public inbox for kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
	Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>,
	x86@kernel.org, alex.popov@linux.com
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v6 4/6] lkdtm: Add a test for STACKLEAK
Date: Wed,  6 Dec 2017 02:33:45 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1512516827-29797-5-git-send-email-alex.popov@linux.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1512516827-29797-1-git-send-email-alex.popov@linux.com>

Introduce two lkdtm tests for the STACKLEAK feature: STACKLEAK_CHECK_ALLOCA
and STACKLEAK_TRACK_STACK. Both of them check that the current task stack
is properly erased (filled with STACKLEAK_POISON).

In addition, STACKLEAK_CHECK_ALLOCA tests that:
 - check_alloca() allows alloca calls which don't exhaust the kernel stack;
 - alloca calls which exhaust/overflow the kernel stack hit BUG() in
    check_alloca().

And STACKLEAK_TRACK_STACK checks that exhausting the thread stack with a
recursion is detected:
 - it hits the BUG() in track_stack() if CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is not enabled,
 - or hits the guard page otherwise.

Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@docker.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
---
 drivers/misc/Makefile          |   3 +
 drivers/misc/lkdtm.h           |   4 ++
 drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c      |   2 +
 drivers/misc/lkdtm_stackleak.c | 139 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 148 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 drivers/misc/lkdtm_stackleak.c

diff --git a/drivers/misc/Makefile b/drivers/misc/Makefile
index 5ca5f64..66c3605 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/misc/Makefile
@@ -63,6 +63,9 @@ lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM)		+= lkdtm_perms.o
 lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM)		+= lkdtm_refcount.o
 lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM)		+= lkdtm_rodata_objcopy.o
 lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM)		+= lkdtm_usercopy.o
+lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM)		+= lkdtm_stackleak.o
+
+KASAN_SANITIZE_lkdtm_stackleak.o := n
 
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT_lkdtm_rodata.o	:= n
 
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h b/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h
index 687a0db..2a0cd0d 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h
@@ -83,4 +83,8 @@ void lkdtm_USERCOPY_STACK_FRAME_FROM(void);
 void lkdtm_USERCOPY_STACK_BEYOND(void);
 void lkdtm_USERCOPY_KERNEL(void);
 
+/* lkdtm_stackleak.c */
+void lkdtm_STACKLEAK_CHECK_ALLOCA(void);
+void lkdtm_STACKLEAK_TRACK_STACK(void);
+
 #endif
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c
index ba92291..3a22ffa 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c
@@ -183,6 +183,8 @@ static const struct crashtype crashtypes[] = {
 	CRASHTYPE(USERCOPY_STACK_FRAME_FROM),
 	CRASHTYPE(USERCOPY_STACK_BEYOND),
 	CRASHTYPE(USERCOPY_KERNEL),
+	CRASHTYPE(STACKLEAK_CHECK_ALLOCA),
+	CRASHTYPE(STACKLEAK_TRACK_STACK),
 };
 
 
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_stackleak.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_stackleak.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1f95ee3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_stackleak.c
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+/*
+ * This file tests a few aspects of the STACKLEAK feature:
+ *   - the current task stack is properly erased (filled with STACKLEAK_POISON);
+ *   - check_alloca() allows alloca calls which don't exhaust the kernel stack;
+ *   - alloca calls which exhaust/overflow the kernel stack hit BUG() in
+ *    check_alloca();
+ *   - exhausting the thread stack with a recursion is detected: it hits the
+ *    BUG() in track_stack() if CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is not enabled, or hits the
+ *    guard page otherwise.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) Docker, Inc. 2017
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ *   Tycho Andersen <tycho@docker.com>
+ *   Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
+ */
+
+#include "lkdtm.h"
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/compiler.h>
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+# define STACKLEAK_POISON -0xBEEF
+# define CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE 100
+#endif
+
+static noinline bool stack_is_erased(void)
+{
+	unsigned long *sp, left, found, i;
+
+	/*
+	 * For the details about the alignment of the poison values, see
+	 * the comment in track_stack().
+	 */
+	sp = PTR_ALIGN(&i, sizeof(unsigned long));
+
+	left = ((unsigned long)sp & (THREAD_SIZE - 1)) / sizeof(unsigned long);
+	sp--;
+
+	/*
+	 * Two unsigned long ints at the bottom of the thread stack are
+	 * reserved and not poisoned.
+	 */
+	if (left <= 2)
+		return false;
+
+	left -= 2;
+	pr_info("checking unused part of the thread stack (%lu bytes)...\n",
+					left * sizeof(unsigned long));
+
+	/* Search for 17 poison values in a row (like erase_kstack() does) */
+	for (i = 0, found = 0; i < left && found < 17; i++) {
+		if (*(sp - i) == STACKLEAK_POISON)
+			found++;
+		else
+			found = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (found < 17) {
+		pr_err("FAIL: thread stack is not erased (checked %lu bytes)\n",
+						i * sizeof(unsigned long));
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	pr_info("first %lu bytes are unpoisoned\n",
+				(i - found) * sizeof(unsigned long));
+
+	/* The rest of thread stack should be erased */
+	for (; i < left; i++) {
+		if (*(sp - i) != STACKLEAK_POISON) {
+			pr_err("FAIL: thread stack is NOT properly erased\n");
+			return false;
+		}
+	}
+
+	pr_info("the rest of the thread stack is properly erased\n");
+	return true;
+}
+
+static noinline void do_alloca(unsigned long size)
+{
+	char buf[size];
+
+	/* So this doesn't get inlined or optimized out */
+	snprintf(buf, size, "hello world\n");
+}
+
+void lkdtm_STACKLEAK_CHECK_ALLOCA(void)
+{
+	unsigned long left = (unsigned long)&left & (THREAD_SIZE - 1);
+
+	if (!stack_is_erased())
+		return;
+
+	/* Try a small alloca to see if it works */
+	pr_info("try a small alloca of 16 bytes...\n");
+	do_alloca(16);
+	pr_info("small alloca is successful\n");
+
+	/* Try to hit the BUG() in check_alloca() */
+	pr_info("try a large alloca of %lu bytes (stack overflow)...\n", left);
+	do_alloca(left);
+	pr_err("FAIL: large alloca overstepped the thread stack boundary\n");
+}
+
+/*
+ * The stack frame size of recursion() is bigger than the
+ * CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE, hence that function is instrumented
+ * by the STACKLEAK gcc plugin and it calls track_stack() at the beginning.
+ */
+static noinline unsigned long recursion(unsigned long prev_sp)
+{
+	char buf[CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE + 42];
+	unsigned long sp = (unsigned long)&sp;
+
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "hello world\n");
+
+	if (prev_sp < sp + THREAD_SIZE)
+		sp = recursion(prev_sp);
+
+	return sp;
+}
+
+void lkdtm_STACKLEAK_TRACK_STACK(void)
+{
+	unsigned long sp = (unsigned long)&sp;
+
+	if (!stack_is_erased())
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Exhaust the thread stack with a recursion. It should hit the
+	 * BUG() in track_stack() if CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is not enabled, or
+	 * access the guard page otherwise.
+	 */
+	pr_info("try to exhaust the thread stack with the recursion...\n");
+	pr_err("FAIL: thread stack exhaustion (%lu bytes) is not detected\n",
+							sp - recursion(sp));
+}
-- 
2.7.4

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-12-05 23:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-12-05 23:33 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v6 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it Alexander Popov
2017-12-05 23:33 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v6 1/6] x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls Alexander Popov
2017-12-08 11:44   ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-08 21:54     ` Alexander Popov
2017-12-11  9:26       ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-05 23:33 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v6 2/6] gcc-plugins: Add STACKLEAK plugin for tracking the kernel stack Alexander Popov
2017-12-06 18:57   ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2017-12-07 23:05     ` Alexander Popov
2017-12-12  0:09   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dmitry V. Levin
2017-12-15 15:28     ` Alexander Popov
2017-12-05 23:33 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v6 3/6] x86/entry: Erase kernel stack in syscall_trace_enter() Alexander Popov
2017-12-06 21:12   ` Dmitry V. Levin
2017-12-11 22:38     ` Alexander Popov
2017-12-05 23:33 ` Alexander Popov [this message]
2017-12-05 23:33 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v6 5/6] fs/proc: Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system Alexander Popov
2017-12-06 19:22   ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2017-12-06 20:40     ` Kees Cook
2017-12-06 23:06       ` Laura Abbott
2017-12-07 22:58         ` Alexander Popov
2017-12-07  7:09     ` Alexander Popov
2017-12-07 20:47       ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-12-05 23:33 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v6 6/6] doc: self-protection: Add information about STACKLEAK feature Alexander Popov

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=1512516827-29797-5-git-send-email-alex.popov@linux.com \
    --to=alex.popov@linux.com \
    --cc=a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl \
    --cc=ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
    --cc=labbott@redhat.com \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \
    --cc=mingo@kernel.org \
    --cc=pageexec@freemail.hu \
    --cc=spender@grsecurity.net \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=tycho@tycho.ws \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox