermediate cast and let the usual arithmetic conversions widen
*addr according to its own type. unsigned long is 64 bits on LP64, so the
two forms are identical there and 64-bit kernels are unaffected.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260917015532.103081-1-donggeunyoo.kernel@gmail.com
Fixes: 79e577cbce4c ("tracing: Support string type key properly")
Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260914054614.82A9B1F000FF@smtp.kernel.org/
Signed-off-by: Donggeun Yoo <donggeunyoo.kernel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c
@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ static u64 hist_field_unary_minus(struct
 {									\
 	type *addr = (type *)(event + hist_field->field->offset);	\
 									\
-	return (u64)(unsigned long)*addr;				\
+	return (u64)*addr;						\
 }
 
 DEFINE_HIST_FIELD_FN(s64);

[PATCH 6.6 125/168] tracing/histograms: Verify event_call identity when updating synth_event refcount

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>

commit 3403d9bb27ebc3572bd048620746b4414e073bf9 upstream.

In event_hist_trigger_parse() and hist_unreg_all(), the histogram
registration and unregistration paths look up find_synth_event() using
trace_event_name(file->event_call) and adjust se->ref if a match is
found.

Because find_synth_event() only compares the event basename, registering
or removing a histogram on a non-synthetic trace event whose basename
matches a synthetic event erroneously modifies the synthetic event's
reference count.  If a histogram is registered on the non-synthetic
event before the synthetic event is created and removed afterwards,
se->ref is decremented without a matching increment, allowing the
synthetic event to be freed while an active histogram action still holds
a pointer to it.

Introduce find_synth_event_call() to verify that &se->call matches
file->event_call before adjusting se->ref.

Fixes: 4b147936fa50 ("tracing: Add support for 'synthetic' events")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261019120730.2342739-1-lee@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c  |   11 +++--------
 kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c |   10 ++++++++++
 kernel/trace/trace_synth.h        |    1 +
 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c
@@ -6729,7 +6729,6 @@ static void hist_unreg_all(struct trace_
 	struct event_trigger_data *test, *n;
 	struct hist_trigger_data *hist_data;
 	struct synth_event *se;
-	const char *se_name;
 
 	lockdep_assert_held(&event_mutex);
 
@@ -6742,8 +6741,7 @@ static void hist_unreg_all(struct trace_
 			list_del_rcu(&test->list);
 			trace_event_trigger_enable_disable(file, 0);
 
-			se_name = trace_event_name(file->event_call);
-			se = find_synth_event(se_name);
+			se = find_synth_event_call(file->event_call);
 			if (se)
 				se->ref--;
 
@@ -6767,7 +6765,6 @@ static int event_hist_trigger_parse(stru
 	struct hist_trigger_data *hist_data;
 	char *param, *filter, *p, *start;
 	struct synth_event *se;
-	const char *se_name;
 	bool remove;
 	int ret = 0;
 
@@ -6861,8 +6858,7 @@ static int event_hist_trigger_parse(stru
 		}
 
 		event_trigger_unregister(cmd_ops, file, glob+1, trigger_data);
-		se_name = trace_event_name(file->event_call);
-		se = find_synth_event(se_name);
+		se = find_synth_event_call(file->event_call);
 		if (se)
 			se->ref--;
 		ret = 0;
@@ -6897,8 +6893,7 @@ static int event_hist_trigger_parse(stru
 	if (ret)
 		goto out_unreg;
 
-	se_name = trace_event_name(file->event_call);
-	se = find_synth_event(se_name);
+	se = find_synth_event_call(file->event_call);
 	if (se)
 		se->ref++;
  out:
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c
@@ -857,6 +857,16 @@ struct synth_event *find_synth_event(con
 	return NULL;
 }
 
+struct synth_event *find_synth_event_call(struct trace_event_call *call)
+{
+	struct synth_event *se;
+	const char *name;
+
+	name = trace_event_name(call);
+	se = find_synth_event(name);
+	return se && &se->call == call ? se : NULL;
+}
+
 static struct trace_event_fields synth_event_fields_array[] = {
 	{ .type = TRACE_FUNCTION_TYPE,
 	  .define_fields = synth_event_define_fields },
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_synth.h
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_synth.h
@@ -37,5 +37,6 @@ struct synth_event {
 };
 
 extern struct synth_event *find_synth_event(const char *name);
+extern struct synth_event *find_synth_event_call(struct trace_event_call *call);
 
 #endif /* __TRACE_SYNTH_H */

[PATCH 6.6 126/168] io-wq: order the exit bit against worker creation task work

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>

Commit 0e5663856b69219ef2f02e04bac9f5c5be19718a upstream.

io_wq_exit_workers() cancels task work for queued worker creation with
task_work_cancel_match(). That has a plain load of task->task_works.

io_queue_worker_create() adds the new entry and tests IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT to
cancel it if the workqueue is already on its way out.

That must be ordered. task_work_add() has a full barrier via cmpxchg().
But io_wq_exit_start() sets the bit with set_bit() which doesn't have
any memory ordering.

So afaict, on weakly ordered architectures the exiting task may load
task_works before the store of the bit is visible. The other side tests
the bit before the store is visible as well. So the entry remains queued
with worker_refs and the exiting task waits on worker_done indefinitely.

If the task still has rings then io_uring_del_tctx_node() provides the
barrier via test_and_set_bit() in io_wq_set_exit_on_idle(). When it
has closed all rings though that barrier is gone.

Add the barrier after the set_bit().

Fixes: 71a85387546e ("io-wq: check for wq exit after adding new worker task_work")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260921-work-coredump-fixes-v3-4-8e4adb1619e6@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 io_uring/io-wq.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/io_uring/io-wq.c
+++ b/io_uring/io-wq.c
@@ -1236,6 +1236,8 @@ static bool io_task_work_match(struct ca
 void io_wq_exit_start(struct io_wq *wq)
 {
 	set_bit(IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT, &wq->state);
+	/* Pairs with task_work_add() in io_queue_worker_create(). */
+	smp_mb__after_atomic();
 }
 
 static void io_wq_cancel_tw_create(struct io_wq *wq)

[PATCH 6.6 127/168] io_uring/wait: dont spin on a stuck overflow list

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>

Commit 34f5a664c34d3cb62f6bec7f4156754594a7d25b upstream.

As long as IO_CHECK_CQ_OVERFLOW_BIT is set, io_cqring_wait_schedule()
returns right away, before it gets to look at signals or arms the timeout,
for io_cqring_wait() to flush the overflow list. If that doesn't empty the
list, and the CQ ring doesn't hold the number of events the caller wants,
the loop starts over, with the same result. The task spins in the kernel,
and can't be killed.

The assumption is that this can't happen: if CQEs can't be flushed, the
ring is full, and min_events is capped to the size of the ring. But:

- With IORING_SETUP_CQE_MIXED a 32b CQE needs two contiguous entries. It
  is stuck on the list if a single one is free, and then the ring holds
  less than cq_entries events. A single threaded application that asks
  for as many events as the ring has entries never gets out of
  io_uring_enter().

- Whether the ring is full is up to the CQ head, which the application
  can write to. While one thread waits for events on an empty ring,
  another one can move the head back so that the ring looks full and
  have a CQE overflow. The waiter can't be stopped any more, not even by
  SIGKILL.

Only the application can make room in the CQ ring. Return to it if the
list could not be flushed.

[ 6.6: io_cqring_wait() lives in io_uring/io_uring.c ]
Fixes: 3fcf19d592d5 ("io_uring: parse check_cq out of wq waiting")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261015-b4-io-uring-fixes-v1-3-c1556f5d7bf5@toxicpanda.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 io_uring/io_uring.c |   13 +++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/io_uring/io_uring.c
+++ b/io_uring/io_uring.c
@@ -2641,9 +2641,18 @@ static int io_cqring_wait(struct io_ring
 
 		check_cq = READ_ONCE(ctx->check_cq);
 		if (unlikely(check_cq)) {
-			/* let the caller flush overflows, retry */
-			if (check_cq & BIT(IO_CHECK_CQ_OVERFLOW_BIT))
+			if (check_cq & BIT(IO_CHECK_CQ_OVERFLOW_BIT)) {
 				io_cqring_do_overflow_flush(ctx);
+				/*
+				 * No room for what has overflown. It takes the
+				 * application to change that, so return to it.
+				 */
+				if (test_bit(IO_CHECK_CQ_OVERFLOW_BIT,
+					     &ctx->check_cq)) {
+					ret = 0;
+					break;
+				}
+			}
 			if (check_cq & BIT(IO_CHECK_CQ_DROPPED_BIT)) {
 				ret = -EBADR;
 				break;

[PATCH 6.6 128/168] io_uring/io-wq: dont lose the signal that ends work

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>

Commit 63c103279a95e82280092f2f4232e91e8117a252 upstream.

When a thread exits, only its tracked requests are cancelled. Then its
io-wq is torn down. io_wq_exit_workers() signals every worker, to get it
out of an interruptible sleep, and waits for all of them to exit. Before
they do, they go through the work that is left. Unbounded work is
cancelled. Bounded work is run, as it is expected to end by itself.

Not all of it does. An open has no file yet, so it counts as bounded, and
the open of a FIFO waits for the other end. That is what the signal is for.
But the workers are signalled once, and a worker that hasn't started the
work by then loses the signal:

  io_wq_exit_workers()               io_worker_handle_work()
    io_wq_worker_wake()
      set TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL
                                       io_assign_current_work()
                                         io_run_task_work()
                                           clear TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL
                                       io_wq_submit_work()
                                         fifo_open()
                                           wait_for_partner()
    wait_for_completion_timeout()

The thread never gets out of do_exit():

  IORING_OP_OPENAT of a FIFO without a writer, IOSQE_ASYNC
  exit of the thread that has submitted it

hangs in more than 9 of 10 attempts (4 CPUs, KVM), until the process is
killed.

Set TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL for bounded work that is started with IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT
set. The bit is set before the workers are signalled, and it is tested
after the flag has been cleared, with clear_notify_signal() providing the
barrier. So either the flag stays, or the bit is seen.

Work that is started while the io-wq exits is treated like work that is
being run at that time: it isn't interrupted unless it waits
interruptibly.

[ 6.6: work->flags is not atomic here ]
Fixes: afcc4015d1bf ("io-wq: provide an io_wq_put_and_exit() helper")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261015-b4-io-uring-fixes-v1-4-c1556f5d7bf5@toxicpanda.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 io_uring/io-wq.c |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

--- a/io_uring/io-wq.c
+++ b/io_uring/io-wq.c
@@ -600,8 +600,15 @@ static void io_worker_handle_work(struct
 
 			next_hashed = wq_next_work(work);
 
+			/*
+			 * io_wq_exit_workers() signals us once, so that we
+			 * don't sleep for ever. If that was before this work
+			 * became the current one, the signal is gone.
+			 */
 			if (unlikely(do_kill) && (work->flags & IO_WQ_WORK_UNBOUND))
 				work->flags |= IO_WQ_WORK_CANCEL;
+			else if (unlikely(do_kill))
+				set_notify_signal(current);
 			wq->do_work(work);
 			io_assign_current_work(worker, NULL);
 

[PATCH 6.6 129/168] io_uring/io-wq: dont hide a link from cancellations

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>

Commit 436d48a2ed13112d2d27085325838e5bce6b4507 upstream.

A task that exits cancels its tracked requests and waits until they are
gone. io_uring_cancel_generic() looks everywhere a request can be, and
goes to sleep if it found nothing to cancel. It is woken up each time
one of the requests of the task is completed by task work or freed.

When io-wq is done with a request that has a link, there is a time in which
the next request of the link can't be found:

  io_worker_handle_work()
    io_assign_current_work(worker, NULL)
    io_wq_free_work(work)
      io_req_find_next()           // takes the link off the request
      io_free_req()                // task work for the task
    io_assign_current_work(worker, linked)
      io_run_task_work()
      cond_resched()
      worker->cur_work = linked

It is not pending, it is not the current work of a worker, and it is not
yet on the list that it is about to be parked on. If the pass that the
exiting task makes because of io_free_req() falls into that time, it finds
nothing and the task goes to sleep. The worker then runs the link, which
IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT doesn't prevent for bounded work. If that parks the request
nothing is completed or freed, and nobody wakes up the task. If it is the
process that exits it can't be killed any more either.

  NOP, IOSQE_ASYNC | IOSQE_IO_LINK
  FUTEX_WAIT, FUTEX2_PRIVATE
  exit of the thread, or of the process, up to 63us later

With four of these per round 5 to 8 of 10,000 rounds hang (4 CPUs, KVM):

  io_uring_cancel_generic
  do_exit

Commit f8b632e89a10 ("io_uring: tighten task exit cancellations") is about
the same gap, and makes the task look again for whatever happens before
io_free_req().

Free the request once the link is the current work of the worker, or
pending. Whoever is woken up by that can find the link, until it is parked
where cancellations look as well. To do so split io_wq_free_work() in two.

[ 6.6: io-wq takes callbacks, split the free_work one into put_work and free_work, and keep io_wq_put_work() finding the next link the way io_wq_free_work() did here ]
Fixes: 768134d4f481 ("io_uring: don't do flush cancel under inflight_lock")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261015-b4-io-uring-fixes-v1-5-c1556f5d7bf5@toxicpanda.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 io_uring/io-wq.c    |   22 ++++++++++++++++++----
 io_uring/io-wq.h    |    4 +++-
 io_uring/io_uring.c |   28 ++++++++++++++++++++--------
 io_uring/io_uring.h |    3 ++-
 io_uring/tctx.c     |    1 +
 5 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

--- a/io_uring/io-wq.c
+++ b/io_uring/io-wq.c
@@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ enum {
 struct io_wq {
 	unsigned long state;
 
+	put_work_fn *put_work;
 	free_work_fn *free_work;
 	io_wq_work_fn *do_work;
 
@@ -595,8 +596,9 @@ static void io_worker_handle_work(struct
 		/* handle a whole dependent link */
 		do {
 			bool do_kill = test_bit(IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT, &wq->state);
-			struct io_wq_work *next_hashed, *linked;
+			struct io_wq_work *next_hashed, *linked, *done = work;
 			unsigned int hash = io_get_work_hash(work);
+			bool last;
 
 			next_hashed = wq_next_work(work);
 
@@ -612,7 +614,7 @@ static void io_worker_handle_work(struct
 			wq->do_work(work);
 			io_assign_current_work(worker, NULL);
 
-			linked = wq->free_work(work);
+			last = wq->put_work(work, &linked);
 			work = next_hashed;
 			if (!work && linked && !io_wq_is_hashed(linked)) {
 				work = linked;
@@ -621,6 +623,13 @@ static void io_worker_handle_work(struct
 			io_assign_current_work(worker, work);
 			if (linked)
 				io_wq_enqueue(wq, linked);
+			/*
+			 * Not before the link is current or pending work again.
+			 * This may be the last time that a task is woken up
+			 * which exits and looks for requests to cancel.
+			 */
+			if (last)
+				wq->free_work(done);
 
 			if (hash != -1U && !next_hashed) {
 				/* serialize hash clear with wake_up() */
@@ -921,9 +930,13 @@ static bool io_wq_worker_wake(struct io_
 static void io_run_cancel(struct io_wq_work *work, struct io_wq *wq)
 {
 	do {
+		struct io_wq_work *linked;
+
 		work->flags |= IO_WQ_WORK_CANCEL;
 		wq->do_work(work);
-		work = wq->free_work(work);
+		if (wq->put_work(work, &linked))
+			wq->free_work(work);
+		work = linked;
 	} while (work);
 }
 
@@ -1176,7 +1189,7 @@ struct io_wq *io_wq_create(unsigned boun
 	int ret, i;
 	struct io_wq *wq;
 
-	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!data->free_work || !data->do_work))
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!data->put_work || !data->free_work || !data->do_work))
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!bounded))
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
@@ -1187,6 +1200,7 @@ struct io_wq *io_wq_create(unsigned boun
 
 	refcount_inc(&data->hash->refs);
 	wq->hash = data->hash;
+	wq->put_work = data->put_work;
 	wq->free_work = data->free_work;
 	wq->do_work = data->do_work;
 
--- a/io_uring/io-wq.h
+++ b/io_uring/io-wq.h
@@ -21,7 +21,8 @@ enum io_wq_cancel {
 	IO_WQ_CANCEL_NOTFOUND,	/* work not found */
 };
 
-typedef struct io_wq_work *(free_work_fn)(struct io_wq_work *);
+typedef bool (put_work_fn)(struct io_wq_work *, struct io_wq_work **);
+typedef void (free_work_fn)(struct io_wq_work *);
 typedef void (io_wq_work_fn)(struct io_wq_work *);
 
 struct io_wq_hash {
@@ -40,6 +41,7 @@ struct io_wq_data {
 	struct io_wq_hash *hash;
 	struct task_struct *task;
 	io_wq_work_fn *do_work;
+	put_work_fn *put_work;
 	free_work_fn *free_work;
 };
 
--- a/io_uring/io_uring.c
+++ b/io_uring/io_uring.c
@@ -1904,17 +1904,29 @@ int io_poll_issue(struct io_kiocb *req,
 				 IO_URING_F_COMPLETE_DEFER);
 }
 
-struct io_wq_work *io_wq_free_work(struct io_wq_work *work)
+/*
+ * io-wq is done with @work. Returns true if it held the last reference, and
+ * hands out the next request of the link then. The caller has to make sure
+ * that cancellations can find the latter before it calls io_wq_free_work().
+ */
+bool io_wq_put_work(struct io_wq_work *work, struct io_wq_work **linked)
 {
 	struct io_kiocb *req = container_of(work, struct io_kiocb, work);
 	struct io_kiocb *nxt = NULL;
 
-	if (req_ref_put_and_test_atomic(req)) {
-		if (req->flags & IO_REQ_LINK_FLAGS)
-			nxt = io_req_find_next(req);
-		io_free_req(req);
-	}
-	return nxt ? &nxt->work : NULL;
+	*linked = NULL;
+	if (!req_ref_put_and_test_atomic(req))
+		return false;
+	if (req->flags & IO_REQ_LINK_FLAGS)
+		nxt = io_req_find_next(req);
+	if (nxt)
+		*linked = &nxt->work;
+	return true;
+}
+
+void io_wq_free_work(struct io_wq_work *work)
+{
+	io_free_req(container_of(work, struct io_kiocb, work));
 }
 
 void io_wq_submit_work(struct io_wq_work *work)
@@ -1925,7 +1937,7 @@ void io_wq_submit_work(struct io_wq_work
 	bool needs_poll = false;
 	int ret = 0, err = -ECANCELED;
 
-	/* one will be dropped by ->io_wq_free_work() after returning to io-wq */
+	/* one will be dropped by io_wq_put_work() after returning to io-wq */
 	if (!(req->flags & REQ_F_REFCOUNT))
 		__io_req_set_refcount(req, 2);
 	else
--- a/io_uring/io_uring.h
+++ b/io_uring/io_uring.h
@@ -91,7 +91,8 @@ int io_do_iopoll(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx
 void __io_submit_flush_completions(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx);
 int io_req_prep_async(struct io_kiocb *req);
 
-struct io_wq_work *io_wq_free_work(struct io_wq_work *work);
+bool io_wq_put_work(struct io_wq_work *work, struct io_wq_work **linked);
+void io_wq_free_work(struct io_wq_work *work);
 void io_wq_submit_work(struct io_wq_work *work);
 
 void io_free_req(struct io_kiocb *req);
--- a/io_uring/tctx.c
+++ b/io_uring/tctx.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ static struct io_wq *io_init_wq_offload(
 
 	data.hash = hash;
 	data.task = task;
+	data.put_work = io_wq_put_work;
 	data.free_work = io_wq_free_work;
 	data.do_work = io_wq_submit_work;
 

[PATCH 6.6 130/168] io_uring: dont flood a cancelling task with task_work

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>

Commit 22e643e61b9b6299b42ff7d88bab48bccada8a5d upstream.

io_ring_exit_work() asks each task which has used the ring to remove its
tctx node, by task_work, and repeats that until the list is empty.
io_tctx_exit_cb() doesn't touch the node while the task is in
io_uring_cancel_generic(), which removes all the nodes at its end. So the
work item queues the callback again as soon as it has completed, for
nothing.

That is more than a waste of time. task_work_run() only returns when it
finds the list empty. If the rings are released from inside the
cancellation, because requests of other rings held the last references to
their files, up to 64 work items keep sending callbacks to the one task
which is running them. It never finds the list empty, never gets back to
the cancellation, the nodes stay, and so it goes on: a task with 60 pairs
of rings which poll each other ran 280000 callbacks in 5 seconds, 20
seconds after exit_group(). It ends when all the senders happen to be late
at the same time. Until then the task keeps a CPU and the work items busy.

An exiting task can't be killed meanwhile. execve() cancels the requests in
the same way, so a live task can get stuck there as well, for minutes. If
it takes more than five, the work items run into the
WARN_ON_ONCE(time_after(jiffies, timeout)) of io_ring_exit_work(). No
privilege is needed for any of this.

If the callback has met a task in cancellation, wait a little before it is
sent again. Nobody has to wake the work item up for that: either the node
is gone by then, or it is the turn of the next round.

Fixes: d56d938b4bef ("io_uring: do ctx initiated file note removal")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261015-b4-io-uring-fixes-v1-6-c1556f5d7bf5@toxicpanda.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 io_uring/io_uring.c |   12 +++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/io_uring/io_uring.c
+++ b/io_uring/io_uring.c
@@ -3169,6 +3169,7 @@ struct io_tctx_exit {
 	struct callback_head		task_work;
 	struct completion		completion;
 	struct io_ring_ctx		*ctx;
+	bool				in_cancel;
 };
 
 static __cold void io_tctx_exit_cb(struct callback_head *cb)
@@ -3183,7 +3184,8 @@ static __cold void io_tctx_exit_cb(struc
 	 * tctx can be NULL if the queueing of this task_work raced with
 	 * work cancelation off the exec path.
 	 */
-	if (tctx && !atomic_read(&tctx->in_cancel))
+	work->in_cancel = tctx && atomic_read(&tctx->in_cancel);
+	if (tctx && !work->in_cancel)
 		io_uring_del_tctx_node((unsigned long)work->ctx);
 	complete(&work->completion);
 }
@@ -3277,6 +3279,14 @@ static __cold void io_ring_exit_work(str
 		 * wait is marked as interruptible.
 		 */
 		wait_for_completion_interruptible(&exit.completion);
+		/*
+		 * The task removes the node when it is done with its
+		 * cancellation. Give it the time for that: it doesn't get back
+		 * to it as long as it finds new task_work each time it has run
+		 * the old one, and we may be one of many who send it.
+		 */
+		if (exit.in_cancel)
+			schedule_timeout_idle(HZ / 20);
 		mutex_lock(&ctx->uring_lock);
 	}
 	mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock);

[PATCH 6.6 131/168] io_uring/io-wq: dont strand work when a worker exits

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>

Commit ad41f325be1271b22d99353819c90f0d5e45acc8 upstream.

A worker exits if its idle timeout fired and it isn't the last one, if
its affinity was changed, or if the wq is marked exit-on-idle. It decides
so after it found the work list empty, and until io_worker_exit() is
through it stays on the free list and in ->nr_running:

worker                                io_wq_enqueue()
io_acct_run_queue() == false
                                      queues work
                                      io_acct_activate_free_worker()
                                        wake_up_process(worker)
                                      // found one, nothing to create
acct->nr_workers--
break
io_worker_exit()

Nobody is going to look at the work. If other workers exist, it has to
wait until one of them finishes what it is blocked on or hits its idle
timeout. If not, which is possible for the affinity and the exit-on-idle
case, it sits there until something else is queued. For exit-on-idle it
takes a task that closes its last ring and sets up a new one while the
workers are on their way out.

Make the worker take itself off the free list when it gives up its
->nr_workers slot, then leave ->nr_running, and only then take the final
look at the work list. That look and queueing work are both done under
acct->lock, so either the worker sees the work and stays, or the enqueue
side sees that the worker is gone and wakes or creates another one. If it
wants to stay and finds that its slot has been taken, a worker has been
created in its place, which is going to look at the work list, and it can
leave after all.

[ 6.6: no exit-on-idle state, ->nr_workers and the free list are under wq->lock ]
Fixes: 38aa434ab933 ("io_uring/io-wq: add exit-on-idle state")
Fixes: 05c5f4ee4da7 ("io-wq: get rid of FIXED worker flag")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261015-b4-io-uring-fixes-v1-11-c1556f5d7bf5@toxicpanda.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 io_uring/io-wq.c |   37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/io_uring/io-wq.c
+++ b/io_uring/io-wq.c
@@ -648,6 +648,36 @@ static void io_worker_handle_work(struct
 	} while (1);
 }
 
+/*
+ * The worker has decided to exit, and has given up its ->nr_workers slot and
+ * its place on the free list. io_wq_enqueue() may have picked it from that
+ * list, or seen it running, after it last looked at the work list. Leave
+ * ->nr_running as well and check again. Returns false if the worker has to
+ * stay.
+ */
+static bool io_worker_retire(struct io_wq *wq, struct io_wq_acct *acct,
+			     struct io_worker *worker)
+{
+	/* turns io_wq_dec_running() and the scheduler hooks into no-ops */
+	clear_bit(IO_WORKER_F_UP, &worker->flags);
+	atomic_dec(&acct->nr_running);
+	if (!io_acct_run_queue(acct))
+		return true;
+	raw_spin_unlock(&acct->lock);
+
+	raw_spin_lock(&wq->lock);
+	if (acct->nr_workers >= acct->max_workers) {
+		/* a worker was created in our place, the work is its business */
+		raw_spin_unlock(&wq->lock);
+		return true;
+	}
+	acct->nr_workers++;
+	raw_spin_unlock(&wq->lock);
+	atomic_inc(&acct->nr_running);
+	set_bit(IO_WORKER_F_UP, &worker->flags);
+	return false;
+}
+
 static int io_wq_worker(void *data)
 {
 	struct io_worker *worker = data;
@@ -681,9 +711,14 @@ static int io_wq_worker(void *data)
 		 */
 		if (last_timeout && (exit_mask || acct->nr_workers > 1)) {
 			acct->nr_workers--;
+			if (test_and_clear_bit(IO_WORKER_F_FREE, &worker->flags))
+				hlist_nulls_del_init_rcu(&worker->nulls_node);
 			raw_spin_unlock(&wq->lock);
 			__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
-			break;
+			if (io_worker_retire(wq, acct, worker))
+				break;
+			last_timeout = false;
+			continue;
 		}
 		last_timeout = false;
 		__io_worker_idle(wq, worker);

[PATCH 6.6 132/168] io_uring/io-wq: dont exit with a creation pending

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>

Commit e231d2e8f80d3649ecd3851b7f2abdfbe606c04b upstream.

A worker that is the last one to go to sleep while work is pending asks
for another worker. io_wq_dec_running() bumps ->nr_running on behalf of
the new worker and queues create_worker_cb() as task_work for the owner
of the io-wq. Until that has run, everybody else takes it that a worker
is running which is going to look after the work list: io_wq_enqueue()
doesn't create one, and other workers that go to sleep don't find
themselves to be the last.

If the worker that made the request exits, io_worker_exit() cancels the
task_work, and io_worker_cancel_cb() drops ->nr_running without a look at
the work list:

worker A                   worker B                 io_wq_enqueue()
blocks, work is pending
  nr_running++
  queues create_worker_cb()
wakes, handles the work
idle timeout, decides to exit
                           picks up work 1
                                                    queues work 2
                                                    B is on the free list
                                                    still: wakes B
                           work 1 blocks
                             nr_running 2 -> 1
io_worker_exit()
  io_worker_cancel_cb()
    nr_running 1 -> 0

Work 2 has to wait for work 1, although there is room for more workers.
It takes an owner that doesn't get around to run its task_work for the
time of the idle timeout, less if the worker exits because its affinity
was changed or the io-wq is marked exit-on-idle.

Let the worker stay around until its request has been dealt with. Only
the worker itself sets ->create_state, so it can't be set behind its
back once it has decided to leave.

[ 6.6: no exit-on-idle state ]
Fixes: 1d5f5ea7cb7d ("io-wq: remove worker to owner tw dependency")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261015-b4-io-uring-fixes-v1-12-c1556f5d7bf5@toxicpanda.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 io_uring/io-wq.c |    6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/io_uring/io-wq.c
+++ b/io_uring/io-wq.c
@@ -708,8 +708,12 @@ static int io_wq_worker(void *data)
 		/*
 		 * Last sleep timed out. Exit if we're not the last worker,
 		 * or if someone modified our affinity.
+		 * Not as long as a request of ours for another worker is
+		 * pending, though. It is accounted as a running worker, which
+		 * others rely on, and io_worker_exit() would cancel it.
 		 */
-		if (last_timeout && (exit_mask || acct->nr_workers > 1)) {
+		if (last_timeout && (exit_mask || acct->nr_workers > 1) &&
+		    !test_bit(0, &worker->create_state)) {
 			acct->nr_workers--;
 			if (test_and_clear_bit(IO_WORKER_F_FREE, &worker->flags))
 				hlist_nulls_del_init_rcu(&worker->nulls_node);

[PATCH 6.6 133/168] io_uring/io-wq: let cancel find picked up hashed work

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>

Commit e9efeb4fc97b0879512a3c3b995ed448f2487e12 upstream.

io_get_next_work() takes all the work items that share a hash off the
work list in one go, and the worker runs them one after the other. Only
the one it is working on is visible as ->cur_work. The others are neither
on the list nor current, so io_wq_cancel_cb() can't find them.

IORING_OP_ASYNC_CANCEL and IORING_REGISTER_SYNC_CANCEL return -ENOENT for
a request that has not even been started, e.g. a buffered write queued
behind another write to the same file that is blocked, and the request is
carried out. The cancellation done for a task or ring that goes away gets
there in the end, as it keeps trying, but it has to wait for each item to
become current.

Keep a pointer to the remainder of the chain next to ->cur_work, and have
io_wq_worker_cancel() look at it. The items on it belong to the worker,
which needs ->lock to move on to the next one. Matching work is flagged
with IO_WQ_WORK_CANCEL and fails with -ECANCELED when its turn comes. The
worker isn't signalled for it, that would interrupt the unrelated work it
is busy with. As the request isn't gone yet, it is reported like running
work, with -EALREADY.

[ 6.6: ->next_work was the item being picked up, which io_wq_worker_cancel() checked next to ->cur_work. Set ->cur_work in that window instead, as upstream does, and give ->next_work the new meaning. work->flags is not atomic here ]
Fixes: 86f3cd1b589a ("io-wq: handle hashed writes in chains")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261015-b4-io-uring-fixes-v1-13-c1556f5d7bf5@toxicpanda.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 io_uring/io-wq.c |   38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

--- a/io_uring/io-wq.c
+++ b/io_uring/io-wq.c
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ struct io_worker {
 	struct io_wq *wq;
 
 	struct io_wq_work *cur_work;
+	/* rest of the hashed chain ->cur_work was taken off the list with */
 	struct io_wq_work *next_work;
 	raw_spinlock_t lock;
 
@@ -536,6 +537,17 @@ static struct io_wq_work *io_get_next_wo
 	return NULL;
 }
 
+static void __io_assign_current_work(struct io_worker *worker,
+				     struct io_wq_work *work)
+{
+	raw_spin_lock(&worker->lock);
+	worker->cur_work = work;
+	/* stays valid while in between two items of a chain */
+	if (work)
+		worker->next_work = wq_next_work(work);
+	raw_spin_unlock(&worker->lock);
+}
+
 static void io_assign_current_work(struct io_worker *worker,
 				   struct io_wq_work *work)
 {
@@ -544,10 +556,7 @@ static void io_assign_current_work(struc
 		cond_resched();
 	}
 
-	raw_spin_lock(&worker->lock);
-	worker->cur_work = work;
-	worker->next_work = NULL;
-	raw_spin_unlock(&worker->lock);
+	__io_assign_current_work(worker, work);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -578,9 +587,7 @@ static void io_worker_handle_work(struct
 			 * work list, but isn't yet discoverable as the
 			 * current work item for this worker.
 			 */
-			raw_spin_lock(&worker->lock);
-			worker->next_work = work;
-			raw_spin_unlock(&worker->lock);
+			__io_assign_current_work(worker, work);
 		}
 
 		raw_spin_unlock(&acct->lock);
@@ -1083,15 +1090,28 @@ static bool __io_wq_worker_cancel(struct
 static bool io_wq_worker_cancel(struct io_worker *worker, void *data)
 {
 	struct io_cb_cancel_data *match = data;
+	struct io_wq_work *work;
 
 	/*
 	 * Hold the lock to avoid ->cur_work going out of scope, caller
 	 * may dereference the passed in work.
 	 */
 	raw_spin_lock(&worker->lock);
-	if (__io_wq_worker_cancel(worker, match, worker->cur_work) ||
-	    __io_wq_worker_cancel(worker, match, worker->next_work))
+	if (__io_wq_worker_cancel(worker, match, worker->cur_work))
 		match->nr_running++;
+	/*
+	 * Hashed work is taken off the work list a chain at a time, what the
+	 * worker hasn't started yet can only be found here. It doesn't move on
+	 * without the lock. Just mark the work, it fails once it is its turn.
+	 */
+	for (work = worker->next_work; work; work = wq_next_work(work)) {
+		if (match->nr_running && !match->cancel_all)
+			break;
+		if (match->fn(work, match->data)) {
+			work->flags |= IO_WQ_WORK_CANCEL;
+			match->nr_running++;
+		}
+	}
 	raw_spin_unlock(&worker->lock);
 
 	return match->nr_running && !match->cancel_all;

[PATCH 6.6 134/168] io_uring/poll: dont lose a cancel as io-wq arms poll

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>

Commit 6d2d4c2530e95ff6ddeb98195d49d99dbca14369 upstream.

A request on a pollable file that was forced to io-wq is issued without
blocking there. If that ends in -EAGAIN, io_wq_submit_work() arms poll
for it and returns. It looks at IO_WQ_WORK_CANCEL once, before it issues
the request.

Somebody who wants to cancel the request in between finds it running:

  io-wq worker                          io_try_cancel()
  io_wq_submit_work()
    IO_WQ_WORK_CANCEL isn't set
    io_issue_sqe() = -EAGAIN
                                        io_async_cancel_one()
                                          sets IO_WQ_WORK_CANCEL
                                          signals the worker
                                          = -EALREADY
                                        io_poll_cancel() = -ENOENT
                                        ...
                                        = -ENOENT
    io_arm_poll_handler() = IO_APOLL_OK
    return

Nobody looks at the flag again, and the signal doesn't matter to a
worker that doesn't sleep. The request is armed as if nothing had
happened:

 - a linked timeout completes with -ENOENT, and the request it was
   meant to limit waits for as long as it takes.
 - IORING_OP_ASYNC_CANCEL returns -EALREADY, and the request stays.
 - IORING_REGISTER_SYNC_CANCEL waits for the request to complete if it
   gets -EALREADY. Since commit 5623eb1ed035 ("io_uring/tctx: add
   separate lock for list of tctx's in ctx") it doesn't sleep but spins,
   so its next attempt finds the armed poll.

The same goes for a multishot poll, recv or accept that is armed from
io-wq.

With a read of an empty pipe, IOSQE_ASYNC, and a linked timeout of 5ms
or a cancel in the same submission, in a guest that is slow enough (TCG,
KASAN), the request is lost in 21 of 24 rounds of 40 or 100 attempts.

While it arms poll from io-wq, __io_arm_poll_handler() owns the request.
Look at the flag once the request is in the hash table. The table is
searched and the request is added with ->uring_lock held, and the flag is
set before the search. So either the search finds the request, or it
came first and the flag is seen. With the request marked as cancelled, the
task work that is queued, right away or because ownership can't be
released, fails it with -ECANCELED.

What the canceller is told doesn't change. In this window a linked timeout
still completes with -ENOENT rather than -ETIME, a cancel request with
-EALREADY, and one with IORING_ASYNC_CANCEL_ALL or _ANY with a count that
doesn't include the request. But the request is cancelled, so what is new
is a request that completes with -ECANCELED after such a result.

This doesn't help in two cases:

 - IORING_ASYNC_CANCEL_ALL and _ANY, if the work is flagged after the
   test added here, while io-wq still has it as the current work of the
   worker. io_cancel_cb() stamps it with the sequence of the cancel, so the
   search of the hash table on behalf of the same cancel takes it for
   done and skips it.
 - requests that are parked elsewhere by io-wq, like IORING_OP_FUTEX_WAIT
   and IORING_OP_WAITID. They have the same problem.

[ 6.6: work->flags is not atomic here, the hash table has its own locks ]
Fixes: 90fa02883f06 ("io_uring: implement async hybrid mode for pollable requests")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261015-b4-io-uring-fixes-v1-14-c1556f5d7bf5@toxicpanda.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 io_uring/poll.c |   11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)

--- a/io_uring/poll.c
+++ b/io_uring/poll.c
@@ -644,6 +644,17 @@ static int __io_arm_poll_handler(struct
 
 	io_poll_add_hash(req);
 
+	/*
+	 * Whoever tried to cancel the request while io-wq was running it has
+	 * flagged the work item. If it searched the hash table before the
+	 * request got there it found nothing, and it won't come back. Both
+	 * the search and the insertion are done with the lock of the hash
+	 * table held, and the flag is set before the search. If the search
+	 * came first, the flag is visible by now.
+	 */
+	if (ipt->owning && (req->work.flags & IO_WQ_WORK_CANCEL))
+		io_poll_mark_cancelled(req);
+
 	if (mask && (poll->events & EPOLLET) &&
 	    io_poll_can_finish_inline(req, ipt)) {
 		__io_poll_execute(req, mask, 0);

[PATCH 6.6 135/168] io_uring/cancel: dont forget that the work was running

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>

Commit 8aa0e5db4845fb5ac11abe40d7b1cac0656c3ee3 upstream.

If the request to be cancelled is being run by io-wq,
io_async_cancel_one() flags the work, signals the worker and returns
-EALREADY. Since commit ccbf726171b7 ("io_uring: perform poll removal even
if async work removal is successful") io_try_cancel() goes on regardless,
as poll may be armed for the request. If it isn't, and nothing else turns
up, the result is the -ENOENT of the last search.

__io_async_cancel() makes up for that. On -ENOENT it tries the io-wq of
every task that uses the ring, and that of the caller is one of them. So
the work is found a second time, and the result is -EALREADY after all.

Unless the worker is done with it by then. If the work is flagged before
io_wq_submit_work() looks at IO_WQ_WORK_CANCEL, all the worker does is to
queue the request to be failed by task work. Then it isn't anywhere to be
found until the task work has run, and

 - IORING_REGISTER_SYNC_CANCEL returns -ENOENT,
 - IORING_OP_ASYNC_CANCEL completes with -ENOENT,

for a request that they have just cancelled, and that completes with
-ECANCELED.

With a read of an empty pipe, IOSQE_ASYNC, and a sync cancel right behind
it, 1 to 3 of 1,000,000 calls return -ENOENT, and 50 to 110 with
IORING_SETUP_DEFER_TASKRUN (4 CPUs, KVM). Nothing is written to the pipe,
and all of these reads end with -ECANCELED.

Remember that the work was found. IORING_OP_ASYNC_CANCEL completes with
-EALREADY, as it does if the worker is a bit slower. For
IORING_REGISTER_SYNC_CANCEL it means to try again, which ends with 0.

The result of a linked timeout, which calls io_try_cancel() by itself,
and the number that is returned for IORING_ASYNC_CANCEL_ALL and _ANY don't
change.

Fixes: ccbf726171b7 ("io_uring: perform poll removal even if async work removal is successful")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261015-b4-io-uring-fixes-v1-16-c1556f5d7bf5@toxicpanda.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 io_uring/cancel.c |   13 ++++++++++++-
 io_uring/cancel.h |    2 ++
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/io_uring/cancel.c
+++ b/io_uring/cancel.c
@@ -114,6 +114,8 @@ int io_try_cancel(struct io_uring_task *
 	 */
 	if (!ret)
 		return 0;
+	if (ret == -EALREADY)
+		cd->running = true;
 
 	ret = io_poll_cancel(ctx, cd, issue_flags);
 	if (ret != -ENOENT)
@@ -162,6 +164,7 @@ static int __io_async_cancel(struct io_c
 	struct io_tctx_node *node;
 	int ret, nr = 0;
 
+	cd->running = false;
 	do {
 		ret = io_try_cancel(tctx, cd, issue_flags);
 		if (ret == -ENOENT)
@@ -185,7 +188,15 @@ static int __io_async_cancel(struct io_c
 		}
 	}
 	io_ring_submit_unlock(ctx, issue_flags);
-	return all ? nr : ret;
+	if (all)
+		return nr;
+	/*
+	 * The worker may be done with the work that was found running, and
+	 * flagged, above. That isn't the same as not having found it.
+	 */
+	if (ret == -ENOENT && cd->running)
+		ret = -EALREADY;
+	return ret;
 }
 
 int io_async_cancel(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags)
--- a/io_uring/cancel.h
+++ b/io_uring/cancel.h
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ struct io_cancel_data {
 	u8 opcode;
 	u32 flags;
 	int seq;
+	/* io_try_cancel() has found it being run by io-wq, and flagged it */
+	bool running;
 };
 
 int io_async_cancel_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe);

[PATCH 6.6 136/168] io_uring/cancel: recognize "no timeout" on 32-bit

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>

Commit 3774e4d4c8533da2caae95556c4d635c7c4f45b8 upstream.

IORING_REGISTER_SYNC_CANCEL waits without a limit if both fields of
io_uring_sync_cancel_reg::timeout are -1. io_sync_cancel() compares them
with -1UL. They are of type long long. With a long of 32 bits -1UL is
4294967295, which is what it stays when it is converted for the
comparison, and the fields are never equal to it.

So { -1, -1 } is taken for a timeout. ktime_set() takes the nanoseconds as
an unsigned long, so what becomes of it is -1s + 4294967295ns = 3.29s.

If the request is being run by io-wq and can't be interrupted, the call
returns -ETIME after that time, rather than waiting for the request to be
gone. On i386, with a buffered read from a null_blk device that takes 4s
to complete a request, IOSQE_ASYNC, that is what each call does.

Fixes: 78a861b94959 ("io_uring: add sync cancelation API through io_uring_register()")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261015-b4-io-uring-fixes-v1-17-c1556f5d7bf5@toxicpanda.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 io_uring/cancel.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/io_uring/cancel.c
+++ b/io_uring/cancel.c
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ int io_sync_cancel(struct io_ring_ctx *c
 	if (ret != -EALREADY)
 		goto out;
 
-	if (sc.timeout.tv_sec != -1UL || sc.timeout.tv_nsec != -1UL) {
+	if (sc.timeout.tv_sec != -1 || sc.timeout.tv_nsec != -1) {
 		struct timespec64 ts = {
 			.tv_sec		= sc.timeout.tv_sec,
 			.tv_nsec	= sc.timeout.tv_nsec

[PATCH 6.6 137/168] io_uring/cancel: dont default to setting req->work.cancel_seq

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Commit 521223d7c229f83915619f888c99e952f24dc39f upstream.

Just leave it unset by default, avoiding dipping into the last
cacheline (which is otherwise untouched) for the fast path of using
poll to drive networked traffic. Add a flag that tells us if the
sequence is valid or not, and then we can defer actually assigning
the flag and sequence until someone runs cancelations.

[ 6.6: prerequisite for "io_uring/cancel: let CANCEL_ALL find parked requests". There is no free request flag bit here, so use the cancel_seq_set field that commit f4a1254f2a07 ("io_uring: fix cancellation overwriting req->flags") introduces upstream, which this also covers ]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 include/linux/io_uring_types.h |    3 ++-
 io_uring/cancel.c              |    3 +--
 io_uring/cancel.h              |   10 ++++++++++
 io_uring/io_uring.c            |    2 +-
 io_uring/poll.c                |    6 +-----
 5 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/io_uring_types.h
+++ b/include/linux/io_uring_types.h
@@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ struct io_kiocb {
 		__poll_t apoll_events;
 	};
 	atomic_t			refs;
-	atomic_t			poll_refs;
+	bool				cancel_seq_set;
 	struct io_task_work		io_task_work;
 	unsigned			nr_tw;
 	/* for polled requests, i.e. IORING_OP_POLL_ADD and async armed poll */
@@ -586,6 +586,7 @@ struct io_kiocb {
 	/* opcode allocated if it needs to store data for async defer */
 	void				*async_data;
 	/* linked requests, IFF REQ_F_HARDLINK or REQ_F_LINK are set */
+	atomic_t			poll_refs;
 	struct io_kiocb			*link;
 	/* custom credentials, valid IFF REQ_F_CREDS is set */
 	const struct cred		*creds;
--- a/io_uring/cancel.c
+++ b/io_uring/cancel.c
@@ -56,9 +56,8 @@ bool io_cancel_req_match(struct io_kiocb
 		return false;
 	if (cd->flags & IORING_ASYNC_CANCEL_ALL) {
 check_seq:
-		if (cd->seq == req->work.cancel_seq)
+		if (io_cancel_match_sequence(req, cd->seq))
 			return false;
-		req->work.cancel_seq = cd->seq;
 	}
 
 	return true;
--- a/io_uring/cancel.h
+++ b/io_uring/cancel.h
@@ -22,3 +22,13 @@ void init_hash_table(struct io_hash_tabl
 
 int io_sync_cancel(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, void __user *arg);
 bool io_cancel_req_match(struct io_kiocb *req, struct io_cancel_data *cd);
+
+static inline bool io_cancel_match_sequence(struct io_kiocb *req, int sequence)
+{
+	if (req->cancel_seq_set && sequence == req->work.cancel_seq)
+		return true;
+
+	req->cancel_seq_set = true;
+	req->work.cancel_seq = sequence;
+	return false;
+}
--- a/io_uring/io_uring.c
+++ b/io_uring/io_uring.c
@@ -434,7 +434,6 @@ static void io_prep_async_work(struct io
 
 	req->work.list.next = NULL;
 	req->work.flags = 0;
-	req->work.cancel_seq = atomic_read(&ctx->cancel_seq);
 	if (req->flags & REQ_F_FORCE_ASYNC)
 		req->work.flags |= IO_WQ_WORK_CONCURRENT;
 
@@ -2164,6 +2163,7 @@ static int io_init_req(struct io_ring_ct
 	req->file = NULL;
 	req->rsrc_node = NULL;
 	req->task = current;
+	req->cancel_seq_set = false;
 
 	if (unlikely(opcode >= IORING_OP_LAST)) {
 		req->opcode = 0;
--- a/io_uring/poll.c
+++ b/io_uring/poll.c
@@ -585,10 +585,7 @@ static int __io_arm_poll_handler(struct
 				 struct io_poll_table *ipt, __poll_t mask,
 				 unsigned issue_flags)
 {
-	struct io_ring_ctx *ctx = req->ctx;
-
 	INIT_HLIST_NODE(&req->hash_node);
-	req->work.cancel_seq = atomic_read(&ctx->cancel_seq);
 	io_init_poll_iocb(poll, mask);
 	poll->file = req->file;
 	req->apoll_events = poll->events;
@@ -826,9 +823,8 @@ static struct io_kiocb *io_poll_find(str
 		if (poll_only && req->opcode != IORING_OP_POLL_ADD)
 			continue;
 		if (cd->flags & IORING_ASYNC_CANCEL_ALL) {
-			if (cd->seq == req->work.cancel_seq)
+			if (io_cancel_match_sequence(req, cd->seq))
 				continue;
-			req->work.cancel_seq = cd->seq;
 		}
 		*out_bucket = hb;
 		return req;

[PATCH 6.6 138/168] io_uring/cancel: let CANCEL_ALL find parked requests

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>

Commit fe6ca13c98b1223f6005f32913ebd32e4df64b77 upstream.

A cancellation with IORING_ASYNC_CANCEL_ALL or _ANY goes on until it finds
nothing more. A request may stay where it was found for a while after it
has been cancelled, so each one that matches is stamped with the sequence
number of the cancellation, and is skipped from then on.

io_cancel_cb() does so for io-wq work as well. There is no need to:
pending work is taken off the list, and the workers are looked at once per
call. And it does harm. A request that is run by io-wq may be parked
while it still is the current work of the worker: poll gets armed for it,
or it is put on ->futex_list or ->waitid_list.

  io-wq worker                       io_try_cancel()
  io_wq_submit_work()
    io_arm_poll_handler()
      io_poll_add_hash()
                                       io_async_cancel_one()
                                         io_cancel_cb()
                                           stamps the request
                                         sets IO_WQ_WORK_CANCEL
                                         = -EALREADY
                                       io_poll_cancel()
                                         skips the request
                                       = -ENOENT
  io_assign_current_work(NULL)

The flag comes too late for the worker to see it, and the search that
would have found the request takes it for done. The cancellation returns,
and the request stays.

With a multishot poll, IOSQE_ASYNC, and IORING_OP_ASYNC_CANCEL with
IORING_ASYNC_CANCEL_ALL up to 63us later, that happens to 4 of 1,000
requests (4 CPUs, KVM).

Take the stamp off again if the work matches. If the request is found
on one of the lists it gets a new one, and io_cancel_cb() doesn't match it
a second time.

__io_async_cancel() tries the io-wq of the caller twice. So far the stamp
has kept it from counting work that is running there the second time.
Skip it instead, so that the number that is returned stays the same.

Fixes: 8e29da69fead ("io_uring: add support for IORING_ASYNC_CANCEL_ALL")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261015-b4-io-uring-fixes-v1-18-c1556f5d7bf5@toxicpanda.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 io_uring/cancel.c |   18 ++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/io_uring/cancel.c
+++ b/io_uring/cancel.c
@@ -68,7 +68,16 @@ static bool io_cancel_cb(struct io_wq_wo
 	struct io_kiocb *req = container_of(work, struct io_kiocb, work);
 	struct io_cancel_data *cd = data;
 
-	return io_cancel_req_match(req, cd);
+	if (!io_cancel_req_match(req, cd))
+		return false;
+	/*
+	 * Pending work is gone once it has matched. Work that is running may
+	 * park the request where the same cancellation looks next. Don't make
+	 * it skip the request as one that it has dealt with.
+	 */
+	if (cd->flags & (IORING_ASYNC_CANCEL_ALL | IORING_ASYNC_CANCEL_ANY))
+		req->cancel_seq_set = false;
+	return true;
 }
 
 static int io_async_cancel_one(struct io_uring_task *tctx,
@@ -177,9 +186,10 @@ static int __io_async_cancel(struct io_c
 	io_ring_submit_lock(ctx, issue_flags);
 	ret = -ENOENT;
 	list_for_each_entry(node, &ctx->tctx_list, ctx_node) {
-		struct io_uring_task *tctx = node->task->io_uring;
-
-		ret = io_async_cancel_one(tctx, cd);
+		/* has been done above, don't count what is running there */
+		if (all && node->task->io_uring == tctx)
+			continue;
+		ret = io_async_cancel_one(node->task->io_uring, cd);
 		if (ret != -ENOENT) {
 			if (!all)
 				break;

[PATCH 6.6 139/168] io_uring: wake ring pollers for local task_work

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>

Commit b88902d8745a701d24275d012f0830e3628e2a22 upstream.

With IORING_SETUP_DEFER_TASKRUN completions are queued as local work, and
only become CQEs when the submitter enters the kernel to wait for events.
For an application that finds out via poll() or epoll on the ring fd when
it is time to do that, io_uring_poll() reports EPOLLIN if local work is
pending.

That only helps if the work is there at the time of the call. When
DEFER_TASKRUN was added, io_req_local_work_add() did io_cqring_wake(),
which took care of tasks sleeping in poll() as well. Then polling got a
wait queue of its own, ->poll_wq, and the wake up in
io_req_local_work_add() was replaced by waking the submitter directly.
Since then ->poll_wq is only woken when CQEs are committed, which for
such a ring is done by the very task that is waiting to be told to:

  submitter                           completion
  poll(ring_fd)
    io_uring_poll()  // nothing yet
    schedule()
                                      io_req_local_work_add()
                                        // ->cq_wait_nr: nobody waits
  // sleeps on

Wake ->poll_wq when the first entry is put on the work list. Like for the
eventfd, that must not be done right away if the work is queued from a
wake up handler, as the chain of wake ups could get back to the wait
queue whose lock is held. Use an RCU callback in that case, with a
reference to the ring.

[ 6.6: io_req_local_work_add() lives in io_uring/io_uring.c, and with no IOU_F_TWQ_IN_WAKE to tell a wake up handler context apart, the ->poll_wq wake up is always deferred to an RCU callback ]
Fixes: 130bd686d9be ("io_uring: waitqueue-less cq waiting")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261015-b4-io-uring-fixes-v1-19-c1556f5d7bf5@toxicpanda.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 include/linux/io_uring_types.h |    3 +++
 io_uring/io_uring.c            |   28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+)

--- a/include/linux/io_uring_types.h
+++ b/include/linux/io_uring_types.h
@@ -362,6 +362,9 @@ struct io_ring_ctx {
 	bool				iowq_limits_set;
 
 	struct callback_head		poll_wq_task_work;
+	/* deferred ->poll_wq wake up for local task_work */
+	struct rcu_head			poll_wq_rcu;
+	atomic_t			poll_wq_rcu_pending;
 	struct list_head		defer_list;
 	unsigned			sq_thread_idle;
 	/* protected by ->completion_lock */
--- a/io_uring/io_uring.c
+++ b/io_uring/io_uring.c
@@ -1273,6 +1273,31 @@ void tctx_task_work(struct callback_head
 	trace_io_uring_task_work_run(tctx, count, 1);
 }
 
+static void io_poll_wq_wake_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
+{
+	struct io_ring_ctx *ctx = container_of(rcu, struct io_ring_ctx,
+					       poll_wq_rcu);
+
+	atomic_set(&ctx->poll_wq_rcu_pending, 0);
+	io_poll_wq_wake(ctx);
+	percpu_ref_put(&ctx->refs);
+}
+
+/*
+ * io_uring_poll() reports pending local work as EPOLLIN, as it takes a trip to
+ * the kernel to turn it into CQEs. Let those know who are asleep already.
+ * This may be called from a wake up handler with some wait queue lock held,
+ * and this wake up could lead back to it. Do it from a clean context.
+ */
+static void io_local_work_wake_poll(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	if (!wq_has_sleeper(&ctx->poll_wq) ||
+	    atomic_xchg(&ctx->poll_wq_rcu_pending, 1))
+		return;
+	percpu_ref_get(&ctx->refs);
+	call_rcu_hurry(&ctx->poll_wq_rcu, io_poll_wq_wake_rcu);
+}
+
 static inline void io_req_local_work_add(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned flags)
 {
 	struct io_ring_ctx *ctx = req->ctx;
@@ -1310,6 +1335,9 @@ static inline void io_req_local_work_add
 			atomic_or(IORING_SQ_TASKRUN, &ctx->rings->sq_flags);
 		if (ctx->has_evfd)
 			io_eventfd_signal(ctx, flags & IOU_F_TWQ_IN_WAKE);
+		/* whoever sets the flag wakes ->poll_wq afterwards */
+		if (ctx->poll_activated)
+			io_local_work_wake_poll(ctx);
 	}
 
 	nr_wait = atomic_read(&ctx->cq_wait_nr);

[PATCH 6.6 140/168] io_uring/wait: look at all CQ waiters on wake up

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>

Commit 356f92f2412686f822383b784fa102924407457a upstream.

io_wake_function() returns -1 if the waiter it is called for doesn't have
enough events yet, which makes __wake_up_common() stop walking the wait
queue. That assumes that the waiters behind it can't be satisfied either.
Each waiter has its own target though, computed from the min_complete it
passed in:

  thread A: io_uring_enter(GETEVENTS, min_complete = 10)  // queued first
  thread B: io_uring_enter(GETEVENTS, min_complete = 1)
  one CQE is posted: A isn't woken, and B isn't even considered

B keeps sleeping with the event it asked for sitting in the CQ ring, until
A's demand is met or a timeout or signal ends the wait.

Return 0 to carry on with the next waiter. Only waiters whose condition
is met are woken, like before.

[ 6.6: io_wake_function() lives in io_uring/io_uring.c ]
Fixes: bda521624e75 ("io_uring: make CQ ring wakeups be more efficient")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261015-b4-io-uring-fixes-v1-20-c1556f5d7bf5@toxicpanda.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 io_uring/io_uring.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/io_uring/io_uring.c
+++ b/io_uring/io_uring.c
@@ -2531,7 +2531,8 @@ static int io_wake_function(struct wait_
 	 */
 	if (io_should_wake(iowq) || io_has_work(iowq->ctx))
 		return autoremove_wake_function(curr, mode, wake_flags, key);
-	return -1;
+	/* keep going, a waiter further down may be content with less */
+	return 0;
 }
 
 int io_run_task_work_sig(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx)

[PATCH 6.6 141/168] io_uring/poll: drop stale double poll entry on rearm

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>

Commit f2dbe87968a3aef74a11c025776d293b80964d3f upstream.

A file that uses two wait queues for poll, e.g. a tty, gets a second
io_poll entry, which IORING_OP_POLL_ADD keeps in ->async_data until the
request is freed. io_poll_add() can run more than once for a request
though: IORING_OP_POLL_REMOVE with one of the update flags disarms and
rearms it, and io_poll_task_func() reissues it if a wake up turns out to
be spurious. The second poll_wait() of the new round then finds
*poll_ptr set, with ->head cleared by the disarm, and __io_queue_proc()
fails what it takes for a third wait queue with -EINVAL.

For an update that means that the poll request is completed with
-ECANCELED, while the update itself reports success. For a spurious wake
up, e.g. tcsetattr() on the polled tty, the poll request fails with
-EINVAL.

Free the old entry and clear the poll flags before arming, which is what
io_arm_apoll() does for internal polling. All entries have been removed
from their wait queues at that point.

[ 6.6: no io_req_async_data_free(), open-coded ]
Fixes: b69de288e913 ("io_uring: allow events and user_data update of running poll requests")
Fixes: 6e5aedb9324a ("io_uring/poll: attempt request issue after racy poll wakeup")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261015-b4-io-uring-fixes-v1-21-c1556f5d7bf5@toxicpanda.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 io_uring/poll.c |   12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

--- a/io_uring/poll.c
+++ b/io_uring/poll.c
@@ -983,6 +983,18 @@ int io_poll_add(struct io_kiocb *req, un
 	if (req->ctx->flags & (IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL|IORING_SETUP_SINGLE_ISSUER))
 		req->flags |= REQ_F_HASH_LOCKED;
 
+	/*
+	 * A poll update or a spurious wake up arms the request again. Forget
+	 * the entries of the previous round like io_arm_apoll() does, a stale
+	 * second entry would be taken for a third wait queue.
+	 */
+	if (req_has_async_data(req)) {
+		kfree(req->async_data);
+		req->async_data = NULL;
+		req->flags &= ~REQ_F_ASYNC_DATA;
+	}
+	req->flags &= ~(REQ_F_SINGLE_POLL | REQ_F_DOUBLE_POLL);
+
 	ret = __io_arm_poll_handler(req, poll, &ipt, poll->events, issue_flags);
 	if (ret > 0) {
 		io_req_set_res(req, ipt.result_mask, 0);

[PATCH 6.6 142/168] io_uring/timeout: dont skip over reached sequences

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>

Commit c6c0b3eba88c3b13ca11ea112404982e86d58f7a upstream.

io_flush_timeouts() copes with the wrap of the CQ sequence by looking at
the distance from ->cq_last_tm_flush. That relies on the target of each
pending timeout being at or ahead of the last flush.

io_timeout() breaks that. It sets ->cq_last_tm_flush to the current
sequence, on the assumption that nothing has been posted since the last
flush. That isn't true. A multishot request posts its CQEs right when it
is issued or retried, but they are committed, and the timeouts flushed,
at the end of the submission or task_work run:

  X: IORING_OP_TIMEOUT, off == 1       target_seq == N + 1
  io_submit_sqes()
    multishot recv, posts two CQEs     sequence == N + 2
    Y: IORING_OP_TIMEOUT, off == 100   ->cq_last_tm_flush = N + 2
  io_flush_timeouts()
    X: events_needed = N + 1 - (N + 2) // 0xffffffff
       events_got = 0                  // not yet

X isn't completed although the completions it was waiting for have
happened, only its timer can end it now. And as the list is sorted and
the walk ends at the first timeout that isn't due, it gets in the way of
the ones behind it. The insertion sort has the same problem, it measures
the distance of the pending targets from the current sequence.

->cq_last_tm_flush only needs to be brought up to date if no timeout is
waiting for a sequence, as io_flush_timeouts() isn't called before the
first one is set up. Otherwise it is current enough. Timeouts with a
sequence come first in the list, so looking at the first entry will do.
Use the last flush as the base for the insertion sort as well.

Fixes: f010505b78a4 ("io_uring: flush timeouts that should already have expired")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261015-b4-io-uring-fixes-v1-29-c1556f5d7bf5@toxicpanda.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 io_uring/timeout.c |   21 ++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/io_uring/timeout.c
+++ b/io_uring/timeout.c
@@ -579,8 +579,9 @@ int io_timeout(struct io_kiocb *req, uns
 	struct io_timeout *timeout = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_timeout);
 	struct io_ring_ctx *ctx = req->ctx;
 	struct io_timeout_data *data = req->async_data;
+	struct io_timeout *first;
 	struct list_head *entry;
-	u32 tail, off = timeout->off;
+	u32 tail, base, off = timeout->off;
 
 	spin_lock_irq(&ctx->timeout_lock);
 
@@ -597,11 +598,17 @@ int io_timeout(struct io_kiocb *req, uns
 	tail = data_race(ctx->cached_cq_tail) - atomic_read(&ctx->cq_timeouts);
 	timeout->target_seq = tail + off;
 
-	/* Update the last seq here in case io_flush_timeouts() hasn't.
-	 * This is safe because ->completion_lock is held, and submissions
-	 * and completions are never mixed in the same ->completion_lock section.
+	/*
+	 * Update the last seq here in case io_flush_timeouts() hasn't, it only
+	 * gets called once sequences are in use. Leave it alone if there are
+	 * timeouts waiting for one. CQEs may have been posted since the last
+	 * flush, and a target that has been reached must not fall behind it.
 	 */
-	ctx->cq_last_tm_flush = tail;
+	first = list_first_entry_or_null(&ctx->timeout_list, struct io_timeout,
+					 list);
+	if (!first || io_is_timeout_noseq(cmd_to_io_kiocb(first)))
+		ctx->cq_last_tm_flush = tail;
+	base = ctx->cq_last_tm_flush;
 
 	/*
 	 * Insertion sort, ensuring the first entry in the list is always
@@ -613,8 +620,8 @@ int io_timeout(struct io_kiocb *req, uns
 
 		if (io_is_timeout_noseq(nxt))
 			continue;
-		/* nxt.seq is behind @tail, otherwise would've been completed */
-		if (off >= nextt->target_seq - tail)
+		/* no target is behind the last flush, see io_flush_timeouts() */
+		if (timeout->target_seq - base >= nextt->target_seq - base)
 			break;
 	}
 add:

[PATCH 6.6 143/168] io_uring/timeout: keep repeat count on multishot update

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>

Commit 3dc2a32cd356ee382aa4a8c7d844c53b2c0ad83b upstream.

IORING_TIMEOUT_UPDATE clears ->off of the timeout it updates, to turn a
timeout that waits for a number of completions into a pure one. For a
multishot timeout ->off isn't a sequence though, it tells whether the
number of repeats is limited: io_timeout_finish() only looks at
->repeats if ->off is set.

A multishot timeout that was set up to fire N times hence fires forever
once its interval has been updated. Leave ->off alone for those, they are
never treated as sequence timeouts anyway.

Fixes: ea97f6c8558e ("io_uring: add support for multishot timeouts")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261015-b4-io-uring-fixes-v1-30-c1556f5d7bf5@toxicpanda.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 io_uring/timeout.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/io_uring/timeout.c
+++ b/io_uring/timeout.c
@@ -411,8 +411,10 @@ static int io_timeout_update(struct io_r
 	if (IS_ERR(req))
 		return PTR_ERR(req);
 
-	timeout->off = 0; /* noseq */
 	data = req->async_data;
+	/* for a multishot request this isn't a sequence, keep the repeats */
+	if (!(data->flags & IORING_TIMEOUT_MULTISHOT))
+		timeout->off = 0; /* noseq */
 	data->ts = *ts;
 
 	list_add_tail(&timeout->list, &ctx->timeout_list);

[PATCH 6.6 144/168] io_uring/sqpoll: let the thread sleep on disabled rings

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>

Commit d492dcbb3b81c1c2d0aabef41fa1307093f3a556 upstream.

__io_sq_thread() doesn't submit anything as long as the ring has
IORING_SETUP_R_DISABLED set. The check that keeps the SQPOLL thread from
going to sleep while the SQ ring holds entries doesn't know about that.
If an application fills in SQEs first and enables the ring later, the
thread finds that there is work each time it is about to sleep, goes
around, doesn't submit it, and so on. It uses up a CPU until the ring
gets enabled.

Entries in the SQ ring of a disabled ring are no reason to stay awake.
io_register_enable_rings() clears the flag and then wakes the thread, and
the flag is looked at after prepare_to_wait(), so the thread can't miss
that.

Fixes: 0298ef969a11 ("io_uring: clean R_DISABLED startup mess")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261015-b4-io-uring-fixes-v1-37-c1556f5d7bf5@toxicpanda.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 io_uring/sqpoll.c |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

--- a/io_uring/sqpoll.c
+++ b/io_uring/sqpoll.c
@@ -300,6 +300,13 @@ static int io_sq_thread(void *data)
 				 */
 				smp_mb__after_atomic();
 
+				/*
+				 * Nothing gets submitted before the ring is
+				 * enabled, which comes with a wake up.
+				 */
+				if (READ_ONCE(ctx->flags) & IORING_SETUP_R_DISABLED)
+					continue;
+
 				if (io_sqring_entries(ctx)) {
 					needs_sched = false;
 					break;

[PATCH 6.6 145/168] io_uring: dont pass restart error codes to userspace

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>

Commit e1a64bc64897f4c2fe460922c345f2ed8f889b5f upstream.

-ERESTARTSYS and friends are instructions for the system call exit code,
which either restarts the call or turns them into -EINTR. They are not
supposed to be seen by applications. A request isn't a system call,
nobody looks at what it returns before that is put into a CQE.

The read/write and the networking opcodes convert these codes to -EINTR
by hand. The others don't. An io-wq worker that is blocked in the open of
a FIFO, a tty or some other device, or in a splice from an empty pipe,
and that gets interrupted because the request is cancelled, completes it
with -512:

  IORING_OP_OPENAT, IOSQE_ASYNC       // FIFO without a writer
  IORING_OP_ASYNC_CANCEL              // -EALREADY, worker is signalled
  CQE of the open: res == -512

There are more candidates, like whatever a file system or driver returns
from ->flush(), ->fsync(), ->fallocate() or ->uring_cmd(), or breaking a
lease or delegation.

Take care of it in io_issue_sqe(), which all of them go through. The
helper is moved from rw.c as is. The cost is a compare and a branch that
is not taken per request.

[ 6.6: io_issue_sqe() returns IOU_OK and an error straight away ]
Fixes: 15b71abe7b52 ("io_uring: add support for IORING_OP_OPENAT")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261015-b4-io-uring-fixes-v1-39-c1556f5d7bf5@toxicpanda.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 io_uring/io_uring.c |    8 +++++++-
 io_uring/io_uring.h |   18 ++++++++++++++++++
 io_uring/rw.c       |   18 ------------------
 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

--- a/io_uring/io_uring.c
+++ b/io_uring/io_uring.c
@@ -1906,6 +1906,9 @@ static int io_issue_sqe(struct io_kiocb
 	}
 
 	if (ret == IOU_OK) {
+		/* not all handlers take care of the internal restart codes */
+		if (unlikely(req->cqe.res <= -ERESTARTSYS))
+			req->cqe.res = io_fixup_restart_res(req->cqe.res);
 		if (issue_flags & IO_URING_F_COMPLETE_DEFER)
 			io_req_complete_defer(req);
 		else
@@ -1914,8 +1917,11 @@ static int io_issue_sqe(struct io_kiocb
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	if (ret != IOU_ISSUE_SKIP_COMPLETE)
+	if (ret != IOU_ISSUE_SKIP_COMPLETE) {
+		if (unlikely(ret <= -ERESTARTSYS))
+			ret = io_fixup_restart_res(ret);
 		return ret;
+	}
 
 	/* If the op doesn't have a file, we're not polling for it */
 	if ((req->ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_IOPOLL) && def->iopoll_queue)
--- a/io_uring/io_uring.h
+++ b/io_uring/io_uring.h
@@ -193,6 +193,24 @@ static __always_inline bool io_fill_cqe_
 	return true;
 }
 
+static inline ssize_t io_fixup_restart_res(ssize_t ret)
+{
+	switch (ret) {
+	case -ERESTARTSYS:
+	case -ERESTARTNOINTR:
+	case -ERESTARTNOHAND:
+	case -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK:
+		/*
+		 * We can't just restart the syscall, since previously
+		 * submitted sqes may already be in progress. Just fail
+		 * this IO with EINTR.
+		 */
+		return -EINTR;
+	default:
+		return ret;
+	}
+}
+
 static inline void req_set_fail(struct io_kiocb *req)
 {
 	req->flags |= REQ_F_FAIL;
--- a/io_uring/rw.c
+++ b/io_uring/rw.c
@@ -140,24 +140,6 @@ void io_readv_writev_cleanup(struct io_k
 	kfree(io->free_iovec);
 }
 
-static inline ssize_t io_fixup_restart_res(ssize_t ret)
-{
-	switch (ret) {
-	case -ERESTARTSYS:
-	case -ERESTARTNOINTR:
-	case -ERESTARTNOHAND:
-	case -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK:
-		/*
-		 * We can't just restart the syscall, since previously
-		 * submitted sqes may already be in progress. Just fail
-		 * this IO with EINTR.
-		 */
-		return -EINTR;
-	default:
-		return ret;
-	}
-}
-
 static inline void io_rw_done(struct kiocb *kiocb, ssize_t ret)
 {
 	/* IO was queued async, completion will happen later */

[PATCH 6.6 146/168] io_uring/timeout: no ABS update of multishot timeouts

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>

Commit b088ae34d4da730dc647261b893a6eb622fe5e1f upstream.

IORING_TIMEOUT_MULTISHOT can't be combined with IORING_TIMEOUT_ABS, prep
rejects that, as the request is armed again with the same value each time
it fires. IORING_TIMEOUT_UPDATE doesn't check and takes an absolute time
for a multishot timeout. The first expiry is as asked for, but
io_timeout_complete() then arms the timer with ->mode of the original
request, i.e. it uses the absolute time as the interval. With
CLOCK_MONOTONIC the next expiry is an uptime away, with CLOCK_REALTIME
more than fifty years.

Fail such an update with -EINVAL, and do so before the timeout is
touched.

Fixes: ea97f6c8558e ("io_uring: add support for multishot timeouts")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261015-b4-io-uring-fixes-v1-41-c1556f5d7bf5@toxicpanda.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 io_uring/timeout.c |   38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

--- a/io_uring/timeout.c
+++ b/io_uring/timeout.c
@@ -257,22 +257,29 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart io_timeout_f
 	return HRTIMER_NORESTART;
 }
 
-static struct io_kiocb *io_timeout_extract(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx,
-					   struct io_cancel_data *cd)
+static struct io_kiocb *io_timeout_find(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx,
+					struct io_cancel_data *cd)
 	__must_hold(&ctx->timeout_lock)
 {
 	struct io_timeout *timeout;
-	struct io_timeout_data *io;
-	struct io_kiocb *req = NULL;
 
 	list_for_each_entry(timeout, &ctx->timeout_list, list) {
-		struct io_kiocb *tmp = cmd_to_io_kiocb(timeout);
+		struct io_kiocb *req = cmd_to_io_kiocb(timeout);
 
-		if (io_cancel_req_match(tmp, cd)) {
-			req = tmp;
-			break;
-		}
+		if (io_cancel_req_match(req, cd))
+			return req;
 	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static struct io_kiocb *io_timeout_extract(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx,
+					   struct io_cancel_data *cd)
+	__must_hold(&ctx->timeout_lock)
+{
+	struct io_kiocb *req = io_timeout_find(ctx, cd);
+	struct io_timeout *timeout;
+	struct io_timeout_data *io;
+
 	if (!req)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
 
@@ -404,14 +411,21 @@ static int io_timeout_update(struct io_r
 	__must_hold(&ctx->timeout_lock)
 {
 	struct io_cancel_data cd = { .ctx = ctx, .data = user_data, };
-	struct io_kiocb *req = io_timeout_extract(ctx, &cd);
+	struct io_kiocb *req = io_timeout_find(ctx, &cd);
 	struct io_timeout *timeout = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_timeout);
 	struct io_timeout_data *data;
 
-	if (IS_ERR(req))
-		return PTR_ERR(req);
+	if (!req)
+		return -ENOENT;
 
 	data = req->async_data;
+	/* multishot requests only make sense with rel values */
+	if ((data->flags & IORING_TIMEOUT_MULTISHOT) && mode == HRTIMER_MODE_ABS)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	req = io_timeout_extract(ctx, &cd);
+	if (IS_ERR(req))
+		return PTR_ERR(req);
 	/* for a multishot request this isn't a sequence, keep the repeats */
 	if (!(data->flags & IORING_TIMEOUT_MULTISHOT))
 		timeout->off = 0; /* noseq */

[PATCH 6.6 147/168] io_uring: look up the file before queueing to io-wq

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>

Commit 98bc044d5a5374f8d3605fe55a8e2df6d6fc3f82 upstream.

io_prep_async_work() decides by the file of a request what kind of work
it is for io-wq. I/O on regular files and block devices is bounded work,
limited to min(SQ entries, 4 * CPUs) workers, for anything else that may
block indefinitely the limit is RLIMIT_NPROC. Writes to a regular file
are hashed by the inode, so that they are run one after the other instead
of having a bunch of workers fight for the inode lock.

Since the file is only assigned when a request is issued, a request that
is queued without an attempt to issue it, REQ_F_FORCE_ASYNC, doesn't have
one at that point. io_prep_async_work() takes that for "not a regular
file or block device":

- Reads and writes end up as unbound work. 32 reads with IOSQE_ASYNC from
  a slow block device on a ring with 4 SQ entries get 32 workers, not 4.
- Writes aren't hashed. Four buffered writes to one file get four
  workers, three of which do nothing but wait for the lock.

The late assignment is for the benefit of links, where a request may use
a fixed file that one of its predecessors installs. By the time a request
gets to io_queue_iowq() these are done, it is as good as issued. Assign
the file there.

io_assign_file() moves up and is forced inline. With a third caller the
compiler may stop inlining it, and every request that is issued would
pay for a call.

IORING_OP_SPLICE is left as it is, unbound and not hashed. The file of
the request is where it writes to, which says nothing about how long it
takes: a splice from an empty pipe or a socket into a regular file waits
for its input. As bounded work, four of these on a ring with 4 SQ entries
keep all other bounded work of the task from running, and as hashed work
one of them blocks all writes to that file.

REQ_F_FORCE_ASYNC is not only set for IOSQE_ASYNC. What changes, and
brings back what was the case before the file assignment was deferred:

- Requests with IOSQE_ASYNC or IOSQE_IO_DRAIN, and all requests that are
  submitted while a drain is active: reads and writes on regular files
  and block devices count against the limit for bounded workers, including
  the one set with IORING_REGISTER_IOWQ_MAX_WORKERS, so fewer of them run
  at the same time.
- Of these, writes to one regular file are run one at a time, unless they
  are O_DIRECT and the filesystem has FOP_DIO_PARALLEL_WRITE.
- IORING_OP_FALLOCATE and IORING_OP_FTRUNCATE, which always go to io-wq,
  are run one at a time per file, and in turn with these writes.
- The descriptor or the fixed file slot is looked up when the request is
  queued, not when a worker gets around to it, so closing or replacing it
  in between no longer has an effect on the request.

Fixes: 6bf9c47a3989 ("io_uring: defer file assignment")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261015-b4-io-uring-fixes-v1-43-c1556f5d7bf5@toxicpanda.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 io_uring/io_uring.c |   43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

--- a/io_uring/io_uring.c
+++ b/io_uring/io_uring.c
@@ -472,17 +472,46 @@ static void io_prep_async_link(struct io
 	}
 }
 
+/* Called for every request that is issued: keep it inline */
+static __always_inline bool io_assign_file(struct io_kiocb *req,
+					   const struct io_issue_def *def,
+					   unsigned int issue_flags)
+{
+	if (req->file || !def->needs_file)
+		return true;
+
+	if (req->flags & REQ_F_FIXED_FILE)
+		req->file = io_file_get_fixed(req, req->cqe.fd, issue_flags);
+	else
+		req->file = io_file_get_normal(req, req->cqe.fd);
+
+	return !!req->file;
+}
+
 static void io_queue_iowq(struct io_kiocb *req)
 {
 	struct io_uring_task *tctx = req->task->io_uring;
 
 	BUG_ON(!tctx);
+	lockdep_assert_held(&req->ctx->uring_lock);
 
 	if ((current->flags & PF_KTHREAD) || !tctx->io_wq) {
 		io_req_task_queue_fail(req, -ECANCELED);
 		return;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * The file is looked up as late as possible, as it may be the result
+	 * of an earlier request of the link. This one is up now, and what kind
+	 * of work it is depends on the file. If that fails, leave the error
+	 * handling to the worker.
+	 *
+	 * Not for a splice: whatever it writes to, it may wait for its input
+	 * for ever. It has to remain unbound work that isn't hashed.
+	 */
+	if (req->opcode != IORING_OP_SPLICE)
+		io_assign_file(req, &io_issue_defs[req->opcode], 0);
+
 	/* init ->work of the whole link before punting */
 	io_prep_async_link(req);
 
@@ -1857,20 +1886,6 @@ queue:
 	spin_unlock(&ctx->completion_lock);
 }
 
-static bool io_assign_file(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_issue_def *def,
-			   unsigned int issue_flags)
-{
-	if (req->file || !def->needs_file)
-		return true;
-
-	if (req->flags & REQ_F_FIXED_FILE)
-		req->file = io_file_get_fixed(req, req->cqe.fd, issue_flags);
-	else
-		req->file = io_file_get_normal(req, req->cqe.fd);
-
-	return !!req->file;
-}
-
 #define REQ_ISSUE_SLOW_FLAGS	(REQ_F_CREDS | REQ_F_ARM_LTIMEOUT)
 
 static int io_issue_sqe(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags)

[PATCH 6.6 148/168] io_uring/poll: avoid retry wakeup loss when dropping ownership

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Juanlu Herrero <juanlu@fastmail.com>

Commit 937d38dcacd675dc0572d6c9b6743960df3128ed upstream.

If a wakeup sets IO_POLL_RETRY_FLAG between the owning task consuming
the existing instance of IO_POLL_RETRY_FLAG and the loop check
of io_poll_check_events(), then we stall on processing the request
until an unrelated wakeup comes along.

Using atomic_cmpxchg instead of atomic_sub_return to guarantee both the
count v and poll_refs are 0 and no wake-ups are missed.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a26a35e9019f ("io_uring: make poll refs more robust")
Signed-off-by: Juanlu Herrero <juanlu@fastmail.com>
Assisted-by: LLM
Suggested-by: Anand Natarajan <anand@meta.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261013-pu-cmpxchg-v1-1-4ddc10fd8a03@fastmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 io_uring/poll.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/io_uring/poll.c
+++ b/io_uring/poll.c
@@ -345,8 +345,8 @@ static int io_poll_check_events(struct i
 		 * Release all references, retry if someone tried to restart
 		 * task_work while we were executing it.
 		 */
-	} while (atomic_sub_return(v & IO_POLL_REF_MASK, &req->poll_refs) &
-					IO_POLL_REF_MASK);
+		v &= IO_POLL_REF_MASK;
+	} while (atomic_cmpxchg(&req->poll_refs, v, 0) != v);
 
 	return IOU_POLL_NO_ACTION;
 }

[PATCH 6.6 149/168] io_uring/timeout: dont put a sequence target behind the last flush

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Commit fdfce905a58edea053ee7b68b5bd4348dd1b36e0 upstream.

io_timeout_fn() and io_kill_timeout() bump ->cq_timeouts when a timeout
fires, but its CQE is only posted later from task_work. Until then the
sequence io_timeout() computes is one below the last flush per fired
timeout. Now that ->cq_last_tm_flush is kept while sequence timeouts are
pending, a timeout armed in that window with a small offset gets a target
behind the base. Its distance from the base wraps, and it's never
completed by events, only by its timer. With DEFER_TASKRUN that window
is as wide as the application makes it, as submission runs before the
local task_work.

Nothing but those in flight CQEs separates the two, so use the last
flush as the base for the target when the sequence is behind it.

Fixes: c6c0b3eba88c ("io_uring/timeout: don't skip over reached sequences")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 io_uring/timeout.c |   10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/io_uring/timeout.c
+++ b/io_uring/timeout.c
@@ -612,7 +612,6 @@ int io_timeout(struct io_kiocb *req, uns
 	}
 
 	tail = data_race(ctx->cached_cq_tail) - atomic_read(&ctx->cq_timeouts);
-	timeout->target_seq = tail + off;
 
 	/*
 	 * Update the last seq here in case io_flush_timeouts() hasn't, it only
@@ -627,6 +626,15 @@ int io_timeout(struct io_kiocb *req, uns
 	base = ctx->cq_last_tm_flush;
 
 	/*
+	 * A fired timeout bumps ->cq_timeouts before its CQE is posted, which
+	 * leaves the sequence behind the last flush until it is. Nothing else
+	 * separates the two then, so count from the flush.
+	 */
+	if ((s32)(tail - base) < 0)
+		tail = base;
+	timeout->target_seq = tail + off;
+
+	/*
 	 * Insertion sort, ensuring the first entry in the list is always
 	 * the one we need first.
 	 */

[PATCH 6.6 150/168] io_uring/timeout: dont flush with the sequence behind the last flush

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Commit 85f85d573ffa7772e1ad4504d0cec5113a5c5cf1 upstream.

io_flush_timeouts() measures the events since the last flush as the
distance of the current sequence from ->cq_last_tm_flush. A fired
timeout bumps ->cq_timeouts before its CQE is posted, so until it is
the sequence can be behind the last flush, and the distance wraps:

  last flush: seq 100, cq_last_tm_flush = 100
  Y: IORING_OP_TIMEOUT, off 50, target_seq 150
  pure timeout A fires, cq_timeouts = 1
  task_work posts A's CQE, cached_cq_tail = 101
  pure timeout B fires before the flush, cq_timeouts = 2
  io_flush_timeouts(): seq = 99, events_got = 0xffffffff

Y, and every sequence timeout behind it, is ended with -ETIME although
no event happened. Two timeouts expiring close together is all it takes,
a completion with IOSQE_CQE_SKIP_SUCCESS after a single one does it too.

Nothing but those in flight CQEs separates the two, so count from the
last flush when the sequence is behind it, as io_timeout() does.

Fixes: f010505b78a4 ("io_uring: flush timeouts that should already have expired")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 io_uring/timeout.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

--- a/io_uring/timeout.c
+++ b/io_uring/timeout.c
@@ -116,6 +116,14 @@ __cold void io_flush_timeouts(struct io_
 	spin_lock_irq(&ctx->timeout_lock);
 	seq = ctx->cached_cq_tail - atomic_read(&ctx->cq_timeouts);
 
+	/*
+	 * A fired timeout bumps ->cq_timeouts before its CQE is posted, which
+	 * leaves the sequence behind the last flush until it is. No event has
+	 * happened then, see io_timeout().
+	 */
+	if ((s32)(seq - ctx->cq_last_tm_flush) < 0)
+		seq = ctx->cq_last_tm_flush;
+
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(timeout, tmp, &ctx->timeout_list, list) {
 		struct io_kiocb *req = cmd_to_io_kiocb(timeout);
 		u32 events_needed, events_got;

[PATCH 6.6 151/168] io_uring/timeout: dont lose a cancel as io-wq arms a timeout

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Commit 89f193dc3ef462059387e9691bf6af4b1808379a upstream.

An IORING_OP_TIMEOUT run by io-wq, because of IOSQE_ASYNC, has the same
problem as poll, futex and waitid. io_wq_submit_work() looks at
IO_WQ_WORK_CANCEL once, before it issues the request. A cancel in between
flags the work, gets -EALREADY, and searches ->timeout_list in vain,
while the worker then adds the request and starts the timer:

  io-wq worker                          io_try_cancel()
  io_wq_submit_work()
    IO_WQ_WORK_CANCEL isn't set
                                        io_async_cancel_one()
                                          sets IO_WQ_WORK_CANCEL
                                          = -EALREADY
                                        io_timeout_cancel() = -ENOENT
    io_timeout()
      adds the request to ->timeout_list
      hrtimer_start()
    = IOU_ISSUE_SKIP_COMPLETE

Nobody looks at the flag again, and the timeout runs its course. At ring
exit, io_uring_try_cancel_requests() cancels io-wq work and then kills
the timeouts the same way, so an exiting task can get stuck for the full
duration of such a timeout.

Look at the flag under ->timeout_lock, which the search takes as well,
and fail the request if it is set. If the search came first, the flag is
visible. If it comes later, it finds the request on the list.

[ 6.6: carries the __io_wq_cancel_seen()/io_wq_cancel_seen() helpers that
  the futex/waitid fix 5cb049d2203d brought upstream; work->flags is not
  atomic and ->timeout_lock isn't raw here ]
Fixes: ce35a47a3a02 ("io_uring: add IOSQE_ASYNC")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 io_uring/io_uring.h |   23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 io_uring/timeout.c  |    7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+)

--- a/io_uring/io_uring.h
+++ b/io_uring/io_uring.h
@@ -259,6 +259,29 @@ static inline void io_ring_submit_lock(s
 	lockdep_assert_held(&ctx->uring_lock);
 }
 
+/*
+ * For a handler that is run by io-wq and parks the request on a list where
+ * cancellations find it, rather than completing it. Whoever tried to cancel
+ * the request before that found it running. It has flagged the work item,
+ * has searched the list in vain, and won't come back. To be called with
+ * the lock the search takes held: if the search came first, the flag is
+ * visible. For most lists that is ->uring_lock, timeouts use ->timeout_lock.
+ */
+static inline bool __io_wq_cancel_seen(struct io_kiocb *req,
+				       unsigned int issue_flags)
+{
+	return (issue_flags & IO_URING_F_IOWQ) &&
+	       (req->work.flags & IO_WQ_WORK_CANCEL);
+}
+
+static inline bool io_wq_cancel_seen(struct io_kiocb *req,
+				     unsigned int issue_flags)
+{
+	lockdep_assert_held(&req->ctx->uring_lock);
+
+	return __io_wq_cancel_seen(req, issue_flags);
+}
+
 static inline void io_commit_cqring(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx)
 {
 	/* order cqe stores with ring update */
--- a/io_uring/timeout.c
+++ b/io_uring/timeout.c
@@ -609,6 +609,13 @@ int io_timeout(struct io_kiocb *req, uns
 
 	spin_lock_irq(&ctx->timeout_lock);
 
+	/* the list is searched under ->timeout_lock, see io_wq_cancel_seen() */
+	if (__io_wq_cancel_seen(req, issue_flags)) {
+		spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->timeout_lock);
+		io_req_task_queue_fail(req, -ECANCELED);
+		return IOU_ISSUE_SKIP_COMPLETE;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * sqe->off holds how many events that need to occur for this
 	 * timeout event to be satisfied. If it isn't set, then this is

[PATCH 6.6 152/168] io_uring/poll: dont loop on HUP with multiple references

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Commit cf1d5c9d335e2c673811da641531da82cb01393a upstream.

io_poll_check_events() drops down to one reference when a multishot
request sees HUP with more than one, so that the loop goes around once
more. It did so by subtracting one less than it had. With the cmpxchg
that only takes the local count down: the exchange fails, the next pass
reads the unchanged count, and goes through the same motions again. The
loop then only ends once io_poll_issue() stops the request.

Drop the extra references from the counter instead, and loop once more
without trying the exchange. The next pass sees one reference, like it
did before, and ends unless a wake up came in.

[ 6.6: v still carries the flag bits here, mask it for the subtraction ]
Fixes: 937d38dcacd6 ("io_uring/poll: avoid retry wakeup loss when dropping ownership")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 io_uring/poll.c |   17 +++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/io_uring/poll.c
+++ b/io_uring/poll.c
@@ -258,12 +258,14 @@ static inline void io_poll_execute(struc
  */
 static int io_poll_check_events(struct io_kiocb *req, struct io_tw_state *ts)
 {
+	bool again;
 	int v;
 
 	if (unlikely(io_should_terminate_tw(req->ctx)))
 		return -ECANCELED;
 
 	do {
+		again = false;
 		v = atomic_read(&req->poll_refs);
 
 		if (unlikely(v != 1)) {
@@ -325,10 +327,17 @@ static int io_poll_check_events(struct i
 		} else {
 			int ret;
 
-			/* multiple refs and HUP, ensure we loop once more */
+			/*
+			 * Multiple refs and HUP, ensure we loop once more. Drop
+			 * down to one ref now, so the next pass ends unless a
+			 * wake up came in.
+			 */
 			if ((req->cqe.res & (POLLHUP | POLLRDHUP)) &&
-			    (v & IO_POLL_REF_MASK) != 1)
-				v--;
+			    (v & IO_POLL_REF_MASK) != 1) {
+				atomic_sub((v & IO_POLL_REF_MASK) - 1,
+					   &req->poll_refs);
+				again = true;
+			}
 			ret = io_poll_issue(req, ts);
 			if (ret == IOU_STOP_MULTISHOT)
 				return IOU_POLL_REMOVE_POLL_USE_RES;
@@ -346,7 +355,7 @@ static int io_poll_check_events(struct i
 		 * task_work while we were executing it.
 		 */
 		v &= IO_POLL_REF_MASK;
-	} while (atomic_cmpxchg(&req->poll_refs, v, 0) != v);
+	} while (again || atomic_cmpxchg(&req->poll_refs, v, 0) != v);
 
 	return IOU_POLL_NO_ACTION;
 }

[PATCH 6.6 153/168] keys: Avoid the owner account dereference in named keyring lookup

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>

commit 51409aaa01f8602552c336009fd22b226b0cdf1d upstream.

Named keyring lookup must keep the storage containing the owner UID
alive through the namespace mapping check.  find_keyring_by_name()
reads keyring->user->uid under keyring_name_lock, but that lock protects
the keyring's name entry and allocation, not its separate key_user.

A named session-keyring join can overlap a privileged KEYCTL_CHOWN on
another CPU.  If the keyring holds the last reference to its old dynamic
key_user and the ownership transfer succeeds, the following ordering is
possible:

    Named join                         Chown
    find_keyring_by_name()              keyctl_chown_key()
      read_lock(keyring_name_lock)       down_write(key->sem)
      load old keyring->user
                                         replace key->user and key->uid
                                         up_write(key->sem)
                                         key_put(key)
                                         key_user_put(old user): free
      read old user->uid
      read_unlock(keyring_name_lock)

Chown neither takes keyring_name_lock nor key_session_mutex, so it can
free the old account between the pointer load and the UID read.  The
lookup then reads freed memory even though the keyring itself is alive.

Use keyring->uid for the mapping check.  key_alloc() initializes this
inline owner UID and keyctl_chown_key() updates it on chown.
The existing name lock keeps its containing keyring allocated throughout
the check, so lookup no longer depends on the account's lifetime.  This
also matches the owner UID used by the permission check.

KASAN report as below:

    BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in find_keyring_by_name+0x577/0x5d0
    Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881128ae2ec by task keycase/500

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2ea190d0a006 ("keys: skip keys from another user namespace")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/pm-key-management-objects-candidate-0002-v3-2baa8cad2bb554364e10@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 security/keys/keyring.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -1158,7 +1158,7 @@ struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const c
 	 * grants Search permission and that hasn't been revoked
 	 */
 	list_for_each_entry(keyring, &ns->keyring_name_list, name_link) {
-		if (!kuid_has_mapping(ns, keyring->user->uid))
+		if (!kuid_has_mapping(ns, keyring->uid))
 			continue;
 
 		if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &keyring->flags))

[PATCH 6.6 154/168] keys: Check the authorization payload in process keyring searches

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>

commit 0a0ec45bf577a9b4d4960567f20d3877ef480de9 upstream.

An authorization payload and its saved credentials must remain valid
while search_process_keyrings_rcu() searches the requestor's keyrings.
The function validates the authorization key, then separately loads
payload.data[0] and unconditionally reads rka->cred. Validation does
not prevent request_key_auth_revoke() from clearing the payload.

A request-key helper can assume authority and fork a descendant that
inherits the authorization key. If the descendant misses in its own
keyrings, it falls back to the saved requestor credentials. Successful
target instantiation invalidates the authorization key without clearing
the payload. After the helper exits, UMH_WAIT_PROC returns to the
requester, which calls complete_request_key() and revokes that key.

With the descendant paused after validation, the paths can interleave
as follows:

  1. The descendant enters search_process_keyrings_rcu() under RCU and
     key_validate() succeeds.
  2. The helper instantiates the target, invalidates the authorization
     key, and exits.
  3. The requester resumes from UMH_WAIT_PROC, calls
     complete_request_key(), and revokes the authorization key.
     request_key_auth_revoke() sets its payload pointer to NULL.
  4. The descendant loads NULL and dereferences rka->cred.

This NULL dereference can oops the kernel. RCU delays payload disposal
but does not prevent the pointer from being cleared.

Load the payload with dereference_key_rcu() and require a non-NULL
result before validating the authorization key and searching its saved
credentials. A non-NULL payload and its credentials remain alive for
the caller's RCU read-side section; a cleared payload skips the fallback
search and follows the existing error selection.

KASAN report as below:

    Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000005: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
    KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000028-0x000000000000002f]
    RIP: 0010:search_process_keyrings_rcu+0x32b/0x790

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e59428f721ee ("keys: Move the RCU locks outwards from the keyring search functions")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/pm-key-management-objects-candidate-0004-v3-598361863b76bc25d58d@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 security/keys/process_keys.c |    5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -556,9 +556,8 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings_rcu(st
 	    ) {
 		const struct cred *cred = ctx->cred;
 
-		if (key_validate(cred->request_key_auth) == 0) {
-			rka = ctx->cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0];
-
+		rka = dereference_key_rcu(cred->request_key_auth);
+		if (rka && key_validate(cred->request_key_auth) == 0) {
 			//// was search_process_keyrings() [ie. recursive]
 			ctx->cred = rka->cred;
 			key_ref = search_cred_keyrings_rcu(ctx);

[PATCH 6.6 155/168] keys: Protect the type name while describing a key

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>

commit fced7238b7e80cf8aa688d5af976e4aa6e33c329 upstream.

keyctl_describe_key() must keep the key type's name alive until
kasprintf() has consumed it. The retained key reference keeps the key
and its description alive, but does not pin the module providing its
type. The name is passed to kasprintf() without holding key->sem.

kvasprintf() uses the saved name pointer in two formatting passes, with
a GFP_KERNEL allocation between them. With AF_RXRPC=m, a task that
passes View permission before type retirement can overlap a privileged
module unload in this order:

1. KEYCTL_DESCRIBE looks up the key, saves key->type->name in the
   kasprintf() arguments and completes the first formatting pass.
2. While the formatter is delayed before its second pass,
   af_rxrpc_exit() calls unregister_key_type(), which removes the type
   from the registry and waits for key_gc_keytype().
3. The collector takes key->sem for writing, retypes the retained key
   to key_type_dead and completes retirement. Unregistration and module
   exit return, allowing free_module() to release the type and name.
4. The formatter resumes its second pass and reads the saved name from
   released module storage, which can fault in string().

Hold key->sem for reading across kasprintf(). The collector then cannot
retype the key or complete retirement until both formatting passes have
finished. If retirement wins the lock first, formatting uses the core
key_type_dead name instead. Release the semaphore immediately after
kasprintf(), including on allocation failure, before copying to
userspace.

Oops report as below:

    BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff8054794
    #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
    #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
    RIP: 0010:string+0x23f/0x470
    Call Trace:
     vsnprintf+0x330/0x1110

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: aa9d4437893f ("KEYS: Fix the size of the key description passed to/from userspace")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/pm-key-management-objects-candidate-0009-v4-6b537c5732fd957c33fa@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 security/keys/keyctl.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -677,12 +677,14 @@ okay:
 
 	/* calculate how much information we're going to return */
 	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	down_read(&key->sem);
 	infobuf = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL,
 			    "%s;%d;%d;%08x;",
 			    key->type->name,
 			    from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), key->uid),
 			    from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), key->gid),
 			    key->perm);
+	up_read(&key->sem);
 	if (!infobuf)
 		goto error2;
 	infolen = strlen(infobuf);

[PATCH 6.6 156/168] keys: make keyring indexes independent of kernel addresses

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>

commit de891c73c1cf41ac8de12c07fa2c84d6a912ad0c upstream.

KEYCTL_READ returns the serial numbers in a keyring in associative-array
traversal order.  The first word of the index is a public, deterministic
hash of the type pointer, domain pointer and description.  An unprivileged
user can therefore insert keys with known descriptions, predict their
order for each possible KASLR slide, and recover the kernel image address.
On an x86-64 build with 16 MiB alignment, 45 user keys suffice to
distinguish the candidate slides.

Remove the addresses from the whole index, not just its first hash word.
Assign each key type and domain a nonzero 64-bit ID and hash those IDs and
the description with a once-initialized SipHash key.  Use the full IDs in
the later index chunks as well.  Truncating or hashing the IDs there would
lose the guarantee that distinct type/domain/description tuples have a
differing index bit.

Allocate IDs lazily since private key types need not be registered.  Cache
them in the index key so tree walks and copies of an existing index do not
need to dereference a type descriptor that may have been unregistered.
Keep the 32-bit chunk layout and diff_objects() bit offsets consistent,
and retain the separate root slot for keyrings used by recursive search.
The key comparison, permissions and userspace data format are unchanged;
only the address-dependent in-memory ordering is replaced.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: b2a4df200d57 ("KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6-astra
Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20261013231251.56170-1-kylebot@openai.com
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 include/linux/key-type.h |    1 
 include/linux/key.h      |    5 +
 security/keys/keyring.c  |  150 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 3 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/key-type.h
+++ b/include/linux/key-type.h
@@ -158,6 +158,7 @@ struct key_type {
 				     const void *in, const void *in2);
 
 	/* internal fields */
+	atomic64_t		index_id;	/* Opaque keyring index ID */
 	struct list_head	link;		/* link in types list */
 	struct lock_class_key	lock_class;	/* key->sem lock class */
 } __randomize_layout;
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ struct keyring_name;
 
 struct key_tag {
 	struct rcu_head		rcu;
+	atomic64_t		index_id;	/* Opaque keyring index ID */
 	refcount_t		usage;
 	bool			removed;	/* T when subject removed */
 };
@@ -129,6 +130,8 @@ struct keyring_index_key {
 	struct key_type		*type;
 	struct key_tag		*domain_tag;	/* Domain of operation */
 	const char		*description;
+	u64			type_id;	/* Cached index IDs */
+	u64			domain_id;
 };
 
 union key_payload {
@@ -250,6 +253,8 @@ struct key {
 			struct key_type	*type;		/* type of key */
 			struct key_tag	*domain_tag;	/* Domain of operation */
 			char		*description;
+			u64		type_id;
+			u64		domain_id;
 		};
 	};
 
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
 #include <linux/nsproxy.h>
+#include <linux/once.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/siphash.h>
 #include <keys/keyring-type.h>
 #include <keys/user-type.h>
 #include <linux/assoc_array_priv.h>
@@ -147,49 +150,46 @@ static int keyring_instantiate(struct ke
 }
 
 /*
- * Multiply 64-bits by 32-bits to 96-bits and fold back to 64-bit.  Ideally we'd
- * fold the carry back too, but that requires inline asm.
+ * Give key types and domains address-independent identities.  Zero means that
+ * an ID has not yet been allocated.  As with inode sequence numbers used by
+ * futexes, this relies on the 64-bit counter not wrapping in a machine's
+ * lifetime.
  */
-static u64 mult_64x32_and_fold(u64 x, u32 y)
+static u64 key_index_id(atomic64_t *id)
 {
-	u64 hi = (u64)(u32)(x >> 32) * y;
-	u64 lo = (u64)(u32)(x) * y;
-	return lo + ((u64)(u32)hi << 32) + (u32)(hi >> 32);
+	static atomic64_t next_id;
+	u64 old, new;
+
+	old = atomic64_read(id);
+	if (likely(old))
+		return old;
+
+	do {
+		new = atomic64_inc_return(&next_id);
+	} while (WARN_ON_ONCE(!new));
+
+	old = 0;
+	if (!atomic64_try_cmpxchg_relaxed(id, &old, new))
+		return old;
+	return new;
 }
 
 /*
- * Hash a key type and description.
+ * Hash a key type, domain and description.  KEYCTL_READ exposes the tree's
+ * traversal order, so no part of the index may contain kernel addresses.
  */
 static void hash_key_type_and_desc(struct keyring_index_key *index_key)
 {
 	const unsigned level_shift = ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP;
 	const unsigned long fan_mask = ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK;
-	const char *description = index_key->description;
-	unsigned long hash, type;
-	u32 piece;
+	static siphash_key_t hash_key __read_mostly;
+	unsigned long hash;
 	u64 acc;
-	int n, desc_len = index_key->desc_len;
 
-	type = (unsigned long)index_key->type;
-	acc = mult_64x32_and_fold(type, desc_len + 13);
-	acc = mult_64x32_and_fold(acc, 9207);
-	piece = (unsigned long)index_key->domain_tag;
-	acc = mult_64x32_and_fold(acc, piece);
-	acc = mult_64x32_and_fold(acc, 9207);
-
-	for (;;) {
-		n = desc_len;
-		if (n <= 0)
-			break;
-		if (n > 4)
-			n = 4;
-		piece = 0;
-		memcpy(&piece, description, n);
-		description += n;
-		desc_len -= n;
-		acc = mult_64x32_and_fold(acc, piece);
-		acc = mult_64x32_and_fold(acc, 9207);
-	}
+	get_random_once(&hash_key, sizeof(hash_key));
+	acc = siphash(index_key->description, index_key->desc_len, &hash_key);
+	acc = siphash_3u64(index_key->type_id, index_key->domain_id, acc,
+			   &hash_key);
 
 	/* Fold the hash down to 32 bits if need be. */
 	hash = acc;
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ static void hash_key_type_and_desc(struc
 
 /*
  * Finalise an index key to include a part of the description actually in the
- * index key, to set the domain tag and to calculate the hash.
+ * index key, to set the domain tag and index IDs, and to calculate the hash.
  */
 void key_set_index_key(struct keyring_index_key *index_key)
 {
@@ -225,6 +225,14 @@ void key_set_index_key(struct keyring_in
 			index_key->domain_tag = &default_domain_tag;
 	}
 
+	/* Preserve the IDs when copying an existing key's index.  In
+	 * particular, its type may already have been unregistered.
+	 */
+	if (!index_key->type_id)
+		index_key->type_id = key_index_id(&index_key->type->index_id);
+	if (!index_key->domain_id)
+		index_key->domain_id = key_index_id(&index_key->domain_tag->index_id);
+
 	hash_key_type_and_desc(index_key);
 }
 
@@ -263,15 +271,19 @@ void key_remove_domain(struct key_tag *d
 /*
  * Build the next index key chunk.
  *
+ * The hash and inline description are followed by the 64-bit type and domain
+ * IDs, low word first, and then by the rest of the description.
  * We return it one word-sized chunk at a time.
  */
 static unsigned long keyring_get_key_chunk(const void *data, int level)
 {
+	const unsigned int id_chunks = sizeof(u64) / sizeof(unsigned long);
 	const struct keyring_index_key *index_key = data;
+	int desc_len = index_key->desc_len;
 	unsigned long chunk = 0;
-	const u8 *d;
-	int desc_len = index_key->desc_len, n = sizeof(chunk);
+	int n = sizeof(chunk);
 	unsigned int offset;
+	const u8 *d;
 
 	level /= ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE;
 	switch (level) {
@@ -279,27 +291,30 @@ static unsigned long keyring_get_key_chu
 		return index_key->hash;
 	case 1:
 		return index_key->x;
-	case 2:
-		return (unsigned long)index_key->type;
-	case 3:
-		return (unsigned long)index_key->domain_tag;
-	default:
-		level -= 4;
-		offset = sizeof(index_key->desc) + level * sizeof(long);
-		if (desc_len <= offset)
-			return 0;
-
-		d = index_key->description + offset;
-		desc_len -= offset;
-		if (desc_len > n)
-			desc_len = n;
-		d += desc_len;
-		do {
-			chunk <<= 8;
-			chunk |= *--d;
-		} while (--desc_len > 0);
-		return chunk;
 	}
+
+	level -= 2;
+	if (level < id_chunks)
+		return index_key->type_id >> (level * ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE);
+	level -= id_chunks;
+	if (level < id_chunks)
+		return index_key->domain_id >> (level * ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE);
+	level -= id_chunks;
+
+	offset = sizeof(index_key->desc) + level * sizeof(long);
+	if (desc_len <= offset)
+		return 0;
+
+	d = index_key->description + offset;
+	desc_len -= offset;
+	if (desc_len > n)
+		desc_len = n;
+	d += desc_len;
+	do {
+		chunk <<= 8;
+		chunk |= *--d;
+	} while (--desc_len > 0);
+	return chunk;
 }
 
 static unsigned long keyring_get_object_key_chunk(const void *object, int level)
@@ -331,6 +346,7 @@ static int keyring_diff_objects(const vo
 	const struct keyring_index_key *b = data;
 	unsigned long seg_a, seg_b;
 	int level, i;
+	u64 diff;
 
 	level = 0;
 	seg_a = a->hash;
@@ -339,28 +355,22 @@ static int keyring_diff_objects(const vo
 		goto differ;
 	level += ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE / 8;
 
-	/* The number of bits contributed by the hash is controlled by a
-	 * constant in the assoc_array headers.  Everything else thereafter we
-	 * can deal with as being machine word-size dependent.
-	 */
+	/* The inline description contributes one machine-word-sized chunk. */
 	seg_a = a->x;
 	seg_b = b->x;
 	if ((seg_a ^ seg_b) != 0)
 		goto differ;
 	level += sizeof(unsigned long);
 
-	/* The next bit may not work on big endian */
-	seg_a = (unsigned long)a->type;
-	seg_b = (unsigned long)b->type;
-	if ((seg_a ^ seg_b) != 0)
-		goto differ;
-	level += sizeof(unsigned long);
-
-	seg_a = (unsigned long)a->domain_tag;
-	seg_b = (unsigned long)b->domain_tag;
-	if ((seg_a ^ seg_b) != 0)
-		goto differ;
-	level += sizeof(unsigned long);
+	diff = a->type_id ^ b->type_id;
+	if (diff)
+		return level * 8 + __ffs64(diff);
+	level += sizeof(u64);
+
+	diff = a->domain_id ^ b->domain_id;
+	if (diff)
+		return level * 8 + __ffs64(diff);
+	level += sizeof(u64);
 
 	i = sizeof(a->desc);
 	if (a->desc_len <= i)

[PATCH 6.6 157/168] keys: Protect the read method check against type removal

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>

commit 925c84e3cc21caf09de92d9bcafab0147790debf upstream.

keyctl_read_key() checks key->type->read without holding key->sem.
A reference keeps the key alive, but does not pin the module containing
its type. A surviving RxRPC key can therefore be read while AF_RXRPC
is being unloaded:

  KEYCTL_READ task                    Module unload and key GC
  ----------------                   ------------------------
  lookup_user_key()
  permission / possession checks
  load key->type
                                     af_rxrpc_exit()
                                       unregister_key_type()
                                         GC: down_write(key->sem)
                                         GC: retype to key_type_dead
                                         GC: up_write(key->sem)
                                       unregister_key_type() returns
                                     free_module()
  read saved type's read member

The final access can read freed module storage. The read invocation in
__keyctl_read_key() is already protected by key->sem, but the earlier
method check is outside that critical section.

Move the method check into __keyctl_read_key(), after key_validate() and
under its existing read hold on key->sem. The check and invocation then
use the same protected type for length queries and every read retry.
The GC cannot retype the key until the semaphore is released, and type
unregistration waits for that GC pass before the module can be freed.

Return -EOPNOTSUPP when validation succeeds and the type has no read
method. A temporary buffer may now be allocated before this result;
allocation and copying to userspace remain outside the semaphore.

Assisted-by: LLM
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+
Fixes: d3ec10aa9581 ("KEYS: Don't write out to userspace while holding key semaphore")
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/pm-key-management-objects-candidate-0010-v7-fc85721ff5cfb9e33ac6@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 security/keys/keyctl.c |   13 ++++++-------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -808,8 +808,12 @@ static long __keyctl_read_key(struct key
 
 	down_read(&key->sem);
 	ret = key_validate(key);
-	if (ret == 0)
-		ret = key->type->read(key, buffer, buflen);
+	if (ret == 0) {
+		if (key->type->read)
+			ret = key->type->read(key, buffer, buflen);
+		else
+			ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	}
 	up_read(&key->sem);
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -863,11 +867,6 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid,
 
 	/* the key is probably readable - now try to read it */
 can_read_key:
-	if (!key->type->read) {
-		ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
-		goto key_put_out;
-	}
-
 	if (!buffer || !buflen) {
 		/* Get the key length from the read method */
 		ret = __keyctl_read_key(key, NULL, 0);

[PATCH 6.6 158/168] KEYS: Fix key_reject_and_link() race with keyring restriction

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Adrian Martinez <adrimg3196@gmail.com>

commit 0b157166e612b70f98a332b6c7be7eac6f8e9593 upstream.

The restrict_link check in key_reject_and_link() is done before taking
the keyring semaphore, racing with a concurrent keyring_restrict()
that installs the restriction while holding the semaphore in write
mode.

Move the check to after __key_link_lock(), so it is done under the
semaphore, matching the pattern used in __key_create_or_update().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5ac7eace2d00 ("KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a keyring")
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Martinez <adrimg3196@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CACO1+RT+m==BY+ZPkE+fo536D0qu3wog4xE1dfuXQ56g+=Qv=A@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 security/keys/key.c |   13 ++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -586,11 +586,18 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
 	ret = -EBUSY;
 
 	if (keyring) {
-		if (keyring->restrict_link)
-			return -EPERM;
-
 		link_ret = __key_link_lock(keyring, &key->index_key);
 		if (link_ret == 0) {
+			/*
+			 * Check the restriction under the keyring semaphore.
+			 * keyring_restrict() installs it while holding the
+			 * semaphore, so testing it beforehand races with a
+			 * concurrent restriction install.
+			 */
+			if (keyring->restrict_link) {
+				__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, edit);
+				return -EPERM;
+			}
 			link_ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &edit);
 			if (link_ret < 0)
 				__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, edit);

[PATCH 6.6 159/168] KEYS: trusted: Fix blob allocation size in tpm2_key_decode()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>

commit 11077cbcc2695f71c944a84a5f08c6672ab759f1 upstream.

tpm2_key_decode() allocates 4 bytes more than needed. The ASN.1
callbacks tpm2_key_priv() and tpm2_key_pub() provide the lengths
of TPM2B_PRIVATE and TPM2B_PUBLIC, so ctx.priv_len and ctx.pub_len
already account for the 2-byte `size` field each of those structures
starts with.

I noticed this while reviewing commit 114f00d738f1 ("KEYS: trusted:
Fix tpm2_load_cmd() boundary check"), which correctly reports
ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len as the decoded blob size [1].

Let's allocate exactly that amount, matching the data copied into
the blob.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/apfoKo-BdwaLXtkT@sgarzare-redhat/

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+
Fixes: f2219745250f ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs")
Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260923173506.41519-1-sgarzare@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct truste
 	if (ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	blob = kmalloc(ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len + 4, GFP_KERNEL);
+	blob = kmalloc(ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!blob)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 

[PATCH 6.6 160/168] keys/trusted_keys: return immediately after TPM unseal failure

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>

commit f92d0ccb05bf9089072cb067dda0dffd5394c4ef upstream.

trusted_tpm_unseal() proceeds to pcrlock() when the TPM unseal operation
fails. If pcrlock() succeeds, its return value overwrites the unseal error,
causing key instantiation to succeed.

Return immediately when unseal fails to preserve the original error.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.15+
Fixes: 5d0682be3189 ("KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework")
Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260912062950.279104-2-ssrish@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
@@ -959,8 +959,10 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct tru
 		ret = tpm2_unseal_trusted(chip, p, options);
 	else
 		ret = key_unseal(p, options);
-	if (ret < 0)
+	if (ret < 0) {
 		pr_info("key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	if (options->pcrlock) {
 		ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);

[PATCH 6.6 161/168] asymmetric_keys: reject trust keys without IDs

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>

commit 9695df3b1db4ac4534274d38ee16e3b9b0bf910e upstream.

The PKCS#8 parser deliberately leaves the asym_key_ids payload slot
empty. key_or_keyring_common() unconditionally dereferences that slot
when a PKCS#8 key is supplied to a key_or_keyring restriction. Both the
plain and :chain forms reach this branch, allowing an unprivileged caller
to trigger a NULL pointer dereference through KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING
followed by add_key().

 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000
 KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
 RIP: 0010:key_or_keyring_common (crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c:205 crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c:279)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  __key_create_or_update (security/keys/key.c:884)
  key_create_or_update (security/keys/key.c:1021)
  __do_sys_add_key (security/keys/keyctl.c:134)
  do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83)
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
  </TASK>
 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

Reject an asymmetric restriction key without key IDs. A PKCS#8 private
key cannot identify the signer of a candidate certificate and is not a
valid trust anchor.

Fixes: 3c58b2362ba8 ("KEYS: Implement PKCS#8 RSA Private Key parser [ver #2]")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260429181629.110802-2-bestswngs@gmail.com
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c |    8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
@@ -236,10 +236,14 @@ static int key_or_keyring_common(struct
 			if (IS_ERR(key))
 				key = NULL;
 		} else if (trusted->type == &key_type_asymmetric) {
+			const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids;
 			const struct asymmetric_key_id **signer_ids;
 
-			signer_ids = (const struct asymmetric_key_id **)
-				asymmetric_key_ids(trusted)->id;
+			kids = asymmetric_key_ids(trusted);
+			if (!kids)
+				return -ENOKEY;
+
+			signer_ids = (const struct asymmetric_key_id **)kids->id;
 
 			/*
 			 * The auth_ids come from the candidate key (the

[PATCH 6.6 162/168] ftrace: Initialize modname and offset in print_rec()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Aaron Ahmed <aarnahmd@amazon.com>

commit e1f339ff3b83857b93baf8b88186275a413d445e upstream.

print_rec() leaves 'modname' and 'offset' uninitialized and
kallsyms_lookup() only sets them on success. When the lookup fails like
when a module is being loaded or unloaded, 'modname' holds a garbage
value, passes the 'if (modname)' check, and is dereferenced by
seq_printf().

  Oops: general protection fault
  RIP: 0010:string+0x48/0xe0
  Call Trace:
   vsnprintf+0x1f5/0x650
   seq_printf+0x8e/0xb0
   print_rec+0x6c/0xc0
   t_show+0x4c/0x440
   seq_read_iter+0x119/0x480

This can be triggered by reading available_filter_functions while a
module is being loaded or unloaded.

Initialize both variables so a failed lookup skips the module name.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: b39181f7c690 ("ftrace: Add FTRACE_MCOUNT_MAX_OFFSET to avoid adding weak function")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261016230403.4916-1-aarnahmd@amazon.com
Tested-by: Gavin Inglis <giinglis@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Aaron Ahmed <aarnahmd@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/trace/ftrace.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/trace/ftrace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/ftrace.c
@@ -3807,9 +3807,9 @@ subsys_initcall(ftrace_check_for_weak_fu
 
 static int print_rec(struct seq_file *m, unsigned long ip)
 {
-	unsigned long offset;
+	unsigned long offset = 0;
 	char str[KSYM_SYMBOL_LEN];
-	char *modname;
+	char *modname = NULL;
 	const char *ret;
 
 	ret = kallsyms_lookup(ip, NULL, &offset, &modname, str);

[PATCH 6.6 163/168] coredump: hold RCU while releasing parked threads

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>

commit 61d58591aa0188bf2463e263962256316ff8b576 upstream.

coredump_finish() releases the parked threads by clearing ->task in
their core_thread entry and calling wake_up_process() on each of them.
It does that without holding a reference on the task and without being
inside rcu.

But calling wake_up_process(task) without rcu here isn't safe. A parked
thread doesn't need that wakeup to leave. A spurious wakeup or a
preemption after the store is enough for the task to go away.

So if the coredump client is preempted between the store and
wake_up_process() the thread can exit and be freed in the meantime and
try_to_wake_up() takes pi_lock in freed memory.

Hold rcu across the loop.

Fixes: a94e2d408eae ("coredump: kill mm->core_done")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260921-work-coredump-fixes-v3-1-8e4adb1619e6@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/coredump.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/coredump.c
+++ b/fs/coredump.c
@@ -469,6 +469,8 @@ static void coredump_finish(bool core_du
 	current->signal->core_state = NULL;
 	spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
 
+	/* A released thread may exit and be freed before it is woken. */
+	guard(rcu)();
 	while ((curr = next) != NULL) {
 		next = curr->next;
 		task = curr->task;
@@ -477,6 +479,7 @@ static void coredump_finish(bool core_du
 		 * ->task == NULL before we read ->next.
 		 */
 		smp_mb();
+		/* Any wakeup now lets the thread exit, rcu keeps it alive. */
 		curr->task = NULL;
 		wake_up_process(task);
 	}

[PATCH 6.6 164/168] signal: only SIGKILL and the freezers interrupt a coredumping task

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>

commit 563d606b93d7a1d23512832fc252d32c68860d87 upstream.

For quite a while now coredump has allowed either SIGKILL or freezing to
interrupt an ongoing coredump. Since we seem to like it complicated
"freezing" can mean a lot of things:

(1) Power Management induced freezing
(2) cgroup v1 freezer controller induced freezing
(3) cgroup v2 freezer controller induced freezing

So (1) and (2) are handled by checking freezing() but (3) isn't.
(3) uses cgroup_freeze_task() which sets JOBCTL_TRAP_FREEZE and calls
signal_wake_up() on every task in the cgroup. The trap isn't handled by
the coredump code.

Which means the current logic is inconsistent. Power and cgroup v1
freeze and abort the coredump. With cgroup v2 it depends on where the
core goes. A dump to a file completes and the cgroup v2 freeze has to
wait for it to finish. When dumping to a pipe or socket the dump is
interrupted at the next write because of trap's TIF_SIGPENDING. Which is
it? Let's be consistent and align (1)-(3): freezing interrupts an
ongoing coredump and doesn't make it wait until the dump is done.

All three freezers go through signal_wake_up() and so set
TIF_SIGPENDING on the dumper. And once zap_threads() has set core_state
that flag can't mean anything else anymore. prepare_signal() drops every
signal but SIGKILL for the group, the dying threads don't retarget
shared signals to the dumper, and zap_process() cleared the pending job
control traps. So the flag is the thing to check. Let dump_interrupted()
test task_sigpending() and nothing else. That is also what the pipe and
socket writes already fail on. TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL is left out on
purpose, task work must not cut a dump short.

A seized tracee that gets PTRACE_INTERRUPT during the dump is cut short
the same way. It already was for pipes and sockets.

The one freeze that check can miss is one requested before the dump
started. zap_threads() clears TIF_SIGPENDING and the cgroup v2 freezer
only wakes a task once while its JOBCTL_TRAP_FREEZE isn't part of
JOBCTL_PENDING_MASK and survives zap_process(). So refuse to start the
dump when freezing() is true or the trap is pending. The task then exits
without dumping, which is what happens today when the freeze interrupts
the dump at the first write.

Fixes: 403bad72b67d ("coredump: only SIGKILL should interrupt the coredumping task")
Fixes: 76f969e8948d ("cgroup: cgroup v2 freezer")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/arJ6zZuI59BJnXpl@redhat.com
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260921-work-coredump-fixes-v3-2-8e4adb1619e6@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/coredump.c |   13 +++++--------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/coredump.c
+++ b/fs/coredump.c
@@ -416,7 +416,9 @@ static int zap_threads(struct task_struc
 	int nr = -EAGAIN;
 
 	spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
-	if (!(signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT) && !signal->group_exec_task) {
+	/* A freeze requested before the dump would be lost with TIF_SIGPENDING. */
+	if (!(signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT) && !signal->group_exec_task &&
+	    !freezing(tsk) && !(tsk->jobctl & JOBCTL_TRAP_FREEZE)) {
 		signal->core_state = core_state;
 		nr = zap_process(tsk, exit_code);
 		clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SIGPENDING);
@@ -487,13 +489,8 @@ static void coredump_finish(bool core_du
 
 static bool dump_interrupted(void)
 {
-	/*
-	 * SIGKILL or freezing() interrupt the coredumping. Perhaps we
-	 * can do try_to_freeze() and check __fatal_signal_pending(),
-	 * but then we need to teach dump_write() to restart and clear
-	 * TIF_SIGPENDING.
-	 */
-	return fatal_signal_pending(current) || freezing(current);
+	/* Only SIGKILL and the freezers set it after zap_threads(). */
+	return task_sigpending(current);
 }
 
 static void wait_for_dump_helpers(struct file *file)

[PATCH 6.6 165/168] signal: dont retarget shared signals in a dying thread group

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>

commit c0e659511d4f49087da095a95799edb5b775a705 upstream.

If the calling thread has blocked a signal then
retarget_shared_pending() slingshots a shared pending signal to a
sibling thread. Today it only skips PF_EXITING threads but not a
coredumping thread.

But if SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT is set no thread in the thread-group can
dequeue such signals anymore as get_signal() sends SIGKILL to every
thread and prepare_signal() drops any other signal.

exit_signals() also returns early on SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT. But neither
sigprocmask() nor the mask restore in sigtimedwait() do.

Say a thread sleeps in sigtimedwait() and a sibling thread crashes. The
sleeping thread gets woken by the zap call. It restores its mask on the
way out and retargets a signal that was queued for the coredumping
process. That means TIF_SIGPENDING is set on the coredumping task which
zap_threads() had cleared. So a blocking write sees TIF_SIGPENDING and
truncates the dump.

Stop retargeting signals when SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT is set and avoid
needlessly truncating coredumps.

Fixes: e6fa16ab9c1e ("signal: sigprocmask() should do retarget_shared_pending()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260921-work-coredump-fixes-v3-5-8e4adb1619e6@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/signal.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

--- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -2985,6 +2985,10 @@ static void retarget_shared_pending(stru
 	sigset_t retarget;
 	struct task_struct *t;
 
+	/* Nobody dequeues them in a dying group, see get_signal(). */
+	if (tsk->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)
+		return;
+
 	sigandsets(&retarget, &tsk->signal->shared_pending.signal, which);
 	if (sigisemptyset(&retarget))
 		return;

[PATCH 6.6 166/168] ptrace: refuse to change the signal mask of a user worker

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>

commit cabc249e6560bee7bdfee9fbcb7ce4e951dcfd41 upstream.

A user worker is created with every signal other than SIGKILL and
SIGSTOP blocked. It never runs user code and that mask is what keeps
get_signal() from dequeuing anything else for it. complete_signal()
never picks a thread that blocks the signal, tkill() queues on the
worker but nothing dequeues it. ptrace_signal() requeues an injected
signal that the tracee blocks.

PTRACE_SETSIGMASK is the only way to change that mask from the outside.
A tracer that clears it makes the worker eligible for every signal.
Whatever the worker then dequeues it can only act on by leaving.

Refuse PTRACE_SETSIGMASK for a user worker with -EPERM, the way
ptrace_attach() refuses a kernel thread. A worker is guaranteed to only
ever dequeue SIGKILL or SIGSTOP and an injected signal stays pending on
it, which is what already happens when the mask isn't touched.

Taking the request and quietly leaving the mask alone was the other
option, the way set_current_blocked() keeps SIGKILL and SIGSTOP
unblocked whatever userspace asks for. But then a tracer gets success
back with nothing changed and no way to tell that apart from a mask that
took effect.

Fixes: e8b33b8cfafc ("Revert "kernel: treat PF_IO_WORKER like PF_KTHREAD for ptrace/signals"")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260921-work-coredump-fixes-v3-9-8e4adb1619e6@kernel.org
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/ptrace.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -1100,6 +1100,12 @@ int ptrace_request(struct task_struct *c
 	case PTRACE_SETSIGMASK: {
 		sigset_t new_set;
 
+		/* A user worker only ever takes SIGKILL and SIGSTOP. */
+		if (child->flags & PF_USER_WORKER) {
+			ret = -EPERM;
+			break;
+		}
+
 		if (addr != sizeof(sigset_t)) {
 			ret = -EINVAL;
 			break;

[PATCH 6.6 167/168] pid_namespace: prevent TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL from interrupting the reaper

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>

commit 5c0985dd3c32fc2bbd0e8beaf13cf52cd97376a2 upstream.

Since commit 7fea700e04bd ("zap_pid_ns_processes: clear
TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL along with TIF_SIGPENDING") zap_pid_ns_processes()
clears TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL before every kernel_wait4() call. Otherwise
kernel_wait4() doesn't sleep and returns -ERESTARTSYS if
signal_pending() is true and the reaper busy-waits.

But clearing TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL doesn't fix it. It can get raised again.
For example, klp_send_signals() sets it raw against any task that hasn't
transitioned yet. And it keeps sending it until the livepatch finishes.

The sleep loop waiting for pid_allocated to drop has the same problem
and it doesn't even clear anything. So a schedule() in
TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE returns immediately.

Use a no_notify_signal guard. signal_pending() will ignore
TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL and the pid namespace reaper sleeps until a child
exits or free_pid() wakes it.

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260824-work-tif_notify_signal-v2-5-6609e42b3157@kernel.org
Fixes: 7fea700e04bd ("zap_pid_ns_processes: clear TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL along with TIF_SIGPENDING")
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/pid_namespace.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/kernel/pid_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/pid_namespace.c
@@ -215,9 +215,10 @@ void zap_pid_ns_processes(struct pid_nam
 	 * kernel_wait4() will also block until our children traced from the
 	 * parent namespace are detached and become EXIT_DEAD.
 	 */
+	/* Task work must not busy-loop the reaper, see signal_pending(). */
+	guard(no_notify_signal)();
 	do {
 		clear_thread_flag(TIF_SIGPENDING);
-		clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL);
 		rc = kernel_wait4(-1, NULL, __WALL, NULL);
 	} while (rc != -ECHILD);
 

[PATCH 6.6 168/168] signal: allow taks to temporarily block TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>

commit 22b7f491be8f93ff72de0a3fe02b8ee9e64d3f21 upstream.

TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL is used to kick a task in uninterruptible sleep to
return to userspace and run task work and then go back to sleep. This
mechanism works well but breaks e.g., coredumps. dump_interrupted() only
allows fatal signals to interrupt a coredump and the whole regular write
path going to actual filesystems is impervious to TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL as
well.

Add PF_NO_NOTIFY_SIGNAL and helpers to raise and restore it. This is the
same approach as memalloc_nofs_save(). signal_pending() will not report
a fake pending signal via TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL if inside a
PF_NO_NOTIFY_SIGNAL section.

No functional changes.

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260824-work-tif_notify_signal-v2-1-6609e42b3157@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 include/linux/sched.h        |    2 +-
 include/linux/sched/signal.h |   27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -1768,7 +1768,7 @@ extern struct pid __rcu *cad_pid;
 						 * I am cleaning dirty pages from some other bdi. */
 #define PF_KTHREAD		0x00200000	/* I am a kernel thread */
 #define PF_RANDOMIZE		0x00400000	/* Randomize virtual address space */
-#define PF__HOLE__00800000	0x00800000
+#define PF_NO_NOTIFY_SIGNAL	0x00800000	/* see no_notify_signal_save() */
 #define PF__HOLE__01000000	0x01000000
 #define PF__HOLE__02000000	0x02000000
 #define PF_NO_SETAFFINITY	0x04000000	/* Userland is not allowed to meddle with cpus_mask */
--- a/include/linux/sched/signal.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched/signal.h
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 #ifndef _LINUX_SCHED_SIGNAL_H
 #define _LINUX_SCHED_SIGNAL_H
 
+#include <linux/cleanup.h>
 #include <linux/rculist.h>
 #include <linux/signal.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
@@ -389,14 +390,36 @@ static inline int task_sigpending(struct
 	return unlikely(test_tsk_thread_flag(p,TIF_SIGPENDING));
 }
 
+/* Prevent TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL from interrupting this task. */
+static inline unsigned int no_notify_signal_save(void)
+{
+	unsigned int flags = current->flags;
+
+	current->flags |= PF_NO_NOTIFY_SIGNAL;
+	return flags;
+}
+
+/* Restore the previous PF_NO_NOTIFY_SIGNAL state. */
+static inline void no_notify_signal_restore(unsigned int flags)
+{
+	current_restore_flags(flags, PF_NO_NOTIFY_SIGNAL);
+}
+
+DEFINE_LOCK_GUARD_0(no_notify_signal,
+		    _T->flags = no_notify_signal_save(),
+		    no_notify_signal_restore(_T->flags),
+		    unsigned int flags)
+
 static inline int signal_pending(struct task_struct *p)
 {
 	/*
 	 * TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL isn't really a signal, but it requires the same
 	 * behavior in terms of ensuring that we break out of wait loops
-	 * so that notify signal callbacks can be processed.
+	 * so that notify signal callbacks can be processed. Not for a task
+	 * that asked not to be interrupted by it, see no_notify_signal_save().
 	 */
-	if (unlikely(test_tsk_thread_flag(p, TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL)))
+	if (unlikely(test_tsk_thread_flag(p, TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL)) &&
+	    likely(!(READ_ONCE(p->flags) & PF_NO_NOTIFY_SIGNAL)))
 		return 1;
 	return task_sigpending(p);
 }

Re: [PATCH 6.6 000/168] 6.6.161-rc1 review

[Brett A C Sheffield]

# Librecast Test Results

044/044 [ OK ] liblcrq
010/010 [ OK ] libmld
120/120 [ OK ] liblibrecast

CPU/kernel: Linux auntie 6.6.161-rc1-gb6e2b2f6f7e1 #1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Wed Oct 28 18:32:27 -00 2026 x86_64 AMD Ryzen 9 9950X 16-Core Processor AuthenticAMD GNU/Linux

Tested-by: Brett A C Sheffield <bacs@librecast.net>

Re: [PATCH 6.6 000/168] 6.6.161-rc1 review

[Florian Fainelli]

On 10/28/26 09:58, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.161 release.
> There are 168 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Fri, 30 Oct 2026 16:59:22 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.6.161-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> 	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.6.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
> 
> thanks,
> 
> greg k-h

On ARCH_BRCMSTB using 32-bit and 64-bit ARM kernels, build tested on 
BMIPS_GENERIC:

Tested-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli@broadcom.com>
-- 
Florian

Re: [PATCH 6.6 000/168] 6.6.161-rc1 review

[Peter Schneider]

Am 28.10.2026 um 17:58 schrieb Greg Kroah-Hartman:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.161 release.
> There are 168 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.

Builds, boots and works on my 2-socket Ivy Bridge Xeon E5-2697v2 server. No dmesg oddities or regressions found.

Tested-by: Peter Schneider <pschneider1968@googlemail.com>


Beste Grüße,
Peter Schneider

-- 
Climb the mountain not to plant your flag, but to embrace the challenge,
enjoy the air and behold the view. Climb it so you can see the world,
not so the world can see you.                    -- David McCullough Jr.

OpenPGP:  0xA3828BD796CCE11A8CADE8866E3A92C92C3FF244
Download: https://www.peters-netzplatz.de/download/pschneider1968_pub.asc
https://keys.mailvelope.com/pks/lookup?op=get&search=pschneider1968@googlemail.com
https://keys.mailvelope.com/pks/lookup?op=get&search=pschneider1968@gmail.com

Re: [PATCH 6.6 000/168] 6.6.161-rc1 review

[Pavel Machek]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 503 bytes --]

Hi!

> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.161 release.
> There are 168 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.

CIP testing did not find any problems here:

https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-testing/linux-stable-rc-ci/-/tree/linux-6.6.y

Tested-by: Pavel Machek (CIP) <pavel@nabladev.com>

Best regards,
                                                                Pavel

[-- Attachment #2: signature.asc --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 195 bytes --]

Re: [PATCH 6.6 000/168] 6.6.161-rc1 review

[Miguel Ojeda]

On Wed, 28 Oct 2026 17:58:56 +0100 Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.161 release.
> There are 168 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Fri, 30 Oct 2026 16:59:22 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.

Boot-tested under QEMU for Rust x86_64:

Tested-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>

Thanks!

Cheers,
Miguel

Re: [PATCH 6.6 000/168] 6.6.161-rc1 review

[Ron Economos]

On 10/28/26 09:58, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.161 release.
> There are 168 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Fri, 30 Oct 2026 16:59:22 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.6.161-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> 	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.6.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h

Built and booted successfully on RISC-V RV64 (HiFive Unmatched).

Tested-by: Ron Economos <re@w6rz.net>

Re: [PATCH 6.6 000/168] 6.6.161-rc1 review

[SJ Park]

On Wed, 28 Oct 2026 17:58:56 +0100 Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.161 release.
> There are 168 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Fri, 30 Oct 2026 16:59:22 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.

This rc kernel passes DAMON functionality test [1] on my test machine.

Tested-by: SJ Park <sj@kernel.org>

[1] https://github.com/damonitor/damon-tests/tree/next/corr


Thanks,
SJ

[...]