From: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>,
x86@kernel.org, alex.popov@linux.com
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v6 4/6] lkdtm: Add a test for STACKLEAK
Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2017 02:33:45 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1512516827-29797-5-git-send-email-alex.popov@linux.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1512516827-29797-1-git-send-email-alex.popov@linux.com>
Introduce two lkdtm tests for the STACKLEAK feature: STACKLEAK_CHECK_ALLOCA
and STACKLEAK_TRACK_STACK. Both of them check that the current task stack
is properly erased (filled with STACKLEAK_POISON).
In addition, STACKLEAK_CHECK_ALLOCA tests that:
- check_alloca() allows alloca calls which don't exhaust the kernel stack;
- alloca calls which exhaust/overflow the kernel stack hit BUG() in
check_alloca().
And STACKLEAK_TRACK_STACK checks that exhausting the thread stack with a
recursion is detected:
- it hits the BUG() in track_stack() if CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is not enabled,
- or hits the guard page otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@docker.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
---
drivers/misc/Makefile | 3 +
drivers/misc/lkdtm.h | 4 ++
drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c | 2 +
drivers/misc/lkdtm_stackleak.c | 139 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 148 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 drivers/misc/lkdtm_stackleak.c
diff --git a/drivers/misc/Makefile b/drivers/misc/Makefile
index 5ca5f64..66c3605 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/misc/Makefile
@@ -63,6 +63,9 @@ lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += lkdtm_perms.o
lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += lkdtm_refcount.o
lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += lkdtm_rodata_objcopy.o
lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += lkdtm_usercopy.o
+lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += lkdtm_stackleak.o
+
+KASAN_SANITIZE_lkdtm_stackleak.o := n
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_lkdtm_rodata.o := n
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h b/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h
index 687a0db..2a0cd0d 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h
@@ -83,4 +83,8 @@ void lkdtm_USERCOPY_STACK_FRAME_FROM(void);
void lkdtm_USERCOPY_STACK_BEYOND(void);
void lkdtm_USERCOPY_KERNEL(void);
+/* lkdtm_stackleak.c */
+void lkdtm_STACKLEAK_CHECK_ALLOCA(void);
+void lkdtm_STACKLEAK_TRACK_STACK(void);
+
#endif
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c
index ba92291..3a22ffa 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c
@@ -183,6 +183,8 @@ static const struct crashtype crashtypes[] = {
CRASHTYPE(USERCOPY_STACK_FRAME_FROM),
CRASHTYPE(USERCOPY_STACK_BEYOND),
CRASHTYPE(USERCOPY_KERNEL),
+ CRASHTYPE(STACKLEAK_CHECK_ALLOCA),
+ CRASHTYPE(STACKLEAK_TRACK_STACK),
};
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_stackleak.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_stackleak.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1f95ee3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_stackleak.c
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+/*
+ * This file tests a few aspects of the STACKLEAK feature:
+ * - the current task stack is properly erased (filled with STACKLEAK_POISON);
+ * - check_alloca() allows alloca calls which don't exhaust the kernel stack;
+ * - alloca calls which exhaust/overflow the kernel stack hit BUG() in
+ * check_alloca();
+ * - exhausting the thread stack with a recursion is detected: it hits the
+ * BUG() in track_stack() if CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is not enabled, or hits the
+ * guard page otherwise.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) Docker, Inc. 2017
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Tycho Andersen <tycho@docker.com>
+ * Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
+ */
+
+#include "lkdtm.h"
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/compiler.h>
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+# define STACKLEAK_POISON -0xBEEF
+# define CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE 100
+#endif
+
+static noinline bool stack_is_erased(void)
+{
+ unsigned long *sp, left, found, i;
+
+ /*
+ * For the details about the alignment of the poison values, see
+ * the comment in track_stack().
+ */
+ sp = PTR_ALIGN(&i, sizeof(unsigned long));
+
+ left = ((unsigned long)sp & (THREAD_SIZE - 1)) / sizeof(unsigned long);
+ sp--;
+
+ /*
+ * Two unsigned long ints at the bottom of the thread stack are
+ * reserved and not poisoned.
+ */
+ if (left <= 2)
+ return false;
+
+ left -= 2;
+ pr_info("checking unused part of the thread stack (%lu bytes)...\n",
+ left * sizeof(unsigned long));
+
+ /* Search for 17 poison values in a row (like erase_kstack() does) */
+ for (i = 0, found = 0; i < left && found < 17; i++) {
+ if (*(sp - i) == STACKLEAK_POISON)
+ found++;
+ else
+ found = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (found < 17) {
+ pr_err("FAIL: thread stack is not erased (checked %lu bytes)\n",
+ i * sizeof(unsigned long));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ pr_info("first %lu bytes are unpoisoned\n",
+ (i - found) * sizeof(unsigned long));
+
+ /* The rest of thread stack should be erased */
+ for (; i < left; i++) {
+ if (*(sp - i) != STACKLEAK_POISON) {
+ pr_err("FAIL: thread stack is NOT properly erased\n");
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ pr_info("the rest of the thread stack is properly erased\n");
+ return true;
+}
+
+static noinline void do_alloca(unsigned long size)
+{
+ char buf[size];
+
+ /* So this doesn't get inlined or optimized out */
+ snprintf(buf, size, "hello world\n");
+}
+
+void lkdtm_STACKLEAK_CHECK_ALLOCA(void)
+{
+ unsigned long left = (unsigned long)&left & (THREAD_SIZE - 1);
+
+ if (!stack_is_erased())
+ return;
+
+ /* Try a small alloca to see if it works */
+ pr_info("try a small alloca of 16 bytes...\n");
+ do_alloca(16);
+ pr_info("small alloca is successful\n");
+
+ /* Try to hit the BUG() in check_alloca() */
+ pr_info("try a large alloca of %lu bytes (stack overflow)...\n", left);
+ do_alloca(left);
+ pr_err("FAIL: large alloca overstepped the thread stack boundary\n");
+}
+
+/*
+ * The stack frame size of recursion() is bigger than the
+ * CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE, hence that function is instrumented
+ * by the STACKLEAK gcc plugin and it calls track_stack() at the beginning.
+ */
+static noinline unsigned long recursion(unsigned long prev_sp)
+{
+ char buf[CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE + 42];
+ unsigned long sp = (unsigned long)&sp;
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "hello world\n");
+
+ if (prev_sp < sp + THREAD_SIZE)
+ sp = recursion(prev_sp);
+
+ return sp;
+}
+
+void lkdtm_STACKLEAK_TRACK_STACK(void)
+{
+ unsigned long sp = (unsigned long)&sp;
+
+ if (!stack_is_erased())
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Exhaust the thread stack with a recursion. It should hit the
+ * BUG() in track_stack() if CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is not enabled, or
+ * access the guard page otherwise.
+ */
+ pr_info("try to exhaust the thread stack with the recursion...\n");
+ pr_err("FAIL: thread stack exhaustion (%lu bytes) is not detected\n",
+ sp - recursion(sp));
+}
--
2.7.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-12-05 23:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-12-05 23:33 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v6 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it Alexander Popov
2017-12-05 23:33 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v6 1/6] x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls Alexander Popov
2017-12-08 11:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-08 21:54 ` Alexander Popov
2017-12-11 9:26 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-05 23:33 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v6 2/6] gcc-plugins: Add STACKLEAK plugin for tracking the kernel stack Alexander Popov
2017-12-06 18:57 ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2017-12-07 23:05 ` Alexander Popov
2017-12-12 0:09 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dmitry V. Levin
2017-12-15 15:28 ` Alexander Popov
2017-12-05 23:33 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v6 3/6] x86/entry: Erase kernel stack in syscall_trace_enter() Alexander Popov
2017-12-06 21:12 ` Dmitry V. Levin
2017-12-11 22:38 ` Alexander Popov
2017-12-05 23:33 ` Alexander Popov [this message]
2017-12-05 23:33 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v6 5/6] fs/proc: Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system Alexander Popov
2017-12-06 19:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2017-12-06 20:40 ` Kees Cook
2017-12-06 23:06 ` Laura Abbott
2017-12-07 22:58 ` Alexander Popov
2017-12-07 7:09 ` Alexander Popov
2017-12-07 20:47 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-12-05 23:33 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v6 6/6] doc: self-protection: Add information about STACKLEAK feature Alexander Popov
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