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From: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@tobin.cc>
To: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
	Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>,
	x86@kernel.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH RFC v6 5/6] fs/proc: Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system
Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2017 07:47:46 +1100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171207204746.GI2191@eros> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5fb044ec-cf1e-6281-01a9-c845b738914e@linux.com>

On Thu, Dec 07, 2017 at 10:09:27AM +0300, Alexander Popov wrote:
> Hello Laura and Kees,
> 
> [adding Tobin C. Harding]
> 
> On 06.12.2017 22:22, Laura Abbott wrote:
> > On 12/05/2017 03:33 PM, Alexander Popov wrote:
> >> Introduce CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS providing STACKLEAK information about
> >> tasks via the /proc file system. In particular, /proc/<pid>/lowest_stack
> >> shows the current lowest_stack value and its final value from the previous
> >> syscall. That information can be useful for estimating the STACKLEAK
> >> performance impact for different workloads.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
> >> ---
> >>   arch/Kconfig                     | 11 +++++++++++
> >>   arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S        |  4 ++++
> >>   arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S        |  4 ++++
> >>   arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h |  3 +++
> >>   arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c    |  3 +++
> >>   arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c     |  3 +++
> >>   arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c     |  3 +++
> >>   fs/proc/base.c                   | 14 ++++++++++++++
> >>   8 files changed, 45 insertions(+)
> 
> [...]
> 
> >> +#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS
> >> +static int proc_lowest_stack(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
> >> +				struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task)
> >> +{
> >> +	seq_printf(m, "prev_lowest_stack: %pK\nlowest_stack: %pK\n",
> >> +		   (void *)task->thread.prev_lowest_stack,
> >> +		   (void *)task->thread.lowest_stack);
> >> +	return 0;
> >> +}
> >> +#endif /* CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS */
> >> +
> > 
> > This just prints the hashed value with the new pointer leak work.
> > I don't think we want to print the fully exposed value via %px so
> > it's not clear how valuable this proc file is now.
> 
> Yes, I tested that before sending the patch. I was confused when I saw the
> hashed values. But setting kptr_restrict to 1 fixed that for me:
> 
> root@hobbit:~# cat /proc/2627/lowest_stack
> prev_lowest_stack: 00000000ed8ca991
> lowest_stack: 0000000040579d76
> root@hobbit:~# echo 1 > /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict
> root@hobbit:~# cat /proc/2627/lowest_stack
> prev_lowest_stack: ffffc9000094fdb8
> lowest_stack: ffffc9000094f9e0
> 
> However, Documentation/printk-formats.txt and Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> don't specify that behaviour.

thanks for pointing this out. Yes, %pK hashes the address now when
kptr_restrict==0

And yes, I forgot to update the docs :( will amend.

thanks,
Tobin.

  reply	other threads:[~2017-12-07 20:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-12-05 23:33 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v6 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it Alexander Popov
2017-12-05 23:33 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v6 1/6] x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls Alexander Popov
2017-12-08 11:44   ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-08 21:54     ` Alexander Popov
2017-12-11  9:26       ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-05 23:33 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v6 2/6] gcc-plugins: Add STACKLEAK plugin for tracking the kernel stack Alexander Popov
2017-12-06 18:57   ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2017-12-07 23:05     ` Alexander Popov
2017-12-12  0:09   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dmitry V. Levin
2017-12-15 15:28     ` Alexander Popov
2017-12-05 23:33 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v6 3/6] x86/entry: Erase kernel stack in syscall_trace_enter() Alexander Popov
2017-12-06 21:12   ` Dmitry V. Levin
2017-12-11 22:38     ` Alexander Popov
2017-12-05 23:33 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v6 4/6] lkdtm: Add a test for STACKLEAK Alexander Popov
2017-12-05 23:33 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v6 5/6] fs/proc: Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system Alexander Popov
2017-12-06 19:22   ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2017-12-06 20:40     ` Kees Cook
2017-12-06 23:06       ` Laura Abbott
2017-12-07 22:58         ` Alexander Popov
2017-12-07  7:09     ` Alexander Popov
2017-12-07 20:47       ` Tobin C. Harding [this message]
2017-12-05 23:33 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v6 6/6] doc: self-protection: Add information about STACKLEAK feature Alexander Popov

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