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From: Rodolfo Giometti <giometti@enneenne.com>
To: Demi Marie Obenour <demiobenour@gmail.com>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: "David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	"Herbert Xu" <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	"Jens Wiklander" <jenswi@kernel.org>,
	"Sumit Garg" <sumit.garg@kernel.org>,
	op-tee@lists.trustedfirmware.org,
	"Horia Geantă" <horia.geanta@nxp.com>,
	"Pankaj Gupta" <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>,
	"Sahil Malhotra" <sahil.malhotra@nxp.com>,
	"Ahmad Fatoum" <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>,
	"Richard Weinberger" <richard@nod.at>,
	"Christophe Leroy (CS GROUP)" <chleroy@kernel.org>,
	"Eric Biggers" <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Shuah Khan" <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/9] KEYS: keycrypt: keys that user space can use but never read
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 13:17:29 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <10d27c34-72d7-4380-abc9-6f8eddc6c08c@enneenne.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <01692969-8e92-4a08-bde9-aad86674504f@gmail.com>

On 19/11/2026 05:35, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:
> On 11/18/26 7:43 PM, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:
>> On 11/18/26 7:37 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
>>> On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 06:42:15PM -0500, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:
>>>> AES-256-CBC isn't a suitable mode on its own, unless it's combined
>>>> with a MAC in encrypt-then-MAC.  Even then, it has a 2^64 birthday
>>>> bound, so it should only be used 2^48 times with a single key unless
>>>> the key is ephemeral.

CBC is there for existing formats (craf writes files that openssl enc
can read) and because the CAAM path is CBC only. I take your points
on it.

>>>> AES-GCM is not a suitable algorithm either.  If you allow encrypting
>>>> with a key loaded from persistent storage, there is no way for the API
>>>> to ensure it is only used with a unique nonce.  Nonce reuse leaks the
>>>> authentication key and allows forgeries.  Using random nonces isn't
>>>> good enough either: NIST only allows 2^32 encryptions in this case,
>>>> and the API can't enforce that limit.

You are right that a construction of our own is the wrong choice:
patch 9, the only GCM in the series, has no user yet and can go.

[snip]

>> The usual solution to something like this is a userspace service
>> like ssh-agent.  Then you can do whatever key management you want.
>> That doesn't protect against root, but if someone can get root you
>> have bigger problems.

The threat here is root, on devices where root eventually falls: a
key root can copy decrypts that device's data offline and forever. A
service that holds the key in its memory gives that away. keycrypt
with the OP-TEE backend does not: the TA keeps the key and checks the
purpose sealed with it at every use, so even a compromised kernel can
only use it on that device, and only for that purpose.

> Also, if you need keys stored in hardware for some reason (compliance,
> time-limited exfiltration), you can use a userspace library or
> daemon that abstracts over whatever the hardware-specific API is.

Yes, that is the case I mean, and a daemon over a TEE would not give
the key away either. What it costs here is, for OP-TEE's PKCS#11 TA,
secure storage before the root filesystem exists; for the CAAM, the
only user-space path is AF_ALG cbc(paes), the one off-CPU exception
left in an interface the kernel documents as deprecated, privileged by
default, with a key format per driver and no purpose.

Ciao,

Rodolfo

-- 
GNU/Linux Solutions                  e-mail: giometti@enneenne.com
Linux Device Driver                          giometti@linux.it
Embedded Systems                     phone:  +39 349 2432127
UNIX programming

  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-11-19 12:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-18 14:04 [RFC PATCH 0/9] KEYS: keycrypt: keys that user space can use but never read Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:04 ` [RFC PATCH 1/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add a key type for keys user space never reads Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:33   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:04 ` [RFC PATCH 2/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the sw backend Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:21   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:04 ` [RFC PATCH 3/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the OP-TEE backend Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:33   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:07 ` [RFC PATCH 4/9] docs: keycrypt: document keycrypt keys Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:19   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:08 ` [RFC PATCH 5/9] MAINTAINERS: add KEYS-KEYCRYPT Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:09 ` [RFC PATCH 6/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the engine tier Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:17   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:10 ` [RFC PATCH 7/9] crypto: caam - add an internal cbc(paes) taking the blob's key modifier Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:24   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:11 ` [RFC PATCH 8/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the CAAM backend Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:36   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:12 ` [RFC PATCH 9/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the aes256-gcm-stream algorithm Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:30   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-19  0:25   ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-11-19  0:55     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 14:31 ` [RFC PATCH 0/9] KEYS: keycrypt: keys that user space can use but never read Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 14:39   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 14:57 ` Marco Felsch
2026-11-18 15:07   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 10:18   ` Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 23:42 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-11-19  0:37   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19  0:43     ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-11-19  1:01       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19  4:35       ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-11-19  5:01         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 12:17         ` Rodolfo Giometti [this message]
2026-11-19 10:19     ` Rodolfo Giometti

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